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Abstract
It has often been claimed that, during the 1980s and early 1990s, the new right think tanks
— namely the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), and
Adam Smith Institute (ASI) — had a major impact on policy-making and policy change.
This thesis addresses such claims by examining three reforms in which the new right
think tanks have been attributed an influence — bus deregulation, education reform, and
prison privatisation. It seeks not only to empirically assess their impact, but also to relate
these findings to the policy-making literature, in particular the Rhodes Model which
emphasises policy continuity and the Advocacy Coalition Framework which seeks to
explain policy change.
It is argued that the new right think tanks had an impact on all three policy changes, as
members of "advocacy coalitions", although the nature and extent of this impact varied.
In some cases, the TEA, CPS, and ASI were able to have a direct impact on policy change,
obtaining access to policy-makers through coalition allies. In other cases their impact was
indirect, in shaping the broader "climate of ideas". The new right think tanks also
contributed to new patterns of policy formulation, although there is limited evidence of
any long-term structural impact on policy-making in these areas. It is also argued that the
case studies raise a number of issues for the Rhodes Model and the Advocacy Coalition
Framework, although these could be addressed by integrating the two to develop an
approach to account for both policy continuity and policy change.
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The Parameters of Analysis
Over the last twenty years think tanks have become an integral part of the British political
landscape. During the 1980s, media and academic attention focused largely on the three
"new right" think tanks: the Institute of Economic Affairs (TEA); Centre for Policy Studies
(CPS); and the Adam Smith Institute (ASI). 1 The number of think tanks has grown steadily
in recent years. Since 1988 the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) and Demos
have been established on the left/centre-left, while the European Policy Forum (EPF) and
the (re-launched) Social Market Foundation (SMF) have been established on the
right/centre-right. In 1995 another new right think tank was formed, Politeia, "dedicated to
carving out a revolutionary new social policy agenda for the rest of the century" (The
Times 19.10.95).
Of course, think tanks are not recent innovations. The Fabian Society dates back to 1884,
Political and Economic Planning to 1931, 2 and the IEA to 1957. Nor should think tanks be
seen as purely partisan or ideological organisations. The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS),
for example, specialises in the study of budgetary and taxation issues. However, it is the
work of the TEA, CPS, and ASI which deserves the closest scrutiny for it is widely
perceived that these three institutions played a significant role in defining and developing
"Thatcherism". The Times claimed that Mrs Thatcher had "three favourite boutiques", the
TEA, CPS, and ASI, from which she could "buy policies ready made off the shelf'
(17.02.89). According to The Sunday Times "think tank commanders were the SAS of
Toryism, working silently behind enemy lines, destroying outmoded policies, capturing the
hearts and minds of ministers in pursuit of national revival" (21.04.94). Some suggested
that policy-making had become privatised (The Spectator 23.04.88; The Times 17.02.91).
Moreover, the perceived success of the TEA, CPS, and ASI perhaps helps explain the
growth of think tanks since the late 1980s. Cockett argued that "the new generation of
I
think-tanks on the left has consciously taken its cue from the success of the free-market
think tanks that launched the Thatcherite revolution: the Institute of Economic Affairs, the
Centre for Policy Studies, the Adam Smith Institute et al" (The Times 08.08.94). In its
promotional literature the IPPR claims that, when it was founded in 1988, "its purpose was
to provide an alternative to the then-influential free-market think tanks".
The above observations raise two important issues which need to be disentangled. The first
is that the new right think tanks were influential in bringing about policy change. The
second is that they contributed to changes in the way in which policy is actually made. This
research addresses both these claims. It shows how the IEA, CPS, and ASI attempted to
influence policy, examines their relationship with other actors in the policy process, and
assesses their impact on policy change and policy-making in three policy areas. The
obvious limitations attached to any research such as this are acknowledged, namely the
difficulties of quantifying "impact", and "proving" causal links between the work of
specific policy actors and policy outcomes. However it is still possible to make a
qualitative judgement of the impact of the new right think tanks. This research adopts a
research framework, the "template", which attempts to incorporate the key factors which
influenced policy change. This allows the contribution of the new right think tanks to be
placed in its proper context. The template is then applied to three case studies: bus
deregulation and the Transport Act 1985; secondary education reform and the Education
Reform Act 1988; and finally prison privatisation, contained in the Criminal Justice Act
1991.
This introductory chapter has four sections. The first reviews the UK literature on think
tanks, and identifies a major gap in the literature. The second explains how this research
intends to fill that gap, and outlines its aims and the approach used. The third section
outlines the research strategy and methodology adopted. The final section provides a brief
outline of subsequent chapters.
?
THE THINK TANK LITERATURE IN THE UK
The study of think tanks in the UK has generated a growing body of literature in recent
years. Previously, the academic literature on the subject was said to be "underdeveloped"
(James, 1993: p.492) and "meagre" (Denham and Garnett, 1995: p.324). Prior to 1996,
there had been little produced on think tanks, other than Richard Cockett's Thinking the
Unthinkable (1994). 3 However, four further books were published in 1996: Think Tanks of
the New Right by Andrew Denham; 4 Capturing the Political Imagination by Diane Stone;
and a two-volume work entitled Ideas and Think Tanks in Contemporary Britain edited by
Michael David Kandiah and Anthony Seldon.5 This section first highlights the early
contributions of the study of think tanks from a number of articles prior to 1994. Second it
assesses the major strengths and weaknesses of the four substantive book-length studies
indicated above.
The academic study of think tanks in the UK began to develop momentum only in the late
1980s/early 1990s, with the appearance of a small number of articles. Some of these were
comparative. Gaffney (1991) compared the IEA, CPS, and ASI with ministerial cabinets in
France, while Stone (1991) examined how the respective constitutional, institutional,
cultural and legal environments helped explain differences in the number and type of think
tanks between the US, UK and Australia. 6 Other articles addressed specific think tanks,
such as the IFS (Kay, 1989), the PSI (Daniel, 1989), and the IPPR (Cornford, 1990). Of
these three, only Cornford makes any broader observations about think tanks in the UK. He
questions some of the exaggerated claims made about think tank influence, calling them
"the performing fleas of the body politic, constantly seeking that critical moment when a
small sting may goad the beast in the right direction" (1990: p.22). Similarly, according to
James:
The impact of think tanks on Britain's policy-making system has been marginal
rather than structural. Just as it is no longer possible to dismiss think tanks as
irrelevant cranks, so it is unrealistic to claim (as some free market zealots have
done) that policy making has been snatched from the hands of Whitehall. Yet while
one can point to successful and unsuccessful bodies, it is difficult to draw any
general conclusions about think tanks as a class (1993: p.504).
3
Drawing on examples from a range of think tanks, James's article broke new ground in
attempting to evaluate their impact on British goverment. Yet, despite his own warning,
James was himself guilty of drawing general conclusions. It is doubtful, for example,
whether the impact of all think tanks was equally "marginal". James himself conceded that
there has been "successful" and "unsuccessful" bodies. Moreover, James did not
adequately distinguish between the various types of think tanks and the different functions
they perform, and was thus unable to suggest the extent to which certain types of think
tanks were more or less "marginal" than others. The influence of think tanks was also
likely to have differed between policy areas, yet the various factors determining their
influence were not addressed. This research will attempt to distinguish between the
different types of think tank, and will suggest how the contribution of the TEA, CPS, and
ASI to the policy process was distinctive from that of other think tanks. It will also
identify the variables which influenced the impact of new right think tanks across three
case studies. Although any generalisation based on three case studies must be qualified,
the research nevertheless provide a starting point in the attempt to establish which factors
determined think tank impact on any particular policy change.
To date there has been little debate regarding the impact of think tanks on British
government. Only Denham and Garnett (1994, 1995) have responded to James's article,
although they focus their attention largely on the issue of definition (see chapter 2).
Surprisingly, given the attention and influence attributed to the new right think tanks by
sections of the media, there have been few articles looking specifically at the IEA, CPS,
and ASI collectively. One exception to this is Desai (1994), who sought to identify lessons
for the left from the role of the new right think tanks in Thatcherism's "struggle for
hegemony", although Desai's analysis largely accepted assumptions of influence
uncritically. It was only with the publication of Thinking the Unthinkable in 1994 that a
detailed analysis of the significance of the new right think tanks was attempted.
Thinking the Unthinkable, Richard Cockett (1994)
Cockett's Thinking the Unthinkable is "a study of the revival of the doctrine of 'economic
liberalism' in British political life, from 1931 to 1983" (1994: p.2), and the incorporation of
these ideas into the reform programme of the Conservative Party under Mrs Thatcher.
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Cockett endorses Maurice Cowling's opinion that the pioneers of this economic liberal
counter-revolution numbered around fifty people. Thinking the Unthinkable "is the story of
those fifty people" (ibid). Cockett's study emphasises the role of the new right think tanks
in bringing about this new orthodoxy of economic liberalism. Cockett argues that the new
right think tanks "did much to articulate and publicize the application of 'economic
liberalism' to economic affairs" and "did as much intellectually to convert a generation of
'opinion-formers' and politicians to a set of ideas as the Fabians had done with a former
generation at the turn of the century" (ibid).
The strength of Thinking the Unthinkable lies in the detail in which the evolution and
development of the counter-revolution movement, and its relationship with the
Conservative Party, is explained. Drawing upon a wealth of archival and interview
material, Cockett is able to chart the growing importance of the IEA, and later the CPS, to
senior Conservatives such as Enoch Powell, John Biffen, Keith Joseph, Geoffrey Howe
and Margaret Thatcher. It is also a fertile source of information regarding the foundation,
evolution, strategy and output of the new right think tanks. However there are two main
weaknesses. First, Cockett fails to produce a conceptual framework, or "lens" through
which the reader can interpret the evidence provided. The reader is presented with plenty of
information but little instruction as to its importance or use. It is unclear, for example, how
this information relates to the relationship between think tanks and the broader political
environment, or the relationship between think tanks and other political actors (are think
tanks to be treated as individual organisations, or part of "coalitions", or "networks"?).
The first two-thirds of Thinking the Unthinkable concentrate on the years before Mrs
Thatcher became leader of the Conservative Party. Cockett's analysis of this period
produces an informative and readable historical account of the arguments against the then
"Keynesian consensus". However, after Mrs Thatcher became leader of the Conservative
Party in 1975, the number of think tanks, study groups and individuals involved increases
significantly. The policy agenda broadened from one largely concerned with economics to
one placing a greater emphasis on social policy. Lacking a conceptual framework, Cockett
is unable to present these developments effectively - the purpose of this information, or
how it supports his central thesis, is often unclear. As such, the final third of the book at
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times reads as a sequence of mini-biographies of individuals and organisations, with only
superficial treatment of their impact upon specific policies.
A second criticism is that Thinking the Unthinkable lacks a contextual framework. In
maintaining that the new right think tanks played an important role in bringing about the
"new political economy", and by describing that role, Cockett fails to take into account
other contributory factors. As one reviewer observes, Thinking the Unthinkable has
nothing on the oil shocks of the 1970s which did so much to undermine Keynesianism, or
the Labour divisions on Europe which contributed to Conservative victories in 1983 and
1987 "without which economic liberalism would not have triumphed in the same way"
(Douglas, 1994: p.245). Any research which seeks to evaluate the role of think tanks (or
indeed any groups or individuals) in the process of policy change must also take into
account the broader political, economic, and social context within which change occurs.
This will help determine whether think tanks were the prime movers in policy change,
opportunistic policy entrepreneurs, or merely epiphenomenal.
Think Tanks of the New Right, Andrew Denham (1996)
Denham's Think Tanks of the New Right adopts a different approach to evaluating think
tanks. Its stated aim is simply to examine "the ideas and policies of the New Right in
contemporary Britain" (1996: p.iv). Denham outlined a more substantive aim in his thesis,
claiming he wanted "to produce the first detailed study so far of the institutional
significance or otherwise of New Right think-tanks in the period after 1975 in
philosophical and policy terms" (1992: p.i). Denham assesses the impact of four new right
think tanks, the TEA, the CPS, the ASI, and the SAU, exploring the philosophical and
policy differences between them. Think Tanks of the New Right has a much sharper focus
than Cockett's study. First, the philosophy and approach of each individual think tank is
carefully examined. Second, these are applied to specific policy reforms, namely the
Education Reform Act of 1988, and the Prime Minister's Review of the Health Service
leading to the National Health Service reforms of the late 1980s. Finally, he considers the
prospects of the new right think tanks in the post-Thatcher era.
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The strength of Think Tanks of the New Right is the extent to which Denham distinguishes
the philosophical differences between the four new right think tanks. There has been a
tendency (especially in the press) to group together the IEA, CPS, ASI, and to a lesser
extent the SAU, with little appreciation of their individual characteristics. Denham shows
that, philosophically at least, each is distinctive and reviews the different schools of
thought which drive their work: the Austrian, Chicago and Virginia schools of economics
for the IEA; the social market for the CPS; micropolitics for the ASI; and the "ignorance of
social intervention" for the SAU. However, Denham's assessment of the impact of the new
right think tanks on the health and education reforms has major weaknesses.
Denham's arguments can be criticised on the grounds of what he believes to be evidence of
cause and effect. For Denham's analysis is almost entirely dependent on think tank
publications. The case study on education reform, for example, dedicates over half the
chapter to a review of think tank publications on the subject. There is very little on how the
IEA, CPS, ASI, and SAU attempted to translate their ideas into Government policy, or of
the overlap and interaction between them and other political actors. 7 In education, an
argument that the think tanks were "useful but exaggerated" (1996: pp.109-110), is based
upon the testimony of a single special adviser, Stuart Sexton (although this view is neither
questioned nor endorsed by Denham). In the case study on health, Denham argues that the
CPS was "more influential" in bringing about the NHS review than the other new right
think tanks. However, not only do his arguments depend heavily upon a single, secondary
source, 8 but the evidence presented is largely circumstantial. He argues, for example, that
the CPS was "instrumental" in bringing about the Prime Minister's review, on the basis that
it published a pamphlet shortly before the review was announced. Yet no evidence is
produced to support this interpretation (ibid). Noticeable in Denham's analysis is the lack
of broad-based primary evidence. For example, there is no interview material in either case
study from civil servants who might have been well-placed to see what impact (if any) the
new right think tanks had directly on policy formulation. The absence of such perspectives
undermines Denham's arguments.
The case studies also overlook the possible consequences that any "impact" of the new
right think tanks might have on conventional models or patterns of policy-making. As will
be shown in chapter 3, an important aspect of the work of the new right think tanks is the
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extent to which they might have been used by the Conservative Government to bypass
groups and service providers who would normally expect to be consulted in the process of
policy change. However, models of policy-making are not addressed by Denham.
Moreover, Denham's final chapter avoids drawing any general conclusions or hypotheses
regarding the impact of the new right think tanks, focusing instead on the philosophical
differences and challenges which they face in the 1990s. Thus, although a informative
work on the philosophical similarities and differences between the new right think tanks,
Think Tanks of the New Right does not really consider their "institutional significance"
and as such makes only a limited contribution to understanding their role in policy-making.
Capturing the Political Imagination, Diane Stone (1996)
Diane Stone's Capturing the Political Imagination does seek to link the subject of think
tanks with models of policy-making, agenda-setting, and policy change. It is a comparative
study of think tanks from the US and the UK, described as "a step towards establishing
why think tanks have proliferated primarily in the US" (1996: pp.3-4). However, Stone
covers much more ground than this, looking at such as areas as definition and
classification, the organisational dynamics of think tanks, models of policy-making, and
think tank influence. The broad scope of this study means that the book does not so much
construct and defend a specific argument, but compares think tanks across a number of
dimensions, such as think tanks as part of "knowledge communities", "policy
entrepreneurs" or "second-hand dealers in ideas". A running theme throughout the book is
the notion of think tanks as disseminators of knowledge and ideas. Recognising the
methodological difficulties of quantifying the influence of think tanks, Stone attempts to
incorporate the work of think tanks within policy-making concepts, and in particular
epistemic communities (addressed in chapter 3). Given the breadth of Stone's study it
would be difficult to review all her arguments in the space available here. But she raises a
number of important points, many of which this research endorses, regarding methodology
and policy-making which will be addressed in the relevant sections below.
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Contemporary British History: Ideas and Think Tanks in Contemporary Britain 
Vols. 1 & 2 
This two-volume study seeks to assess the influence of ideas and think tanks through a
collection of articles, transcripted interviews, and "witness seminars". All of the interviews
address the influence of ideas on a particular policy area (such as defence policy, or
economic policy) or the influence of a particular discipline (such as philosophy or
sociology) in post-war Britain. The interviewees are leading academics or commentators in
their field. The two witness seminars address the No. 10 Policy Unit, and "The Market
Place of Ideas". Only the articles specifically address the work of think tanks.
The collection provides a comprehensive survey of contemporary think tanks, including
articles on the IEA, CPS, ASI, SMF, Demos, the Fabians, and the IPPR. In some cases the
articles make an original contribution such as those on Demos (Bale, 1996) and the SMF
(Baston, 1996), neither previously addressed in the academic literature. These articles are
largely biographical and historical rather than analytical, but provide valuable background
information on two relatively young think tanks. Muller's (1996) study of the IEA,
however, largely re-visits ground covered by Cockett. An opportunity to go beyond 1983
(where Cockett's analysis ends) is somewhat wasted, as the main focus remains on the
IEA's earlier phases. Harris's (1996) study of the CPS is less repetitive in this respect and
provides more analysis of its role in policy-making, such as the "paradoxes" faced in
sustaining its influence (see Chapter 2). Heffernan's (1996) study of the ASI brings
together a variety of primary and secondary material into a convenient article format, and
takes the history of the ASI beyond 1983 to 1996. The articles on the centre-left think tanks
are timely, given Labour's victory in the 1997 election. Largely overshadowed by the new
right think tanks in recent years, their role in the contemporary left and "New" Labour had
been neglected. These articles (which focus on Labour's years in opposition) will form a
useful base for any future analysis of the impact of the centre-left think tanks on the Blair
Government. All these case studies have their limitations. In particular there is little
engagement with the policy-making literature, although as these articles are a contribution
to the study of British contemporary history rather than political science it would perhaps
be inappropriate to identify this as a serious criticism.
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Other articles address the impact of think tanks in the UK generally. Like Cornford and
James, Denham and Garnett (1996) play down the impact of the new right think tanks since
1979. They argue that studies showing that 75% of economists, many Conservative
politicians, and the wider public do not agree with the free market message "shows that the
victory of economic liberalism has been incomplete" (1996: p.51). 9 Denham and Garnett
conclude their article by maintaining that "it is more valuable to investigate the impact of
'think tanks' on the 'climate of opinion', which in turn affects government, rather than
trying to trace decisive influence over specific policies" (1996: p.5'7). But, they do not
explain why this is so, or how the impact on the "climate of opinion" can be measured. It is
also a strange assertion to make given that think tank publications, conferences and
coalition-building focus on specific policy areas. As such, specific policy areas may well
be a more logical starting point for assessing think tank influence, although the "climate of
opinion" would form part of the context of policy change.
Whatever the strengths and limitations of individual articles, the weakness of the study as a
whole is that it lacks a substantive purpose. Its aim, stated very simply, is to consider "the
influences on politics and policy-making", and "the place and significance of ideas in the
shaping of British policy-making" (Kandiah and Seldon, 1996: p.1). How this is to be
achieved is unclear. There are no common themes running through the individual case
study articles which could be used as a basis for comparison. There is no conclusion to
bring the individual contributions together, and no hypotheses concerning the role or
impact of ideas and think tanks generally. There are brief "Afterthoughts" provided by
Richard Cockett, but this does not compensate for the lack of a general conclusion.
Building on the Literature
The study of think tanks has, in recent years, produced a body of literature which now
gives us a greater understanding of the histories, philosophies and organisational structures
of think tanks in general, and of the new right think tanks in particular. Attempts have also
been made to assess the impact of the new right think tanks on specific policy change, and
to incorporate think tanks within particular concepts in the policy-making literature.
However, claims that the impact of the new right think tanks has been only marginal
(Comford, 1989; James, 1993; Denham and Garnett, 1996), or substantial (as many of the
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media quotes in this research suggest) are largely over-generalisations based upon selective
evidence. Consequently a significant gap in the literature exists - there is very little case
study material (with the exception of Denham, 1996 and Stone, 1996) 10 on which to make
informed judgements about the impact of the new right think tanks. This research attempts
to help fill that gap.
RESEARCH AIMS AND APPROACH
The primary aim of this research is to assess the impact (if any) of the new right think
tanks on specific policy changes in the UK, and the extent to which the IEA, CPS, and ASI
either brought about, or benefited from, a change in the style or pattern of policy-making
in these areas. The secondary aim is to consider the theoretical implications of these
findings for the leading models of policy-making and policy change: the Rhodes Model and
the Advocacy Coalition Framework
The new right think tanks are thus the independent variable — this research assesses their
impact on policy change (the dependent variable). The focus on particular policy areas is
justified because the new right think tanks largely targeted specific policy issues in their
publications/seminars/conferences. The style of policy-making relates to the extent to
which policy-making can be characterised, for example, by consultation or imposition
(Jordan and Richardson, 1982). The pattern of policy-making refers to the line-up of
groups who, in consultation with government, help shape policy outcomes - one policy
area might be very open and another relatively closed, while some might be dominated by
professional values and others by economic interests (the categorisation of such
relationships is a key feature of policy network analysis, and in particular the Rhodes
Model). The style and pattern of policy-making are addressed because of claims that they
have changed significantly since 1979 and that the IEA, CPS, and ASI might have played a
part in this shift.
Although the IEA, CPS, and ASI have been identified as the "agenda-setters" of the new
right, it would be simplistic to say that they operated exclusively at the earliest stages of
the policy process. This ignores the links that the new right think tanks had with other key
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policy actors both inside and outside government, as part of a "new right network" which
allowed them to influence policy in later stages of the policy process. As such the new
right think tanks should be assessed through meso-level approaches, which attempt to link
the processes of agenda-setting, policy formulation, and implementation. Two of the most
influential meso-level approaches have been the Rhodes Model and the Advocacy
Coalition Framework (ACF). Both focus on specific policy areas for their case studies and
both put forward major propositions about how groups contribute to the policy-making
process.
The dominant meso-level approach to understanding policy-making in recent years in the
UK has been policy network analysis, described by Smith as "a means of categorising the
relationships that exist between groups and government" (1993: p.56), and in particular the
Rhodes Model. The Rhodes Model is perhaps the most widely used network approach in
the UK and forms the basis of network discussion in this research. The Rhodes Model
classifies group-state relations into five types of network, ranging from stable, restricted
and highly integrated policy communities to unstable, unrestricted issue networks with
limited degrees of interdependence. However, despite its clear contribution to our
understanding of policy-making in the UK, it will be argued that the Rhodes Model is
limited in explaining policy change and it is unclear how, or if, it could incorporate the
work of the new right think tanks.
Alternatively the ACF addresses policy change, the role of groups in policy change, and
the context in which change occurs. The ACF suggests that groups organise themselves
into competing "advocacy coalitions", underpinned and held together by belief systems.
The ACF is a causal model of policy change, arguing that change occurs when external
events interact with stable parameters, which provide the opportunities for coalition
members to influence policy. However, it will be argued that applying the various
hypotheses of the ACF to the case studies in Part Two will not provide the necessary focus
to address the primary research question highlighted above. This research therefore
develops an alternative framework, or "template", which recognises the contributions of
both the Rhodes Model and the ACF to our understanding of policy-making and policy
change but which allows for the work of the new right think tanks to be given greater
attention. The template is not an explanatory model but a mapping framework which
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incorporates a range of important variables which either accelerate, promote, hinder or
delay the process of change. By looking at the relationship between variables, it is possible
to assess the contribution of each and focus on one in particular, in this case the new right
think tanks. That is not to say that the template makes no contribution to the theoretical
literature — the conclusions of the case studies have important implications for the Rhodes
Model and the ACF, and it will be suggested why and how these approaches might be
integrated.
The template is applied to the three case studies: bus deregulation; secondary education
reform; and prison privatisation. It will be argued that, although impossible to quantify, it
is possible to argue that the new right think tanks did have a noticeable impact on policy
change although the extent of this impact varied between the case studies. Each case study
suggests that policy change occurred in a context that was conducive to change, and that
there were other influential policy actors (such as ministers and advisers) also advocating
change. However, it would be simplistic to infer from this that the work of the new right
think tanks was coincidental to the process of change. Not only can the new right think
tanks be identified as part of advocacy coalitions (interacting with many of those actors),
but they also contributed to the "climate of ideas" which helped determine the direction and
content of policy change.
It will be argued that, on the basis of the three case studies considered, the IEA, CPS, and
ASI helped promote and shape policy options in response to pressures and/or crises in
individual policy areas, and were able to influence outcomes directly through other
coalition members and ministers. It is not suggested that the new right think tanks
transformed policy-making in the UK, but in some cases (education policy and bus
deregulation) they were able to benefit from and exploit new points of access to policy-
makers brought about by ministerial will. In other cases policy-making has always been
relatively open (such as in penal policy) allowing groups (including think tanks) to
participate. Overall, the direct impact of the new right think tanks on policy change and
policy-making can be said to have been marginal in the case of bus deregulation and prison
privatisation (although in different ways), and more significant in the case of education
reform.
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RESEARCH STRATEGY AND METHODOLOGY
Researching the impact of think tanks on policy change presents tough methodological
problems for political scientists, which perhaps accounts for the lack of research on the
subject. Part of the difficulty is that think tanks are just one of a number of factors which
help explain why change occurs. According to Stone:
It is impossible to establish a causal link between the activities of think tanks and
policy outcomes. A particular policy and its implementation can rarely be attributed
to the influence of one organisation (Stone, 1996: p.4).
Some of these methodological problems in evaluating think tanks are common to social
science research as a whole in that it is rarely possible to use the experimental method
(Mackie and Marsh, 1995). As such it is difficult to hypothesise with any degree of
accuracy whether policy outcomes would have been different without the involvement of
the new right think tanks. Even if it is argued that the new right think tanks were not
directly influential in bringing about a policy change, it would be harder to prove that they
had no indirect influence in shaping the "climate of ideas". Stone suggests that "One way
to mitigate the problem of quantifying influence is by looking not at the degree of
influence but the role think-tanks see themselves playing, the contributions they make to
the policy process and how, or if, these contributions are used" (1996: p.4).
This thesis adopts the case study method as the central research strategy. It is a multiple,
or comparative, rather than a single case study research strategy, examining three case
studies. This approach allows for broader generalising than is possible with a single case
study strategy, where there is always the possibility that the results highlight the exception
rather than the rule. Yin notes that the advantage of the multiple case study strategy is that
the evidence "is often considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore
regarded as being more robust" (1984: p.45). The major disadvantage of such a strategy is
that there are fewer resources (time, money, word limits) available for each case study. In
a multiple case study strategy, there must therefore be a balance between the specificity
and detail necessary for each case study, and the resources available. The thesis requires
there to be enough case studies for generalisations, but not so many as to oversimplify their
results.
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This section has three parts. The first addresses the issue of case studies, and outlines the
three criteria which helped determine which ones were chosen. The second explains which
sources are used, and the strengths and weaknesses of each. Finally it shows how the
sources were used in the case studies, highlights the problems encountered, and how they
were overcome.
Case Studies
This thesis applies the template to three case studies: the deregulation of the bus industry;
the reform of secondary education; and prison privatisation. Although no three case studies
can be totally representative, efforts have been made to choose a selection of policy issues
which help answer the key research questions. There were three criteria which helped
determine the choice of case studies. First, that the new right think tanks were active in
that policy area. Second, that there was change in that policy area. Third, that the case
studies should not be exclusively focused upon a specific period of the Thatcher/Major
governments (for example, 1987-88 when Mrs Thatcher was perceived to be relatively
strong within her party) or upon a narrow area of policy, such as welfare or the economy.
In short, the case studies should have variety across time and policy space. These three
criteria will now be discussed in turn.
The Requirement of Think Tank Activity: The first requirement in selecting case studies
was that the TEA, CPS, or ASI had actually advocated the policy change in question. This
thesis does not purport to offer a general theory of policy change, address the "three faces"
of power (Lukes, 1974) in British policy-making, or claim to undermine or endorse
specific theories of the state - all of which might require case studies without new right
think tank involvement. That is not to say that such exercises would not be worthwhile, but
would detract from the principle objective of this research which is the role and impact of
the new right think tanks on specific policy changes. Such an exercise would be less
productive if case studies are chosen in which the new right think tanks were not active.
The Requirement of Policy Change: One legitimate criticism is that this research should
contain at least one case study where there has been no clear example of policy change
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despite policy promotion and pressure from the new right think tanks. There were two
reasons why such a case study was not chosen. First it is difficult to identify a policy area
in which the new right think tanks were active which did not experience policy change
(although not necessarily radical policy change) of some kind between 1979-97. As the
case study on education reform will show, even where the new right think tanks failed to
have a specific measure adopted - the voucher - fundamental reform in the shape of the
Education Reform Act was only a few years away and was then largely built upon the
foundations laid by the New Right Coalition over a twenty year period. Second, there
already exists mainstream approaches to policy-making which account for policy
continuity or, perhaps more accurately, the failure to introduce radical policy change. One
such approach is the Rhodes Model which has suggested that policy networks are able to
utilise their resources and bargaining strategies to frustrate the introduction of policy
change. With the Rhodes Model we therefore already have an approach which is capable
of explaining why think tanks might not have been successful in getting certain policy
changes adopted. Focusing on policy change therefore allows for the development of a
more complete picture of policy-making in the UK, incorporating both policy continuity
and policy change.
The Requirement of Variety: With the proviso that all case studies constitute examples of
policy change, an attempt has been made to focus on the work of the new right think tanks
in various policy areas across time. The key items of legislation around which the case
studies revolve span the Thatcher and Major years. The education case study covers
legislative reform between 1979 and the Education Reform Act of 1988. Bus deregulation
was contained in the 1985 Transport Act. Prison Privatisation was contained in the 1991
Criminal Justice Act. The case studies thus address policy changes from the fields of
transport/economic policy, the welfare state, and the criminal justice system. As such, this
thesis is not dependent upon case studies from a particularly narrow area of policy, or
unrepresentative time-frame. The pattern of think tank involvement also differs between
the three case studies. While the IEA, CPS, and ASI (plus others) were active in education,
only the TEA and ASI were active in education, and only the ASI in prison privatisation.
Although this might have the disadvantage of making it difficult to make useful
generalisations, any common themes which can be identified are also more likely to apply
to policy-making and policy change in other fields.
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Although the three case studies chosen fulfil the requirements of these criteria, there are a
range of policy issues which could have been included and which were also consistent with
the above criteria such as:
• abolition of exchange controls;
• contracting-out in local government;
• the health reforms of the late 1980s (internal market);
• the community charge;
• the Citizen's Charter; or
• rail privatisation.
The new right think tanks were active in all these policy changes, so what was the rationale
for choosing bus deregulation, education reform, and prison privatisation ahead of others?
First, there are a number of case studies such as rail privatisation which were (and in some
cases still are) highly contentious issues when this research began which would have made
access to policy-makers difficult. This was found when an attempt was made to address
the impact of think tanks on the Deregulation Initiative of 1993/4 as one of the case
studies." Thus all the case studies in this research had the relevant legislation in place
before the 1992 election (the latest was the Criminal Justice Act 1991), over a year before
the beginning of the research and when they had largely been "depoliticised" in
Westminster. This brought greater opportunities for access to key protagonists, many of
whom may have moved on from posts from which they observed or participated in the
relevant policy change and who are likely to have had fewer inhibitions about disevss)ng
their involvement.
Second, a number of these issues had already been researched, albeit not necessarily using
the approach adopted in this research. Issues such as the origins of the health reforms and
the community charge (see, for example, Butler, Adonis and Travers (1993) for the
community charge and Denham (1996) for the health reforms) have been well documented,
and some have emphasised the role of the new right think tanks in these reforms. Cockett
(1994) also considers the role of the new right think tanks with regard to the introduction
of contracting-out in local government and the abolition of exchange controls. Although
these policy areas were not addressed in any real depth, the intention of this research was to
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look at issues which had not previously been considered in order to highlight new areas
where think tanks had been active, and perhaps influential, in bringing about policy
change.
However, this second point begs one question: why include education reform as one of the
case studies in Part Two, the origins of which have been considered in depth elsewhere
(Chitty, 1989; Knight, 1990; Baker, M., 1994). Indeed, Denham (1996) specifically looked
at the role of the new right think tanks in education policy. The reasoning for his is
fourfold. First, the three major policy reforms that the IEA, CPS, and ASI have been
credited with are, arguably, education reform, the internal market in health, and the
community charge. Given the lack of any detailed empirical research, it would be
unsatisfactory for any substantial analysis of the new right think tanks not to consider at
least one of them, although to include all three would not have produced the desired variety
across time and space. Second, health, education, and local government finance have all
figured prominently in the Rhodes Model literature, so the inclusion of one as a case study
would ensure that the think tank literature and policy network literature were fully engaged
in at least one of the case studies. Third, health and education were the two case studies
addressed by Denham (1992, 1996). Applying the template to one of these policy areas
would allow useful comparisons to be made between different approaches for assessing
think tanks. Fourth, although the new right think tanks have been credited with helping to
formulate and introduce health and education reform, it has been argued by some (see
Chapter five) that the new right also had a structural impact on policy-making in education
beyond the Education Reform Act in that their influence continued long after legislation.
Given that one of the aims of this research is to consider the structural impact of the new
right think tanks on policy-making as well as policy change, a case study on education
reform provides the opportunity to examine such issues in greater depth. Neither health
reform nor the community charge satisfied all four criteria.
Sources
Three key sources will be used in this research:
Is
1. Primary and Secondary Published Literature: There is a considerable literature in the
public domain such as existing studies, think tank and pressure group publications,
Government and party publications, Hansard, consultation responses to White Papers and
submissions to select committees, newspaper articles, trade and specialist press, political
memoirs, and other academic studies.
2. Private Documentation: This refers to non-public papers which require privileged
access or prior permission. Such sources include archival evidence from think tanks and
pressure groups and the private papers of individuals involved in the policy process.
Personal letters from individuals to the author also constitutes a source under this heading.
3. Interview material: From ministers, advisers, civil servants, MPs, and others. All these
sources have their strengths and weaknesses. Primary and secondary literature have the
advantages of being retrievable, easily and repeatedly. They are also likely to provide a
wealth of information, especially from newspapers which have tended to take a greater
interest in the new right think tanks than academics. Private documentation offers the
advantage of clear and precise information. However, it is also likely to be selective, and
occasionally access may be difficult, or denied. Official documentation is unavailable due
to the Thirty Years Rule. There is the further difficulty of knowing where to locate the
relevant material. For example, evidence of contact between think tanks and ministers is
unlikely to be contained within official files, due to the practice of sensitive policy advice
from non-official sources being channelled through ministers' parliamentary offices. While
this makes retrievability easier, its dispersal makes it harder to locate, although even then
there is no guarantee that it will be made accessible. Finally, interviews allow specific
questions to be targeted at key political actors. Through the semi-structured interview
respondents are allowed "considerable liberty in expressing their definition of a situation
that is presented to them" (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992: p.255). According to
Richards, the advantages of interviewing are:
• They can help in interpreting documents, or reports, particularly if you gain
access to the authors responsible for putting together a relevant document or
report.
• They can help in interpreting the personalities involved in the relevant decisions
and help explain the outcome of events.
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• They can provide information not recorded elsewhere, or not yet available (if
ever) for public release.
• They can provide a series of accompanying benefits: They can help you to
establish networks or provide access to other individuals, through contact with a
particular interviewee (Richards, 1996: p.200).
The disadvantages of interviews include bias due to badly constructed questions, response
bias, inaccuracies due to poor recall, and reflexivity - the interviewee gives what
interviewer wants to hear (Yin, 1984: p.80). On the question of elite interviewing Richards
highlights a number of methodological and operational problems involved:
• Although unrepresentative sampling is not often a problem in elite interviewing,
where it is so, it may be due to problems of access.
• [...] The reliability of the interviewee is sometimes questionable. This often
results from failures in his/her memory. The older the witness, and the further
from events they are, the less reliable the information (though the more willing
they may be to talk).
• [...] Interviewees asked about the same event can say different things at
different interviews or alternatively, they can change their mind in the course of
a single interview ...
• [...] The problem can arise of interviewers being too deferential in their
interviews. This can work on a sliding scale - the more famous (notorious) the
individual, the more deferential the interviewer can become (1996: p.200-201).
Additionally, quantitative studies were also considered. Two such examples are a
quantitative review of newspaper references and publications sales, both of which could be
used as indicators of the ideas of the new right think tanks were having an impact.
However, both have serious methodological weaknesses. In the case of newspaper
references, allowances must be made for how think tanks attempt to manipulate media
attention. Nor does media attention pick up all contact between think tanks and policy-
makers. In some cases, close supporters of think tanks work within departments, far from
the media spotlight. Sales figures are equally misleading. In many cases, not all sales are
recorded. Some "sales" may simply be pamphlets sent by think tanks although unrequested
by their recipients. Nor does it "weigh" where publications are sent. A pamphlet requested
by a minister is perhaps a greater measure of influence than a pamphlet requested by a
student. As Stone observes:
influence cannot be measured. Proof of it is elusive and, at best anecdotal. Think-
tank indicators such as media citations or appearances of staff before Congress and
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parliamentary committees merely signify that think-tanks have attracted the
attention of the media and politicians. It does not demonstrate that the thinking or
the perceptions of the public or politicians has been influenced or that some policy
initiative has resulted. Asking the question "How much do you measure influence
misses the point. It is more important to ask first "What do they do that is policy
relevant and how?" (1996: p.219).
There have been attempts to quantify the influence of different think tanks, as shown in
Tables 1 and 2 below. Emerging from the media rather than academia, neither offers any
justification for how the "scores" for each think tank were reached, nor what determined
the criteria against which the think tanks were assessed. Moreover, these tables focus on
general influence, rather than influence in particular areas. Such exercises are interesting in
reflecting how think tanks are perceived in parts of the media, but such attempts at
quantifying influence should be treated with caution.
Application
The principal epistemological and methodological questions for research such as this are
"What counts as evidence of impact?" and "How can this evidence be collected?". This is
not a scientific exercise, as variables cannot be isolated and "impact" cannot be proven.
Assessing the impact of think tanks requires a qualitative judgement - a plausible
interpretation of evidence both presented and omitted. To strengthen the plausibility of
these interpretations requires that evidence be gathered from a range of sources. During the
course of this research, all of the sources indicated above were used. Some were more
accessible than others, and problems were encountered with those which were used. In
some cases information was difficult to obtain. Private documentation was made available,
although this was rare and did not contain information directly relevant to the central
arguments in this research. Unfortunately, the new right think tanks keep very little
archival material, while past government documentation is subject to official constraints.
Where such evidence helped support secondary points it was utilised. However, the main
sources used were primary sources in the public domain, secondary literature, and
interviews.
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Table 1
"Scores on the Doors"
(marks out often) Profile Political Intellectual
Influence Rigour
Institute of Economic Affairs 5 6 8
Centre for Policy Studies 5 5 6
Adam Smith Institute 8 8 8
Social Market Foundation 6 6 4
Institute for Public Policy Research 8 7 6
Fabian Society 4 4 6
Demos 9 9 3
Employment Policy Institute 2 3 8
Institute for Fiscal Studies 6 9 9
Policy Studies Institute 1 2 8
Source: The Guardian 01.04.95
Table 2
"The Ideas Business"
Influence
on events
As hosts Creativity Business-	 Ambience
friendly
Well-
Connected
Funding
AS! 5 3 5 3 3 5 2
CPS 2 2 2 3 1 1 3
Demos 3 4 3 5 3 2 4
lEA 2 4 2 5 4 3 5
IPPR 2 3 1 4 3 3 5
SMF 3 2 4 4 3 3 3
Source: Watson, 1996: p.83
The primary and secondary sources were used for two main purposes. First, through
looking at think tanks publications, select committee reports, government white papers and
other such documents, possible cause-effect relationships can be identified between think
tanks and policy change, and the evolution of policy change charted over time. The content
of such documents does not in itself reveal "impact", although it may suggest a possible
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relationship between the new right think tanks and policy change to be investigated.
Second, primary and secondary sources can also be used to provide empirical evidence. For
example, the case study on education reform draws heavily on three accounts of the
evolution of the Education Reform Act, namely Chitty (1989), Knight (1990), and Baker,
(1994). All provide evidence of relevance to this thesis, although the education case study
in Part Two re-conceptualises this evidence according to the framework outlined in
Chapter 3. Primary documentation was used to suggest the existence of advocacy
coalitions. In some cases these coalitions were formalised and documentation from these
coalitions will show the composition, interaction, and co-ordination of such coalitions. In
other cases, advocacy coalitions were less formalised and therefore lacked such
documentation. However, overlaps in group membership helped identify possible advocacy
coalitions, although this had to be verified by interviews.
Neither primary nor secondary sources, however, provided persuasive evidence of the
impact (if any) of the new right think tanks. Both academic studies and media reports have
argued that the think tanks were influential in bringing about change, but they provide little
empirical evidence to support these arguments. Thus there is the danger that such accounts
have accepted assumptions of think tank influence uncritically. Those accounts which do
provide evidence (however anecdotal) of "impact" are used, and when taken collectively
constitute an important source. However, these are few in number. As such the major
source for assessing "impact" was interviews. Over the course of this thesis over fifty
interviews were conducted on a semi-structured basis with the major policy actors involved
in policy change. These included: ministers (from Cabinet ministers to Parliamentary
Under-Secretaries); senior officials (from Permanent Secretaries to Under-Secretaries);
MPs; special advisers; think tank personnel and authors; shadow ministers; representatives
from trades unions, local authority organisations, and pressure groups involved in opposing
advocacy coalitions to those of the new right think tanks; private sector representatives;
and academics. 12 Generally interviews lasted between 30-60 minutes. Occasionally second
interviews were conducted. In some cases, interviews were conducted over the telephone.
As was suggested in the previous section, interviews have the advantage of making it
possible to direct specific questions at relevant policy actors. In this thesis, interviews
provided the opportunity to question ministers, officials, and special advisers on the direct
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impact of the new right think tanks on policy change. Despite their weaknesses as a source
(see above) interviews remain one of the only ways by which the internal development of
policy can be researched. The major problem encountered concerned the difficulty
interviewees found in recalling certain developments due to the passage of time. This was a
particular problem in the case of bus deregulation, which occurred over twelve years ago.
Although education reform and prison privatisation proceeded some years after the 1985
Act, the interviewee's inability to recall events remained a constant danger. In an attempt to
remedy this problem, a full list of questions was sent out a few days prior to the interview.
A synopsis, or draft of the case study chapter, would also often be sent. This gave the
interviewees time to consider the questions and familiarise themselves with the principal
issues. The results of this approach were largely positive. The interviewee had not only
been able to give more detailed thought to the questions, but the draft chapters also
provided a useful focal point of discussion in which the interviewee could point out areas
of both agreement and disagreement.
RESEARCH OUTLINE
This research is divided into two main parts. Part One is entitled "A Framework for
Assessment". Its purpose is to explain which think tanks are being assessed, how, and why.
There are two chapters in Part One. Chapter 2 is entitled "Think Tanks in the UK". Its aim
is to clarify the organisational focus of the research by examining think tanks as a specific
type of political actor, suggesting how the new right think tanks can be characterised and
how they are distinctive from other think tanks. It also argues that the new right think tanks
should be evaluated at the meso-level. Chapter 3 is entitled "Think Tanks, Networks and
Coalitions". The aim is to show why the major meso-level approach to policy-making such
as the Rhodes Model and the ACF are inappropriate for assessing the work of the new right
think tanks. It also outlines the alternative research framework, the template, which will be
used to assess the impact of the TEA, CPS, and ASI. Part Two contains the three case
studies: bus deregulation; education reform; and prison privatisation. Chapter 7 provides
the conclusions to the thesis. It brings together issues which emerged from the case studies,
considers the theoretical implications for the Rhodes Model and the ACF, and suggests
areas for future research.
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NOTES
1 Another new right think tank operating at this time was the Social Affairs Unit (SAU) although this
attracted much less attention.
2 This was a forerunner to the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) established in 1978.
3 Think tanks were often mentioned in the study of broader political phenomena. The new right think tanks,
for example, were occasionally discussed (albeit briefly) in studies of Thatcherism (see, for example,
Kavanagh, 1990).
4 This first emerged as a PhD study in 1992, entitled Think Tanks of the New Right: Theory, Practice, and
Prospects
5 These were published simultaneously as books and special editions of the journal British Contemporary
History, and as such have both chapters and articles respectively. In the interests of consistency, all
references will be made to the journal articles.
6 See also Hames and Feasey (1993), who compared "conservative" think tanks in the US and UK under
Reagan and Thatcher.
7 This is despite noting that, in education, the new right think tanks "enjoy interlocking memberships, an
observation which renders the question which think tank was most obviously 'responsible' for suggesting the
ideas which subsequently 'became' the ERA? both unhelpful and inappropriate" (1996: pp.109-110).
8 This refers to Paton (1989).
9 In a critical reply to Denham and Garnett, Oliver argues that this is a false measure of impact, suggesting
that Denham and Garnett miss a fundamental point - that "it is not the number of conversions that are
important, but rather whom the conversion affects" (1996: p.81), highlighting the conversions of Thatcher,
Joseph and other senior Conservatives.
10 Of Stone's two case studies, the first, on the spread of privatisation ideas, has a global focus and does not
focus exclusively on the UK. The second, on foreign affairs, focuses on think tanks from both sides of the
Atlantic but not the new right think tanks (who rarely address foreign affairs unless on the subject of
Europe).
" During the course of this case study, a content analysis of key documents was undertaken and a number of
interviews with pro-deregulation activists were also conducted. However, access to policy-makers inside
Whitehall proved very difficult and the case study was discontinued as the witness sample would have been
heavily weighted towards the new right think tanks and coalition partners.
12 In the case of ministers, officials, and special advisers, all were no longer in government
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PART ONE
A Framework for Assessment
Two
Think Tanks in the UK
The aim of this chapter is to provide a brief review of think tanks in the UK, and of new
right think tanks in particular. Its purpose is to establish: what think tanks are and how they
differ from other political actors; how the new right think tanks differ from other think
tanks and other providers of policy advice and policy analysis; the similarities and
differences between the new right think tanks themselves; the opportunities they have for
influencing policy; and how these opportunities correspond to the perception of the new
right think tanks as "agenda-setters", and possible approaches for assessing their impact.
There are three sections. The first considers the problems of definition and classification
and proposes alternatives for each. The second section provides a survey of the key new
right think tanks in this research, namely the TEA, CPS, and ASI. The aim is not to produce
a comprehensive study of these individual organisations, but brief background profiles on
their origins, philosophies and work. The final section examines the different roles of the
new right think tanks in policy-making, and highlights the "network" which not only
includes the new right think tanks, but also special advisers, Conservative MPs, journalists
and others. This "new right network" offers opportunities to influence policy in a number
of ways, five of which are shown. It also suggests that if the new right think tanks are to be
seen as "agenda-setters", then they need to be incorporated into broader "meso" approaches
to policy-making.
DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION
This section first considers the problems of defining think tanks, and proposes a new
definition distinguishing think tanks such as the IEA, CPS, and ASI from other policy
research and advice bodies. Secondly, it looks at two existing think tank classifications,
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and suggests a third dimension by which think tanks can be classified. Finally, this section
considers the place of the new right think tanks within the broader structures of policy
advice, further distinguishing their work from other organisations geared to providing
policy analysis.
Defining Think Tanks
There is no standard definition of a think tank on either side of the Atlantic. Denham and
Garnett suggest that the term is "notoriously difficult to define" (1995: p.324), while Stone
notes that it is "an umbrella term that means different things to different people" (1996:
p.9). The problem is that the term "think tank" is used as shorthand to describe a range of
organisations involved in policy research. A similar problem was identified in the US
where "the phrase 'think tank' is the imprecise and generic term we have coined to describe
the many and diverse research centers and institutes dotting our political landscape"
(Smith, 1989: p.178). In the UK the term "think tank" has also been widely applied. Within
government, the Central Policy Review Staff (CPRS) was known as the Think Tank (see
below). Party research departments have also been labelled think tanks, especially the
Conservative Research Department (for example, see Ranelagh, 1991: p.150). Another
approach has been to treat think tanks as a form of pressure group (e.g. Grant, 1995).
There have been numerous attempts to define think tanks from both the US and the UK.
From the US, Dror (1984) defines think tanks as "policy research, design, and analysis
organisations", whereas Weaver (1989) refers to "the non-profit public policy research
industry". Fischer (1991) talks of "policy experts" and "policy advice-giving
organisations". Stone (1991, 1996) in her comparative work on think tanks in the US, UK,
and Australia prefers "independent policy planning institutes". While these definitions
provide some insight into what think tanks do they fail to distinguish such organisations as
the IEA, CPS, and ASI from pressure groups, trade associations, and university research
since all can produce policy research and advise government. From the UK, a more
substantial definition is provided by James: a think tank is "an independent organisation
engaged in multi-disciplinary research intended to influence public policy" (1993: p.492).
James adds that think tanks have three characteristics. First, think tanks are intellectually
independent from government but their output is geared to government needs. Second, they
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undertake public interest and strategic research. Finally, James notes that most think tanks
are politically partisan although this "manifests itself in varying degrees" (ibid).
The James definition is criticised by Denham and Garnett (1995), who dispute James's
inclusion of the IEA, CPS, and ASI as "think tanks", questioning their "independence".
Denham and Garnett argue that a think tank cannot be independent if it is politically
partisan. It is certainly the case that the TEA, CPS, and ASI have been closely associated
with the Conservative Party, and that the IPPR has a close relationship with the Labour
Party. However, these relationships are not institutionalised. Allegiance should not be
mistaken for subservience. Neither the Conservative nor the Labour Party formally
intervenes in the running of these organisations. The think tank most closely connected to a
political party is the Fabian Society, whose constitution affiliates it to the Labour Party, but
it maintains editorial independence and is free to disagree with Labour policy. It is possible
to be a member of the Fabian Society but not the Labour Party, ahhough the Fabian
constitution prohibits membership to anyone intending to stand in an election against an
official Labour candidate. The independence and formal distance of the new right think
tanks from the Conservative Party probably gave them their greatest asset - deniability.'
According to James, deniability means that:
Think tanks can float ideas in which politicians may be interested but which they
are uncertain about voicing publicly themselves. If public reaction is good,
politicians can take up the idea. If not, they can repudiate it or ignore it; and even
then the think tanks will have added another option to the foot of the policy agenda
and keep lobbying for the idea, slowly softening up public opinion (1993: pp.499-
500).
The example of the TEA illustrates a problem with Denham and Garnett's analysis. Denham
and Garnett associate the IEA with the Conservative Party because both advocate market-
oriented policies, not because there is any formal link. Yet the IEA was founded nearly
fifteen years before the Conservative Party's first rediscovery of economic liberalism under
Heath with the 1970 "Selsdon Man" election manifesto. It has been argued that after years
in the political wilderness, the IEA was instrumental in helping to shape both Heath's and,
later, Thatcher's liberal economic policies (see below). But it does not follow that the TEA
suddenly became less independent when the Conservatives adopted a liberal economic
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platform and won power in 1970. Surprisingly, given their criticism of James, Denham and
Garnett do not provide an alternative definition.
It is possible to identify a number of organisations conventionally called "think tanks" from
the left and right, as well as those not overtly politically-aligned. These organisations have
a number of characteristics which, collectively, distinguish them from other political
actors. Merely to describe think tanks as "policy researchers", "policy advisers", or "policy
formulators" does not sufficiently make this distinction. It is therefore unsurprising that
definitions which simply stress these functions of think tanks will draw in other
organisations as an unintended consequence. The definition proposed here is that:
A think tank is an independent organisation acting primarily as a forum for policy
discourse, which aims to influence Government policy through the publication and
dissemination of its ideas and research.
A central characteristic of a think tank is that it should be independent of government
departments and political parties. Independence is regarded as organisational (legally
separate) and editorial (inability of government or party to veto output). This would nile
out the CPRS, which was part of the government machine. The CPRS was constitutionally
part of the Cabinet Office and its research was largely directed by the Prime Minister
(James, 1992; Blackstone and Plowden, 1988). Stone suggests that think tanks must also be
permanent, to distinguish them from government enquiries, task forces and other ad hoc
bodies with limited life spans (1996: p.14). However, Stone's insistence on "permanence"
can be questioned on two grounds. First, it is possible to exclude these other bodies as
think tanks on the basis that their terms of reference are established by government, hence
impeding their editorial independence - they cannot pick and choose their field of research.
Second, there are bodies which fulfil all the above criteria of a think tank but which were
established to operate for a limited period of time, such as the Constitution Unit. 2 To rule
out such organisations as think tanks would be somewhat arbitrary. For these two reasons
the temi "permanent" is omitted.3
The phrase forum for policy discourse is employed because think tanks vary in size and
research capacity. Think tanks in the US are significantly larger than those in the UK. The
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Brookings Foundation, the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institution on War, Peace, and
Revolution, and the Urban Institute all have over one hundred scholars and research staff.
The RAND Corporation has approximately one thousand researchers (Stone, 1991). In the
UK, the Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA) and the PSI are identified as the
UK's largest think tanks, with eighty-four and fifty-six staff respectively (ibid). These latter
organisations are able to generate their own in-house research. However, at the other end of
the scale are the new right think tanks. These organisations often employ less than a dozen
staff, with much of their research contracted out to their networks of academics,
industrialists, businessmen, journalists and MPs. The new right think tanks bring together
individuals within these networks for conferences, seminars, lectures, and study groups, all
of which promote policy discussion and generate policy ideas for publication. Aforum for
policy discourse encompasses think tanks of varying sizes and research capabilities.
This definition differs from that proposed by James in three ways. First, it stresses the
primacy of the policy research and discussion function of think tanks, as opposed to James
who refers to them merely "engaging" in policy research. Thus, think tanks can be
distinguished from organisations such as trade unions or trade associations which may
produce policy research but whose primary aim is the representation of specific groups or
interests. Secondly, it highlights the importance of publications and ideas. A think tank
seeks to influence public policy by virtue of its ideas, the quality of its research, and the
strength of its arguments. Think tanks disseminate their ideas publicly through their
pamphlets and reports, journals, and newspaper articles in addition to media coverage of
conferences and lectures. They do not engage in forms of political protest which include
violence, demonstrations, petitions, etc. Finally, the definition adopted in this research does
not demand that research be "multi-disciplinary". James's inclusion of this term is not
defined, nor is it explained why organisations conducting "disciplinary" research (either
focusing exclusively on a single policy area or drawing upon a single discipline of the
social sciences) should be excluded. There are a number of organisations (some of which
are actually identified as think tanks by James himself) which are issue-specific yet which
are like "multi-disciplinary" think tanks in all other respects (see below).
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Classification4
Weaver (1989) and Stone (1996) provide two distinct think tanks classifications. From the
US, Weaver identifies three types of think tank according to the type of research
conducted, and their relationship with other political institutions and the broader political
system. First, the "university without students". The emphasis is on academics as
researchers, producing book-length studies with a long-term focus. These organisations
aim to change the climate of opinion through the "battle of ideas" rather than attempt to
influence policy in the short-term. Examples of such think tanks include the liberal
Brookings Institution, and the conservative American Enterprise Institute. Second, there is
the "contract research organisation", which carries out research projects for other
organisations, including government. An example of this is the relationship between the
RAND Corporation and the US Department of Defense. 5 Finally, there are "advocacy
tanks" who "combine a strong policy, partisan, or ideological bent with aggressive
salesmanship and an effort to influence current policy debates" (1989: p.567), such as the
Heritage Foundation. They produce brief reports, are accessible directly to policy-makers,
and market themselves aggressively.
Weaver's classification is only partially helpful when applied to think tanks in the UK. The
US constitution has created significant gaps which have allowed think tanks to proliferate
(Smith, 1989; Weaver, 1989; Denham and Garnett, 1995; Stone, 1996: chapter 3). The
structural friction between the Presidency and Congress has created an environment for
think tanks to flourish, where "policy research institutions have been able to supply data,
analysis, technical help, and political argument because of interbranch rivalries" (Smith,
1989: p.180). The separation of powers in the US permits Congress to be an active rather
than a reactive legislature. Policy entrepreneurs within Congress constitute "a ready made
audience both for critiques of the executive's proposals and for alternative proposals"
(Weaver, 1989: p.570). Weaver also identifies a further contributing factor, "a tradition of
corporate, foundation, and individual philanthropy to support non-partisan social science
research" (ibid). This is sustained by tax laws making such donations a deductible expense.
This environment has spawned a larger number of think tanks in the US. By the end of the
1980s there were an estimated 1000 think tanks in the US, with over 100 in Washington
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alone (Smith, 1989: p.178). It is common for US think tanks to exploit the above
conditions and carve themselves a niche in the policy market-place. This is not the case in
the UK. There is not the constitutional friction between executive and legislature as in the
US. Government is executive-dominated and Parliament is more reactive than active,
reducing opportunities for exploiting interbranch rivalries. As a result there are fewer think
tanks in the UK. Nor can it be said that many UK think tanks have a specific, structural
role in the political process according to Weaver's classification. There are exceptions. The
IEA, with its emphasis on changing the climate of ideas amongst "opinion-formers",
academics and students could well be described as a "university without students". The
ASI, with its steady flow of brief, practical policy proposals is very much in the mould of
Weaver's "advocacy tank".
However, few think tanks can be categorised so simply. It is unclear where a "university
without students" ends and an "advocacy tank" begins. Weaver's categories are not
mutually exclusive. In the UK, many think tanks can be categorised as either. For example,
the SMF has produced both longer-term philosophical tracts regarding the future of
conservatism (Willetts, 1994; Gray, 1994), but it has also produced practical policy
proposals such as the suggestion that local education authorities should be abolished and
all schools become grant-maintained (Pollard, 1995). The PSI also falls between two
categories. It is a "university without students" in that it produces book-length reports with
a long-term focus, but it could also be described as a "contract research organisation" since
it conducts research on behalf of Whitehall departments such as the Department of Social
Security (see, for example, McKay and Marsh, 1994).
Stone's classification draws upon her comparative work of think tanks from the US, UK,
and Australia. In this classification think tanks
are distinguished along two dimensions: temporal (old and new) and ideological
(old guard and new partisan) ... The temporal dividing line is 1970. It represents the
end of the economic boom ... but precedes the recession of the early 1970s. The
first period of growth, of the "old guard" institutions, occurred in the fifty years
between World War One and 1970. While the second growth period (1970-1990)
spans only twenty years, the growth of new partisan IPPI's [independent policy
planning institutes] has been staggering (1991: p.201).
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Ideology may appear an obvious criteria for classification, but Stone's typology is open to
criticism in that it masks similarities as well as emphasising differences. In a later work,
Stone (1996) divides the New Partisans into four sub-categories: ideological tanks;
specialist tanks; state tanks, which address state and regional issues (within federal political
systems); and think and do tanks which are less academic and engage more directly in
political activity, especially abroad in emerging democracies.6
Table 3
The Stone Typology of Policy Institutes7
Old Guard
Conservatism	 IEA
Liberalism
Non-Partisan	 PSI, RIIA
Socialism	 Fabians
New Partisans
Neo-Conservatism	 CPS
Libertarianism	 AS!
Non-Partisanship	 -
Socialism	 IPPR
Source: Stone, 1991: p.202
However, this breakdown is of greater relevance to the US than the UK. No UK think tanks
are mentioned as think and do tanks, while the prospect of state tanks is dismissed as
unlikely in unitary political systems such as the UK. While Stone highlights certain UK
ideological tanks (although only the CPS and ASI), she mentions no UK specialist tanks,
maintaining that "specialisation is most pronounced in the USA" (1996: p.21). 8 The
Weaver and Stone classifications are useful, but neither can fully account for the key
differences between think tanks. Consequently a new classification of think tanks is
proposed, which does not therefore seek to supplant the contributions made by Weaver
and Stone, but add a further dimension. It identifies three types of think tanks based on
their objectives and intentions.
I. Policv Promoters. A think tank may seek to promote a set of beliefs, or ideology. From
the late nineteenth century onwards, the Fabian Society promoted its vision of society,
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based upon the values of the early socialist movement in Britain. The Fabian constitution
explains that:
the Society consists of Socialists. It therefore aims at the establishment of a society
in which equality of opportunity will be assured and the economic power and
privileges of individuals and classes are abolished through the collective ownership
and democratic resources of the community.
More recently such think tanks have been associated with the new right. The IEA began
publishing in 1957 "with specialised studies of markets and pricing systems as technical
devices for registering preferences and apportioning resources". The ASI maintains that it
"explores new ways of extending choice and competition into public services". In his
analysis of the new right think tanks, Desai notes:
the label "think-tank" is in an important respect a misnomer. Most think-tanks and
certainly all the Thatcherite ones were set up not to "think up" bold new ideas but to
elaborate and peddle a single, already fairly well worked-out ideology. They were
in essence proseltyzers, not originators (1994: p.62).
The same point is made by Cockett who notes that, compared to the centre-left think tanks
(see below), the IEA, CPS, and ASI "were formed to propagate an idea, not to form one"
(1994: p.326). This does not mean that such think tanks cannot produce imaginative or
original policy proposals (as the ASI claims to do), but suggests that these proposals are
formulated and guided by an overarching ideology. As Stone notes, "there is a world of
difference between the expert, or theoretician compared to the intellectual who propagates
and purveys ideas" (1996: p.137). Hayek called the latter "second-hand dealers in ideas".
Occasionally think tanks are established with the overt or covert aim of promoting the
ideas, and career, of particular politicians. This practice is widespread in the US where
presidential candidates frequently establish "governments in exile", where policies are
developed and members of future administrations recruited.9 In the UK, a centralised and
unitary state with the integration of legislature and executive discourages factionalism and
encourages discipline in the party system. Nevertheless it could be suggested that senior
politicians utilise think tanks for the promotion of their own careers, although this may be
denied. The Centre for Policy Studies was established by Margaret Thatcher and Sir Keith
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Joseph in 1974/5. The CPS never promoted itself as a support organisation for the
leadership ambitions of either politician. However, Joseph did consider closing the CPS
down after Mrs Thatcher became leader of the Conservative Party (Todd, 1991), which
suggests that it might have served at least part of its function.
More recently, John Redwood established the Conservative 2000 Foundation (C2000F)
after his failed attempt at the Conservative leadership in 1995. The C2000F was widely
seen as a means for John Redwood to establish his credentials for a future leadership
campaign. The first of the C2000F stated objectives is: "To develop the policies set out by
the Right Honourable John Redwood MP in the campaign from June to July 1995 for the
leadership of the Conservative and Unionist party (C2000F, Press Release 16.08.95).
Following the Conservatives' general election defeat of May 1997, The Sunday Times
noted that the C2000F "is still too much of a vehicle for Redwood's ideas to have a
significant impact - unless [he] carries off the leadership this time" (18.05.97). In the
Conservative leadership election of June that year, Redwood was eliminated in the second
ballot and the C2000F was wound down in July 1997 after he accepted a position in
William Hague's shadow Cabinet.
2. Policy Originators. While the new right think tanks (and the Fabians before them)
sought and continue to promote a specific set of beliefs and policies, other think tanks
attempt to shape a new agenda. Recent political developments have presented challenges to
the left. The turn-of-the-century Fabian vision appeared increasingly dated with the
breakdown of the post-war settlement in the 1970s (Kavanagh, 1990). Four successive
election defeats forced Labour to modernise its institutions, processes and ideas. Three
particular think tanks, the Fabians, the IPPR, and Demos have attempted to shape the new
Labour agenda. The Fabians have dropped much of their socialist baggage, arguing for
example that the NHS, a shibboleth to most of the Labour Party, could learn much from the
US private health system (Sieverts, 1996). The IPPR, which describes itself as "centre-
left", maintains that:
The new mood is not for a return to the corporatism of the 1970s, far less the
statism of the 1940s. Rather it is for a new approach combining the market
economy with ideals of fairness, partnership, responsibility, and community. The
IPPR's role is central in helping to convert aspiration into sound and sensible
policy.
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Demos attempts to "reinvigorate public policy and political thinking which was felt to have
become too-short term, partisan and out of touch".
In the past creative political thinking often came from within the main political
ideologies. Today these are no longer able to keep up with the pace of change in
society, the economy, technology, and culture. Society has become more porous
and complex, as old traditions and hierarchies have broken down.
Although the search for a new agenda has determined the modus operandi of these think
tanks, it is far from certain that they have achieved much success. According to The Times:
What is most striking for Mr Blair (the Labour leader) is the collective
acknowledgement that there is no "big idea" for Labour. In this the new generation
of think tanks are truer to their calling, in that rather than just proclaiming the
gospel of the free market like the good old days, they are involved in a much more
pragmatic evolution of ideas and policies, drawing their inspiration from a wider
range of disciplines (08.08.94).
The Director of Research at the Fabian Society, Ian Corfield, acknowledges the role played
by the new right think tanks in sustaining Thatcherism, and in helping Conservative
ministers formulate a programme of reform. But, he continues:
the same cannot be said of the present Labour Party. There is little sense of a
driving purpose or mission. Ministers will arrive in office practised only in
Opposition.
Similarly on the intellectual Left there is some good thinking, but few good ideas.
David Marquand, Frank Field, Patricia Hewitt, Will Hutton, James Comford - all
intelligent people but hardly thinkers of the stature of Hayek, Friedman or Rand.
This is perhaps understandable. The Left has only been released from its collectivist
straight-jacket since the collapse of the cold war. In sharp contrast the new Right
had forty years of work to build upon started by the Mont Pelerin society and others
in the Austrian School (Tribune 14.02.97).
This lack of new ideas has led to suggestions that the centre-left think tanks - the IPPR and
the Fabians in particular - have played more of a supporting than trail-blazing role for New
Labour. For example, according to Ruben:
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The IPPR lacks a definite ideological agenda and Peter Hennessy has therefore
suggested that they, unlike many think tanks, are "evidence driven". Gerald
Holtham suggests that "There is an egalitarian provision lying behind our policy
prescriptions. But it is not the grand formula the IEA have". The Institute is widely
seen as the brains of the Labour Party's modernisers who want to jettison policy and
ideological baggage as a means of getting Labour back in touch with the electorate
(1996: p.73).10
Although these may appear to contradict their role as policy originators, it may be more a
reflection of the inability of the centre-left think tanks to develop an alternative agenda to
challenge that of the new right. However, it might be unfair to the centre-left think tanks to
claim they are lacking in intellectual direction. Ashford, for example, highlights a network
of thinkers from the centre-left think tanks and Labour Party with their own "coherent
policy programme that will transform Britain's welfare system and with it British politics"
(1997: p.1).
Socialism is in an intellectual, political and economic crisis. In particular, Labour is
caught between public resistance to any tax increases and increasing demands on
health and welfare. The Blairite solution to this dilemma is to reduce the role,
responsibilities and obligations of the state, the traditional instrument of power for
the Labour Party, and to transfer them to the individual and the family through the
trade unions, the co-operative movement, friendly societies, charities, non-profit
and private insurance, based on the principles of self-help and mutual aid (ibid).
Whether the centre-left think tanks will be able to develop a programme to sustain the
Labour Government for a prolonged period in office is, at present, unclear, and is clearly
an issue for future research.
3. Policy Contributors: Finally, there are think tanks whose aim is not to promote or
discover a particular belief system, but to conduct high quality research with the aim of
enhancing policy debate. Such think tanks can conduct multi-disciplinary research, or
specialised research into defined policy areas. 11 An example of the former is the Policy
Studies Institute, whose "mission is to inform the policy-making process through the
conduct of high quality research and the active dissemination of research results".
According to a former PSI Director:
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We have no set programme or policies to promote. We have no basic political
position or philosophy underpinning our work other than empiricism and
pragmatism (Daniel, 1989: p.24).
The Institute for Fiscal Studies performs a similar function within the narrower field of
budgetary and taxation issues. The IFS
exists to investigate issues of current public policy through a combination of
rigorous economics and a detailed understanding of institutional reality. Too often
there is a gulf between the work of academic economists and the interests of
practitioners and policymakers; IFS aims to bridge that gap.
An IFS researcher maintains that "my own interest derived less from concern about what
policy should be than from the process by which policy was determined" (Kay, 1989:
p.20). James (1994) also identifies the Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA) and
the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) as specialist think tanks in foreign and defence
policy respectively, as well as the King's Fund (health) and the Police Foundation.
It should be noted that categorisation is not permanent. It is conceivable that think tanks,
under certain circumstances, could switch categories. For example, when the policy
originators have discovered an "agenda", they may become policy promoters.
Alternatively, the Fabians were policy promoters but are now perhaps best seen as policy
originators. In some cases, there may be a very fine line between the categories. Think
tanks in the UK are, generally, flexible organisations which do not always adhere rigidly to
their own stated modus operandi. A detailed content analysis of think tank publications
would always find anomalies. As such, the modus operandi remains a useful focus for
classification, with the qualification that it should allow for some element of deviation. It is
not suggested that all think tanks must belong to one of the three types, which should be
regarded as ideal types. Some think tanks might fall between categories. However, what
this brief comparison does emphasise is that the new right think tanks are distinctive as
policy promoters.
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Table 4
A New Classification of Think Tanks
Policy Promoters
	 IEA, CPS, SAU, ASI, C2000F, SMF
Policy Originators	 Fabians, IPPR, Demos
Policy Contributors	 NIESR, PSI, IFS, RIIA, Kings Fund, Police Foundation
Note: The above classification does not claim to include all think tanks.
Think Tanks, Policy Advice and Policy Analysis
As the above section on defining think tanks suggests, there are a multiplicity of
organisations which provide policy advice to government. It is widely regarded that
comprehensive advice structures are essential for modern governance, whether this advice
be internal within government or external, formalised or ad hoc, sought or unsolicited.
Peters and Barker, for example, argue that:
Providing advice to government has become a very large game in which almost any
number can play. A large number of individuals and organisations, inside and
outside of government, are involved in the process daily and modern governments
have become major consumers of advice (1993: p.1).
They suggest three reasons for this development. First, democratic governments must
increasingly be seen to be both seeking and taking advice from others in order to legitimise
their policy decisions. They argue:
If government is willing to allow groups in society to put forward their ideas for
serious consideration, then any policy-making must be seen as properly democratic
rather than imposed along preconceived lines. Further, this openness to
participation may allow government to co-opt the groups which do participate;
having had their say once, the groups should be expected to keep quiet even if the
decision goes against them (Heisler, 1974). Thus, taking and even requesting
advice helps democratic governments to legitimate their decisions (pp. 1-2).
40
Occasionally Government's seek to exploit this function by forming standing advisory
groups or committees to produce advice which can be self-serving to government
departments but which appears "legitimate" because it is presented to ministers and
officials by experts. An example of this was the Committee on the Medical Aspects of
Food Policy (COMA) which was set up within the Department of Health (DoH) to provide
expert advice on dietry questions. However, the DoH were able to significantly influence
the output of COMA by determining its composition and terms of reference, and writing
COMA's reports based on members' opinions which were later agreed by the Committee.
This drastically reduced the possibility of COMA recommending policies which were not
to the DoH's liking (Mills, 1993). A second reason why policy advice has grown in recent
years is that, in an information age, governments must "be seen to be accepting and
welcoming information no matter what its origins". Finally, in the interests of good public
policy "governments may accept or seek advice because they want to make the right
decisions" (1993: p.2).
Advice structures in British government have grown as the scope of government activity
has increased. King (1974) highlights the issue of "government overload", and James
suggests that the enormous growth of government and its increased complexity has been a
major factor behind the decline of Cabinet government (James, 1992: p.3). Dror identifies
a number of "inherent defects" of modern rulers, two of which are quantitative work
overload and qualitative work overload. Quantitative work overload refers to the "many
ritual activities taking up a great deal of time and energy and super-saturated decision
agendas producing great fatigue". Qualitative overload refers to the "perplexing quandries
combining with time pressures to result in stress" causing a "decay in decision quality,
leading to confused policy behaviour and policy convulsions" (1987: p.189).
Governments have attempted to ease these pressures on policy-makers by improving the
processes of information collection and policy advice, and institutionalising decision-
makers growing dependence upon expert help through the development of policy analysis.
Largely a product of the US, Williams defines policy analysis as "a means of synthesizing
information including research results to produce a format for policy decisions (the laying
out of alternative choices) and of determining future needs for policy-relevant information"
(1988: p.68). Amongst the innovations spawned from this approach in the US was the
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Planning-Programming-Budgeting System (PPBS) in 1965, "mandating analytical offices
[throughout federal government] and establishing an outcome-oriented system as the base
for US policy planning" (ibid).
The UK also sought to develop its own analytical capability through the creation of
Programme Analysis and Review (PAR), in-house departmental policy units, and the
aforementioned CPRS. PAR was launched in the 1970 White Paper The Reorganisation of
Central Government and "involved the review of departmental and interdepartmental
programmes on a regular basis and in a fundamental way" (Gray and Jenkins, 1985: p.105).
The White Paper also announced the creation of the CPRS, which would assist ministers
to:
take better policy decisions by assisting them to work out the implications of their
basic strategy in terms of policies in specific areas, to establish the relative
priorities to be given to the different sectors of their programme as a whole, to
identify those areas of policy in which new choices can be exercised and to ensure
that the underlying implications of alternative courses of action are fully analysed
and considered.
The contribution of policy analysis to policy-making has been mixed (Williams, 1988).
Government sponsored attempts to develop in-house analytical capabilities have either
only brought limited benefits or have been abandoned. In the UK, PAR was discontinued
in 1974. According to Gray and Jenkins (1985) one of the principal reasons for its demise
was the loss of any strategic focus by the Heath Government as it became increasingly
preoccupied with industrial problems, although they note that PAR had produced a number
of substantial pieces of policy analysis during its brief existence. Hennessy highlights the
institutional shortcomings of PAR and the difficulties of establishing truly strategic and
interdepartmental processes, maintaining it "became slow, top-heavy and the victim of the
relentless interdepartmental grind" (1990: p.236).'
The UK has also sought to improve its central analytical capability by creating in-house
think tanks or "policy planning units", whose role is to provide rational policy analysis
within individual Whitehall departments. This was reinforced by the CPRS which sought
to provide long-term strategic thinking across government departments. Both have had
limited impact. Prince (1993) argues that the impact of in-house policy planning units has
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been limited because of the tension between rational policy analysis and its acceptability
within departments, which might regard such contributions as a nuisance and at odds with
more immediate priorities. The fate of the CPRS, however, tells us more about the
changing role of policy analysis and policy advice under the Conservatives from 1979.
In June 1983 Downing Street announced that the CPRS was to be abolished. This decision
followed a leak from the CPRS to The Economist earlier in the year claiming that the
Government was considering a range of user charges for the NHS. The outcry which
followed was for many the defining moment when Mrs Thatcher decided to disband the
CPRS. Willetts (1987) lists four reasons why the CPRS was abolished. First, it appeared
to become obsolete for a self-styled conviction government. Second, as it served the whole
Cabinet, the circulation of reports reached all ministers encouraging the temptation to leak
any undesirable policy proposals. Third, the CPRS's work tended to undermine
departments by overshadowing their policy proposals with ones of their own. Finally
institutions like the CPRS can only exist if the Prime Minister of the day is comfortable
with them, and Mrs Thatcher was not. Thatcher herself confirms many of Willetts'
arguments.
The CPRS had originally been set up ... at a time when there were fewer think
tanks, special advisers in government and a widespread belief that the great
questions of the day could be solved by specialised technical analysis. But a
government with a firm philosophical direction was inevitably a less comfortable
environment for a body with a technocratic outlook. And the Think Tank's
detached speculations, when leaked to the press and attributed to ministers had the
capacity to embarrass. The world had changed, and the CPRS had not changed
with it. For these reasons and others, I believe that my later decision to abolish the
CPRS was right and probably inevitable. And I have to say that I never missed it
(1993: p.30).
Thus the new right think tanks could be said to have prospered because the IEA, CPS, and
ASI were much more in tune with the conviction politics and Thatcherite approach to
public policy than departmental and interdepartmental policy units. Organisations such as
the CPRS were perceived to be too bound up in the technocratic and positivist approach
which conviction politicians explicitly rejected: Williams (1988: p.69, 74) notes that both
Thatcher and Reagan were anti-analytical, leading to a decline in the demand for policy
analysis during the 1980s. There was less demand for evidence-driven analysis during this
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period because public policy was, in theory, to be built upon key "new right" principles.
This contributed to an environment far more conducive to the work of the TEA, CPS, and
ASI than the CPRS. The study of the new right think tanks is thus markedly different from
that of governmental policy units, being the study of independent, ideological policy
promotion as opposed to in-house technical policy analysis.
Although it can be argued that there was a decline in the demand for policy analysis in the
1980s there are lessons regarding the potential impact of policy analysis which may have
relevance for the study of the new right think tanks. Meltsner's (1976) study of the impact
of policy analysis, for example, suggests that there are four variables which are influential
in the production and use of policy analysis. First, the analysts themselves, who produce
and present analysis with various degrees of analytical, political, and presentational skills.
The second important factor is the client, upon whom any analyst is ultimately dependent.
In the UK, the key clients of policy analysis will might be the Prime Minister, individual
ministers, or the Cabinet. The third factor is the organisational situation, and the place of
the analyst within the policy-making structure. For example, in some cases the analyst
might have more than one client, or the client more than one analyst. Some analysts will
be closer to decision-making centres than others, while some policy areas might be more
"open" or "closed" than others (see chapter 3). The final key factor is the nature of
individual policy areas. Some issues are highly technical or scientific, such as energy
policy or defence, and as such may be more conducive to specialised policy analysis than,
say, penal policy where policy is as likely to be influenced by popular than "informed" or
expert opinion (see chapter 6).
Although Meltsner's framework was built upon the study of the impact of policy analysis,
it nevertheless identifies a number of variables which might be as important in determining
the impact of the new right think tanks. It raises such questions as:
• How effective were the think tanks (in this case the "analysts") in getting their message
across and what resources and strategies were employed in this process?
• How receptive were officials, advisers, ministers, and Prime Ministers (the "clients") to
the policy ideas being promoted?
• What access to decision-makers did the new right think tanks enjoy (the "organisational
situation")?
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• Finally, how did the characteristics of the individual policy areas determine the impact
of the think tanks?
Such issues are central to understanding the impact of the IEA, CPS, and ASI on policy
change. The following chapter will outline the template which, although developed from
the broader policy-making literature, incorporates Meltsner's four variables and helps
provides answers to the above questions.
NEW RIGHT THINK TANKS: A SURVEY
This section provides the institutional context of the key think tanks addressed in this
research. It considers the origins, methodology/philosophy, and work of the IEA, CPS, and
ASI. First, however, a point about the term "new right". The use of this term is somewhat
controversial and needs qualification, as it is dismissed by those who are themselves
labelled as "new right". Reflecting on the resurgence of economic liberalism, Seldon
maintains that the term "new right" is a "derogatory description used by critics who dismiss
the new liberalism as reactionary because it rejects the post-war all-Party consensus based
on Fabianism, Beveridgism, and Keynesianism" (1985: p.xi). Similarly Ashford and
Davies argue:
The term "new right" is used by left-wing and socialist commentators as a
portmanteau label for the many anti-socialist movements in politics and philosophy
which have become prominent in recent years. This assumes that the various
movements so put together are ideologically akin in some fundamental sense so
that it is proper to consider them as a single object. This is simply not true (1991:
p.187).
Introducing a series of essays on the "new right enlightenment" by twenty authors, Seldon
notes that:
the "new right" as a title is condemned by most of the essayists as a pejorative
description of modern classical liberalism - the New Entitlement that most of them,
explicitly or implicitly, portray. It is neither new nor right (-wing) (1985: p.xii).
45
Evans's sociological study of the Conservative youth movement between 1970-92,
identifies an alternative, libertarian "new right" challenging conventional interpretations.
He argues that:
the New Right has often been popularly aligned with Fascism and South African
apartheid. However, the truth is entirely different. The mainstream of the British
New Right explicitly rejects such values. It is instead internationalist, individualist,
culturally relativist, and secularist. Its adherents regard racism, sexism and
nationalism as no more than different forms of the collectivist ideology to which
they are implacably opposed ... Their advocacy of the free market has nothing to do
with imposing discipline at second hand, and everything to do with reducing - and
in some extreme instances, totally eliminating - the power of the State over the
individual (1996: pp.xii-xiii).
The origin of the term "new right" has been traced to a Fabian pamphlet in 1968, entitled
The New Right: A Critique by David Collard (Cockett, 1994: p.157). Collard emphasised
the importance of the market system to the new right, whose ideas had been "most
coherently expressed in the publications of the Institute of Economic Affairs". According
to Ashford and Davies, the new right today is a fusion of two beliefs. First neo-liberalism,
which "is the revival and development of classical ideas such as the importance of the
individual, the limited role of the state, and the value of the free market" (1991: p.185).
Secondly, neo-conservatism which in the UK "has been used to describe the revival of
traditional conservatism [and who] insist that order is the main concern of conservatism"
(ibid). Thatcherism has been described as a fusion between these beliefs. Ashford and
Davies (1991) describe Thatcherism as "liberal conservatism", while Gamble (1988)
characterises it as "a free economy and a strong state". Although Thatcherism emphasised
non-interventionism in the economy, it supported state intervention to pursue social and
moral objectives, such as family values and morality in education.
For the purposes of this research, the "new right" provides a convenient umbrella term for a
number of political, economic, and philosophical strands of thought sympathetic to the free
market, 13 and is applied to describe the TEA, CPS, and ASI collectively. The term is used in
preference to alternatives such as "free market" or "libertarian", as these do not sufficiently
incorporate the role of the state within the "social market" favoured by some think tanks.
The "new right" is used to incorporate both free market think tanks such as the IEA and
ASI, and the social market think tanks such as the CPS (and more recently, the SMF). The
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term is in no way intended to attribute nationalistic, racist, sexist or homophobic tendencies
to these organisations.
The Institute of Economic Affairs
The Origins of the IEA: During the 1930s, liberalism appeared to its supporters to be in
global retreat. Throughout mainland Europe, fascism and communism were gaining
strength, while the popularity of the New Deal in the US and Keynes' General Theory in
the UK suggested that collectivism posed a threat even in these supposed bastions of
liberalism. The outbreak of the Second World War significantly increased the role of the
state in economic planning in the UK. Cockett notes that: "By the end of 1940 Britain was
the most rigorously planned and regimented society in Europe, fighting 'total war' to a
degree that the Germans never achieved" (1994: p.58). Leading liberal academics in
Europe and America became concerned with this trend and sought to reverse it. Professor
Louis Rougier from France suggested "an international liberal forum", while Professor
Friedrich von Hayek from the London School of Economics (LSE) envisaged "a gathering
of those intellectuals who shared his views to discuss and redefine liberalism" (ibid).
Following the War, Hayek began turning this idea into a reality, inviting a number of
liberal scholars from Europe and America to a conference in Swilmetiand in The spring of
1947.
The Mont Pelerin Society (MPS), as it became known (because the inaugural conference
took place on the slopes of Mont Pelerin), met between 1 and 10 April 1947, three years
after the publication of Hayek's highly influential The Road to Serfdom. 14 Other than
Hayek, the delegates included Lionel Robbins, Stanley Dennison, John Jewkes, Ludwig
von Mises, Karl Popper, and from the US Aaron Director, George Stigler, and Milton
Friedman. It expanded its operations considerably, especially during the 1960s and 70s,
when British politicians such as Geoffrey Howe, Enoch Powell, John Biffen, Keith Joseph
and Rhodes Boyson attended MPS meetings (Cockett, 1994: p.118).
Thus, leading liberal intellectuals committed themselves to the "battle of ideas" for
securing the long-term liberty of the individual, rather than trying to influence governments
directly. It was recognised that this process may take many years, and it was with this in
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mind that the IEA was formed. While it is the economists Ralph (now Lord) Harris and
Arthur Seldon who are most frequently associated with the IEA, it was actually founded
and initially funded by a chicken farmer called Anthony Fisher. Ralph Harris was recruited
from St Andrews University to become the first General Director on January 1 1957,
Arthur Seldon was recruited soon afterwards "and an extraordinarily fruitful partnership
begins" (Blundell, 1987: p.31).
The Philosophy of the IEA: The status and approach of the IEA is set out on the inside
cover of all its publications:
The Institute is a research and educational charity ... independent of any political
party or group, and financed by sales of publications, conference fees and voluntary
contributions from individuals and organisations.
... It specialises in studies of markets and pricing systems as technical devices for
registering preferences and apportioning resources. Micro-economic analysis forms
the heart of economies and of the work of the Institute. Such analysis is relevant
and illuminating in both the public and private sectors, and in collectivist,
individualist, and "mixed" economies.
While there is no corporate view, and while the Institute has a tradition of welcoming
discussion, debate, and papers from those on the left, the IEA promotes the market.
Denham detects two prominent themes in the IEA's publications. First, a belief in limited
government and, second, "the technical (and moral) superiority of markets and competitive
pricing in the allocation of scarce resources" (1996: p.2). Seldon argues that the essence of
the TEA was
that governments could not assemble the information required for the desired use of
resources; that only individuals could derive the information from their local,
voluntary, private lives; that they could reveal and apply the information only or
most effectively by coming together as buyers and sellers in markets (1981: p.xvii).
Building on the theoretical foundations of the Austrian, Chicago, and Virginia schools of
economics, the TEA has promoted the role of the price mechanism in both public and
private sectors. 15 The low priority politicians attached to prices for most of the "consensus"
years "has produced massive de-stabilising, simultaneous wastes of surpluses and
shortages" (ibid). Thus the IEA approach was, and remains, a reaction against the belief
that social and economic problems are best solved by an interventionist state. Governments
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do not have the knowledge or the capacity to process the information needed adequately to
solve such problems. Rather than trying to impose at a macro-level, it is better to empower
at a micro-level through such mechanisms as markets, prices, and property rights.
The Work of the IEA: As suggested above, the TEA is best described as a "university
without students". Its primarily target is not politicians but "the gatekeepers of ideas",
namely the intellectuals, academics, and journalists. The IEA believe that a change in the
intellectual climate is a pre-condition for any ideological shift within political parties or
government institutions. It commonly utilises a military metaphor, with the IEA as the
artillery firing the shells (ideas) and clearing the way for the infantry (politicians) at a later
stage. Some land on target - the intellectuals (Blundell, 1987: p.32). According to John
Blundell, the IEA's General Director:
The role of the IEA is to provide a platform to people who share our interest in
exploring the problem-solving capabilities of markets, property rights and the rule
of law. And we do that in a number of different ways, probably best known for our
publications, but we also do a lot of conferences, lectures, seminars. We also have
student outreach, and we do an awful lot of brokering of introductions and building
of networks.16
The IEA's work is generally more theoretical than political, and has a rigorous refereeing
process for all its publications. John Blundell observes that the [EA is probably better
classified as a specialist publisher than as a think tank." Nevertheless the quality of its
work had a profound influence upon senior Conservative politicians such as Keith Joseph,
Geoffrey Howe, and Margaret Thatcher, who were regular attendees at the IEA during the
1960s and 1970s. Upon her election in 1979, Margaret Thatcher wrote to Ralph Harris,
thanking him for the IEA's contribution to her new agenda:
let me thank you for all you have done for the cause of free enterprise over the
course of so many years. It was primarily your foundation work which enabled us
to rebuild the philosophy upon which our Party succeeded in the past. The debt we
owe to you is immense and I am very grateful (Cockett, 1994: p.173).
It was the arrival of "stagflation" in the 1960s, and the defeat of the Conservative Party in
the 1964 and 1966 general elections, which initially opened the window of opportunity for
the lEA to influence policy debates. According to Cockett, it was "perfectly natural that
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politicians should turn to the TEA for answers to the country's economic woes, as by 1964
the Institute had been publicising a coherent analysis of Britain's economic problems for
almost a decade, and proposing workable solutions to those problems" (Cockett, 1994:
p.162). The experience of the Heath Government in the early 1970s would further increase
the IEA's profile, as it "created a far more determined group of politicians, eager to explore
the alternative economic strategy as laid out by the TEA" (Muller, 1996: p.101). Mrs
Thatcher's election to party leader in 1975 allowed the TEA "indirect access" to the
Conservative's policy-making machinery (ibid).
During the late 1970s and 1980s, the TEA campaigned vigorously for monetarism and
monetary stability, and trade union reform (Muller, 1996; Cockett, 1994). Social policy
also began to attract the interest of the TEA at this time. The Social Affairs Unit (SAU) was
formed in 1980 by Digby Anderson at the suggestion of Arthur Seldon. Cockett notes that
"Seldon and Anderson conceived of the SAU as doing for sociology and social policy what
the LEA had done for economics, fighting an intellectual counter-revolution against the
prevailing collectivist, interventionist orthodoxies which permeated most of contemporary
social policy" (1994: p.280).
Since the late 1980s, the LEA has had to respond to new challenges, and a new political
agenda. One area of growing issue to the IEA is Europe, which also served as the catalyst
for the LEA's most serious crisis. Between 1987-92 the IEA's General Director was Graham
Mather. He had spent the previous four years as Head of the Institute of Director's (IoD)
Policy Unit. Around the time of the accession of John Major to the premiership, clear and
open tensions developed between Mather and the "founding fathers", namely Harris,
Seldon and their supporters on the IEA's advisory council. The Financial Times (30.12.92)
reported that Mather "refused to become the repository of the Thatcher legacy". Mather
believed that the style and strategy of the TEA was no longer appropriate, if it had ever
been successful. He questioned whether the long-term aim of trying to influence academic
economic opinion had been as central to the development of a new consensus around
market economics as IEA supporters might claim. Mather commissioned a survey of
academic economists which showed in the late 1980s that most British economists were
still committed to the same Keynesian ideas which had been so important and influential in
the post-war years (Ricketts and Shoesmith, 1990). Yet, for Mather the ideological battle
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had still been won. There was now little dispute about the need and importance of
monetarism and market mechanisms, leading Mather to doubt the link between the IEA's
strategy and policy outcomes."
Mather identified a new agenda based on institutional and constitutional issues, with the
aim of increasing the link between voter choices and policy outcomes. 19 Under Mather the
TEA pursued a research programme of law and the economy, the future of regulation, the
application of public choice to bureaucracy, constitutional reform, and Britain's
relationship with Europe (Muller, 1996: p.105). Mather also instigated a change of
strategy, as the TEA became increasingly prepared to participate more directly in policy
debates. For the founding fathers, these changes in ideas and technique betrayed the
principles upon which the IEA was built. Mather was seen as popularising and politicising
the cause. Eventually the relationship became unsustainable and Mather and three
colleagues resigned from the TEA to set up another think tank, the European Policy Forum.
Following Mather's departure, John Blundell was appointed General Director in January
1993. Under new management, "the IEA began to return to its former objective of
consistently applying free market analysis to the changing and evolving political arena
without overt political lobbying" (Muller, 1996: p.106). Since 1993 the TEA has focused
on such issues as:
• utility regulation, with the TEA operating a joint lecture and publication series with the
London Business School;
• the environment (the TEA established an Environment Unit in 1993 "to apply market
analysis to environment al problems");
• education (a new Education and Training Unit was established in 1996 with the aim to
"explore the part which markets can play in meeting the educational needs of
individuals, families, communities and industry, hence reducing the role of the
state").2°
• and the welfare state, with the IEA Health and Welfare Unit focusing on dependency
and the underclass, and non-state forms of welfare provision.
Since the departure of Mather, the IEA has also developed a more sceptical line on Europe.
Since 1993, LEA publications have argued strongly against the centralisation of political
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decision-making, criticised plans for monetary union, and highlighted the danger of EU
social policy for Europe's long-term competitiveness.
The Centre for Policy Studies
The Origins of the CPS: The CPS is the most partisan of the three main think tanks, being
the direct creation of former Conservative Cabinet ministers. The CPS grew out of the
failure of the 1970-74 Conservative Government to achieve its initial stated objectives.
Halcrow notes that: "The New Right had briefly hoped that Edward Heath might prove to
be the instrument for the radical changes they wanted in the British economy" (1989: p.61).
Yet the Heath Government's enthusiasm for market reforms faltered, and the U-turns were
followed by electoral defeat in February 1974. Those Cabinet ministers on whom the TEA
had placed such hopes, namely Joseph, Thatcher and Howe "vanished without trace"
(Cockett, 1994: p.207). Joseph returned to the TEA for intellectual support following the
1974 election defeat, while Harris and Seldon provided Joseph with reading and general
guidance. Alfred Sherman, a journalist and Joseph's former speech writer from the days of
opposition during the 1960s, and Alan Walters, later to be Mrs Thatcher's economic
adviser, fine-tuned the arguments over monetarism and other elements of market theory
(ibid). Mrs Thatcher joined these meetings in the spring. These series of discussions
convinced Joseph that "it was only in April 1974 that I was converted to Conservatism. I
thought I was a Conservative but now I see that I was not one at all" (quoted from
Halcrow, 1989: p.56). With this re-awakening, Joseph saw the need for a new institution to
promote this brand of "conservatism". The CPS was not envisaged as a competitor with the
IEA but more a partner - it was "to do in political terms for the free market what the TEA
had so successfully done in the wider intellectual community" (Cockett, 1994: p.236)
Given the ideological standpoint of Joseph and Sherman it is perhaps surprising that Heath
allowed the CPS to be established at all. In 1976 he claimed he hadn't (The Times
05.07.76). Willie Whitelaw, Conservative Party Chairman in 1974, with "a reputation for
being one of the shrewder political observers of the time regarded it as one of the great
political mysteries that the Centre for Policy Studies was allowed to come into being"
(Halcrow, 1979: p.65). However it appears that Heath not only knew about the CPS but, as
party leader, approved it. This Ile did "with no great enthusiasm after it was explained that
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the object was to examine how the market system worked in the various economies of the
world" (ibid. Moreover, he nominated Adam Ridley from the Conservative Research
Department (CRD) to the board of the CPS, to act as a link between the two bodies (Todd,
1991: p.10). Joseph became chairman of the CPS with Mrs Thatcher as a director, and
Sherman as Director of Studies. The CPS was officially launched on January 14 1975,
during the campaign for the party leadership.
The Philosophy of the CPS: Specifically, the CPS was established to study the success and
relevance of the "social market" economies and especially the soziale marketwirtschaft of
Germany. Sir Keith Joseph explained that:
[The idea] was mine and Alfred Sherman's ... I did it to try and persuade myself and
then ... the party and the country, that the German social market philosophy was the
right one for the Conservatives to adopt. I set it up - with Ted Heath's
understandably slightly grudging approval - to research, and then to market, social
market philosophy (Denham, 1996: p.39).
The CPS's declaration of intent stated:
The Centre will state the case for a social market economy: this is a free market
economy operating within a humane system of laws and institutions. This case will
be presented in moral as well as economic terms, emphasising the links between
freedom, the standard of living and a market economy based on private enterprise
and the profit discipline (ibid).
It is this emphasis on morals, values and community which distinguishes the CPS from the
IEA and, as suggested below, the ASI. The CPS was still a market-friendly institute. David
Willetts, Director of Studies between 1987-1992, explains that "We are, of course, free
marketeers but we were never just free marketeers ... We don't think that economics is the
explanation, nor believe the free market is the solution to everything" (ibid). Denham also
noted that "there was early interest ... at the CPS, in reviving the so-called 'Victorian'
values of hard work, thrift and self-reliance" (ibid), a theme which was to recur in the
speeches and rhetoric of Mrs Thatcher throughout her premiership.
The important point here is that for the CPS, a free economy, and a free society
ultimately depend on a moral citizenry - on the voluntary exercise of morality by
individual citizens. In this connection, economic self-sufficiency and moral
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restraint are seen not just as a personal but as a social responsibility. Because the
individual is no mere individual, but an individual and social being, he or she must
be prevailed upon to exercise certain responsibilities; to fulfil moral duties and
obligations; to recognise "legitimacy" in authoritative social institutions and
observe the "fact" of community (ibid).
One of the earliest CPS pamphlets was entitled Why Britain Needs a Social Market
Economy.
The notion it conveys is that of a socially responsible market economy, for a market
economy is perfectly compatible with the promotion of a more compassionate
society. Indeed, by encouraging the energies and initiative of the creative and
sturdier members of our society, the resources available for the helping the aged,
the sick and disabled are substantially enlarged (CPS, 1975: p.7).
Harris notes that one of the most important themes behind the work of the CPS has been
promoting the moral superiority of market capitalism. This has been one of increasing
importance to the CPS as the political debate has moved away from macroeconomic issues
to social and cultural issues. Harris argues that "the shift in the nature of the left-right
debate, and similarity in language (community, duties as well as rights, individual
empowerment with moral responsibility) owes much to the CPS, even if it is possible to be
critical of the Thatcher governments' record on these issues" (199&. p51).
The Work of the CPS: The CPS has gone through a number of stages during its twenty year
history. Initially it helped launch Margaret Thatcher to the leadership of the Conservative
Party. Under Alfred Sherman it assisted Joseph in moving Conservative policy away from
the centre ground, by assisting him with research and information, and Sherman acting as
his major speech-writer. Cockett argues that the task of the CPS between 1975 and 1979
"was to translate [the IEA's broad principles of economic liberalism] into practical policy
proposals, and to win acceptance for those policies within the Conservative Party" (1994:
p.244). Desai suggests that the CPS "was and remained primarily a launching pad for a
collection of individuals with a semblance of institutional coherence, rather than a unified
organisation working towards an accepted goal with accepted methods" (1994: p.55). The
CPS sat uneasily with the CRD, despite the fact that their roles, in theory, were very
different.
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The CPS and the CRD conducted what amounted to guerrilla warfare against each
other for much of that time, reflecting the ideological divisions within the Party
between the old, 'paternalistic" Conservatism and the new "free market" version.
Beneath the civilities of Conservative Party politics at the higher levels, the CRD
tried to neutralise the work of the CPS, and the CPS tried to work around the CRD
(Cockett, 1994: pp.254-5).
Gradually study groups replaced pamphlets as the main means of influencing Conservative
Party policy. These groups were established by Sherman and "consisted of a variety of
people such as MPs, journalists and people working in or interested in the policy area
under study, who met regularly to discuss current and alternative policies in their
respective areas" (Desai, 1994: p.56). Three were established in opposition on health,
energy, and trade union reform. The CPS was also responsible for the influential "Stepping
Stones" policy document. By 1983 there were sixteen such study groups (Cockett, 1994:
p.276), which worked closely with the No.10 Policy Unit and Cabinet ministers.
Sherman had hoped to get an "army" of CPS advisers into government in 1979. Hoskyns
and Strauss were taken into the Policy Unit, ahead of the CRD's Adam Ridley, David
Young was appointed special adviser at the Department of Industry, and Stuart Sexton was
appointed special adviser at the DES but that was all. Alan Walters was later appointed
special economic adviser to the Prime Minister and Sherman himself was given some
limited, privileged access to No.10. However, by 1983 Hoskyns and Strauss had left
Downing Street, Walters returned to the US and Sherman was effectively eased out of the
CPS by its new Chairman Hugh Thomas. It had become increasingly difficult for the CPS
to "think the unthinkable", with its senior members were so close to Mrs Thatcher.
Sherman, in particular, had a tendency to criticise the Government's pace of reform in
public, which eventually undermined his position. According to Cockett "the CPS was so
closely associated with Mrs Thatcher that it had to be either with her totally, or divorced
from her" (1994: p.317). Thomas therefore attempted to change the CPS from an
independent trail-blazing institute to a research arm for ministers and the Prime Minister.
In the words of one former member of the CPS and member of the Policy Unit, the CPS
"died when Sherman left". 21
 Cockett believes this judgement reflects the views of most
involved in Conservative politics (1994: p.320). It is suggested that between 1987-92,
under David Willetts, CPS had effectively become simply a defender of the Government's
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social policy (Hames and Feasy, 1994), and under John Major was never the voice that it
once had been. Indeed, in September 1995 the director of the CPS, Gerald Frost, was
forced to resign because he had failed to deliver the CPS a high enough profile in the post-
Thatcher era. According to The Guardian, the CPS was in serious decline "with falling
donations, fewer publications, fewer conferences and outshone by rivals which were not
even directly connected with the party" (01.09.95).
Harris argues that major the problem for the CPS throughout its history has resulted from
"the paradoxes of power". This refers to the CPS's "dual role of being the institutional
expression of the tendency that wanted to 'convert' the party, and indeed control its
hierarchy, and as a participant in public debate" (1996: p.52). Harris concludes that:
There are many paradoxes to the story of the CPS. It has always trodden the thin
line between "intellectual integrity" and access to the party and government. It was
formed to speak over the heads of the party to create a public debate, yet relied on
the party as the vehicle to implement its ideas. perhaps the central paradox has been
its closeness to power and yet its apparent marginalisation (ibid).
The CPS's future looks uncertain. Despite the efforts of the new director, Tessa Keswick,
to turn the CPS's fortunes around, it still remains closely associated with Mrs Thatcher.
Following the defeat of the Conservative Party in May 1997, The Sunday Times argued
that unless a Thatcherite leader of the Party revitalises it "There does not seem the remotest
hope that the CPS could reclaim for itself the central role it played in formulating Tory
policy when it was last in opposition in the mid-1970s" (18.05.97). With William Hague as
Conservative leader, the future of the CPS remains unclear.
The Adam Smith Institute
The Origins of the ASI: The ASI has its origins in the University Conservative Association
of St Andrews in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It was there that two postgraduates,
Madsen Pine and Eamonn Butler, who currently run the ASI, met Robert Jones,
Christopher Chope, Michael Fallon and Michael Forsyth, all of whom went on to become
ministers in the Thatcher governments. This gathering of individuals prompted the
Glasgow Herald to run a two-part feature entitled "St Andrews; Crucible of Revolution"
which purported to "trace the tributaries of Thatcherism from it's Scottish source and
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follows the route from the East Neuk of Fife to the Adam Smith Institute and ultimately to
No.10 itself' (5.10.89). The ASI was conceived in 1976, the bicentenary of the work of
Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations.
The Philosophy of the ASI: According to Madsen Pine, the ASI has a "clear agenda". He
states that "the aim of the ASI is to transform society from one which is run from the top to
one which is run from the bottom", 22 or "to redistribute power downwards from
government and its bureaucracy, and into the hands of ordinary citizens" (Pine, 1992: p.9).
What distinguishes the ASI from the other new right think tanks is not ideology but
methodology and, in particular, an emphasis on public choice theory. Public choice theory
is the application of economic analysis to the political process and challenges the view that
policy-making is driven by the pursuit of the "public interest". Instead, the early
proponents of public choice theory, James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, argued that
political actors should be regarded as "rational utility maximisers", with politicians as vote-
maximisers and bureaucrats as budget-maximisers.
Building upon the foundations of public choice theory, the ASI has developed the concept
of "micropolitics" (Pine, 1988). In particular, micropolitics focuses upon the role of
interest groups in the policy process. Public choice theory regards the electorate as
coalitions of interest groups, or minorities. It is argued that it is politically easier to satisfy
the wish of a minority than a majority, because, although the benefit to the minority may
be substantial, the cost to the majority is proportionately lower. The minority therefore
have a greater incentive to fight for the benefit than the majority have to reclaim its cost.
Pine argues that if a benefit is withdrawn from a group, it is necessary either to replace it
with another, preferably larger benefit, or to create another interest group which would
benefit from the policy change. Benefits are simply commodities which can be traded.
Just as many economists find that study at the micro-level is needed for a more
accurate picture of economic reality, so it could be argued that the equivalent might
be useful in the field of politics. If it is true that people bid and trade in political
markets as they do in economic ones, then study at the micro-scale might give a
more meaningful picture, and might even lead to more practical solutions. The
suggestion is that there is a "micropolitics" just as there is a microeconomics (Pine,
1988: p.127).
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Micropolitics is thus the "creative counterpart" 23 of public choice theory, turning public
choice analysis upside down to bring self-interest to potential opponents and create
incentives for them to support and implement policy change. It is suggested that
privatisation provides an example of micropolitics in action.
For privatisation is a policy which takes on board as many of the interest groups as
possible; the former civil servants become the board of directors of the new private
companies, the workers have 8-10% of the shares allocated to them at half-price,
customers are given a preferred share allocation with reductions on the bills if they
are shareholders. You buy off every interest group you can identify, deliberately
using public choice principles to ally the interests of all major groups in support of
the policy.24
According to micropolitical analysis, this is why the privatisation under the Thatcher
Government "succeeded" while denationalisation under the Heath Government "failed",
because the latter ignored public choice theory and the political marketplace. Pine (1988)
argues that the Thatcher Government was generally more successful than the Heath
Government in achieving its policy objectives because it adopted micropolitical strategies
when implementing policy change.
Instead of running headlong into the opposition of interest groups under threat, they
were able to introduce policies which offered such groups the opportunity to trade
for greater advantage. The Conservative programmes of the early 1970s met with
failure. Those of the 1980s met with some successes. The difference between the
two was policy technique. It was the entry of ideas concerning political markets
into the activity of policy formulation (Pine, 1988: p.134).
Denham suggests that micropolitics is "less confrontational and less holistic than
conventional policy, in that it seeks to work with, rather than against, the grain of
entrenched interest groups" (1996: p.33). Given that micropolitics attempts to minimise
confrontation between interest groups "it is more piecemeal and more gradual" than some
free market programmes" (Pine, 1988: p.125).
The Work of the ASP The role of the ASI was to be one quite different from the IEA, as
Pine reveals:
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Basically the IEA was serving a different purpose. Its main strength was then, and
still is, influencing the ideas of a generation, and their main work was always done
in the universities with academic economists and so on ... What we wanted to do
was extend the range of policy options; to develop creative solutions to problems
which governments or others could take up if they wished; it was a different niche,
there was room for us both (Glasgow Herald 5/10/89).
Nor was the ASI a Conservative think tank in the mould of the CPS. Pine describes what
he regards as the key differences between the ASI and the CPS:
The CPS was founded by two important Conservatives, and remains fundamentally
interested in altering the opinion of the Conservative Party - its market is the
Conservative Party. The CPS does absolutely excellent work reminding the
Conservative Party of its own soul and persuading it of the eternal verities of the
principles of economy, and modesty of government which it may forget from time
to time. The ASI does nothing like that. All we do is innovate and produce new
ideas designed to solve specific problems.25
While the IEA sees its target audience as the "gatekeepers of ideas", the ASI focuses more
directly on decision-makers. According to Heffernan, the Institute is "elite centred,
targeting decision-makers first and opinion formers second" and its "primary audience is to
be found in Whitehall and Westminster, among them ministers, civil servants and political
opinion-formers" (1996: p.78). Central to the ASI's approach to policy change is the belief
that ideas are not enough to bring about reform themselves. As the concept of micropolitics
implies, the ASI attempts to turn theory and ideas into workable policies which have a
chance of being accepted and implemented. Pine (1988) draws an analogy between
scientists and engineers, with think tanks such as the IEA as "policy scientists" generating
and promoting an understanding of ideas, while organisations such as the ASI serve as the
"policy engineers" to help enact them.
According to Heffernan, the ASI is "fiercely libertarian" and "campaigns for the free
market in almost every sphere of life from the deregulation of licensing laws to the
privatisation of the prison service". It has also "has been particularly active in promoting
privatisation across a range of services at the level of local and national government"
(1996: pp.74-5). Some argue that the influence of the ASI upon the Thatcher Governments
was significant. The Times (17.02.89) lists its "battle honours" as not only the
privatisations of British Gas, the electricity industry, water, and Rolls Royce, but also the
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internal markets in health and education, and local government reform including
contracting out, privatisation, the abolition of the GLC, and the community charge. Many
of these policies were first advocated in the ASI's The Omega File (Butler et al, 1985),
which established working parties and reported on all areas of government policy.
Of the three new right think tanks in this survey, the ASI probably had the smoothest
transition from Thatcher to Major. While the IEA split, and the CPS found itself
increasingly marginalised, the ASI has been "prepared to make the most of the election of
John Major in succession to Margaret Thatcher" (Heffernan, 1996: p.82). 26 In particular the
ASI can claim some credit for the development of Citizens Charter, although this might be
disputed by others. 27 Pine's work on the Citizens Charter was publicly acknowledged by
the former Public Services Minister, William Waldegrave (1993), and he was appointed to
John Major's Citizen's Charter Panel of advisors between 1991-95. More recently, the ASI
has been active in promoting the shift from a pay-as-you-go to a funded pension system, or
what are called fortune accounts. Between 1995-97, the ASI committed most of its
resources to this project, which will eventually produce over a dozen publications, and
numerous seminars, lectures, and conferences. It also brought together practitioners from
the insurance industry into a working party who were closely involved in developing the
detail of the policy.
POLICY-MAKING AND THE NEW RIGHT THINK TANKS
The aim of this section is to identify the approach which would be most suitable for
assessing the impact of the new right think tanks. There are two parts. The first considers
the extent to which a new right network existed between the new right think tanks and
other political actors. It highlights a number of ways in which think tanks attempt to
influence policy, both as organisations in their own right and as part of a this network. The
second examines whether the new right think tanks should be evaluated through a "stages
heuristic" approach (through their work as "agenda-setters"), or whether a meso-level
approach (such as policy network analysis, epistemic communities, or the Advocacy
Coalition Framework) would be more useful.
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A New Right Network
As the previous section suggests, it is difficult to generalise about of think tanks in the
policy process. Each think tank carved itself a niche in the market, and each purported to
have a different role and audience. However, they did not work in a vacuum. Think tanks
worked closely with other actors to promote their policies and a number of bridges existed
to connect think tanks with others in government. Special advisers, for example, played a
pivotal role in linking ministers with the ideas of think tanks - indeed, some had written
and served in think tanks. The No. 10 Policy Unit membership also had a tradition of close
think tank association, especially with the TEA and CPS. Former ministers, and many
Conservative backbenchers on the right of the party, were keyed in to the thinking within
such circles. Many candidates at the 1992 general election were drawn from this
environment: it was noted that "of the 58 Tory seats which are being vacated, nine have
gone to the former political advisers of Cabinet ministers" (The Independent 27.03.92).
There was also a great deal of interaction and overlap between the think tanks, and
movements between think tanks and positions within government. Graham Mather began
in the Policy Unit of the IoD 28, became General Director of the TEA in 1987, helped
establish the EPF in 1992, and he is now an Conservative MEP. Oliver Letwin began as a
special adviser to Keith Joseph in the early 1980s, transferred to the No.10 Policy Unit,
wrote for the CPS (and served on its Education Study Group), was a parliamentary
candidate in the 1987 and 1992 before being elected to Parliament in 1997. Anthony Flew
wrote, or participated, on the subject of education reform for the IEA, the CPS, and the
ASI. All Heads of Mrs Thatcher's Policy Unit have had close links with the CPS. Many of
the Thatcherite No Turning Back Group, which regularly met at the TEA, had close links
with the ASI, with their respective founding members studying at St Andrews together
during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The existence of what could be called a new right network has been identified elsewhere.
Kavanagh suggests that:
close personal links existing between many activists in these groups have helped to
develop what might be called a "free enterprise solar system" ... The offices of the
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groups are located within a few square miles of each other in Westminster, close to
Parliament. The regular lunches at the TEA and the CPS study groups provide
mutual social and intellectual support for participants (1990: pp.111-112).
Dunleavy and Rhodes note that "Thatcher had a very extensive network of advisers, image
consultants, speech writers and intellectuals" (1990: p.10). According to James:
Since the 1980s, this loose but potent network has linked the free market think
tanks to sympathisers in Parliament, in the Cabinet, and in advisory posts in
Whitehall. Some members of the network went full circle: David Willetts left Mrs
Thatcher's Policy Unit to become Director of the Centre for Policy Studies, later
elected a Conservative MP, and became a leading light of the Social Market
Foundation. The significance of this network is a much neglected feature of recent
government (1993: p.503).
James actually talks of a policy network "of think tanks and Whitehall insiders" (ibid).
Similarly, Ashford argues that:
To understand the project later labelled 'Thatcherism', they should have read the
works of thinkers such as Sir Keith Joseph, Ralph Harris, Arthur Seldon and Dr
Madsen Pine and think tanks such as the Centre for Policy Studies, the Institute of
Economic Affairs, and the Adam Smith Institute that made up a small, but
ultimately influential, policy network dedicated to the promotion of a set of ideas,
associated with the new right, that were to come to dominate British politics for
well over a decade (1997: p.1).
Reflecting on Mrs Thatcher's early years in power, Riddell notes that she "kept open lines
to free-market and pro-business thinkers outside the government through some of these
advisers" (1983: p.54). Singer maintains that the economic academic profession was not
the intellectual source for the economic policy of the Thatcher Government after 1979. He
talks of "the increasing influence of a system of anti-Keynesian private think tanks" (1993:
p.77), and highlights the importance of the CPS and the IEA and their contribution to the
development of Conservative economic policy.
Other organisations contributing to the anti-Keynesian network have followed,
among them the Adam Smith Institute (with an Austrian economics approach) and
the long-established membership organisation, the Institute of Directors (with
supply side orientation). Journalists formed a part of this network: Bernard Levin
and Peter Jay in The Times, Ronald Butt in The Sunday Times and Samuel Brittan
in The Financial Times (Singer, 1993! p.77-78).
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Singer notes that the advice from this network was institutionalised by bringing such
experts into the government system as special advisers or members of the Policy Unit, or
directly into the Treasury and other departments.
The objective was to create a network of influence inside the goverment to rival
the traditional power of the Whitehall mandarins and to create channels for regular
contact between the Prime Minister's Office and the external Conservative think
tanks (1993: p.78).
This "general operating style" was utilised throughout a variety of policy areas and
"involved the extensive use of small, informal ad hoc groups of ministers and experts of
her own choice. This circumvented the formal paths of decision-making in the Cabinet and
its decision system" (ibid).
The existence of this new right network enabled think tanks to influence policy in a
number of ways. First, however, think tanks are able to influence policy in their own right.
The traditional weapon of the new right think tank was the pamphlet or report. These were
often supported by a conference, seminar, or lecture. Very occasionally, it is possible to
highlight such a report which has directly led to policy change. One example of this is the
abolition of retail price maintenance. In 1960, the IEA published Retail Price Maintenance
and Shopper's Choice, by Basil Yamey. In 1964 the responsible minister, Edward Heath,
piloted the Bill to abolish retail price maintenance (RPM) through the House of Commons.
Heath himself later highlighted the importance of the TEA, and that particular report, in a
celebratory lunch at the IEA in February 1994, marking the twentieth anniversary of the
abolition of RPM. Cockett, however, offers a cautionary note for this example noting that
"it is impossible to attribute the abolition of RPM by Edward Heath in 1964 solely to
Yamey's paper, but if Anthony Fisher's story of Heath telling him at an IEA lunch that the
troubled passage of the legislation to abolish RPM was all Yamey's fault, then Yamey
could at least claim some credit for this small step towards a free market" (1994: p.146).
Often, though, the influence of think tanks was dependent upon network allies. For
example, a second strategy by which think tanks exercised an influence on the direction or
timing of government policy was by utilising its "transmission belts". These involved the
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appointment of members, or associates, of think tanks to advisory positions within
government. They may have been appointed special advisers, or members of the Prime
Minister's Policy Unit. In these positions they had access to official documentation,
assisted in speech-writing, or wrote articles for their minister. Gerald Frost, the former
Director of the Centre for Policy Studies, maintained that: "There used to be a transmission
belt from us to Keith Joseph's speeches" (The Guardian 01.04.95). James highlights the
links between the No.10 Policy Unit and the CPS which "provided a conduit for CPS
papers to the centre of policy-making" (1992: p.237). Proposals from the new right think
tanks were more likely to be channelled to ministers or Prime Minister when such advisers
are appointed, although the success of this strategy was probably determined by the status
of the special adviser within the department (or standing with the Prime Minister).
Increasingly, given the growth of QUANG0s29 and regulatory agencies, greater patronage
is now in the hands of ministers to appoint political allies to office. Individuals from the
new right network were sometimes appointed to such bodies, giving them a greater input
during the implementation of policy, as happened to some extent in education (see chapter
5).
The role of a special adviser or an adviser in the Policy Unit leaves little time for detailed
examination of long-term problems or solutions. During the 1980s and 1990s, many
advisers left their departments not only with ideas about the direction of Government
policy, but also the direction the minister's/Prime Minister's thinking. 30 This led to a third
strategy: some advisers wrote pamphlets for think tanks after leaving Whitehall. The
eventual incorporation of their proposals into government policy may have had little to do
with the document itself, but as a consequence of the former adviser having seen the policy
evolving in Whitehall. David Willetts, Hartley Booth, and Oliver Letwin all contributed to
one or more of the new right think tanks after leaving the Downing Street Policy Unit.
Some think tank reports were formerly private briefings to ministers from when the author
was a special adviser.31
Fourth, the new right think tanks were frequently asked by the media to give a free market
perspective on current policy issues. The think tanks themselves, with their small
permanent staff, were in no position to handle most of these requests directly, but could
recommend relevant specialists from their own networks. When that person appeared on
64
the television or radio news, or is quoted in the press, there was no mention of the think
tank which brokered the introduction. Yet it was, and remains, a vital function of modern
think tanks, and ensured a steady flow of their ideas into the public domain.
Finally, it is necessary to consider a strategy which may give the illusion of influence, but
in reality suggests that certain think tanks did not act quite as independently as they might
claim. Ministers might have asked think tanks to publish a pamphlet on a particular subject
with specific proposals. While the proposals were still deniable, ministers might have been
intending to implement the proposals from the outset. For ministers, the pamphlets could
have helped create the illusion that there was an independent call for policy change. Such a
strategy might have been useful as a means of enabling ministers to test reaction to certain
policy proposals. The extent to which this kind of relationship existed between ministers
and think tanks is unknown, there is little empirical evidence, and would be difficult to
gather given that it would not be in the interest of either ministers or think tanks to make
such information public. Ministers might have been accused of not having the courage to
reveal their intentions and perhaps encouraged taunts of "hidden agendas" - and they might
also have found it difficult to distance themselves from less-helpful reports in the future.
For the think tanks it would have been a blow for their claims of independence and might
damage their credibility with the press, supporters and sponsors.
The New Right Think Tanks and "Agenda-Setting"
This notion of a new right network is useful in highlighting the opportunities available to
the IEA, CPS, and ASI to influence, or be seen to influence, policy. However, the notion
has its limitations. For example, it is also unclear how the new right network manifests
itself in particular policy areas or on specific issues. Moreover, none of those who refer to
this "network" expand on its role, or address its implications for our understanding of
policy-making. However, although the role of this network in policy-making is unclear,
some have identified a major policy-making role for the IEA, CPS, and ASI as the
"agenda-setters" of Thatcherism. The Guardian suggested that since 1979, "the influence of
the new right think tanks has been disproportionate. To a remarkable degree, they have set
the political agenda" (13.01.89). James argues that one of the new right think tanks' most
significant breakthroughs was in persuading the civil service "to share its control of the
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policy agenda" (1992: p.239). Seldon notes that the new right think tanks "helped prepare
the ground and occasionally the detail of the Thatcher agenda" (1994: p.154).
Given these perceptions, it might be tempting to assess the impact of the new right think
tanks through the stages approach to policy-making which breaks the policy process down
into a series of temporally distinct subprocesses. For example, Hogwood (1987) breaks
down the policy process into the stages of issue emergence, agenda-setting, agenda
processing, decision-making, legislation, resource allocation, implementation,
adjudication, and impact and evaluation. If the views quoted above are correct, the stages
approach would place the work of the new right think tanks at the agenda-setting stage of
the policy process. However, the notion of a new right network would suggest that
organisations such as think tanks can have an impact on policy-making throughout the
policy process, through their close links with network allies. It should be remembered that
agenda-setting and policy formulation can continue during and beyond legislation, and the
stages approach needs to be developed to take account of these factors. It is not denied that
there are temporally distinct processes - policy formulation is required before legislation,
which may be required before implementation. The task is to ensure that the work of
groups, networks, or coalitions which transcend one particular stage is not lost by
overlooking the factors which link the stages together. As Parsons argues:
although "problem" recognition and definition, the search for information, the
framing of agendas, and alternatives are "early" stages in the policy process (qua
model or map) these activities/stages are not logical sequences which culminate in
decision and implementation. Policy-making in this sense may be viewed as a form
of "collective puzzlement on society's behalf; it entails both deciding and knowing"
(Heclo, 1974: [131305). This puzzlement in the form of defining problems and
framing agendas continues - like a core thread - throughout the policy process
(1996: p.85).
Similarly Oliver Letwin argues that:
There's a sort of naive view that the policy process consists of a think tank
originating an 'idea', and that this gets translated into 'policy' by some special
adviser with the Policy Unit, and then this gets translated into ministerial will, and
then somehow translated into law by officials. Now this is a wholly false view - I
mean it is simple enough to be significantly wrong.'
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A proper evaluation of the new right think tanks must acknowledge their relationships with
other policy actors, and their links throughout the policy process. In this respect meso-level
approaches may be able to make a telling contribution. Meso-level analysis focuses on "the
linkage between the definitions of problems, the setting of agendas and the decision-
making and implementation processes" (Parsons, 1996: p.85). There are meso-level
concepts such as policy networks and advocacy coalitions which not only provide general
models of these processes (Parsons, 1996: p.184) but which also place a heavy emphasis on
the importance of groups in policy-making. Such approaches might help provide a more
accurate account of the role and impact of the new right think tanks in policy change than
the stages approach. Focusing at the meso-level also has the added advantage of relating
the work of the IEA, CPS, and ASI to two of the most influential approaches in the policy-
making literature - the Rhodes Model and the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Moreover,
focusing on approaches which use the language of "networks" and "advocacy coalitions" is
appropriate given that many identified a "new right network" the TEA, CPS, and ASI, the
last two of which had been identified by Stone as advocacy tanks (see above).
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this chapter was to introduce the organisations which are the focus of this
research. It suggests that think tanks are distinct political actors and that the new right think
tanks, as policy promoters, are distinct types of think tank. However, claims that the new
right think tanks acted as "agenda-setters" in the process of policy change should be treated
cautiously. To suggest that the IEA, CPS, and ASI operated at the beginning of a policy
process composed of temporally-distinct stages is to overlook two important factors. The
first is that the new right think tanks do not operate in a vacuum and, through the new right
network, have opportunities to shape policy throughout the stages of policy formulation.
The second factor is that policy formulation is an on-going process and, although it can be
distinguished from policy implementation, it is important to recognise the overlaps and
links between these two processes. Meso-level approaches help provide the basis of a
framework that can avoid the limitations of the stages approach as a means of assessing the
impact of the new right think tanks. This will be discussed in the following chapter.
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NOTES
1 Interview with David Willetts.
2 The Constitution was established as a two-year project in June 1995. It examined the technicalities of
constitutional reform, and closed on 31 May, 1997.
3 The above definition does, however, share other features of think tanks identified by Stone, in particular
their organisational and editorial independence, and a focus on influencing government policy.
4 For the purposes of this section, all uncited material refers to promotional literature of think tanks.
5 Weaver notes that "The steady flow of defense dollars has made Rand by far the largest of the think tanks,
with fiscal year 1986/87 revenues of almost $77 million" (1989: p.566).
6 Stone quotes the examples of the Washington-based Center for Democracy Which "has organised a 'Gift of
Democracy' programme involving donations of personal computers, printers, copiers, fax machines and other
communication facilities to the Polish legislature, as well as the Library of Democracy programme involving
gifts of collections of 'classic' works on democracy for contribution to civic groups in Eastern Europe"
(1996: pp.22-3).
7 Stone's typology also included think tanks from the US and Australia, not of direct relevance here.
8 See also Barberis and May (1993) who divides UK think tanks into those on the left, the centre, and the
right, or in-between categories.
9 See, for example, The Sunday Times (08.11.92).
113 See also Callaghan on the Fabian Society, which he claims is "more important in reflecting the shifting
priorites of the Labour party than bringing them about" (1996: p.48).
11 Despite the above criticism of James's use of the terms "disciplinary" and "multi-disciplinary", they are
nevertheless employed here. James's use was criticised as it made application of his definition of think tanks
arbitrary. Here they are not used for either definition or classification, but for description. The point that the
difference between them is arbitrary is acknowledged and accepted. However, seen as a continuum (from
highly-specialised to multi-disciplinary) the terms can have descriptive value.
12 See also Heclo and Wildavsky (1981: chapter 6) and Campbell (1983).
13 This follows Collard's original use of the term which uses the support of the free market as the common
denominator of the new right.
/ 4 For a review of The Road to Serfdom's initial impact, see Cockett, 1994, chapter 2.
15 For more information on the Austrian, Chicago, and Virginia schools, see Denham (1996), and Ashford
(1993).
16 Interview with John Blundell.
17 Interview with John Blundell.
18 Interview with Graham Mather.
19 Interview with Graham Mather.
20 Promotional literature.
21 Christopher Monckton interviewed by Richard Cockett (1994: p.320)
22 Interview with Madsen Pine.
23 Interview with Madsen Pine.
24 Interview with Madsen Pine.
25 Interview with Madsen Pine.
26 See also Hames and Feasy (1994: p.236).
27 See Hogg and Hill (1995: p.103)
28 The IoD is not a think tank as such. It is a representative organisation for directors but with its own policy
unit. The IoD was founded in 1906 and is distinguished from other trade associations by its consistent free
market approach (as opposed to more interventionist organisations such as the Confederation of British
Industry), and in that members subscribe as individual directors rather than corporate representatives. As
such, the IoD is perhaps less beholden to large donors than other trade associations.
29 Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Agencies.
30 Interview with former member of No.10 Policy Unit.
31 Private information.
32 Interview with Oliver Letwin
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Three
Think Tanks, Networks and Coalitions
The aim of this chapter is to consider the utility of competing meso-level policy
frameworks for assessing the impact of the new right think tanks on policy change, and to
present a framework for assessment based on the strengths and weaknesses of these
approaches. There are a number of existing approaches and theories which seek to explain
the role of groups in policy-making and/or policy change, such as policy network analysis
(in particular the Rhodes Model) and the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF). It will be
argued that such approaches either fail to incorporate think tanks into their analysis or do
not allow sufficient focus to be placed upon the activities of think tanks to enable the
primary research questions outlined in chapter one to be answered. That is not to say that
these approaches are of little value. On the contrary, both the Rhodes Model and the ACF
make valuable contributions to our understanding of the. TOCt of groups in the policy
process. However, these approaches have been developed to address issues different from
the focus of this research. Consequently the application of these approaches carries the
potential danger of distorting the evidence, or the presentation of evidence, in a way which
would not directly address the impact of the new right think tanks.
The framework adopted for the case studies will be known as the template. The template is
designed to allow a greater degree of flexibility than is provided by existing approaches,
although it draws heavily upon aspects of both the Rhodes Model and the ACF. The major
difference between the template and these approaches is that the former does not promote a
particular theory of policy-making and/or policy change. The template is primarily a
mapping device which structures and presents the relevant case study data, against which
qualitative judgements of the impact of the new right think tanks will be made. It seeks to
incorporate a range of key variables which either accelerated or hindered policy change so
that the assessment of the IEA, CPS, and ASI on specific policy changes is placed in its
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proper context. The template is thus a heuristic framework rather than an explanatory
model, although it is argued that further research might be able to give the template greater
explanatory value.
This chapter has three sections. The first looks at the Rhodes Model and suggests that its
difficulties in accounting for policy change limit its potential for assessing the impact of
the new right think tanks. Much of this section concentrates on the Rhodes Model as
developed by Rhodes (1986, 1988), Marsh and Rhodes (1992a) and Smith (1993).
Although Marsh and Smith (1999) have since produced a more dynamic "dialectic"
Rhodes Model,' the earlier work remains important as it generated a number of case studies
which reflect important weaknesses in this approach which have yet to be fully addressed.
The second section considers the key characteristics and criticisms of the ACF. It argues
that, despite having a number of features which might make it superficially more appealing
than the Rhodes Model, it is primarily a theory of policy change with a number of testable
hypotheses which, if applied, would not adequately address the issue of think tank
influence. This section also briefly considers epistemic communities which have been used
to explain the work of the new right think tanks, and which have also been presented as a
subset of advocacy coalitions. The third section outlines the template which seeks to
amalgamate some of the key insights of both the Rhodes Model and the ACF to construct a
framework for the case study chapters. This section suggests that Marsh and Smith's
dialectic approach incorporates some of the important dynamics present in the ACF, and
that the two could be synthesised to develop a more comprehensive approach which could
help explain both policy continuity and policy change. Although the template is although
designed to help assess the impact of just one particular variable - think tanks - it may have
wider theoretical significance by providing the basis for integrating the two approaches.
POLICY NETWORKS
One of the most influential recent developments in the British policy-making literature has
been policy network analysis. Dowding suggests that "Policy network analysis has become
the dominant paradigm for the study of the policy-making process in British political
science" (1995: p.136), whilst Hay maintains that the "network paradigm" is "reshaping the
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political, economic, and social landscape of the advanced industrial societies" (1998: p.33).
There have been a number of approaches to policy network analysis in recent years,
including: the rational choice approach; the personal interaction approach; formal network
analysis; and the structural approach.' This research focuses on the Rhodes Model, which
presents networks as groups linked by "resource dependencies". This is not to deny the
validity of alternative approaches to policy network analysis, but the Rhodes Model is the
most widely applied and probably the most influential approach in the UK.
Another reason for employing the Rhodes Model is that it has proved to be more dynamic
than other network approaches. Not only has the Rhodes Model evolved in response to
some of the criticisms levelled against it, but it has also attempted to integrate some of the
more important contributions of alternative approaches. Most network approaches are
either structure-centred or agency-centred, where the former emphasises the structural
nature of networks (for example, Knoke, 1990) and the latter focuses on the importance of
interpersonal relations within the networks (for example, Heclo and Wildavsky, 1974).
Although Marsh and Smith believe that the Rhodes Model is "essentially structural", they
have recently developed a "dialectic" approach to the Rhodes Model which is neither
simply structure nor agency-based but one which recognises that structures and agents
continually interact. Although the dialectic approach does not address all the criticisms
levelled at the Rhodes Model it is research in progress and its major propositions are
beginning to dovetail with those of the influential Advocacy Coalition Framework. This
suggests that the dialectic Rhodes Model is likely to be the most important network
approach in the near future.
This section has two parts. The first examines the key characteristics of the Rhodes Model.
The second highlights its main weaknesses and limitations. Although the Rhodes Model
literature has acknowledged that the new right think tanks promoted policy change, their
role is insufficiently conceptualised. To incorporate the IEA, CPS, ASI and their allies into
the analysis would require the Rhodes Model either to extend its typology or to adopt a
more flexible approach to categorising its networks, with guidance as to the implications of
these new groups and/or networks for the future analysis of policy-making and policy
change. Although research into the Rhodes Model and the role of policy networks on
policy outcomes has progressed recently with the development of the dialectic approach, it
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has not sufficiently addressed this weakness. In particular, there are a number of questions
regarding the relationship between the new right networks (or "personal networks"), policy
networks and policy outcomes that remain unexplored. This limits the capacity of the
Rhodes Model in its present form to provide a complete analysis of the impact of the new
right think tanks.
Key Characteristics of the Rhodes Model
Rhodes and Marsh explain that the policy network concept has grown out of the
inadequacies of both the pluralist and corporatist models as neither "provided a very
realistic picture of the relationships between government and interest groups, largely
because they purported to offer a general model of these relationships" (1992a: p.3). They
argue that such relationships may differ markedly between policy areas and therefore what
is needed is an approach which will "disaggregate policy analysis and stresses that
relationships between groups and government vary between policy areas" (ibid). At the
heart of Rhodes's analysis is the notion of power-dependence. This contains five
propositions:
a) Any organisation is dependent upon other organisations for resources.
b) In order to achieve their goals, the organisations have to exchange resources.
c) Although decision-making within the organisation is constrained by other
organisations, the dominant coalition retains some discretion. The appreciative
system of the dominant coalition influences which relationships are seen as a
problem and which resources will be sought.
d) The dominant coalition employs strategies within known rules of the game to
regulate the process of exchange.
e) Variations in the degree of discretion are a product of the goals and the relative
power potential of the interacting organisations. This relative power potential is a
product of the resources of each organisation, or the rules of the game and the
process of exchange between organisations (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992a: p.10).
In his study of central-local relations, Rhodes suggested that: "Central-local relations take
on aspects of a 'game' in which central and local participants manoeuvre for advantage,
deploying the resources they control to maximise their influence over outcomes and trying
to avoid becoming dependent on other 'players' (1988: p.42). Organisations have a number
of resources which can be deployed, such as authority (legal resources), money (financial
resources), political legitimacy (political resources), and informational and organisational
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(people, skills, equipment) resources (Rhodes, 1988: pp.90-1). Organisations also deploy
strategies "for imposing upon other organisations and organisation's preferences
concerning the time of, conditions for and extent of the exchange of resources" (ibid).
Strategies can include consultation, bargaining, confrontation or persuasion. 3 The concept
of power-dependence was first deployed by Rhodes to analyse the relationship between
central and local government (1981, 1986). He argued that "both central departments and
local authorities are inter-dependent and no matter how powerful central government may
seem it is always dependent upon local government to some degree" (1986: p.17).
The definition of a policy network is given as "a cluster or complex of organisations
connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or
complexes by breaks in the structure of the resource dependencies" (ibid). The term "policy
networks" is treated as an over-arching label, with the Rhodes Model identifying five ideal
types. Policy communities (derived from Richardson and Jordan, 1979) and issue
networks (derived from Heclo, 1978) represent the two extremes of the model. While
policy communities (and territorial communities) have a highly restricted and integrated
membership, such as fire services or education (Richardson and Jordan, 1979; Rhodes,
1986: chapter 4; Rhodes, 1988: chapter 4), issue networks are characterised by a large
number of participants, diverse and fragmented, with no single focal point at the centre,
such as with leisure and recreation policy (Rhodes, 1988: p.78). In between lie professional
networks, intergovernmental networks, and producer networks, on a continuum (from
policy communities to issue networks) based on increasing numbers of participants per
network and decreasing vertical independence.
The Rhodes Model is different from that adopted from Richardson and Jordan (1979) in
distinguishing between different types of network. While Richardson and Jordan use the
term "policy community" to describe nearly all types of state/group relations, the Rhodes
Model distinguishes between relations in different policy areas on the basis of composition,
integration, and interdependence. The Rhodes Model is presented as a meso-level concept,
addressing the structural relationship between units of sub-central government, as opposed
to a micro-level concept looking at relationships within specific units of government (for
example Heclo and Wildavsky, 1974; and MacPherson and Raab, 1988), or a macro-level
analysis which focuses upon the interaction between groups and the broader socio-
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Table 5
Policy Community and Policy Network: the Rhodes Model
Characteristics of network
Stability, highly restricted membership,
vertical independence, limited horizontal articulation
Stability, highly restricted membership, vertical
independence, limited horizontal articulation, serves
interest of profession
Limited membership, limited vertical interdependence,
extensive horizontal articulation
Fluctuating membership, limited vertical
interdependence, serves interest of producer
Unstable, large numbers of members, limited vertical
interdependence
Intergovernmental network
Producer network
Issue network
Type of network
Policy community/territorial
community
Professional network
economic and political context (Rhodes, 1988: p.46). Recent analysis suggests that the
policy network approach has little utility as an explanatory concept unless it is integrated
with macro and micro-level analysis (Marsh and Smith, 1999), but the principal focus of
the Rhodes Model remains interest group intermediation (Daugbjerg and Marsh, 1998).
Source: Rhodes and Marsh, 1992a: p.14
The Rhodes Model, Think Tanks and Policy Change
One of the main criticisms of the Rhodes Model is that it has little to contribute to our
understanding of why or how policy changes. The remainder of this section will address
this criticism to consider whether the Rhodes Model could be a suitable framework through
which to assess the impact of the new right think tanks.
Since it was first presented the Rhodes Model has developed and responded to certain
criticisms. Some have proposed a "dialectical" approach to the Rhodes Model (Marsh,
1998; Marsh and Smith, 1999; Hay, 1998) which provides a more dynamic account of the
relationship between policy networks and policy change, but which fails to incorporate
groups which promote change and which do not fall comfortably within the Rhodes Model
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typology. It will be argued that the failure fully to address this limitation means that, for
the purposes of addressing the key research questions outlined in chapter 1, alternative
approaches must be explored for an appropriate framework to be found.
The main criticism of the Rhodes Model here is that it struggles to account for policy
change. Smith maintains that the "role of a policy community is to prevent change by
excluding threats to the dominant interests" (1993: p.76). Marsh and Rhodes note that their
case studies "show that policy networks exist to routinize relationships; they promote
continuity and stability", and that much of the literature "sees policy networks as a major
source of policy inertia, not innovation" (1992c: p.261). This is not to suggest that policy
change never occurs. Marsh and Rhodes argue that "policy networks do not necessarily
seek to frustrate any and all change, but rather to contain, constrain, redirect, and ride out
such change, thereby materially affecting its speed and direction" (ibid). It is recognised
that "there has been policy change, both in the shape of the policy networks and in the
outcomes, but the existence of a policy network or community acts as a major constraint
upon the degree of change" (ibid).
The Rhodes Model does not ignore the question of change completely, as Marsh and
Rhodes (1992c) and Smith (1993a) do suggest reasons why policy networks might change.
For example, economic change could undermine the role of some groups and increase the
relevance and importance of others. Marsh (1992) argues that the growth in unemployment
from the 1970s increased the importance of the Manpower Services Commission and the
development of an employment network including the Department of Employment, the
Confederation of British Industry and the Trades Union Congress. However, focusing on
how policy networks change is different from explaining why policies change, although it
is possible that both networks and policies might change due to the same factors (Marsh
and Smith, 1999). Other factors affecting network change are said to include: ideological
factors, especially the ideology of the governing party; knowledge and technological
change; and institutional change, such as the growing significance of European Union
institutions (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992c: pp.257-8).
Rhodes and Marsh (1992b) criticise those such as Savage and Robins (1989) for
concentrating excessively on legislative change, and insufficiently on changes in policy
outcomes and, in particular, the problems of implementation. Marsh and Rhodes suggest
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that such problems were due to the continuing relevance of policy networks in their ability
to use their resources to frustrate change. Their study Implementing Thatcherite Policies 
concludes that in most cases "continuity has been preserved, in part, because of the policy
network [preventing] radical policies being brought forward" (Marsh and Rhodes, 1992d:
p.186). For example, regarding the community charge they note that "the Government tried
to bypass the policy network at the policy formation stage, but the implementation of the
policy was constrained by the actions of that network" (ibid). This led to an
"implementation gap", where the Thatcher Government
deliberately adopted a top-down model [of implementation] and either failed to
recognise, or chose to ignore, the known conditions for effective implementation in
its determination to impose its preferred policies. It is legitimate to hypothesise that
Conservative policy failure is explained by this self-inflicted implementation gap
(Rhodes and Marsh, 1992b: p.9).
Since 1979 there have been significant changes both in intent and in the style of policy-
making, and a marked decline in the level of consultation between the Conservative
Government and service providers and interest groups was identified. Indeed, this lack of
consultation may help explain the implementation gap:
It is often suggested that, after 1979, there was little role for interest groups in the
creation of policy; that consultation became a thing of the past. This generalisation
is true of the policy areas examined here. Certainly, the representative organisations
of local government were not consulted during the saga of the reform of local
government finance. Nor were the trade unions consulted about the content of most
of the Thatcher Government's industrial relations legislation; at 'best' they were
called in to be told what the Government of the day intended (Marsh and Rhodes,
1992d: p.180).
A number of case studies have reinforced the view that policy-making since 1979 marks a
departure from previous patterns. Moon, Richardson, and Smart, suggest that the
privatisation of British Telecom reflected "the priorities and methods adopted by the
departments and ministers directly involved than those characteristic of the traditional
policy community" (1986: p.350). With regard to water privatisation, Richardson et al
argue that the policy style switched between consultation and imposition, thus reflecting "a
shifting pattern of policy-making in which one model is insufficient, over time, to describe
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the process" (1992: p.172). On the community charge, Crick and Van Claveren (1991)
explain that, while the search for an alternative to the rates had begun in earnest back in the
early 1970s, a small and exclusive group of political advisers were responsible for what
emerged as the "poll tax". The community charge is also cited by Dunleavy as an example
of "policy disaster", brought about partly because of a "divorce between initiation and
implementation" (1995: p.62). Dunleavy talks of "the shift by ministers away from using
their senior civil servants for policy advice, and towards reliance instead on politically
aligned think tanks and outside experts, plus younger civil servants or advisors anxious to
make their mark and secure promotion" (ibid).
What all these studies suggest is that there are a number of policy actors involved in policy
formulation who appear to be neglected by the Rhodes Model. MPs, special advisers, think
tanks and others all have resources and all seek to influence policy outcomes: MPs have the
authority as elected representatives to raise specific issues, either publicly in Parliament, or
privately with ministers; special advisers also have substantial access to ministers; print
journalists have a captive audience for their ideas, subject to the competitive pressures
faced by their newspapers; think tanks have more time than those involved with day-to-day
policy management to think strategically and long-term, with the TEA, CPS, and the ASI
developing a considerable reputation for influencing the Thatcher and Major Governments.
There is no theoretical reason why such actors cannot be members of policy networks,
although the nature of their work means it is unlikely that MPs or journalists will be
involved in regular, incremental policy discussions. It is highly unlikely, for example, that
think tanks could be classified within policy communities. They are, as James argues,
"irregular, freebooting outfits" whose "interventions are limited and sporadic (1993:
p.504). It is especially difficult to reconcile the new right think tanks, whose raison d'être
is policy change with policy communities which seek to limit it. It might be possible that
the present Labour Government is regarded with less hostility by policy communities and
as such the centre-left think tanks, with their close links to the Blair leadership, might have
access to policy communities on broader, strategic policy-making issues. It may be
possible that alliances will be formed to push through policy changes where there is
agreement between the centre-left think tanks and the policy communities. As chapter two
shows, Demos and the IPPR have or have had personnel in key advisory roles although the
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actual extent of their influence on policy communities or upon policy outcomes is an area
which will require further research. However, as the case study chapters in Part Two
demonstrate, the new right think tanks did not have the cordial relationship with service
providers within which a constructive dialogue could take place.
The literature on the Rhodes Model has, overall, been relatively silent on the role and
significance of the new right think tanks. There is no indexed mention of the IEA, CPS, or
ASI in Rhodes's Beyond Westminster and Whitehall, Marsh and Rhodes's Policy Networks 
in British Government or Implementing Thatcherite Policies, or Marsh's Comparing Policy
Networks.4 This may simply be a reflection of the case study conclusions in Marsh and
Rhodes (1992a) which identified policy continuity rather than change, and as such there
should be no suggestion that the Rhodes Model precludes us from dealing with think tanks
or policy change. Indeed, the role of the new right think tanks is recognised by Smith who
acknowledges their role in Mrs Thatcher's review of the health service. Health policy, and
the internal market, was a policy area under Mrs Thatcher where a distinct change of style
occurred: "policy-making has moved away from being consensual to being conflictual, to
the extent that the government has been prepared to exclude traditional members of the
policy community and include new groups such as the new right think-tanks" (Smith,
1993: p.183). In particular, Smith shows that groups which would normally have been
consulted - such as the British Medical Association (BMA) and the Royal Colleges - were
excluded until the publication of the White Paper announcing the reform programme.5
One way of incorporating the role of the new right think tanks within the Rhodes IvJodei
could be through the notion of issue networks, which incorporate a much larger number of
actors. According to Rhodes, "The distinctive feature of this kind of network are its large
number of participants and their limited degree of interdependence", and where "there is no
single focal point at the centre with which other actors need to bargain for resources"
(1988: p.78). However, the concept of issue networks raises a number of problems. Marsh
and Rhodes argue that issue networks occur only with issues that are relatively unimportant
for macro-policy such as leisure policy. Smith disputes this, arguing that "Issue networks
do exist in areas of the policy core agenda and where the interests of economic groups and
professionals are threatened" (1993: p.223). Smith cites the example of industrial policy,
where there was a range of actors who "had different economic interests. Consequently, it
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was extremely difficult to build any consensus, and the policy area remained highly
political" (ibid).
Elsewhere Read, in his study on the politics of smoking, identifies both a producer network
and an issue network. The producer network includes the tobacco producers and
government departments (the Department of Trade and Industry in particular) and
discusses matters relating to tobacco taxation, advertising, and sponsorship. Opposing it are
bodies such as the Department of Health, the BMA and the pressure group ASH (Action on
Smoking and Health). These groups operate in an issue network which also includes other
supporters of the tobacco industry such as the Tobacco Workers' Union and the pro-
smoking group FOREST (Freedom Organisation for the Right to Enjoy Smoking
Tobacco). The anti-smoking bodies began to pose a threat to the producer network when a
statistical link was made between smoking and ill-health (Read, 1992: p.132). According to
Read, the line-up of policy actors suggests that "Rhodes's attempt to locate policy
communities and issue networks at opposite ends of a continuum may be misguided",
arguing instead that the two might in fact be "coterminous" (ibid). Marsh and Rhodes
concede that network types "are not mutually exclusive" (1992c: p.255).
Read's division of the smoking network into a core (producer group) and periphery (issue
network) has important implications for the concept of issue networks and the Rhodes
model generally. For do not all policy areas have a core and periphery? If so, are not issue
networks a ubiquitous feature of policy-making? It is doubtful that issue networks are as
atomistic as is claimed (Rhodes, 1988: p.78; Rhodes and Marsh, 1992a: p.14). This would
be to ignore the links which exist between groups in the periphery and groups in the core.
Read, for example, does not fully address the relationship between FOREST and the
tobacco producers, despite noting that the former is financed by the latter. Thus it is unclear
how FOREST, on the periphery, helps the tobacco producers, in the core, to achieve their
policy objectives. Clearly groups outside the core affect the core. Read emphasises this
point arguing that, following the link between smoking and certain diseases, such
information "has been used by the BMA and ASH, both groups outside the [producer]
network, in an attempt to restrict the promotional activities of the industry, suggesting that
the political agenda can be altered from the outside" (1992: p.132). Marsh and Rhodes
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themselves acknowledge that ideas at a systemic level affect policy outcomes at a sectoral
level:
The Conservative Party and the ideology of the New Right have been a wellspring
of policy initiatives during the 1980s, giving the policy agenda a distinctive twist
and mounting a serious and continuous challenge to the established routines of the
policy networks ... Many a policy initiative may have faltered in the process of
implementation, but the impact of party on setting the policy agenda and the
process of policy innovation is considerable (1992c: p.257-258).
Thus in order to get a more complete explanation of policy outcomes it is necessary to go
beyond the routine, formal patterns of consultation, advice and bargaining in the Rhodes
Model, and focus upon the resources and strategies of those who disseminate knowledge
and ideas outside of the policy networks.
The Rhodes Model makes little or no allowance for different "levels" of policy-making.
Policy communities, for example, are defined largely by routine, formalised relationships
and incremental policy-making, such as the Annual Review for agricultural prices (Smith,
1992), or the delivery of medical services within the NI-IS (Wistow, 1992: p.59). More
recently Rhodes (1996) has used the network approach in the exclusively narrow context of
service delivery rather than policy-making at multiple levels. Policy actors identified in the
Rhodes Model are largely service providers, economic interests, and governmental (both
national and local) agencies. It is unsurprising that focusing on routine policy-making will
unearth regular relationships. But this is only one aspect of policy-making, and such
approaches are often unable to account for irregular, but radical, policy change. According
to Baumgartner and Jones:
Rapid change in public policy outcomes often occurs, but most theories of
pluralism emphasize only incrementalism. This overemphasis on incrementalism
has caused many to view pluralism as inherently conservative. Yet from a historical
view, it can easily be seen that many policies go through long periods of stability
and short periods of dramatic reversals. These long periods of stability have led
political scientists to focus on the equilibrium of current policy compromises rather
than on the punctuations in the equilibrium by dramatic change (1991: p.1044).
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Baumgartner and Jones suggest that radical policy change can occur when policy actors
seek to switch policy debates to "arenas" more favourable for the consideration of their
issues. An example of this was the environmental lobby in the UK which was able to
influence roads policy and undermine the powerful alliance of the Department of Transport
and the roads lobby by focusing more of their resources first, in the 1970s, towards public
inquiries and, in the 1990s, on the sites themselves (Dudley and Richardson, 1996, 1998).
The importance of alternative arenas and their significance for policy networks and policy
outcomes is a much neglected factor within the Rhodes Model approach.
It is also necessary to identify what is meant by "policy change". Hall suggests that policy-
making and policy change operate at three levels:
First and second order change can be seen as cases of "normal policymaking",
namely of a process that adjusts policy without challenging the overall terms of a
given policy paradigm, much like "normal science". Third order change, by
contrast, is likely to reflect a very different process, marked by the radical changes
in the overarching terms of policy discourse associated with a "paradigm shift"
(1993: p.279).
Hall's breakdown is useful in allowing for the potential impacts of different groups on
policy change at different "levels". Some groups may be involved in changing the overall
direction of policy (third order change), while others may simply be involved in annual
consultations or incremental revisions to policy (first order change). Marsh and Rhodes do
appear to recognise this in their notion of the implementation gap. If this implementation
gap is "self-inflicted" (i.e. the Government chose not to consult fully to discover the
conditions for the successful implementation of its policies), this raises a number of
questions:
• to whom did the Government go for advice and support?
• which groups promoted policy change?
• what resources and strategies were deployed by these groups? and
• what were the effect of these on policy outcomes?
As noted above, think tanks have resources and are able to deploy strategies to help them
achieve their objectives, although it is less clear that the new right network(s) are bound
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together by resource dependencies as policy networks are in the Rhodes Model. Chapter
two suggests that it was primarily shared beliefs that bound these organisations and
individuals together. The Rhodes Model does not incorporate the notion of belief systems
into its analysis, although Rhodes does argue that the delivery of a specific service might
be shaped by appreciative systems. An appreciative system is described as an "operating
code" or "the accumulated wisdom or map of the world of a central or local department
which enables it to steer a course through its environment" (Rhodes, 1988: p.93).
An appreciative system is not the same as a belief system. Sabatier, in the context of the
ACF, notes that belief systems "involve priorities, perceptions or important causal
relationships, perceptions of world states, perceptions of the efficacy of policy instruments
and so on" (1993: p.17). Thus Rhodes notes that within the education service, policy-
making was guided by an appreciative system described as the "logic of arithmetic" in that
"policy was determined by the numbers of pupils in the education sector" (Rhodes, 1988:
p.93). This is different from those who sought to shape policy on the grounds of deeply-
held beliefs regarding the legitimate role of the state, the purpose of schooling or the
philosophy of education. The belief system determines the general parameters of policy
whereas the appreciative system focuses more on process, referring to the guiding approach
which helps agents determine how routine policy issues are decided (such as what the
relationship between different levels of government should be). The difference between
appreciative systems and belief systems might be simply a matter of degree (for example,
the former involved with first order changes and the latter with third order changes) but this
should not mean that either end of the spectrum should be neglected.
The difficulties which the Rhodes Model has had with policy change have yet to be
satisfactorily addressed. Recently Dudley and Richardson noted (with the Rhodes Model
in mind) that "one reason that network analysis is showing some intellectual fatigue is that
it seems weak in explaining how policy change comes about" (1998: p.728). Marsh and
Smith have recognised some of the weaknesses with the Rhodes Model and have
responded with a dialectical approach to policy networks. This was partly in response to
Dowding (1995) who argued that the Rhodes Model was merely a metaphor for
understanding policy-making rather than a model which explained policy outcomes.
According to Dowding, approaches such as the Rhodes Model
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fail because the driving force of the explanation, the independent variables, are not
network characteristics but rather characteristics of components within the
networks. These components explain both the nature of the network and the nature
of the process (1995: p.157).
Arguing from a rational choice perspective, Dowding believes that the policy network
approach could have greater explanatory value if there more focus on the bargaining
strategies between network members. It is argued that previous case study work had failed
to establish a direct causal link between bargaining amongst network members and policy
outcomes. To establish this link Dowding suggests that network analysis needs to adopt a
bargaining model and game theory.
Thus while Marsh and Rhodes originally developed a structural approach to policy network
analysis, Dowding suggests that the Rhodes Model needs to pay greater attention to agents.
The dialectic approach seeks to bridge the structure/agency debate. Marsh and Smith
(1999) argue that any discussion between policy networks, policy outcomes and policy
change must acknowledge three dialectical relationships between: structure and agency;
network and context; and network and outcome. Dowding is criticised for privileging
agents (members of the network) over structure (the network itself) and failing to recognise
that structures help determine the actions of agents.
The actions of agents change structures which, in turn, form the context within
which agents act. Structures may constrain or facilitate agents but they are not
given; rather they are capable of interpretation and re-negotiation and, thus, subject
to change (ibid).
The relationship between structure and agency is dialectical in that it is "an interactive
relationship between two variables in which each affects the other". There is a similar
relationship between the networks and the broader context. Marsh and Smith argue that
it is evident that exogenous changes can affect the resources, interests and
relationships of the actors within the network. Changes in these factors can
produce tensions and conflicts which lead to either a breakdown in the network or
the development of new policies. However, these changes don't have an effect
independent of the structure of, and interactions with, the network. All such
exogenous change is mediated through the understanding of agents and interpreted
in the context of the structures, rules/norms and interpersonal relationships within
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the network. So, any simple distinction between endogenous and exogenous
factors is misleading (ibid).
Finally, a dialectical relationship also exists between the networks and policy outcomes,
where networks not only affect outcomes but "these outcomes also affect the shape of the
policy network directly, as well as having an effect on the structural position of certain
interests in civil society and the strategic learning of actors in the network".
Marsh and Smith's dialectical approach offers a far more dynamic account of how
networks operate, not only in relation to network members and network structures but also
between policy networks and policy outcomes, and policy networks and the context within
which they operate. Thus networks and outcomes are not static but in a continuous state of
flux, although there is nothing to suggest that networks no longer seek to minimise the
extent of policy change. But this new approach remains firmly wedded to the Rhodes
model typology so it provides no further indication as to how groups which promote
change, and are outside the policy networks, are to be treated. For example, Marsh and
Smith refer to the formation of Mrs Thatcher's "own personal network ... to reform the
National Health Service and override the institutionally defined health policy network"
(ibid). But Marsh and Smith give little guidance about how such "personal networks"
should be regarded vis-à-vis the Rhodes Model. It raises such questions as:
• should all actors, including think tanks, participating in a specific policy area be part of
a single policy network?
• should these rival networks be seen as competing policy networks?
• should they be seen as competing "coalitions" within the same network?
Marsh and Smith acknowledge that policy networks can conflict and constrain each other,
noting that "the context within which networks operate is composed, in part, of other
networks and this aspect of the context has a clear impact on the operation of the network,
upon change in the network and upon policy outcomes" (ibid). But Marsh and Smith are
less clear on how conflict between groups manifests itself, or how they aggregate
themselves in the same policy area. In talking of "personal networks", Marsh and Smith
appear to acknowledge implicitly that organisations such as the lEA, CPS, and ASI have a
role in policy-making. Yet they also endorse the Rhodes Model, in which none of the
categories satisfactorily incorporates the role of the new right think tanks in policy-making.
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Smith argues that when policy change occurred, as with the health service reforms of the
late 1980s, this was due largely to the political resources available to ministers. With
regard to health policy, he notes that: "Mrs Thatcher was prepared to use her political
authority - even her 'despotic power' - and capital to challenge an established policy
community by making policy outside it" (Smith, 1993: p.184). It appears that defenders of
the Rhodes Model such as Smith regard (in the case of health) the policy community as the
only set of group relationships worth conceptualising. The role of Mrs Thatcher's "personal
network" is acknowledged but its treatment is superficial. Neither Smith (1993) nor Marsh
and Smith (1999) address:
• the actual composition and stability of this network;
• the factors which bound it together;
• the resources and strategies available and how they were used;
• the extent to which these resources and strategies helped the network achieve its policy
objectives; and
• the factors which aided and constrained it in this process.
This omission is somewhat surprising because, despite arguing that resource dependencies
can occur between Cabinet ministers (Smith, 1994) and between government departments
(Smith, Marsh, and Richards, 1993), Marsh and Smith do not address the extent to which
the power-dependence framework might or might not be applicable to these "personal
networks". Similarly, Marsh and Smith make no reference to the implications of "personal
networks" for the structure/agency debate which they are addressing. Does the dialectic
approach have the same underlying dynamic for personal networks as, say, for policy
communities? Do personal networks, which by definition place a greater emphasis on
inter-personal relations, privilege agents over structures in the relationship between the
personal network and network members? Is the comparison between policy communities
and personal networks of any value?
To summarise, the Rhodes Model has contributed a great deal to our understanding of the
impact of groups on policy-making and policy outcomes. However, it can only provide a
partial understanding of policy-making, and can only account for the impact of some
groups on some policy outcomes. The Rhodes Model has proved useful in categorising
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and describing the role of groups involved in routine, regular policy-making and in
explaining policy outcomes where there has been policy continuity. It is less useful in
analysing the role and dynamics of groups (such as the new right think tanks) which are
involved sporadically and who promote radical policy change. We learn very little about
the role of the TEA, CPS, or ASI in policy change other than that they might have been
influential in promoting the general principles of the new right, and that policy
communities and other networks are likely to have provided a major obstacle to the
changes which they promoted.
While the development by Marsh and Smith of the dialectical model provides the approach
with stronger theoretical foundations, it does little to broaden the Rhodes Model to
incorporate organisations such as the new right think tanks or new right networks. It is
disappointing that there has been little further case study work conducted into policy areas
where policy change has occurred despite the opposition of the relevant service providers.
As such the relationship between policy networks, new right networks and policy outcomes
remains largely unexplored. This limits the utility of the Rhodes Model as a general
approach and for the narrow focus of this research. It might be possible to take the
underlying characteristics of the Rhodes Model and apply them to policy areas which have
experienced radical policy changes. But the primary aim of the thesis is not to "develop"
the Rhodes Model. Moreover, there are alternative approaches, compatible with the
Rhodes Model, which focus on policy change and are capable of incorporating the work of
the new right think tanks. One such approach is the Advocacy Coalition Framework.
THE ADVOCACY COALITION FRAMEWORK
This section provides a critical analysis of the ACF. The ACF appears to offer a more
suitable approach for assessing the new right think tanks than the Rhodes Model. First, it
is a model of policy change, well-suited to the third order change usually promoted by
think tanks. Second, the notion of advocacy coalitions bound together by the beliefs of its
members is far more in keeping with the idea of a new right network outlined in the
previous chapter. Third, it incorporates more explicitly contextual factors which are likely
to affect the impact that any group or coalition is likely to have on policy outcomes. This
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section outlines the key tenets of the ACF and some of its weaknesses and limitations. It
does not address all or arguably the most important criticisms of the ACF, but includes
those with the most important theoretical and methodological implications for this
research.6
Key Tenets of the ACF
The ACF is built upon four premises. The first is that understanding policy change requires
a time perspective of a decade or more. The second premise is that "the most useful
aggregate unit of analysis for understanding policy change in modern industrial societies is
not any specific government institution but rather a policy subsystem, that is, those actors
from a variety of public and private organisations who are actively concerned with a policy
problem or issue such as air pollution control, mental health, or surface transportation"
(Sabatier, 1993: p.16). Subsystems emerge when a "group of actors become dissatisfied
enough with the neglect of a particular problem by existing subsystems to form their own"
(ibid). Sabatier makes a distinction between a policy subsystem in the ACF and
subsystems which have been characterised, for example, as "iron triangles" (Heclo, 1978).
This concept is criticised as being too exclusive, focusing only upon interest groups,
congressional committees, and government agencies. Sabatier argues that policy
subsystems should also include "journalists, analysts, researchers, and others who play
important roles in the generation, dissemination, and evaluation of ideas, as well as actors
at other levels of government who play important roles in policy formulation" (1993: p.24).
The third premise is that policy subsystems operate at all levels of government, and should
therefore incorporate an inter-governmental dimension. Finally, Sabatier emphasises the
importance of belief systems.
The ACF assumes that within each policy subsystem "actors can be aggregated into a
number of advocacy coalitions composed of people from various governmental and private
organisations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and who often act in concert"
(Sabatier, 1993: p.18), and who "show a nontrivial degree of co-ordinated activity over
time" (ibid). Each coalition has resources, which "include such things as money, expertise,
number of supporters, and legal authority" (ibi d), and strategies (which are undefined). The
number of advocacy coalitions within a policy subsystem will vary, and not every actor
87
RELATIVELY STABLE
PARAMETERS
I Basic attrkles of the problem
area (good)
2.Basic distribution of natural
resources
3.Fundamental sociocultural
values and social structure
4.Basic constitutional
structure (rules)
EXTERNAL (SYSTEM)
EVENTS
t Changes in socioecanorric
condons
2. Changes in systernic governitg
coafition
3. Policy decisions and impacts
Irom other subsystems
Constraints
and
Resources
of
Subsystem
Actors
POLICY SUBSYSTEM
Coalition A
a. Pelicy beliefs
b.Resources
Strategy Al
re guidance
iistruments
Coalition B
a Policy beliefs
b Resources
1
Strategy 61
re guidance
hstruments
Decisions
by Sovereigns
4.
Agency Resources and
General Poky Orientation
Policy outputs -10-
4,4-- Poky Impacts
Po cy
Brokers
Table 6
The Advocacy Coalition Framework7
will belong to an advocacy coalition. Within policy subsystems, policy brokers will exist
"whose dominant concerns are with keeping the level of political conflict within acceptable
limits and reaching some reasonable 'solution' to the problem" (ibid).
Source: Sabatier, 1993a: p.18
The ACF includes two sets of external factors which are said to affect the nature of policy
change. The first are "relatively stable parameters", which "limit the range of feasible
alternatives or otherwise affect the resources and beliefs of subsystem actors" (ibid). The
stability of such factors means that coalition members will be unlikely, or unwilling, to
make them the focus of their strategics in pursuit of policy goals. These include the "basic
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attributes of a problem area (or "good")", the "basic distribution of natural resources", the
"fundamental cultural values and social structure", and the "basic legal structure". More
important are the "dynamic (system) events", which refer to "the principal dynamic
elements affecting policy change" and which, unlike relatively stable parameters, "present
a continuous challenge to subsystem actors, who must learn how to anticipate them and
respond to them in a manner consistent with their basic beliefs and interests" (ibid. The
ACF posits that policy change will occur when dynamic (system) events alter the pattern of
resources between competing coalitions, allowing one coalition to influence outcomes in
its favours.
The ACF originally included three such factors. First, changes in "socioeconomic
conditions and technology" can affect policy subsystems, "either by undermining the
causal assumptions of present policies or by significantly altering the political support of
various advocacy coalitions" (ibid). For example, the recession in the US which followed
the Arab oil embargo of 1973-4 caused auto workers to moderate their support for rigorous,
and costly, pollution controls to maintain industrial competitiveness. Second, there are
changes in systemic governing coalitions or "critical elections". Sabatier emphasises that
this would "normally require that the same coalition control the chief executive's office and
both houses of the legislature" (ibid). While this may be unusual in the US with the
separation of powers between executive and legislature, it will be much less so in a country
such as the UK where the former is drawn from the latter. Thus in 1980, there was not a
change in the US system-wide governing coalition because, although the Republicans
controlled the Presidency and the Senate, the Democrats held the House of Representatives
(ibid). Finally "policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems" drive policy change.
No policy subsystem operates in a vacuum, and examples of such impacts are "legion". For
example, "Britain's entry into the Common Market (largely on foreign policy and economic
grounds) has had repercussions on UK pollution control because of the need to comply
with European Economic Community mandates" (ibid). Following the application of a
number of case studies (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993a), "public opinion" was added
under this category. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith argue that "the general public has neither
the expertise, nor the time, nor the inclination to be active participants in a policy
subsystem; that role is reserved for policy elites" (1993d: p.223). Nevertheless, they
maintain that "Public opinion can, however, constitute a substantial constraint on the range
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of feasible strategies available to subsystem participants if it persists for some time and
demonstrates some recognition of value trade-offs" (ibid).
Central to the ACF is the notion of "belief systems". According to Sabatier, "shared beliefs
provide the principal 'glue' of politics", and therefore "the framework explicitly rejects the
view that actors are primarily motivated by their short-term self-interest and thus that
'coalitions of convenience' of highly varying composition will dominate policy making
over time" (Sabatier, 1993: p.27). The structure of belief systems are divided into three: a
deep (normative) core; a near (policy) core; and secondary aspects. The deep (normative)
core refers to deeply held philosophical beliefs. The near (policy core) are the policy
positions and strategies taken to achieve the goals in the deep (normative) core. The
secondary aspects of belief systems concern those decisions which are necessary to
implement the policy core. It is also assumed that the components are progressively
susceptible to change. Thus while the deep (normative) core is highly resilient to change,
coalition members are more willing to change the secondary aspects of their belief systems.
Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier note that "aspects of a coalition's belief system are susceptible
to change on the basis of scientific and technical analysis" (ibid) and that the ACF
considers this as part of the process of policy change. This is called "policy-oriented
learning", which "involves relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioural
intentions that result from experience and which are concerned with the attainment or
revision of the precepts of the belief system of individuals or collectivities (such as
advocacy coalitions)" (ibid). It is "an ongoing process of search and adoption motivated by
the desire to realize core policy beliefs" (ibid). Policy-oriented learning is driven largely by
an increase in the awareness or understanding of technical analysis, and occurs both across
and within advocacy coalitions.
Overall, the ACF offers not just a plausible account of the dynamics of policy change, but a
model which can be verified. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith condensed the key elements of
the ACF into nine hypotheses which predict how actors or coalitions will act or respond to
certain circumstances. The framework was then applied to six case studies. These included
four qualitative case studies on: change in Canadian education (Mawhinney, 1993); airline
deregulation in the US (Brown and Stewart, 1993); California water politics (Munro,
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1993); and change in US federal communications policy (Barke, 1993). There were also
two case studies employing quantitative research methods on: offshore energy leasing
(Jenkins-Smith and St Clair, 1993); and environmental policy at Lake Tahoe, on the
California-Nevada border in the US (Sabatier and Brasher, 1993). The significance and
contribution of these case studies and others to the ACF will be shown later in this section.
Table 7
The Hypotheses of the ACF
1. On major controversies within a policy subsystem when core beliefs are in dispute, the line-up of
allies and opponents tends to be rather stable over periods of a decade or more.
2. Actors within an advocacy coalition will show substantial consensus on issues pertaining to the
policy core, although less so on secondary issues.
3. An actor (or coalition) will give up secondary aspects of a belief system before acknowledging
weaknesses in the policy core.
4. The core (basic) attributes of a government programme is unlikely to be significantly revised as long
as the subsystem advocacy coalition that instituted the program remains in power.
5. The core (basic attributes) of a governmental action program is unlikely to be changed in the absence
of significant perturbations external to the subsystem, that is, changes in socioeconomic conditions,
system-wide governing coalitions, or policy outputs from other subsystems.
6. Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there is an immediate level of
informed conflict between the two. In such a situation, it is likely that:
1. Each coalition has the technical resources to engage in such a debate; and
2. The conflict be between secondary aspects of a belief system and core elements of the other, or,
alternatively, between important secondary aspects of the two belief systems.
7. Problems for which accepted qualitative data and theory exist are more conducive to policy learning
than those in which data and theory are generally qualitative, quite subjective, or altogether lacking.
8. Problems involving natural systems are more conducive to policy-learning than those involving
purely social or political systems because in the former many of the critical variables are not themselves
active strategists and controlled experimentation is more feasible.
9. Policy-oriented learning across belief systems is most likely when there exists a forum that is:
1. Prestigious enough to force professionals from different coalitions to participate; and
2. Dominated by professional norms.
Source: Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993a
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The ACF: Problems of Application
Despite the potential advantages of applying the ACF to the case studies, there are a
number of problems which limit the utility of this approach for this research. These
problems include the difficulties of identifying coalitions and policy brokers, of defining
policy subsystems, the dangers of applying a causal model such as the ACF for the
deducing the role of one particular variable, and the ethnocentric nature of the ACF.
Advocacy Coalitions: Chapter two suggested that it was necessary to see how the new right
network manifested itself in individual policy areas. The ACF's notion of advocacy
coalitions provides an obvious opportunity to aggregate the new right think tanks and
others for this purpose. But how are advocacy coalitions actually defined? Many of the
case studies in Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach do not
actually demonstrate that advocacy coalitions exist other than on the basis of shared
beliefs. Schlager argues that the ACF pays disproportionate attention to the role of belief
systems and the impact of policy-oriented-learning, neglecting the dynamics of the
coalitions themselves.
Even if such coalitions manage to form, the structure that different coalitions are
likely to take (i.e., a loose structure with minimal coordination versus a well-
defined structure with high levels of coordination), their stability and longevity, are
paid little attention. While belief systems are assumed to be stable, it is not known
whether that translates itself into stable advocacy coalitions. Finally, the AC
framework gives little sense of the strategies that coalitions are likely to pursue in
pressing for preferred policies, and confounding undesirable policies (Schlager,
1995: p.246).
Schlager refers to the case study by Jenkins-Smith and St Clair (1993) on offshore oil
leasing in the US which identified two opposing coalitions, one composed of
environmental groups and the other of oil companies. Jenkins-Smith and St Clair found
that coalition members did share similar beliefs, and suggests that events external to the
subsystem such as the oil price hikes of 1973-4 and 1978-9, and the election of president
Carter in 1976, did have an impact on policy change. However, according to Schlager:
What is missing ... is a sense of action, and a sense of the importance of the
coalitions. The coalitions that Jenkins-Smith and St Clair describe are coalitions
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because their members express similar policy beliefs, not because their members
have engaged in collective action to realise policy goals. In fact, policy change, i.e.,
a change in a stated position by a federal agency, is not even accounted for by
actions of coalitions, but rather by oil shocks and presidential administrations. For
coalitions to take their rightful place in the policy process requires an explanation
of action (1996: p.248).
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith accept that the ACF carries only an assumption "that actors
who hold similar policy core beliefs will act in concert - that is, that the first condition of
coalition formation is a sufficient condition for the second" (1997: p.25). Similarly, the
case studies do not address the nature of coalition interaction, frequency, or co-ordination.
Brown and Stewart, for example, note that in the debate on airline deregulation, "testimony
by various agencies was coordinated to insure that it would be presented by deregulation
advocates", yet they do not provide any evidence to show this. The case studies by Jenkins-
Smith and St Clair, and Sabatier and Brasher, consider in depth the belief system structure
of advocacy coalitions, without first demonstrating that the coalitions actually exist. This
point has since been acknowledged by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith.
Many of the case studies have not ... systematically gathered data on the beliefs and
behaviour of actors within the subsystem, and thus the skeptical reader is unsure if
alleged members of a coalition really do share a set of policy core beliefs and
engage in some degree of coordinated behaviour - the necessary and sufficient
conditions for being members of an advocacy coalition (1997: p.15).
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith also recognise that the problems of collective action have been
somewhat overlooked:
In addition, by focusing on shared policy beliefs within a coalition, the ACF has
neglected the interest that all individuals and organisations have in maintaining and
increasing their viability/welfare. Environmental groups may agree on a general
policy agenda, but each must maintain (and even enhance) its budget and
membership. Because, to some extent, such groups compete against each other for
members and grant funds, they must also compete for credit concerning policy
successes. How interest groups within potential coalitions overcome these
difficulties is, to the best of our knowledge, a neglected topic (1997: p.26).
Moreover, the "institutional heterogeneity" of coalition members could actually inhibit co-
ordination, due to the diversity of skills, and limit the willingness to co-operate. Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith follow Schlager with the suggestion that short-term co-ordination be
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distinguished from long-term co-ordination. Short-term co-ordination is said to be most
likely to occur with repeated interaction and low information costs. Long-term co-
ordination (which, they note, is central to the concept of advocacy coalitions) also includes
repeated interaction and low information costs, but must go further:
such as the development of a peak association to sponsor research and formalize
coordination. Whatever the form it takes, long-term coordination requires that
members feel that they are being fairly treated, i.e. the coordination costs they bear
are proportional to the benefits they receive and/or their ability to pay. In addition,
repeated interaction allows members to develop norms of reciprocity and trust, and
enhances members ability to sanction each other (e.g. by the withholding of
services) (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1997: p.27).
Schlager and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith heavily emphasise formal coalition-building. But
this emphasis overlooks the significance or extent to which informal, ad hoc interaction
and co-ordination may occur between policy actors. As the case studies in Part Two
demonstrate, the coalitions in which the new right think tanks participated had little or no
formal interaction, and certainly no "peak associations" to co-ordinate coalition activities.
Informal interaction might occur and still have an impact on policy change. As such
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith appear to have gone from one extreme to another - from not
demonstrating that advocacy coalitions actually exist, to setting the fairly rigid criteria that
they must be formalised and that policy actors actively calculate the costs and benefits of
participation. Once it has been established that such formalised coalitions exist, then it is
possible to address collective action problems. However, with informal, ad hoc coalitions
without rules or co-ordination it is unlikely that actors will have to make such calculations,
as they are not committed to the costs of political activity in which they do not wish to
participate.
Policy Brokers: According to the ACF, in any subsystem there will be those who seek to
reduce conflict between competing coalitions and attempt to foster compromise. Yet it is
unclear as to who exactly performs this function. The ambiguity may be deliberate, to
allow any one of a number of actors (from the legislature, executive, bureaucracy, or
judiciary) to act as mediator in any single subsystem. The case studies do identify a number
of different actors performing this function. Mawhinney's (1993) study of French-language
education rights in Canada identified the courts as a policy broker, which had to judge the
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size of the French-speaking minority at which Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
allowed a French-language education. Munro's (1993) analysis of California water politics
identified California state governor Jerry Brown as the broker between a Development
Coalition and a Protectionist Coalition. Dudley and Richardson note that, in their study of
trunk road policy in the UK Bill Rodgers, the Minister for Transport, brokered a
compromise between the road lobby and environmentalists with an Advisory Committee
(1996: p.'75)
The ACF appears to assume that policy brokers will emerge whenever coalitions conflict -
in that the conditions under which coalitions will or will not emerge are not addressed. 8 For
countries such as the UK and France it is suggested that the role of policy broker is a
"traditional function" of high civil servants (Sabatier, 1993: p.2'7). In some cases it might
be difficult to distinguish between an advocate and a policy broker, a point acknowledged
by Sabatier:
The distinction between "advocate" and "broker" ... rests on a continuum. Many
brokers will have some policy bent, while advocates may show some concern with
system maintenance. The framework merely insists that policy brokering is an
empirical matter that may, or may not correlate with institutional affiliation: While
high civil servants may be brokers, they are also often policy advocates -
particularly when their agency has a clearly defined mission.
Policy Subsystems: A third criticism of the ACF is its focus on policy subsystems, and the
way in which they are defined. Sabatier concedes that the ACF initially defined policy
subsystems "only very loosely, as the groups of actors interacting with some regularity in a
functional policy area such as air pollution control" (1997: p.22). But any subsystem can be
sub-divided into further subsystems. Mawhinney's subsystem in the Canadian education
system concerns the very narrow issue of French-language minority education in one
province, Ontario, and "the right of the Francophone population to establish and govern
their own school boards" (1993: p.60). The exact delineation of subsystem from system is
unclear. At what level does the subsystem operate - French language minority education in
Ontario? Ontarian education? French-language education in Canada? Or Canadian
education?
95
This is more than a semantic issue as the definition of a policy subsystem is central to the
ACF. If a policy subsystem is not adequately defined, then this has consequences for
"external (system) events". For example, if secondary education is to be treated as a policy
subsystem, then are all other subsystems within the education policy area to be treated as
part of "policy decisions and impacts from other subsystems"? It is questionable whether
the consequences of primary education are "external" to secondary education, especially
when there are key policy actors (such as ministers, civil servants, journalists, and think
tanks ) who could be concerned with both. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith maintain that it is a
"critical issue" for the ACF, as "the framework (a) uses subsystem-wide scope as being the
major criterion for distinguishing policy core from secondary aspects [and] (b) many of the
ACF hypotheses hinge on the distinction between the two levels of beliefs (and policies)"
(1997: p.22). Secondary aspects are specific to the subsystem, while the policy core beliefs
can be applied to other policy areas. This distinction is relevant to hypotheses two, three,
and six (see Table 7) which predict changes to, or conflict between, policy beliefs. Thus, if
a subsystem is undefined, then it is not possible to identify accurately secondary aspects of
belief systems and thus test, for example, hypothesis 3.
In an attempt to clarify the criteria for the existence of a policy subsystem, Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith suggest that:
• Participants regard themselves as a semi-autonomous community.
• They share a domain of expertise.
• They seek to influence public policy within the domain over a fairly long period
of time, i.e. 7-10 years. This stems from the ACF's assumption that such an
interval is necessary for doing meaningful policy analysis that can deal with
learning and real world impacts.
• There exist specialised subunits within agencies at all relevant levels of
government to deal with the topic ...
• There exist interest groups, or specialised subunits within interest groups, which
regard this as a major policy topic (1997: p.23).
However, these criteria raise other questions. It is possible, for example, that some policy
actors have only a transitory interest in a policy issue, and may not see themselves as part
of a "semi-autonomous community". Similarly, there may be individuals or organisations
which have a multi-disciplinary character of which it would be difficult to identify a single
"domain of expertise", and might enter specific policy debates only periodically.
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Moreover, whilst providing a more thorough description of a "subsystem", Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith's revisions do little to expand on the possible relationship between different
"subsystems" in the same policy area.
A related point is that the ACF does not explicitly incorporate internal subsystem factors
that drive policy change. According to Sabatier "the relative strength of different advocacy
coalitions within a subsystem will seldom be sufficiently altered by events internal to the
subsystem (i.e., by efforts to increase resources or to "outlearn" opponents) to overthrow a
dominant coalition" (1993a: p.34). However, in the same way that "external (subsystem)
factors" provide a stimulus to policy change and a "continuous challenge to subsystem
actors" who have to anticipate and react to them, an argument can be still be made for the
inclusion of similar internal factors which are specific to the subsystem. Factors internal to
an education subsystem might include the trend in educational standards, or change in key
personnel with authority (whether legal, professional, or moral) over educational matters.
A decline in educational standards is an internal factor which may stimulate a search for
new policy options regarding the structure and finance of education. Of course, such a
decline could have been influenced by external system-wide events (such a recession, or
"critical election"), but such events have an impact on all policy subsystems and cannot
therefore explain why policy change occurs in one subsystem and not another. Moreover,
if the policy subsystem is not adequately defined, then it is difficult to identify what is
"external" and what is "internal" to that subsystem.
ACF as a Causal Model: Although the ACF is a model of policy change capable of
incorporating the work of the new right think tanks, this does not mean that applying it to
the three case studies will help identify their impact. The ACF and this research are
examining two separate issues. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith set out to examine why policy
changes, whereas this research considers the impact of one particular variable in this
process. Although this research will attempt to provide an explanation as to why policy
changed in the three case studies, it will not present a general theory of policy change like
the ACF. Although the findings of the case studies in Part Two could be used for model-
building in the future, it is not the intention here to provide an exhaustive analysis between
all the variables.
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To apply the ACF in its pure form would require each of its hypotheses to be applied one
by one. The results might tell us whether or not the ACF is a flawed model of policy
change, but may tell us little directly about the impact of the new right think tanks. It
might be possible to deduce their impact if the hypotheses of the ACF were found to be
correct, although it is unclear how the impact of certain groups within advocacy coalitions
can be differentiated from others. More importantly, if the ACF was found to be deeply
flawed or inapplicable to the UK, then very little could be deduced other than that the ACF
can tell us little about the impact of the new right think tanks on policy change. This would
not be a satisfactory conclusion and would add little to our understanding of think tanks.
That is not to say that the ACF should be discarded and, as the final section of this chapter
shows, a number of the ACF's insights are utilised in developing the template.
The Ethnocentric Nature of the ACF: A further difficulty of applying the ACF to policy
change in the UK is that the ACF is a model which has been developed in the context of
the US political system. This could seriously restrict its utility when applied to political
systems which have markedly different constitutional, institutional and procedural
arrangements from the US. Gorham argues that "it is worth remembering that the ACF
purports to explain the policy-making process in 'most industrial countries' ... and that if
this claim is to have any significance the model needs to be replicated in a wide variety of
contexts, which by implication, assumes the mode( cm he" (C9 gT. p.23). ApicAying Vne
ACF to the local government review in England under the Major Government, Gorham
found the ACF had less utility "when analysing policy areas which do not resemble the
pluralistic characteristics which underpin the ACF" (ibid).
The differences between the British and American political systems are significant enough
to suggest that the ACF needs to be rigorously applied to a number of case studies before
any claims about its applicability to the UK can be made. The previous chapter noted, for
example, that the difference in political systems has been a major factor in explaining the
difference in the number of think tanks in the US and UK. It is worthwhile noting,
however, that the ACF has an element of flexibility which reduces its ethnocentric nature.
For example, the notion of policy brokers is not specified to any particular institution or
position within government and Sabatier acknowledges that it is a function which is likely
to be carried out by a different set of actors in the UK or France than in the US.
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Epistemic Communities
The final part of this section addresses the epistemic community approach which has not
only highlighted the role of think tanks in policy change but has also been used in the UK
as a subset of the ACF. According to Haas "An epistemic community is a network of
professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area" (1992:
p.3). It is "uncertainty" which provides opportunities for policy change. Uncertainty
generates a need for specific information which the epistemic community seeks to provide
and eventually "institutionalize its influence and insinuate its views into broader
international politics" (ibid. Recognising that international systemic conditions create
pressures for individual states, Haas offers an approach which "examines the role that
networks of knowledge-based experts - epistemic communities - play in articulating the
cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, helping states identify their interests,
framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient
points for negotiation" (ibid). The international composition of some epistemic
communities can lead to transnational policy-making as decision-makers in one state
influence others, "increasing the likelihood of convergent state behaviour and international
policy coordination, informed by the causal beliefs and policy preferences of the epistemic
community".
The approach has also been utilised by Stone to explain the role of think tanks in the policy
process.
Think-tanks have much in common with epistemic communities. ' Both are
concerned with knowledge. Both desire to influence or inform public opinion and
penetrate government with their ideas and/or personnel. Both set themselves apart
from interest groups and professional associations. There is a potential point of
intersection. Think-tanks clearly form a part of the organisational dimension of
knowledge networks and may represent a means to trace the emergence and
activities of epistemic communities (1996: p.94).
Stone believes that think tanks perhaps play a more significant role than simply as a
member of an epistemic community. Very often, think tanks such as the LEA in the UK, or
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Cato in the US, concern themselves with a very broad mission, such as "rolling back the
frontiers of the state". Yet epistemic communities are more likely to pursue a more defined
and specific objective, such as privatisation. However, "think-tanks provide an
environment for an epistemic community in one policy area to learn about the successes
and tactic of other communities, with the same causal knowledge, that focus on different
areas of public policy or that operate in other countries" (ibid). Think tanks can be seen as
"strategic organisations for combining these discourses into clusters" (ibid). An example
can be seen with privatisation, where it is suggested the new right played a co-ordinating
role in disseminating ideas and generating support (ibid.
As a general approach, the use of epistemic communities may appear limited. For example
it has largely been applied in international rather than national contexts, and in policy areas
which require substantial technical and scientific knowledge/expertise. Alternatively
epistemic communities could be seen not as separate entities, but as a distinct collection of
groups which can reside within advocacy coalitions. For example, in their analysis of
trunk road policy in the UK Dudley and Richardson (1996) suggest that, in the 1950s and
1960s, highway engineers formed an epistemic community providing expert advice to
uncertain policy-makers who had to address the problems for the road network arising from
increasing car ownership. Noting that the principal difference between the two is that
advocacy coalitions are based on values while epistemic communities are based on
knowledge, Dudley and Richardson showed how the knowledge-based epistemic
community of road engineers became a value-based advocacy coalition. This strategy was
matched by environmental groups who, in the 1970s and 1980s, sought to become both an
advocacy coalition and an epistemic community by strengthening the scientific basis of
environmentalism. By integrating epistemic communities into more substantive
approaches to policy-making many of its limitations become redundant. This will be
addressed in more detail in the following section.
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THE TEMPLATE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSMENT
This final section has two parts. The first compares some of the strengths and weaknesses
of the Rhodes Model and the ACF. The second part draws together the lessons of this
chapter and outlines the framework for assessment to be used in the case study chapters.
The Rhodes Model and the ACF
The previous section suggested that the ACF, with its focus on policy change, the
importance placed on belief systems, and the use of advocacy coalitions, appears to have
greater potential for assessing the impact of the new right think tanks than the Rhodes
Model. Given the clear differences between the Rhodes Model and the ACF, notably their
emphasis on policy continuity and policy change respectively, it is perhaps tempting to
regard them as mutually exclusive. However, closer analysis suggests that there are key
similarities which could lead to the ultimate integration of the two approaches. It has
already been suggested that epistemic communities can reside in advocacy coalitions. It is
also possible that advocacy coalitions can reside within policy networks, although the
Rhodes Model typology is not equipped to incorporate advocacy coalitions at present. The
ACF's emphasis on a plurality of groups runs counter to much of the Rhodes Model,
especially its notions of tight-knit policy communities and professional networks.' Also,
Marsh and Smith's dialectic approach brings the Rhodes Model more into line with the
dynamics of the ACF which recognises that policy change is the result of structures
(external system factors) interacting with the resources and strategies of agents (advocacy
coalitions).
Prior to Marsh and Smith's work on the dialectic approach, it could be argued that a basic
advocacy coalition approach might be more appropriate for understanding outcomes in the
UK than the Rhodes Model, such as Smith's (1993) study into salmonella in eggs and
Read's (1992) analysis of the politics of smoking. The challenges by consumer and
environmental groups to the dominance of the food policy community, and by the health
network to the tobacco producer network, could both be re-conceptualised as conflict
between advocacy coalitions.
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The revised "dialectic" Rhodes Model has important similarities with the ACF. Indeed, the
dialectic approach seems to be much indebted to the ACF, despite the fact that Marsh and
Smith make no reference to it in their paper. They present their dialectic approach as a
development of the Rhodes Model, without acknowledging that the dynamics they mention
have been an integral part of the ACF for some years. Change not only occurs when
"external" events affect the distribution of resources between coalitions, but coalitions also
"learn" from these events by altering and revising strategies to ensure that they are well
placed to affect policy outcomes in the future. According to Gorham "the ACF
acknowledges the intertwined relationship between structure and agency, that is that
structures can both facilitate and/or constrain agency and that agency can/or constrain
structure" (1997: p.17). This is the same point that underpins the dialectic approach to the
Rhodes Model - that to take a solely agency-centred or structure-centred approach to
political behaviour is likely to overlook the complex inter-relationship between the two.
Given such similarities it is possible to draw the two approaches together into a more
substantial explanation of policy outcomes. This is not the broad theoretical integration
between the micro, meso, and macro levels outlined by Daugbjerg and Marsh (1998) in
order to give the network approach greater explanatory utility. Instead, it involves the
conceptual integration of networks, coalitions, and epistemic communities into a single
overarching framework to account for a broader range of outcomes. For example,
synthesising the Rhodes Model and ACF approaches could contribute to our understanding
of the implementation gap. As suggested above, the Conservative Government increasingly
by-passed policy communities during policy formulation, possibly enabling other
groups/networks/coalitions to have a significant input at the earlier stages of policy-
making. This point is recognised, although not developed, by Marsh:
It is also worth paying attention to the relationship between policy networks and
implementation networks. In a given policy area they may not be synonymous. So,
those actors involved in the policy network which discussed and shaped policy may
not be the same actors as those involved in the implementation of those policies. In
such circumstances, it is possible that those involved in the implementation
network, but not in the policy network, will obstruct implementation; this may be a
common cause of the implementation gap (1998b: p.192).
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Like the Rhodes Model, the ACF emphasises deployment of resources and strategies by
policy actors, although Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith extend this to a broader range of
participants. Together all these actors, whether acting within advocacy coalitions or
individually, can be said to constitute a broad policy network, defined by the ability of such
actors to exert resources and affect outcomes. While ministers, MPs, journalists, special
advisers and think tanks may have the resources to have a greater impact during the early
stages of policy formulation and legislation, the resources of other groups/coalitions might
be more effectively deployed to affect outcomes during implementation. This does not
necessarily mean that advocacy coalitions will not attempt to influence policy throughout
the process, simply that the distribution of resources may prevent them from doing so in
equal measure. Some advocacy coalitions will have a greater impact in policy formulation
and others during implementation. Advocacy coalitions could therefore be seen to be a
sub-set of a policy network, with epistemic communities as a sub-set of advocacy
coalitions. In terms of group aggregation, what we have is a "Russian doll" where policy
networks, advocacy coalitions and epistemic communities are not distinct entities to be
studied individually but are part of a broader policy context within which other approaches
may have an important contribution to make to our overall understanding of policy
continuity and policy change. This will be touched upon in the final chapter.
Defining the Template
The Rhodes Model and the ACF are two key approaches within the policy-making
literature and any assessment of the role of the new right think tanks must engage with this
literature to some degree. This chapter has suggested reasons why a straightforward
application of one or both of these approaches to the case studies would not answer the
primary research questions. Yet it has also suggested that both approaches have their
strengths. The Rhodes Model is able to explain policy continuity, and where policy change
does occur it is clear that policy communities and other networks will be a major
constraining factor upon organisations such as think tanks and so must be factored into the
analysis. The ACF focuses on policy change, and has the added advantage of being able to
incorporate other approaches, such as epistemic communities, which can be synthesised
with the Rhodes Model. The template borrows from both the Rhodes Model and the ACF
where appropriate.
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Each of the case studies follows the same five-section format, although the sub-sections
differ to reflect the particular characteristics of the individual policy areas. The first section
reviews the major approaches to policy-making in each particular policy area. Given that
the case studies attempt to assess the impact of the new right think tanks not just on policy
change but also on policy-making, it is essential that the nature of policy-making prior to
policy change is addressed. In doing so it will also consider the relevance of the Rhodes
Model to the fields of passenger transport, secondary education, and penal policy. The aim
is not simply to repeat the criticisms of the Rhodes Model made in the first half of this
chapter. Despite the limitations outlined above, the Rhodes Model serves as a useful
starting point for discussing policy-making in each sector, and can reflect these limitations
(and possibly others) in the context of actual policy areas.
The second section outlines the intellectual contribution of the new right think tanks to
policy change, and places these contributions within the historical contexts of the policy
debates. The third section considers the line-up of organisations and individuals seeking to
influence policy. In doing so it borrows the term advocacy coalitions. The ACF's use of
coalitions is a more flexible means of aggregating groups than other approaches. In
particular, epistemic communities focus largely on the importance of knowledge (both in
the formation of communities and in the process of policy change) while the Rhodes Model
is too exclusive. Some approaches, such as Heclo's (and Rhodes's) notion of issue networks
make little attempt to aggregate groups at all. As argued in chapters two it is possible to
identify a new right network. The concept of the advocacy coalition can show how this
network manifests itself on particular issues or in individual policy areas. Groups which
were seen to constitute policy communities or professional networks may well emerge as
alternative advocacy coalitions on major policy issues
Unlike some case studies in the ACF literature, coalition membership is not assumed
simply on the basis of shared beliefs. A focus on the interaction and co-ordination between
particular groups and individuals is adopted to demonstrate coalition existence. The belief
system, and the resources and strategies used by each coalition, are then considered.
Certain organisations might attempt to influence policy independently from other groups or
coalitions. When this occurs (such as in chapter 5), the belief system, resources and
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strategies of these organisations are also addressed. This section also considers the role of
ministers. It is not assumed that ministers will act as policy brokers, or that policy brokers
will exist at all. Ministers and their officials, as decision-makers, provide the focus for
individuals/groups/coalitions who wish to influence policy directly. Given that ministers
and central departments may have their own objectives, it is far from certain that they will
generally try to reduce conflict. Ministers might ally themselves with, or be members of,
particular coalitions. Ministers are ultimately responsible for policy formulation and
legislation and therefore their role, whether as arbiters or advocates, is crucial.
The fourth section considers the context of policy change, and more specifically, the
ideological, political, and socioeconomic contexts within which change occurs. Addressing
the context of policy change is not new. Marsh (1995) considers the importance of
ideological, political, and economic variables upon changes to trade union policy and the
Conservatives' privatisation programme. Similarly, Owen highlights a number of
contextual actors in explaining gas and electricity privatisation (1995: p.722). The dialectic
approach to policy networks accords context a central role in understanding the dynamics
of policy-making. It is thus significant that, as illustrated in chapter one, studies which
have attempted to evaluate the impact of think tanks on policy change, especially Denham
(1996), have ignored or undervalued the importance of context in their analysis. The case
studies will attempt to rectify this deficiency. Moreover, focusing on ideological, political,
and socio-economic factors is a more flexible means of incorporating external factors than
the ACF's "external (system) factors", allowing for a greater possible range of factors to be
considered. It also overcomes the arbitrary delineation between system and subsystem
events identified above. This focus on the context of policy change follows Marsh who
argues that in order to "explain Thatcherite policies" it is necessary to go beyond "uni-
dimensional explanations".
Too many authors over-emphasise one set of explanatory variables, usually the
personality and style of Mrs Thatcher, New Right ideology, or the search for
political and electoral advantage, less often economic crisis. In contrast, some of the
authors who offer a more rounded theoretical analysis of 'Thatcherism' tend to rely
for their empirical evidence upon broad, even heroic, generalizations rather than a
thorough consideration of policy initiation and evolution (Marsh, 1995: p.596).
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The final section of the case studies makes qualitative judgements on the role and impact
of the new right think tanks on policy change. It considers their role as individual actors
and as members of advocacy coalitions, comparing the contribution of the new right think
tanks with other key variables. This section also considers the extent to which the policy
change marked a departure from the previous pattern and style of policy-making, and the
role of the new right think tanks post-policy change.
It should be emphasised again that the template is not an explanatory model. It does not
provide a theory of policy change or offer hypotheses as to the role of particular variables
in policy change. The case studies do set out to explain why policy changed in the policy
areas discussed but a theory of policy change or of think tank impact cannot be built upon
three examples alone. This is not to say that the template is without theoretical value: in
utilising concepts such as advocacy coalitions, resource-dependency, context, and the
dialectic relationship between structures and agents, it is possible to engage with the
Rhodes Model and the ACF literature. However the fact that the template is selective in
adopting aspects of both approaches and omitting others the case studies alone will be
unable to categorically endorse or dismiss either approach. Any theoretical implications
must therefore be qualified by the recognition that the template uses aspects of these
approaches out of context. Nevertheless the case studies do identify a number of issues for
the Rhodes Model and ACF to address. The application of the template to the case studies
will further expand on how the Rhodes Model and the ACF could be integrated and may
form the basis for developing a more comprehensive explanatory model of policy
continuity and policy change.
CONCLUSION
The previous chapter suggested that the IEA, CPS, and ASI should be seen as policy
promoters of the new right. It also suggested that a new right network of organisations and
individuals, including the think tanks, operated to promote these ideas and policies. This
chapter has discussed some of the principal approaches which could be used to assess the
impact of the new right think tanks. It has outlined the template based upon some of these
approaches. The following three chapters will apply the template to the three case studies,
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and begin the process of integrating the new right think tanks with the policy-making
literature. Given the narrow focus of this research, the template cannot address all the
limitations of the Rhodes Model and the ACF discussed in the above sections. A
significant amount of future research is still needed before the integration of these
approaches is complete. This will be considered in greater depth in the concluding chapter.
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NOTES
1 See also Marsh (1998b) and Hay (1998)
2 See Marsh and Smith (1998) for a review of these approaches.
3 Other strategies include: bureaucratic (command of legal resources); incorporation; penetration; avoidance;
incentives; professionalization (where professional values and norms dominate policy-making); and
factorisation (delegation of responsibility to appointed sub-units of government, such as quango's). For a
complete outline of strategies, see Rhodes (1988: pp.92-3).
4 Rhodes does maintain in his case study on local government finance that policies such as monetarism,
privatisation, the community charge, and contracting-out "reflected the thinking of the new right and its think
tanks" (1992: p.61) although he does not elaborate further. Similarly, Owen in her case study on policy
network analysis and energy policy in the 1980s noted that policy change was precipitated by "a change in
'climate' beginning in the early 1970s with right-wing think tanks suggesting that state industries would be
more efficiently run in the private sector and the earlier privatisations" (1995: p.721).
5 See also Griggs (1991: p.422).
6 See Gorham (1997: chapter 2) for a broader critical review of the methodological and theoretical problems
of the ACF.
7 This is the original ACF. The ACF is an ongoing research project, subject to revisions. (see Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith, 1993b, 1997 for minor amendments. This point also applies to the hypotheses of the ACF,
listed in Table 7 below).
8 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith do, however, pose the following questions for future scholars: "Under what
circumstances are successful policy brokers likely to emerge? What are the institutional affiliations of such
brokers and what skills do they tend to possess?". As such, they acknowledge the concept requires further
research.
9 Gorham argues that "the concept of an issue network, with its inclusive and diverse range of interests,
appears to closely resemble an advocacy coalition", although this overlooks the important difference that
within issue networks groups are said to be highly atomised and unstable, whereas advocacy coalitions are
said to be highly stable and bound tightly together through mutual beliefs.
108
PART TWO
Case Studies
Four
Bus Deregulation
The Transport Act 1985 "represented the most radical single change to affect the bus
industry in 55 years" and aimed "to provide 'better bus services' by introducing competition
into bus operations" (Pickup et al, 1991: p.1). The Secretary of State for Transport,
Nicholas Ridley, maintained during the introduction of the Bill's second reading that:
The purpose of the Bill is to halt the decline that has afflicted the bus industry for
more than 20 years.
[...] The Bill is about competition. We want to see operators free to provide the
services that customers want. We want to see competition providing an incentive to
be efficient and to offer passengers a better quality of service. The customers may
want greater efficiency, lower fares, smaller buses going to residential estates,
greater comfort or a more polite and helpful driver. Competition is the key to these
improvements. It is the key to increasing patronage (House of Commons Debates,
12.02.85, co1.192).
The contribution of the new right think tanks in bringing about bus deregulation has been
highlighted, especially the roles of the TEA and the ASI. Whitehead notes that:
In the period immediately prior to the production of the Buses White Paper in June
1984, the "think tanks" had been very active in producing pamphlets and
monographs about transport - a subject that had attracted little attention in right
wing circles previously (1995: p.79).
Amongst the publications cited include Transport for Passengers (Hibbs, 1963) and
Transport without Politics (Hibbs, 1982) published by the IEA, as well as the Omega
Report on Transport Policy (Adam Smith Institute, 1983) and Wheels within Cities (Roth
and Shepherd, 1984) published by the ASI. In particular, Whitehead identifies a close
resemblance between Wheels Within Cities and the Government's proposals.
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The striking similarities between the work of the "think tanks" and the progress of
this particular piece of legislation do not, though, end with the clearly close
similarity between Roth and Shepherd's pamphlet and the Buses White Paper. The
White Paper itself departed radically from more traditional presentations of
government intentions in two ways. First, it announced legislative proposals in
uncompromising tones which indicate a high degree of commitment to an
ideologically based programme ... Second, it used a curious collection of right wing
academics and "think tank" references to bolster the intellectual case presented in
the first part of the White Paper (Whitehead, 1995: pp.79-80).
It is argued that, although the new right think tanks participated in the Pro-Deregulation
Coalition, they played a rather marginal role in the process of policy change. Other
academics (such as Stephen Glaister and Michael Beesley) had a much greater input into
the debate as key advisers on a Department of Transport working party. On the whole, the
role of the new right think tanks, which in this case was limited to the TEA and ASI, was to
provide another platform for the promotion of deregulation. The most significant
contribution by the new right think tanks was perhaps from the IEA which helped to
stimulate a greater appreciation and understanding of the virtues of deregulation and the
market with senior Conservatives in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This led to a
programme of deregulation at a macro level, and it is unlikely that had those arguments not
been won within the Conservative Party leadership before 1979, bus deregulation would
have proceeded with the enthusiasm it was, if at all.
The 1985 Act has fundamentally reformed the process by which bus services are
determined. The consequences of deregulation are that the role of local government has
been reduced, while the role of the market in the provision of bus services has increased.
However, it is not the first major change to affect the industry. The bus industry, and
transport policy in general, has experienced a number of major changes during this century
influenced largely by the dominant ideology of the day, and bus deregulation and
privatisation was in keeping with this trend. What was distinctive about the 1985 Act was
that it was imposed upon a hostile industry which was (and, in some cases, remains)
opposed to deregulation. The opposition has been such that a decade after the 1985 Act the
debate continues, with the IEA and the ASI amongst those now defending, rather than
advocating, policy change.
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POLICY-MAKING IN THE BUS INDUSTRY
The aim of this section is to provide an outline of policy-making in the bus industry prior
to deregulation. There are three parts. The first part examines the origins of the regulatory
framework prior to deregulation, and its operation up to 1985, providing the historical
background to the case study. The second part considers the role of local government in the
provision of local bus services. While the role of the Department of Transport (DTp) was
limited in this process, the responsibilities of local government grew significantly after
1968 and the reduction of local authority powers was one of the major aspects of the 1985
Act. Finally, the third part applies the Rhodes Model to the bus industry, and questions its
utility and outlines the pattern of policy-making in the bus industry prior to deregulation.
The Rise of Regulation
In order to understand policy-making and decision-making in the bus industry prior to
1985, it is necessary to go back to the inter-war years and the Road Traffic Act 1930. This
established a national framework of road service licensing for bus and coach services. Prior
to the 1930 Act, the bus industry was characterised by "uncontrolled competition" (Savage,
1985: p.3) fuelled by the use of demobilised, surplus army vehicles in the years following
the First World War. During the 1920s, a number of problems attracted the Government's
attention. Savage highlights two issues in particular.
The first was the concern about the unscheduled and irregular intervention by
"pirate" operators at peak times - when returns were highest - on some routes, thus
removing the "cream" from the regular operators. Chester [1937] considers that
there was thus no encouragement to set up a network because operators could not
generate profits on favourable operations to provide unremunerative services (this
became known as cross-subsidy). The second was the concern about wasteful
duplication caused by inter-modal competition between the motor bus and both the
train/trolley bus system, and the railways (ibid).
The result of these concerns was the appointment of a Royal Commission which ran from
1927-9. This formed the basis of the 1930 Act. According to Hibbs:
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With almost unprecedented haste and unanimity Parliament adopted the
Commission's recommendations (which included much besides the regulation of
public service vehicles), and the Road Traffic Act, 1930, became law before the
Final Report of the Commission (containing the arguments in its support) had been
published (1963: p.22).
The Royal Commission had advised that there be a statutory monopoly on each route,
establishing thirteen (later reduced to eleven and then nine) "Traffic Areas" headed by an
independent Traffic Commissioner, with full control over quality regulations and route
licensing. White explains that the 1930 Act
provided for quality control through driver and vehicle licensing (but not "operator
licensing" as such), buses and coaches' used for revenue earning service being
designated as "public service vehicles" ... Of greater importance was the strict
quantity control, based on a system of road service licensing (i.e. route licensing),
in which exact route, timetable, and, by accepted convention, the fare scale, were
specified. Licenses were awarded by regional Traffic Commissioners, and in
general, a new operator would find it difficult to obtain a license for a competing
service. Existing operators found it difficult to change fare levels and structures, or
make experimental service changes (1988: p.15).
The Role of Local Government
This regulatory framework existed almost unchanged until the late 1960s. However, from
the late 1960s, local government began to take an increasingly significant role in the
provision of local bus services. The 1968 Transport Act, introduced by Barbara Castle,
established Passenger Transport Authorities (PTAs) and Passenger Transport Executives
(PTEs) in four metropolitan authorities. This "was the first time that public transport
authorities were given a wide and positive planning role" (Pickup et al, 1991: p.233). PTEs
are the executives of PTAs. PTAs exercise political control over local transport planning
and consist of members nominated by local councils. PTEs consist of the professionals
who implement decisions and policies decided by PTAs. The Local Government Act 1972
introduced PTAs to the two remaining metropolitan authorities in England. Between 1968
and 1985, local government played a central role in the provision of road passenger
transport. Hey (1995) identifies seven key functions - regulator, constructor and owner,
operator, financial supporter, policy co-ordinator, and representor.
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Regulator: As noted above, the regulatory framework was laid down in the 1930 Road
Traffic Act, which placed much of the responsibility for route, service and fare regulation
in the hands of the Traffic Commissioners. Local authorities did, however, retain "a very
minor involvement with the Traffic Commissioners covering the locality by providing
nominees to a panel of additional commissioners for the region" (ibid).
Constructor and Owner: Local government began to play a role in the construction and
ownership of road transport passenger services with the 1870 Tramways Act. This allowed
local authorities to "secure ownership of privately owned tramways within the locality, at
structural value, through adoptive powers of compulsory purchase", which gradually
"provided a foundation for the general development of municipal public passenger
transport" (ibid). This included the construction, as well as the ownership of trolleybus and
omnibus networks. However, the Transport Act 1968 had the greatest impact on local
government's ownership of road passenger transport facilities. Within each metropolitan
county, the PTE took control and ownership of all municipal fleets in their areas. The
National Bus Company (NBC) which controlled bus operations outside the metropolitan
counties (although PTEs often used NBC subsidiaries) was formed in 1968 and was
"owned" by local and central government.
Operator: Hey notes that while the Tramways Act 1870 conferred powers of construction
and ownership upon local government, it explicitly prohibited authorities from operating
road passenger transport services. This was to be undertaken through leasing from the
private sector. A change in attitude at the centre at the end of the nineteenth century
reversed this decision. The Light Railways Act 1896 gave local authorities the power both
to control and to operate light railways. However:
These powers were used by a number of tramway promoters, including local
authorities, although it is clear that this was not the specific intent of Parliament ...
It perhaps serves best to illustrate the difficult task of framing legislation in terms
of distinguishing between a tramway and light railway, and the ingenuity of local
government in utilizing a range of statutory provisions to maximum advantage
(ibic1).
Until 1968, "operational policy was a matter purely for local authority discretion" (ibid).
The 1968 Act transferred operations to PTEs in the metropolitan counties. Elsewhere,
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following the reorganisation of the Local Government Act 1972, responsibility for public
transport was divided between the two tiers of local government. The lower tier was
responsible for operations, although policy was determined by the higher tier authority.
Financial Supporter: Prior to the Second World War, the operational discretion of local
authorities was reflected by a range of financial regimes. These ranged from outright
commercial concerns demanding a surplus return on capital expenditure, to a heavy
emphasis on social considerations financed through subsidies.
The financial supporter role became of greater significance in the decades following
World War Two as passenger numbers declined and operating costs increased.
Local authorities were forced into a combination of responses which included
reduced service levels, increased fares and/or higher levels of revenue support. The
Transport Act 1968 which created Passenger Transport Authorities ... formalised
the position. The PTA was allowed to precept the local authorities in the area to
meet any operational deficit of the PTE ... although the Minister of Transport had
reserve power to restrict the total amount raised by this method (ibid).
The years following the 1968 Act saw a shift in the balance of power between local and
central government. The Local Government Act 1974 strengthened central government
control over local government expenditure on road passenger transport in that "grants came
to be determined more in relation to national constraints than the merits of local
requirements" (ibid). The Transport Act 1983 further reduced the autonomy of local
authorities by establishing a Protected Expenditure Level which set legal limits to the
amounts spent by PTEs. The 1985 Act "fundamentally changed" local government's role as
financial supporter, in that it not only further reduced financial support but reduced the
functions of PTAs to "ensuring the provision of those services deemed necessary but which
are not provided by operators on a commercial basis" (ibid).
Policy Co-ordinator: One of the central responsibilities conferred upon the PTAs in the
1968 Act was that of policy co-ordination. Outside the metropolitan county councils, this
role was given to the higher tier authorities.
The policy coordinator role is interesting for as with the financial supporter role, it
covers all modes of local public transport and not just those operated by local
government - since some operators were provided by state or other local state
bodies and executives. The various statutes also placed a duty on such organisations
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to cooperate with the policy coordinating authority. In the event, the coordinating
authorities were able to exercise this role in conjunction with others, notably that of
financial supporter. Where an authority pursued an effective financial supporter role
it was able to exercise considerable powers over those operators dependent upon
such support, although this not without tensions particularly in England and Wales
where, as previously noted, municipal operations were the responsibility of separate
political entities (ibid).
The Transport Act 1978 enhanced local government's role as policy co-ordinator which
made it statutory for Traffic Commissioners "to take account of the public transport
policies of the appropriate local authority when considering road service licence
applications" (ibid). It is suggested that this marked the high-water mark of local authority
control over bus services, although "such influence was to prove transitory when in less
than a decade the Transport Act 1985 deregulated bus services, removed municipal
transport operations, redefined the financial supporters role, and diluted the policy co-
ordinator role to that of developing policies for securing socially desirable services" (ibid).
Representor: Hey notes that local government has a long history of representing their
localities in road passenger transport issues, dating back to the Tramways Act 1870 which
"required private tramway promoters to obtain the consent of the appropriate local
authority before submitting proposals to Parliament (ibid). Local authorities were also
represented in the process of road service licensing, as the 1930 Act "required the Traffic
Commissioners to take into consideration any representations made by any local authority
affected by any licence application or modification" (ibid). However this role was
"considerably diminished" with the advent of the 1985 Act and the abolition of road
service licensing.
The Bus Industry and the Rhodes Model
Between 1930 and 1968 there was little "bus policy" as such, other than the Traffic
Commissioners awarding, or not awarding, licenses to operators. Policy-making became a
more complex process in the late 1960s for three reasons. First, there was the creation of
PTAs and PTEs in the conurbations with the Transport Act increasing local government
intervention in transport policy. Secondly towards the end of the 1960s there was a
growing need for local authorities to subsidise uncommercial services in what had been
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until then a commercially successful industry. Amongst the grants awarded by the DTp (in
close consultation with the Treasury) included the Transport Supplementary Grant (TSG)
which was a special grant calculated by the DTp and awarded to local authorities above
their rate revenue for their transport needs. While the regulatory framework applied equally
to England, Wales, and Scotland, subsidy policy was a responsibility of the territorial
departments. The TSG for example did not exist in Scotland and only in a modified form in
Wales, and as such the Scottish and Welsh Offices conducted their own negotiations with
the Treasury.' Thirdly the creation of the NBC also increased direct government
involvement in the industry. In particular, central government was responsible for
appointing the NBC's Chairman and Board, and for the financial supervision of the NBC.
Other organisations apart from the DTp, PTAs and PTEs, and the NBC, were involved.
One of these was the Passenger Transport Executive Group (PTEG), comprising the
Directors-General of the six PTEs which met (and continues to meet) four times a year to
discuss issues of common interest and provide a forum for communication and the
exchange of ideas and information. Local authorities were represented at a national level
by the Association of Metropolitan Authorities (AMA), Association of County Councils
(ACC), and the Association of District Councils (ADC), all of whom had Planning and
Transportation Committees. The AMA in particular had a close relationship with the PTAs
and the PTEs at a local level and PTEG at a national level, which is unsurprising as PTEs
were all in the former metropolitan counties. Before the abolition of the metropolitan
authorities all of the PTAs were members of the AMA, while the PTEs supplied much of
the specialist advice to the AMA's Planning and Transportation Committee.
Another important organisation was the Bus and Coach Council (BCC), which was the
trade organisation for the bus and coach industry and who would be a key player in the
debate over deregulation.' The BCC represented bus and coach operators from both the
public and private sector, who prior to deregulation ran 98 per cent of buses and 66 per
cent of coaches in the United Kingdom. BCC members are grouped into four sectors
according to the part of the industry in which they operate. These four sectors included: the
nationalised sector (NBC, SBG, Ulsterbus); the Transport Executive sector (PTEs, and
London Regional Transport); the local authority sector; and the independent sector.
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Policy-making prior to 1985 was conducted at both a national and a local level. National
policy-making focused largely upon subsidy and the structure and financing of the NBC,
involving the DTp, the Treasury, the territorial departments, local authorities, national local
authority organisations and the NBC itself. 3 At a local level, policy-making centred around
the direct provision of services in that locality. The key actors were the local authority, the
PTAs and PTEs in metropolitan authorities, the NBC or a subsidiary of the NBC running
the services, the bus manufacturers, and the Traffic Commissioners who received
applications to run services and awarded licenses. Other public transport bodies, such as
British Rail, were also consulted. 4 Links between those involved with policy at a national
level and those running services at a local level were provided through the AMA, ACC,
ADC and PTEG, although problems affecting specific local authorities could be dealt with
through direct contact with the DTp. For example, until 1985 the DTp was responsible for
hearing and adjudicating on appeals against Traffic Commissioners decisions within the
traffic areas. A further consideration is Europe, which has increasingly developed a
transport dimension. It was stated that the objectives of the Treaty of Rome "shall ... be
pursued within the framework of a common transport policy" (cited in Nugent, 1991:
p.44). Although EU directives have had a direct impact on Britain's transport policies s and
while the Commission has its own Transport Commissioner, the effect on the provision of
local bus services has not been significant.
It is possible to identify resource dependencies between those responsible for the financing
and delivery of local bus services prior to 1985. While central government held legislative
and financial resources, local government controlled bus services, held the knowledge and
expertise, and through the rates possessed an independent source of revenue. Other actors
such as the NBC controlled significant organisational resources, including the capital assets
(buses, bus stations etc.) and manpower in bargaining central government. However, it is
difficult to identify a specific policy network from the Rhodes Model which reflects
policy-making in bus services.
Moreover, it appears that the Conservative Government showed little interest in building
such a network. Wistrich argues that, nationally, the DTp has largely shunned public
transport interests and instead built close links with road building and road user interests
(1987: p.101). Rhodes highlights the importance of road engineers as a technocratic
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profession in road construction with "highway engineers, both at the centre and in the
locality, became more deeply institutionalised in government ... As an example of a
professionalised policy community, roads could be seen as an archetypal policy network in
British government: immovable, immutable and inertial" (1988: p.219). No such network
developed with the bus industry. Overall, the Thatcher and Major Governments were often
criticised for taking little interest in public transport issues, leading to "paralysis in policy-
making", brought about "by an ideological obsession with the motor car and a terror of
unpopular measures to restrain traffic" (The Economist 27.04.96).
It is also difficult to identify a dominant profession or organisation within the bus industry.
The problems of identifying a policy network are compounded by the fact that the bus
industry is part of a broader public transport system, in an even broader transport network.
According to Shaw:
The systems concept is based on the philosophy that "the whole is greater than the
sum of its parts". The component parts of the systems are interrelated. Any change
which is introduced in one part of the system will affect all others, through a chain
reaction. Planning and co-ordination are therefore needed to ensure the elements of
the whole work together to the benefit of the user (1995: p.63).
Some issues in the bus industry affect public transport as whole and this will be reflected in
the pattern of consultation for those issues. This was the case during the Labour
governments of the 1960s and 70s which "consistently sought to achieve efficiency, by
eliminating 'wasteful' competition ... through the integration and co-ordination of the
different branches of transport provision" (Wistrich, 1983: p.22). Barbara Castle was
particularly active in this area, publishing three White Papers on transport planning and co-
ordination in the two years prior to the 1968 Act. Different patterns of group interaction
existed for local, national, and European policy. Also at a local level, the network was very
much dependent upon an individual issue and the extent to which it affected other public
transport bodies, such as British Rail, or the transport network as a whole. The pattern of
resource dependencies also differed at the local government level, between the PTE and
non-PTE areas, such as with their relationship with Traffic Commissioners.
The TCs were not terribly significant in the PTE areas. Technically we had to go to
the TCs to ask permission to run services but because of our powers it was very
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unlikely that the TCs would reject an application from a PTE operate or not operate
a service. Outside the conurbations the TCs were still amongst the people of
influence.6
It is therefore difficult to characterise the bus industry in terms of a single policy network.
There are resource-dependencies between organisations responsible for delivering local bus
services, between those responsible for the transport system as a whole, between local and
central government, and between central government departments. All these relationships
can affect policy outcomes. Rhodes admits that his typology cannot account for all policy
areas, as the "variety of networks is potentially much greater" than those in the Rhodes
Model (1988: p.81). Within a single policy area, numerous policy networks can operate
simultaneously.
Additionally, the neglect of belief systems and ideology in the Rhodes Model, and the
effect these can have on policy outcomes, must be addressed. Transport policy as a whole
has always been influenced by the climate of ideas. As Wistrich notes, there has always
been "a continuing preoccupation with the proper role and size of the public sector in the
transport industry" (1983: p.21). While Labour has focused on the benefits of
nationalisation and co-ordination, the Conservatives have long believed in the benefits of
privatisation and deregulation - the Conservatives first denationalised long-distance road
haulage in 1953 and removed British Empire Airways' monopoly of domestic scheduled
flights in 1960. Transport is also a highly "political" policy area. According to Hennessy:
Transport is another of Whitehall's Cinderellas. Yet it is immensely newsworthy,
highly political in its vulnerability to lurches in policy on changes of government,
and, like the Home Office, prey to bolts from the blue, such as a Zeebrugge disaster
or a King's Cross Underground tragedy, which project it to the top of the news
bulletins and across all the front pages (1990: pp.499-500).
Thus the bus industry has also been influenced by developments in political thinking, with
major policy shifts in 1930 and 1968, 1980 and 1985. Since 1979, the bus and coach
industry has again undergone a period of conflict and change, with deregulation replacing
the certainties of road service licensing with the discipline of the market.
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TOWARDS BUS DEREGULATION
This section charts the principal intellectual, ideological and political contributions to the
debates leading to bus deregulation and the Transport Act 1985. It is divided into two parts.
The first reviews the arguments and publications of the new right think tanks, namely the
IEA and the ASI. The CPS produced nothing of significance on the subject. A transport
study group was established in the early 1980s, but was reportedly side-tracked by the
issue of converting railways into roads. 7 The second part highlights the political steps
towards deregulation from 1979 to the years 1983-85 when the intellectual and political
pressures were brought together by Secretary of State Nicholas Ridley, who attempted to
turn academic argument into practical politics. Any direct links between the arguments of
the think tanks and the 1985 Act will be considered in the following section.
Think Tanks and Bus Deregulation
The debate over bus deregulation was, more so than other case studies addressed in this
research, as intellectual as it was polemical. Arguments over whether the abolition of road
service licensing would lead to improved bus services, or whether it would bring back the
"chaos" of the pre-regulation 1920s, have largely been argued and contested in academic
journals. However, the IEA and the ASI have produced a number of pamphlets on the
subject. Unlike publications on education reform and prison privatisation, pamphlets on
bus deregulation (and transport policy generally) have not been written by "in-house" think
tank personnel. They were largely written by full-time academics who utilised the new
right think tanks as another platform for the dissemination of their ideas. The think tanks'
work on bus deregulation can be divided into two phases: the IEA phase, 1963-1982; and
the ASI phase, 1983-85.
The IEA: The IEA produced three publications on transport advocating bus deregulation.
The first was a Hobart Paper entitled Transport for Passengers by John Hibbs. His analysis
begins with the observation that the problems of the bus industry were growing due to
competition from both the railways and, more significantly, the private car. The Road
Traffic Act is said to have had a detrimental impact on the development of the bus industry
as its effect was to restrict competition and its ability to respond to the interests of
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consumers, and "sets a ring-fence round the industry, and except in the limited field of
private hire work severely restricts the natural flexibility of the industry" (1963: p.77).
The main consequence of the Road Traffic Act was that it "discouraged change and
development and encouraged inertia into what had been a highly competitive and adaptable
industry; it also put a premium upon inefficiency by linking most operators into a pricing
system based upon the protection of those with the highest costs" (ibid). Arguments in
favour of cross-subsidisation - where a bus operator runs profitable routes subsidised
unprofitable routes deemed to be socially necessary - were also criticised on two grounds.
First, Hibbs questioned whether the large companies were best suited to operate the
"thinner" rural services, and suggested that these be left to smaller companies who would
have smaller overheads. Second, Hibbs suggested that the arguments in favour of cross-
subsidisation "imply the existence of a sort of contract between those who contribute the
surplus and those whose travel is subsidised out of it" (ibid). Yet it was doubtful whether
passengers on profitable routes had actually consented to paying higher prices to subsidise
fellow passengers elsewhere.
It is doubtful whether cross-subsidisation is either equitable or efficient. There is no
evidence that it must inevitably select the better-off to provide subsidies for the
poorer sections of the community. Even today the most profitable bus routes pass
through the more densely populated parts of our towns, while the surplus from
them may be applied to the maintenance of services in the more fashionable areas.
Above all, the practice is self-defeating so long as the better-off can contract out of
it by using the private car, as more and more are doing (ibid).
Hibbs therefore argues that road service licensing should be abolished, with the result that
consumers should benefit from lower fares and greater choice.
The intellectual arguments in favour of liberalisation were further advanced in a 1969 TEA
pamphlet by Gilbert Ponsonby entitled Transport Policy: Co-ordination through 
Competition. Ponsonby argued that economists who advocate a "properly-co-ordinated"
transport system understand this to mean that "all traffic would be carried by the forms of
transport that require the least call upon scarce economic resources of the country" (1969:
p.9). If necessary, this may mean traffic being carried by more than one mode of transport
per journey. Policy should not be biased towards one particular mode, and "all forms of
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transport should be given an equal chance of competing for custom" (ibid). Ponsonby
believed that road service licensing be lifted and cross-subsidisation abolished. Reinforcing
Hibbs' 1963 arguments, Ponsonby believed that "cross-subsidisation is to be deplored"
(ibid), and added further reasons to justify abolition. Ponsonby asked "whether it is
appropriate to give Traffic Commissioners, an omnibus or coach operator ... or any other
administrative power to (what amounts to) tax some and subsidise others?" (ibid). If some
unremunerative services8 are run, then operators must make excess profits on other routes
to cover their losses. This "is incompatible with the conception of a co-ordinated system of
transport defined above because it encourages such gains, and thus prevents the fullest
possible development of all services in all places where effective demand justifies it"
(ibid). Moreover, Traffic Commissioners are required to take into account the provision of
unremunerative services when awarding licenses.
This leads to the most compelling argument of all against such directives: that they
oblige the Traffic Commissioners to dispense and preserve considerable degrees of
monopoly for the operators involved, for it is neither equitable nor practical to call
upon such operators to provide unremunerative social services out of their revenues
without giving them some quid pro quo - in this, as in most other cases, some
measure of protection or monopoly (ibid).
Ponsonby did not dispute that some loss-making bus services need to be provided for
social reasons. However, it was disputed that these services should be decided and financed
by the bus operators: "subsidies of this kind should be met out of public funds by central
funds or (in this case, preferably) by local government authorities" (ibid). Relieved of this
social burden, the "main argument in favour of protecting them from new or other
established operators would then fall to the ground" (ibid).
The final of the three IEA publications was in 1982 by John Hibbs entitled Transport
Without Politics...'?. Hibbs, like Ponsonby, was concerned with various modes of transport
although the arguments in favour of bus deregulation were reiterated. Hibbs also advocated
the privatisation and break-up of the NBC and its territorial components as a desirable
consequence of the abolition of cross-subsidisation.
An immediate step should be to wind down the "territorial" bus companies and
transfer their operations to smaller units, each drawing upon one of a limited
number of centres providing technical support and management services. After all,
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the territorial companies were explicitly intended to be instruments of cross-
subsidisation and, as such, are both undesirable and anachronistic (1982: p.78-79).
The ASI: As with all other areas of government policy, transport was subject to an Omega
Report, published in 1983. The report was written by John Hibbs, Anthony Shepherd,
Sandy McGregor, and Peter Fells "amongst others". The report covered roads, road
passenger transport, freight transport, and the railways. For road passenger transport it was
argued that deregulation is essential for a realistic and effective transport policy.
The arguments that such de-regulation and freedom will over-provide services and
lead to chaos, criminal practices, etc., are a plea for the continuing insulation of
existing operators from competition. In an open market, the inefficient will fail, but
effective and competitive private services will provide the cheapest possible
transport with no requirement for general subsidy. All complications imposed on
the provision of private transport services for hire and reward tend to promote
public monopolies and waste resources (Adam Smith Institute, 1983: p.12).
The Omega Report attacked what it called the "untenable assumptions" of transport policy:
that there is a need for substantial cross-subsidisation; and that there exists substantial
economies of scale in the industry. Together "these have given rise to a system of licensing
that has created monopolies in an essentially competitive industry" (ibid. The case against
cross-subsidisation has already been highlighted. The argument that large bus companies
generate and require large economies of scale to operate were disputed on two grounds.
First, "there is little evidence about the optimum size of fleet for ... bus operations, but it is
perhaps nearer 50 than 500". Second, the report highlighted the costs of large operations:
namely "remoteness from the customer, rigidity, and institutionalised labour relations"
(ibid). The ASI therefore proposed deregulation, with the PTEs relieved of their obligation
to provide for all their area's transport needs. The Omega Report also echoed Hibbs' IEA
proposal to decentralise NBC operations, encouraging staff buy-outs of the new
organisations.
The ASI's second report on bus deregulation was Wheels Within Cities, by Gabriel Roth
and Anthony Shepherd (1984). The report aimed to provide some empirical evidence that
public transport need not be nationalised, loss-making, and inefficient. Drawing on
evidence from across the world, from cities as diverse as Calcutta, Buenos Aires, Nairobi
and Belfast, the authors point to the success and sustainability of informal passenger
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transport (IPT) systems. IPT systems are characterised by a number of characteristics. First,
ownership is private. Second, transport operators tend to be small firms, allowing closer
scrutiny by managers and reflecting the limited economies of scale that exist in the
industry. Third, most firms use low-cost small vehicles. Fourth, many operators belong to
"route associations" where "a number of private operators band together to run a route in
common". Fifth, all IPT systems are profitable, and finally all companies are anxious to
please their customers (ibid).
Roth and Shepherd made a number of recommendations for the UK in light of this
international evidence:
• at the central level: deregulation and simplification of existing rules to
encourage the entry of private operators into public transport;
• at the regional level: the reorganisation of the Area Traffic Commissioners'
powers, procedure, and requirements; and
• at central and local level: the abolition of generalised subsidy support and its
replacement by specific subsidies to all deserving users of services whether
publicly or privately owned (ibid).
The final ASI publication on the subject was, again, by John Hibbs. The Debate on Bus 
Deregulation was a response to the Government's published proposals for deregulation of
the bus industry in its White Paper of 1984 (see below). As such, Hibbs' paper cannot have
had any influence in the formulation of the proposals. Nevertheless, the Government's
reform programme was welcomed by Hibbs who believed "the industry faces a far more
prosperous future in consequence of the proposed legislation than it could have expected
under the protectionist and monopolist regime that has governed it since 1930" (1985: p.1).
Taken together, the work of the IEA and the ASI provided a theoretical critique of
regulation and road service licensing and proposed a coherent programme of reform. The
proposals of the think tanks bear close similarities to the 1985 Act. Indeed Whitehead
maintains that Wheels Within Cities "represents the blueprint for the 1985 Act" (1995:
p.79).
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The Road to Deregulation 1979-85
The election of the Conservative Government in 1979 heralded the possibility of a
reduction in state intervention in transport industries as in other spheres of government
activities. Long-distance haulage had already been deregulated in the Transport Act 1968.
Although a policy paper by Shadow Transport Minister Norman Fowler in 1977 (Fowler,
1977) fell far short of total deregulation, the Conservatives' 1979 manifesto announced
their intention to "relax the Traffic Commissioner licensing regulations to enable new bus
and other services to develop - particularly in rural areas - and we will encourage new
private operators" (Conservative Party, 1979: p.15). Fowler was appointed as Mrs
Thatcher's first Transport Secretary and the first steps towards deregulation were taken in
the Transport Act 1980, which deregulated long-distance coach journeys and deregulated
price controls and weakened the powers of the Traffic Commissioners for local bus
services. The key provisions of the 1980 Act are highlighted below.
The main political impetus for national deregulation of local bus services came from
Nicholas Ridley, who was appointed Secretary of State for Transport in October 1983. The
first indication that bus deregulation was high on his agenda came at a speeth ke gave ,:s
the Bus and Coach Council in February 1984. Ridley informed his audience that he had
"asked my officials to carry out a thorough study of the whole question of the organisation
and regulation of the bus industry". Ridley praised the response of the coach industry to the
opportunities offered by the 1980 Act.
Deregulation brought its own market into existence and then increased it. By
offering attractive and competitive services which the customers want, you have
shown that a complete break can be made with the dreary pattern of regulation and
subsidy. I wonder whether the lesson of this has been widely understood (Ridley,
1984).
Ridley effectively launched the debate on bus deregulation, emphasising the Government's
belief "that regulation should be kept to a minimum and the Government, whether local or
central, should only intervene when it has to". Moreover, Ridley made his own position on
the subject clear to all.
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I have an instinctive distrust of regulation. I need convincing that the full panoply
of road service licensing is what your industry needs. Where there is competition to
provide goods and services, consumers can vote with their feet ... But where
subsidy and regulation have come to dominate, in the provision of local bus
services, those forces are missing (ibid).
Table 8
Key Provisions of the Transport Act 1980
• All remaining services were also exempted (subject to a few residual powers, never use from price
control (previously ... fare tables had been enforced as a condition of the road service licence
• The "burden of proof" was shifted from the applicant to the objector, the traffic commissioners being
required to grant a road service licence unless they were satisfied that to do so would be "against the
interests of the public"
• County Councils were enabled to ask the Secretary of State to set up "trial areas" ... within which no
road service licence was required at all.
• All long-distance services were exempted from the need for a road service licence (the definition of an
express service, which had turned upon the minimum fare, was to be changed to be one on which no
passenger travelled less than thirty miles, measured in a straight line.
Source: Hibbs (1989: p.264)
The "thorough study" of the industry which the DTp had just embarked upon was carried
out by a group of officials, economists, and advisers called the Road Passenger Transport
Steering Group (RPTSG). This body consisted of representatives from the DTp, the
Treasury, the Scottish and Welsh Offices, and the No 10 Policy Unit. 9
 The RPTSG also
appointed three external consultants: Dr Stephen Glaister from the LSE, Professor Michael
Beesley from the London Business School, and Malcolm Buchanan from Colin Buchanan
and Partners, a transport consultancy firm.
The result of the RPTSG was a White Paper entitled Buses which was published in July
1984. The White Paper criticised the 1930 regulatory framework, the results of which "has
been to maintain a pattern of services developed for a different age and to neglect the best
parts of the market" (Department of Transport et al, 1984: p.1). There resulted "too little
incentive to develop markets, to woo the customer", with operators developing a
philosophy which was "defensive and inward-looking" (ibia'). Drawing on the perceived
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success of the 1980 Transport Act and the deregulation of long-distance coach services, the
White Paper proposed similar changes to the bus industry. The major changes included the
abolition of road service licensing throughout Great Britain except for London'°, and the
break-up and eventual privatisation of the NBC.
The White Paper argued that the licensing system of the 1930s was no longer relevant to
modern transport needs.
The circumstances were very different from today. There were no national safety
provisions to protect the public, no minimum standards for vehicles and their
maintenance, no need to pass a driving test or demonstrate fitness to operate bus
services. Traffic regulation was in its infancy (ibid.
Although the market grew steadily until the 1950s, the growth in car ownership saw a
contraction of the bus market, with reduced profits and rising fares. The White Paper noted
that the effect of this was simply to drive passengers away at an even faster rate.
Regulation was gradually seen as part of the problem, and while the White Paper
acknowledged that attempts were made by the Labour Government in 1977/8 to relax
licensing in an attempt to attract passengers, this was inadequate to halt the spiral of
decline. However, the Transport Act 1980 was presented as a success, and as a justification
for proceeding for deregulating buses. Drawing on research from the Transport and Road
Research Laboratory, the White Paper highlighted that between 1980 and 1983 "fares on
these services dropped on average by 40 per cent in real terms and 700 new services were
introduced" (ibid). The abolition of road service licensing in the three trial areas was also
heralded as a success, with "no massive decline in services to the rural communities in
these areas". In Hereford and Worcester subsidies were down by as much as thirty-eight
per cent, while in Hereford itself "the number of bus services has increased and fares have
gone down" (ibi d). The Government argued that abolishing road service licensing would
"bring big benefits" to consumers in terms of lower fares, more services, new operators
(bringing new jobs), increased patronage, and an industry more responsive to passenger
needs.
The structure and ownership of the bus industry was also a major consideration in Buses, in
particular the size and financial strength of public sector operators. As such: "The
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government has therefore decided that there should be changes to the structure of public
sector operation at the earliest opportunity to ensure fairer competition between public
sector operators and with the public sector" (ibid). Bus undertakings provided by district
councils would be incorporated into a company owned by the district council. After a
transitional period, the council would be prohibited from subsidising the company, and it
would be up to the district councils themselves as to whether to privatise those companies.
Similarly PTE bus operations would be broken up into smaller units and turned into
separate companies. The White Paper proposed that the NBC be broken up and then
privatised, given that its financial strength might deter competitors.
One of the distinctive features of Buses is the annexes which were added to justify and give
intellectual credibility to many of the Government's claims. There were three annexes in
total. Annex 1, entitled "The Bus Industry - Facts and Figures", presented the state of the
bus industry as it stood in 1984. It highlighted: the declining percentage of bus travel in
relation to private transport between 1953-83; the structure of the industry (the relative
contribution of the transport executives, municipal, nationalised, and private sectors); and
the finance of the industry (including its turnover, fare patterns, and subsidy). Annex 2,
"Regulation, Subsidy, and Cross-Subsidy - A Critique", was a theoretical study "of some of
the advantages and disadvantages of the present regulatory system that has governed the
bus industry for the last fifty years and also, as far as the evidence permits, of the
consequences that would follow from the radical changes that the government is
proposing" (ibid). Annex 3 considered "The Effects of the Transport Act 1980 on Local
Bus Services". This provided the detailed evidence from the three trial areas which was
referred to in the body of the White Paper to support the Government's arguments that they
were successful. The annexes were significant in that they provided a more theoretical or
"academic" flavour to Buses than that normally found in white papers. Amongst the works
cited, "uniquely in White Papers", included IEA publications by Ponsonby (1969) and
Hibbs (1982).
The publication of the White Paper was followed by a period of consultation. According to
Savage:
There were over 8000 responses to the Department of Transport, arising from the
publication of the White Paper. In addition the liouse of Commons Select
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Committee took evidence from many sources before publishing its report on bus
deregulation in March 1985. The majority of opinion was critical of the
government's proposals (1985: p.13).
The Government was criticised for initiating the second reading of the Transport Bill
before the Transport Select Committee (TSC) had published its impending report on the
financing of the bus industry. A Conservative member of the TSC, Peter Fry MP, was
particularly critical of Ridley for not allowing the House of Commons the opportunity to
read the select committee's report prior to its scrutiny of the Bill (see House of Commons 
Debates, 12.02.85, co1.209). The Government eventually delayed the second reading until
the publication of the report which eventually criticised the assumptions behind the Bill.
The White Paper describes the local bus sector as an ailing sector of declining
patronage, service levels, increasing fares and increasing subsidy. All of these are
attributed, at least in part, to the "dead hand of regulation". We agree with the
identification of the symptoms, but not with the diagnosis of cause. We feel that the
White Paper considerably understates the extent to which the problems of the
industry are the result of fundamentally underlying economic and social trends, and
overstates the damage caused by the regulatory regime.
... We believe that we have seen enough evidence to fear wasteful and unsafe
competition on the road; increased problems in maintaining safety standards;
destabalisation of desired services by creaming off traffic by new entrants by new
entrants, especially with smaller vehicles which will increase urban congestion; a
serious loss of benefits of co-ordination and integration of public transport
services; and service losses which will make local transport planning Jess effective.
We consider these potential disbenefits to be substantial (Transport Select
Committee, 1995a: pp.lxxxv-lxxxvi).
A further line of attack was on the lack of effective consultation between the publication of
the White Paper and the Bill.
This dissatisfaction with the amount of consultation and its time-scale was echoed
by several witnesses. The Passenger Transport Executive Group, for example,
considered that the lack of consultation on the underlying principles of the White
paper was both "regrettable and imprudent" (Transport Select Committee, 1985a:
p.ixxxiii).
A memorandum from Chartered Institute of Transport told the TSC that whilst "your
Committee may be interested in the views of professional transport people the Government
cannot wait for the views of your Committee" (Transport Select Committee, 1985b: p.48).
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Few concessions of substance made by the Government during the Bill's passage through
Parliament. While the Bill was amended in parts, the central provisions of the Transport
Bill passed into law largely unscathed. The Transport Bill received the Royal Assent on 30
October 1985, "so bringing into force the most controversial and far reaching piece of
transport legislation for over half a century" (Platform, Nov/Dec 1985).
Table 9
The Transport Act 1985
"The 1985 Transport Act made specific alterations to the structure of the bus industry by
changing the following:
Changes in Ownership of the PTE operations: The Act forced a change in ownership
of the PTE bus operations ... from public ownership into a company with shares held by the Passenger
Transport Authority, and PTA members becoming Directors. The Act allowed provisions to be made at a
later date for the possible forced sale of the company into private ownership, and the possible forced break-
up of the companies into smaller units.
The 'break-up' of the National Bus Company (England and Wales): The National Bus Company was
sold off in units of its 'subsidiaries', the local operations typically covering one or two shire counties, and
with two or three operating into PTE cities from outside. From the 1980 Act these companies were allowed
to carry passengers into PTE areas, but were (in most cases) not allowed to operate wholly in areas controlled
by the PTE. Arrangements for the sales had to be agreed with the Secretary of State, and be finalised by mid-
1988.
The Scottish Bus Group: was to remain in public ownership for the time being, but to be operated as
separate subsidiaries, with the possibility of later splitting up, and sale to the private sector.
The abolition of road service licensing (the central aspect of the Act) allowed new private operators to
enter the market.
Changes to 'competition rules' forbid 'unfair competition which could have implications for firms
merging to have a monopoly service in any area.
Source: Stokes (1990: p.3)
ADVOCACY COALITIONS AND BUS DEREGULATION
This section addresses the two coalitions which contested the deregulation debate - a Pro-
Deregulation Coalition and an Anti-Deregulation. It considers each in turn, and concludes
with an examination of the importance of ministers, and, in particular, Nicholas Ridley.
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The Pro-Deregulation Coalition
Support for deregulation came mainly from a small number of academic economists, many
of whom have been connected with the new right think tanks in some way, but who, in this
case, largely pursued deregulation independently of these organisations.
Composition, Interaction, and Co-ordination: Academics who supported deregulation and
who spoke or wrote on the subject included Gilbert Ponsonby, John Hibbs, Gabriel Roth,
Anthony Shepherd, Michael Beesley, Stephen Glaister, and Alan Walters. Initial interest in
deregulation came from Ponsonby, who was at the LSE alongside other eminent free
market thinkers such as Plant, Robbins, and Popper. Ponsonby's early analysis on the
consequences of regulation was an inspiration to other economists. Michael Beesley started
his transport research at the LSE in 1960 at Ponsonby's suggestion." Ponsonby not only
introduced Hibbs to the TEA, but was Hibbs' supervisor for his MSc (Econ) thesis on the
economic consequences of the Road Traffic Act 1930. When Ponsonby retired as Reader in
Transport, he was replaced by Michael Beesley. When Beesley retired, he was replaced by
Stephen Glaister. Other's from the new right think tanks who publicly supported
deregulation included Lord Harris of High Cross, who defended the Transport Bill in the
Lords (House of Lords Debates, 11.06.85, cols.1163-1165) and Digby Anderson from the
SAU, who highlighted the advantages of devegulation in an alt.IC't ill T'ne Times 
(25.07.84). However, these were passing contributions to the debate and neither Harris nor
Anderson are regarded as playing any noticeable role in the Pro-Deregulation Coalition.
As economists interested in a common field, academia provided a useful structure for
interaction and for the exchange of ideas through conferences and joint publications.
According to Hibbs, "there was interaction and we met from time to time, occasionally
shared conference platforms and so on, but it was a very informal kind of process".12
Beesley suggests that the pro-deregulation economists were best described as a network
rather than a coalition, as in a network the components never act in concert and the work of
the deregulation advocates was largely uncoordinated. 13 This view is reinforced by others
in the field it one official was certainly aware of "a group [not network] of academics,
including Glaister, Beesley, Hibbs, Roth and Alan Walters, against regulation and arguing
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that the bulk of it was unnecessary and counter-productive". 14 A former AMA official
recalls:
I do not recall a network of academics but I was aware that the Government's
approach had academic support. John Hibbs was particularly active with articles,
letters in the press and lectures. He was invited to support the Government
proposals in one or two AMA seminars as were successive Government ministers
and Conservative MPs known to favour de-regulation.15
Overall, the TEA and ASI played only a limited role in the Pro-Deregulation Coalition.
They simply provided another platform for the pro-deregulation academics to promote
their policies. The intellectual case for abolishing road service licensing was initially made
by Ponsonby in the Economic Journal in 1958 and the Journal of the Institute of Transport
in 1963, and Hibbs would later build upon Ponsonby's analysis in his Hobarts. During the
passage of the Bill, the arguments over the benefits of deregulation were conducted
through academic journals, such as the debate between Glaister (1985a, 1985b) and Nash
(1985) in the Journal of Transport Economics and Policy. Nevertheless, some suggest that
the new right think tanks contributed to a sustained attack upon road service licensing, with
more than a hint of collusion. Noting the cross-referencing between pamphlets and articles
of this group of academics and the Buses White Paper, Whitehead notes that:
Whilst one should be wary of "ad homimen" arguments, and should give the
arguments of academics respect based on the soundness of argument rather than
political allegiance, the strong impression remains of a hermetically sealed
academic loop feeding into the thought-processes behind the White Paper (1985:
p.80).
Prior to deregulation, approximately ten per cent of licenses for bus services were held by
private operators (Department of Transport et al, 1984: p.15). These private sector
companies, though, were not major advocates for deregulation, perhaps because increased
competition threatened the profitability of services run by these firms. Pro-Deregulation
academics such as Hibbs found little support from private operators. 16 Similar sentiments
were expressed by Malcolm Buchanan who recalls that "the major private sector operators
were not in the least bit interested in deregulation, and in fact they had quite a comfortable
niche within the regulatory framework within which they could make their money"."
Similarly, officials in the DTp recalled no pressure for deregulation from the private sector
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operators. However, this is not to say that all those in the industry were anti-deregulation.
Both Hibbs and Buchanan recalled support from middle management from within the
nationalised sector, who relished the opportunities offered by deregulation.
What intrigued me about the whole thing was that officially the nationalised sector
opposed it. But when you spoke to individuals within the nationalised industry a lot
of them said "Its the best thing that could happen - deregulate, break up the
nationalised sector and let me run the buses in my area according to local needs,
without waiting six weeks for a decision to be made further up the hierarchy".
However, they were unable to go public with such comments."
Belief System: Whitehead (1995) identifies two major ideological influences which
underpinned the case for deregulation. First, the notion of "spontaneous order", associated
with the Austrian school of economics and, most notably, Hayek. The concept of
spontaneous order means "that the world as a whole, and therefore 'the market' will impose
a logical order upon itself by the unknowing inputs of thousands of individuals undertaking
what they see is the most rational course of action". Deregulation would therefore bring
about a network based upon the actual decisions of consumers, rather than Traffic
Commissioners or bureaucrats. New operators would enter the market to run services
demanded by passengers which had previously been neglected or ignored. Given the low
overheads and limited economies of scale in the industry, it was seen as quite conceivable
that gaps in the market would be filled by a large number of small operators. As a result,
"perhaps through the mechanism of route associations, a network would come into being,
but on a very different basis from the assumptions or practice prior to deregulation" (ibid).
The second ideological influence identified is public choice theory, which views all
individuals as rational utility maximisers. The work of Niskanen (1971; 1973) suggested
that bureaucrats work not for the ill-defined "public interest", but to maximise their own
budgets. Government agents are "passive sponsors" who have neither the incentive nor the
opportunity to obtain the information regarding the maximum budget required to produce a
specific service. As a result:
being non-market led bureaus, bus service agencies, and particularly those under
the control of local authorities will be "budget maximising" bureaucracies that will
have inevitably have grown too large for their function because of the relationship
with their sponsor. A combination of a service that would be in no position to
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compete, potential small and lean entrants who can capture dense urban routes, and
a pool of passengers willing to act as rational calculators would provide the motive
force (both negatively and positively) which would make the legislative proposals
work (Whitehead, 1995: p.84).
Resources and Strategies: As academics, those in the Pro-Deregulation Coalition had no
resources which they could use to bargain with the centre, being totally dependent on the
Government's willingness to deregulate. However, once the Government had decided (or
had been persuaded) to deregulate, then the Coalition could offer valuable intellectual
support for the proposals. For this, the key resource granted to pro-deregulation economists
was access to decision-making structures, and in particular the RPTSG, on which both
Glaister and Beesley were invited to serve. The strategy could be nothing more than
persuasion.
Access was granted to Glaister and Beesley because Ridley and the DTp had decided that
the Government's proposals needed and should have a theoretical basis. 19 At the time,
bringing in outsiders to departmental committees was unusual, at least in the DTp.20
According to one DTp official:
In the writing of the White Paper there was a great anxiety to try and set this policy
in an intellectually, defensible context. Not to have simple assertions of what the
policy was, but to say "We have looked at this. This is not simply a political whim.
It has been proceeded by a lot of work of what the problems with the industry are,
and we have outside experts working on this".21
Another DTp official argues that Glaister and Beesley helped turn the RPTSG into a
"perpetual seminar, bringing intellectual clarity and drive to the exercise, important in
examining proposals and changing attitudes in the department", 22 a view endorsed by other
officials.
Beesley in particular was tremendously dynamic and influential in the way he
articulated his knowledge of the transport industry. For example, he was very well
informed on the issue of airline deregulation, although his knowledge extended to
all sectors. He engaged people and was very persuasive. They [Beesley, Glaister,
and Buchanan] all were.23
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Malcolm Buchanan also emphasises the role of Beesley who was "brilliant at argument,
methodically going through all the barriers to entry that existed in the industry to try and
maximise competition".24 Over a six-month period, the RPTSG studies proposals and
submissions from all sides of the argument, including those of the new right think tanks.
Officials maintain that there was only one option that was not considered and that was to
maintain the status quo, 25 which effectively meant "a continued increase in subsidy and
public spending which the review had set out to address". 26 The review addressed a number
of alternatives, including: whether it was necessary to split-up the NBC for deregulation to
work; whether deregulation should apply to both urban and rural areas; or whether PTEs be
included or excluded. According to officials, the work of pro-deregulation academics such
as Beesley and Glaister (and to an extent Buchanan) helped establish the strengths and
weaknesses of these options and clarified the advantages of full deregulation.27 Hibbs was
also drawn in to advise the Secretary of State, although on an unofficial basis. For example,
Ridley specifically requested a memorandum from Hibbs, on behalf of the ASI, on the
consequences of deregulation especially on rural and late-night services (The Times 
04.04.84). Hibbs also provided intellectual support to junior minister David Mitchell MP,
sharing platforms when the minister toured the country to defend the Government's
proposals.28 According to one official from the RPTSG, "Hibbs was not directly involved
in the formulation of policy within the DTp but was a constant source of external support
and was asked by the Dip to defend the proposals in public - which he did".29
The Anti-Deregulation Coalition
Opposition to the 1985 Transport Act was broad-based, and an Anti-Deregulation Coalition
can be identified drawn from local authorities, the bus industry, trade unions, and pressure
groups. While many of these groups acted independently, much of the lobbying at
Westminster was co-ordinated by a local-authority based forum called the Consortium, and
a Grand Consortium which incorporated sympathetic peers for when the Bill reached the
Lords.
Composition, Interaction, and Co-ordination: The groups which campaigned against
deregulation included: the BCC; PTEG; the AMA, ACC, ADC, and the Shires County
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Consortium; the Passenger Transport Campaign Group (PTCG); and individual MPs and
peers.
The BCC soon established a Working Party in 1984 in response to the Government's
consultation exercise on deregulation. Reflecting its overall composition, the BCC
Working Party included four representatives from the nationalised sector, the transport
executive sector, the local authority sector, and the independent sector. It was chaired by a
former BCC Chairman, Ron Whittle. Local authority organisations were also at the
forefront of the debate. The ACC "responded to the White Paper by accepting the principle
of deregulation and seeking detailed objectives to improve its practical workability"
(Stazicker, 1985). The AMA and ADC also came out against deregulation. According to
Stazicker, "there had probably been no Bill in recent years which had attracted such a
breadth and depth of lobbying effort from local government" (ibid).
PTEG also established a Working Party in November 1984. PTCG consisted of: the GLC
and the six metropolitan counties; the Transport and General Workers Union; the
Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF); the National
Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO); the National Union of Railwaymen
(NUR); the Trades Union Congress (TUC); Friends of the Earth; CAPITAL; and Transpoct
2000. Leading peers who opposed the Bill included official Labour spokesmen Lords
Carmichael and Underhill, Lord McIntosh (also a Labour frontbencher), Lord Tordoff
(Liberals) and Earl de la Warr.3°
Each organisation met individually to formulate its opposition to the Transport Bill. In
what Ron Whittle called a "hard drag",31 the BCC Working Party met twice a week for the
duration of the Bill, examining it line by line. In another example, the PTEG Working
Party met twenty-two times, (in addition to meetings between individual members),
including a number of meetings with the Directors General and Chairman of PTEG. 32 The
local authority organisations had their own internal transport committees to monitor the
passage of the Bill.
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There was no dominant partner within these organisations, although co-operation and co-
ordination soon evolved. This was mainly through PTEG, AMA, ACC, ADC and the
Shires County Consortium, all of whom had representatives permanently based in London.
We all knew one another and quickly realised that there were benefits in co-
operation and co-ordination. As a result, what started as an informal meeting
quickly grew into a rather more formal "Consortium" comprising the above. BCC
and the Campaign Group were also invited. BCC tended to keep at "arms length".
In addition, NBC were represented separately from the BCC as well as supporting
BCC.33
The aim of the Consortium was to work closely with the Labour frontbench, ensuring the
Opposition tabled appropriate amendments and were properly briefed. The Consortium met
each Monday when the Bill was been debated to allocate responsibilities for the week
between members. When the Bill reached the Lords, a similar exercise was undertaken,
targeting a number of sympathetic peers mentioned above. This group of peers was
informally called the Grand Consortium, who had regular meetings with the Consortium to
co-ordinate responses to the Bill. 34 Using slightly different phraseology, Phil Swann, then
the AMA's Principal Policy Officer (Planning and Transportation), wrote:
Behind the yards of Hansard reports on the Bill lies a concerted lobbying and
briefing effort which, if "workman-like" in the Commons has been fine-tuned for
the upper House.
Within the Lords itself opposition to the Bill has been co-ordinated by a small all-
party group of peers, known irreverently to their advisers as the "noble consortium"
Officers seconded, begged and borrowed from the metropolitan counties have
spearheaded the Association's work on the Bill. They have worked in conjunction
with colleagues such as the National Bus Company, Passenger Transport Executive
Group and the Public Transport Information Unit (Municipal Review October
1985).
It should be noted that two organisations in particular, the NBC and the BCC were
criticised by parts of the trade press for not being vociferous enough in their opposition to
the Bill. 35 NBC's low profile during the Bill was "causing many to suspect that their silence
is the price was a less onerous carve-up and privatisation plans" (Motor Transport
01.11.84). This suspicion was based on an observation that while NBC responded publicly
to the 1984 White Paper, its response on restructuring went unpublished. The BCC's
problems stemmed from its mixed membership of local authority, nationalised, and private
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sector components. It therefore had difficulty in finding agreement and speaking with a
unified voice on major issues. According to one Dip official, the BCC's inability to speak
effectively with one voice "inhibited them as a serious discussant for major policy matters,
although they were obviously important for minor, procedural matters". 36 At times the
BCC was therefore reluctant to commit itself to anything too controversial. For example, it
refused to participate in the Day of Action organised by the Public Transport Campaign
Group and CAPITAL (see below) because of its "political overtones" (Platform December,
1984).
Belief System: The Consortium and the Grand Consortium were established as reactions to
proposals for deregulation. It is difficult to identify an alternative agenda, other than the
maintenance of road service licensing and maintaining subsidy levels. The aims and
objectives of the Anti-Deregulation Coalition were geared exclusively towards this end,
and can be found in the material of individual members. In its newsletter, it was stated that
"BCC believes that abolition of route service licensing would mean that many people who
depend on buses - as the White Paper recognises, 39% of households have no car - might
be left with a worse service or no service" (Platform July/August 1984). As an alternative
the BCC "supports subsidy by way of competitive tenders for contracts for tenders to run
services, in appropriate circumstances, as the proposed alternative to deregulation" (ibid).
The AMA prophesied that as a result of deregulation:
• competition would be restricted to remunerative routes as popular times;
• route mileage would fall (as distinct from bus mileage);
• integrated transport systems would cease;
• late evening, holiday, hospital, and other services would be reduced or abandoned;
• concessionary fare schemes would be at risk and fares would rise.37
The PTCG outlined what it predicted would be the consequences of deregulation. Drawing
upon the deregulation experiment of the 1980 Act it maintained that:
What will happen is crystal-clear, because it has happened before. Increase fares
and motorists will revert to their cars and non-motorists will stay at home. Use of
public transport will fall off. "Unprofitable" routes will be cut. Passenger traffic
will slump still further. A familiar spiral of decay (The Times 26.11.84).38
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As such, the Anti-Deregulation Coalition sharply disagreed with the analysis of the
Government and its supporters. Opponents of deregulation maintained that far from
increasing passenger levels, increasing the number of services, and lowering fares, the
opposite would be the case.
Resources and Strategies: Opponents of deregulation possessed a number of resources at
their disposal to deploy during the Transport Bill. As noted above, the bus policy
network(s) controlled a variety of resources which could be utilised to affect policy
outcomes. Not only did the producer groups (bus companies, bus producers etc.) control
the capital assets of the bus industry, but the local government dimension was also
important. As Rhodes has argued in some depth (1986, 1988), the discretion of the centre is
limited by the resources of local government, which played a significant role in the
provision of bus services up until the 1985 Act.
The Anti-Deregulation Coalition employed a number of strategies in its opposition to the
Transport Bill. One of these was formally responding to the Government's consultation
exercise following the publication of the White Paper in 1984. When the Transport Bill
was later published, it appeared that the Government had not taken the criticisms of the
producers, local authorities and pressure groups on board, and so the campaign was
accelerated when the Bill was introduced to Parliament.
Some campaigns were locally based. Hull City Transport, for example, "was one of the
several municipals to mount its own local campaign, with a bus touring the city to make
the public, traders and industry aware of the forthcoming legislation and its possible effects
on the city" (Motor Transport 06.12.84). Attempts were also made at a national level to
draw attention to the perceived negative effects of deregulation. The PTCG was
particularly active in this area. On November 27 1984, PTCG with the pressure group
CAPITAL organised a Day of Action with over 3000 people marching on Parliament
Square. This coincided with regional demonstrations in the PTEs (Platform December
1984). A similar demonstration was organised on April 2 1985, attracting over 6000
people. Another attempt by PTCG to attract opposition to deregulation took the form of a
full page advert in the national press (see, for example, The Times 26.11.84).
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The Consortium and Grand Consortium focused their efforts on parliamentary rather than
public opinion. The most important resource and strategy here was access to the Labour
frontbench, and the attempt to affect policy outcomes through amendments to legislation.
According to one PTEG official:
We recognised from the outset that we were unlikely to prevent the Bill from going
through because the vast majority of MPs are controlled by the party whips.
Therefore, what we were seeking to do was amend it.39
According to Labour's frontbench spokesman, Gwyneth Dunwoody MP, the Transport Bill
was the first time that the Opposition had constant support and advice from a professional
rather than political source on a major item of transport legislation. The constant
monitoring of developments in Parliament by the Consortium, and the expert advice on the
technical aspects of the Bill which it provided, were a valuable source of support for the
Labour frontbench. 40 According to an AMA official:
We were invited by the Labour frontbench to suggest those sorts of amendments
and did so, and prepared briefings for the Labour frontbench or any other labour
MP interested to speak on those amendments. Inevitably the main focus of our
work was the Labour frontbench because they were politically opposed and would
listen. But we would also present our arguments to Tory MPs and Liberal Ws.'"
Although unable to prevent the Bill going through, the Consortium was able to secure
important amendments to the Bill. The BCC claimed that these included: the definition of
local bus services being amended from 5 to 15 miles between stops; the rights of district
councils to subsidise services enforced; and the Government being forced to recognise that
deregulation should begin on a common date.
Given the Government's large parliamentary majority, preventing the Bill from being
passed was never a realistic objective. 42 However, the AMA maintained that due to the
extensive lobbying work of the various working groups, "the Government has been forced
to listen and Members of Parliament in the future who take the trouble to dust down the
1985 volumes of Hansard should have no difficulty in telling members of the present
Government still in the House 'we told you so" (Municipal Review Oct 1985).
141
The Role of Ministers
The role of ministers in the process of bus deregulation was crucial. Nicholas Ridley in
particular is widely regarded as being the key impetus behind the 1985 Act. Norman
Fowler had begun the process with long-distance deregulation in the 1980 Act, and his
successor, David Howell, did open discussions with his advisers about full deregulation,
although his initiative failed to develop any momentum. 43 There is a general consensus that
Ridley's role was central. Michael Beesley believes that Ridley's contribution was
"absolutely critical, not only because he was a strong market man, but also because he
didn't like messing around with half-solutions". 44 According to John Hibbs:
Ridley is perhaps best described as a typical Whig grandee. If he thought that
something was "good for the people" then it should be done. And there is no doubt
whatsoever that, after reading his briefs, Ridley was convinced that deregulation
was the best way forward, and therefore went ahead and did it. I can't stress that too
strongly.45
Officials serving on the RPTSG reflect similar sentiments. One called Ridley the "driver"
behind the whole exercise", while another maintained that:
The reason the policy was adopted was very much Mr Ridley. I've absolutely no
doubt about this. He passionately believed in competition, and wanted to get as
much competition into the industry as possible.47
According to another official:
Ridley showed a genuine interest in the subject which was unusual, and was
intellectually equipped to deal with the arguments. Despite his public persona, he
was well respected by his senior ministers. A wonderful minister to work for.48
Buchanan makes a link between the attempt to make the White Paper theoretically
watertight, and Ridley.
I think there was very much a desire to ensure that this policy stood up
intellectually. Ridley for one was a voracious reader, and it is rumoured that he read
every paper from the RPTSG. His officials could not bluff him, which perhaps
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helps explain the drive for academic respectability. And with Ridley you could not
get away with any half-baked ideas. His officials respected him enormously and all
the ones that I have spoken to have said that Ridley was the best minister they
served. Officials respond to strong ministers and I think they responded to Ridley.49
Ridley's opponents also recognised the importance of the Secretary of State, although those
working on the detail of the Bill in Parliament emphasise that it was David Mitchell who
did most of the work in the House of Commons, as well as touring the country and taking
the argument to the local authorities. 50 Although the Policy Unit had a representative on the
RPTSG, there was little direct input or pressure from the Prime Minister. Mrs Thatcher's
occasional economic adviser and transport expert, Alan Walters, had "little to contribute"
at that time to the growing debate. 5i Another official maintained that "it certainly was not
the case of politicians urging deregulation upon a reluctant minister - very much the
reverse". 52 The Cabinet as a whole was generally supportive, if passive. Ridley recalled:
When I took my proposals to Cabinet, Margaret Thatcher was enthusiastic, and
only one voice was raised against them - that was a colleague who feared the
proposals would starve rural areas of bus services. The plan was quickly adopted
(Ridley, 1992: p.61).
Officials stress that, whatever Ridley's private views, the RPTSG were given the freedom
to discuss a range of options - it was not set up to endorse total deregulation. But neither
does this mean that Ridley should be seen as a "policy broker". He not only made it clear
that maintaining the status quo was not an option, but he appointed pro-deregulation
academics to the RPTSG rather than practitioners from the industry. Moreover, he did little
to reduce conflict after the publication of the White Paper, overriding many of the
objections of the industry. Thus, any account of why the bus industry was deregulated must
acknowledge the role of Ridley, and his commitment to the 1985 Act.
THE CONTEXT OF BUS DEREGULATION
The aim of this section is to provide the context of reform, by highlighting the ideological,
political, and socioeconomic forces which created a climate conducive to reform. These
include: the intellectual ascendancy of deregulation; the Conservative Party's "attack" on
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local government; and the problem of subsidy. It suggests that the think tanks, and the IEA
in particular, were influential only in promoting the virtues of deregulation and competition
in the decades prior to the 1985 Act, while the political and socioeconomic context was
shaped by factors beyond the think tanks' control.
Ideological - The New Paradigm of Deregulation
Bus deregulation, according to Pickup et al, "was part of a consistent policy by the
Conservative Government of privatisation and deregulation of publicly controlled activities
from 1979 onwards" (1991: p.29). According to Shaw, "Central government policy
underwent a fundamental and comprehensive revision after 1979, when a pro-market
Conservative government abruptly ended a period of over thirty years during which the
state had played a dominant role in transport and other sectors" (Shaw, 1995: p.162) It
should certainly be seen as part of broader, "supply side" reform programme applied to the
economy from 1979. According to Ridley, Mrs Thatcher's strategy set out to free the
supply side and so "liberate the wealth-creating sector of the economy" (1992: p.54).
The belief that bus deregulation would benefit both consumers and communities was
derived from the same theoretical base which argued that privatisation, competition, and
deregulation would bring benefits to the economy as a whole. Some were derogatory about
Ridley's intentions, especially Labour MPs. Gwyneth Dunwoody maintained that "The
[Transport] Bill is about two pet obsessions of the Secretary of State. One is privatisation
and the other is deregulation" (House of Commons Debates, 12.02.85, co1.200). John
Concannon MP argued that "The Bill has nothing to do with services, and a great deal to
do with party dogma and the dogma of the Secretary of State" (ibid). Sidney Bidwell MP, a
member of the TSC suggested that "The proposals in this Bill are mad" (ibid). However, by
the late 1970s/early 80s there had emerged a powerful intellectual and political movement
arguing for the superiority of markets over planning (Cockett, 1994). The leading
intellectual in this movement was Hayek, who had provided the foundations for the attack
on state planning in his classic The Road to Serfdom. At the heart of his analysis was an
attack on what he later called the "fatal conceit" (Hayek, 1989) - the idea that man is able
to shape the world around him according to his wishes, or that planners could accurately
interpret the preferences of individuals. As the state can never meaningfully collate such
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information, its attempt at planning can never produce the quality or quantity of goods
demanded. The inevitable result will be excesses or shortages, and almost certainly
dissatisfied consumers.
Only in a market free of price controls and regulation can producers understand and
respond to the needs of consumers. Prices play a pivotal role in this process, because they
act as the transmitters of information unavailable to the planner. When prices fluctuate they
are sending signals to economic actors. When prices rise, it indicates a product is in
demand or getting scarcer, discouraging consumption and encouraging production. When
prices fall, the reverse is true. Moreover, for Hayek, competition is a "discovery
procedure", where "required changes in habits and customs will be brought about only if
the few willing and able to experiment with new methods can make it necessary for the
many to follow them , and at the same time to show them the way" (1978: p.189). Only
with competition and a functioning price mechanism can a "spontaneous order" develop.
These ideas underpinned much of the Conservative Government's early supply-side
reforms whether to do with financial deregulation, such as the lifting of exchange controls
in October 1979, or the privatisation programme. As Nigel Lawson recalls:
We had, by the time of the 1980 budget, not only abolished exchange controls ...;
we had also abolished all forms of pay controls and dividend controls, all of which
had been in operation, under governments of both parties, for most of the previous
decade; while preparations for the first privatisations were already well under way.
It all added up to a coherent and far-reaching programme of deregulation, whose
magnitude and importance was not, in those early days, clearly recognised (1992:
pp.52-53).
Bus deregulation entailed the application of the same principles in a different policy area,
at a time when political support for markets and deregulation was high. Much of the credit
for the growing appreciation and understanding of such issues as the importance of the
price mechanism must go to the IEA. As both Cockett (1994) and Muller (1996) have
illustrated, the IEA was vital in educating key Conservative figures in liberal economics
helping to create a new ideological environment in which the first response to an economic
problem was to consider privatisation or deregulation.
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Political - The Conservatives' "Attack" on Local Government
This section questions the extent to which bus deregulation was a political manoeuvre to
further undermine the role of local government. The Conservative Government, since
1979, has often been portrayed as persistent centralists, with a contempt for local
government and local democracy (see, for example, Jenkins, 1995). Bus deregulation could
be seen as a continuation of this trend, in that the 1985 Transport Act significantly reduced
the role of local authorities in the provision of bus services.
Local government reform was certainly a high priority for the Conservative Government
prior to the 1985 Transport Act. Horton notes that while governments previously "utilised
persuasion, negotiation, financial incentives and disseminated information on good practice
to bring about change, the Thatcher government has used law on an unprecedented scale"
(1990: p.174). Numerous Acts of Parliament were passed between 1979-85 to reduce the
autonomy of local authorities. These included general local government legislation such as
the 1980 Local Government, Planning and Land Act which, amongst other things, replaced
the rate support grant with a central government-determined block grant. The 1982 Local
Government Act Finance Act gave the Secretary of State for the Environment powers to set
expenditure targets and punish profligate councils, and the 1984 Rates Act introduced rate-
capping into England and Wales. 53 The deregulation of the bus industry and the suspension
of PTA's co-ordinating role for public transport coincided with the abolition of the
metropolitan authorities themselves. The 1985 Local Government Act abolished the
Greater London Council (GLC) and the six Metropolitan County Councils, transferring
their responsibilities to district or borough councils.
The abolition of the metropolitan counties caused widespread resentment amongst the left.
The abolition of the GLC in particular led to a highly publicised public relations battle
between "Blue Ken" (Baker, Minister for Local Government), and "Red Ken"
(Livingstone, Leader of the GLC), and provides a useful example of the state of central-
local relations by the mid-1980s. The official reason behind abolition was outlined in a
1983 White Paper, Streamlining the Cities which maintained that "the GLC and
Metropolitan County Councils ... had difficulty establishing a role for themselves and too
few real functions. Their search for a strategic role fostered uncertainty and conflict with
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the boroughs/districts" (Rhodes, 1988: pp.308-9). Others identify an unofficial motivation
for the GLC's abolition.
The political motive for its abolition was blatant. It was a left-wing thorn in the side
of the government. The GLC stuck its tongue out at Westminster from County Hall
... Political banners festooned its facade, accusing ministers of the collapse of
London's economy ... Norman Tebbit was unequivocal. The GLC had to go because
it was 'left-wing, high-spending and at odds with the government's view of the
world' (Jenkins, 1995: p.165).
Such concerns were not limited to the GLC and metropolitan counties. Nicholas Ridley
saw local government reform generally as part of the wider attack upon "dependency",
which was understood to mean "a society where people become dependent on the State for
their education, or health care, or pensions, or housing, or in some cases their income"
(1992: p.79). Such dependency made voters "owe political allegiance to their benevolent
political masters who provided the services 'free' (ibid. This was significant because by
the mid-1980s an increasing number of local councils were controlled by the Labour Party,
which was perceived to manipulate the political process to maintain power.
As a result the Conservatives have, since 1979, attempted to marginalise local government
in three ways. The first has been to force local authorities to privatise the provision of local
services. This culminated in the Local Government Act 1988 which required local
authorities to put out to tender a number of services including refuse collection, street
cleaning, and office cleaning. Other examples include the Housing Act 1980 which enabled
tenants to buy their own council houses. The second has been to devolve responsibility
from local authorities in services such as education and health, while increasing the roles of
school governing bodies and hospital managers. A third way has been to centralise
responsibility and for Whitehall to assume greater executive control from local authorities
over public services. An example of this is how elected local councillors have been slowly
been excluded from public administration in favour of central appointments.
School governors, prison visitors, museum councils, hospital trusts, funding council
boards comprised a substantial quangocracy, estimated at 30-50,000 people in
England and Wales, depending on definition ... What was extraordinary was the
lengths to which ministers went to ensure that the membership of these bodies was
loyal to them, and distant from any link with local democracy (Jenkins, 1995:
pp.264-265).
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There is little evidence to suggest that the new right think tanks played any part in a
political strategy to marginalise local government, although the ASI did provide an early
impetus to contracting-out in local government (Cockett, 1994: p.304; Kavanagh, 1990:
p.88; Asher, 1987). The Transport Act 1985 could certainly be seen to have constituted
part of the Conservative's plans to turn local government from public providers to enabling
authorities. In a pamphlet for the CPS in 1988, Ridley himself outlined his vision of local
authorities ensuring essential services are available, although through competing private
providers. This was seen to fill two key objectives of government policy - to restrict any
further growth of local authorities' expenditure and enhance the quality of their services
(Ridley, 1988).
The TSC expressed concern about the motivations behind the Transport Bill, suggesting
that the Government's turbulent relationship with the metropolitan authorities might have
clouded its judgement.
It has been suggested by many witnesses that the central objective of the Bill is
really to curb the activities of the high subsidy metropolitan authorities and that it is
unfair and inappropriate to pursue such a radical and global reorganisation on that
basis. Unhappily we believe that there is some substance in the allegation. We have
therefore felt it appropriate to question the whole range of the contents of the Bill is
appropriate for the declared objectives to be achieved (Transport Select Committee,
1985a: p.lxxxv).
Suggestions that deregulation was a politically motivated policy are denied by members of
the RPTSG,54 and any claims to the contrary are difficult to substantiate. According to one
official: "I don't think that the marginalisation of local government figured very highly at
all - in some cases, as with county councils, it actually gave county councils a greater role
in tendering for unrenumerative services". 55 Malcolm Buchanan echoed these views
maintaining that "had an attack on local government been the underlining philosophy then
the first item on the agenda would have been London when in fact it was the last".56
Nevertheless, the fact the deregulation had political as well as economic benefits (see
below) in that it further marginalised local government no doubt added to its appeal,
however small.
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Socioeconomic - The Problem of Subsidy
As highlighted above, the growth in subsidy was one of the main factors accounting for the
growth of central government involvement in the road passenger transport industry.
According to Glaister the aim of bus deregulation "was primarily a result of the
determination to reduce government expenditure - both central and local authority" (1991:
p.285). Ridley denied that deregulation was simply a cost-cutting exercise: "The Bill is not
about reducing subsidy. It is about putting life back into the industry and making sure that
the country gets the best value it can for the customer" (House of Commons Debates
12.02.85, col. 193). However, in his speech to the BCC, Ridley highlighted the importance
of the subsidy question in undertaking his review of the bus industry.
Fifteen years ago subsidy was a dirty word in the bus industry. Now we have
reached a position where total public support for the bus industry and support for its
needy passengers has gone over the £1 billion mark. That compares with the
industry's total turnover of about £2.5 billion a year. So the level of subsidy, who
pays it, who directs it, and who benefits from it are among the questions I must
address (Ridley, 1984).
The rise in subsidies was largely due to the declining competitiveness of the bus and coach
industry in the post-war years. Pickup et al (1991) divide the development of the bus
industry in the twentieth century into three stages. The first stage - between 1900 and 1950
- was one of growth, when the use of trams and trolley buses was overtaken by the use of
buses and coaches, largely in the inter-war years. The second stage - between 1950 and
1970 - is characterised as one of decline, largely due to the growth of the private car.
The 1950s and 1960s saw a decline in the bus and coach industry in the UK. During
this period, total journeys fell by 48% from 16,703 to 9,154 million and the tram
and trolley bus disappeared from the streets ... During the period as a whole, bus
vehicle miles fell by 13% and fares increased by 50% in real terms; from 1967 the
gap between revenue and costs was met by subsidy (ibid).
The third stage - the 1970s and early 1980s - was largely dominated by the level of subsidy
which became increasingly necessary to sustain a public transport network. This led to a
policy in the metropolitan areas of high investment and low fares.
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In the metropolitan areas by 1980, most PTAs were following general policies of
minimum increases in fares, maintaining services, and integrating timetables,
ticketing and routes at a time when increasing car ownership was reducing the
"base level" of demand for public transport. By about 1983 all the PTAs had "low
fares" policies and were trying to keep fares static, or increasing them as little as
they could, given the constraints of subsidy level (thic1).
The results of these policies was a subsidy level rising from £71 million in 1972 to £897
million in 1982 (Department of Transport et al, 1984: p.38). 57 Given that the Conservative
Government was committed to reducing public expenditure for macroeconomic reasons,
the bus industry was a prime target for reductions in revenue support. Glaister (1991:
pp.288-9) notes that the three problems that needed to be addressed were: that local bus
subsidies were running far ahead of central government provision; that there was no
mechanism within the pre-deregulation system to control expenditure; and that the bus
industry was not considered to have a sufficiently commercial outlook.
Appendix A of Annex 2 in Buses suggests that significant cost savings could be made
given the cost variations between the different sectors of the industry. Thus in 1982 the
cost per vehicle mile of the NBC was 74 per cent of the municipal operators and 66 per
cent of the PTEs. Moreover, the Appendix refers to research suggesting that the private
sector is even more cost effective, being 30-40 per cent below that of the NBC. It also
acknowledges that the evidence from the three trial areas "is consistent with those results"
(Department of Transport eta!, 1984: p.61).
Interestingly, the growing subsidy level was not a prominent part of the think tanks'
analysis. The IEA's arguments focused largely on the theoretical benefits of deregulation
for passengers, rather than the immediate crisis in the industry, although the ASI's Omega
Report on Transport Policy did identify the high subsidy level as a problem which required
attention (Adam Smith Institute, 1983: pp.13-14). By comparison, it was the major concern
for the RPTSG, much of whose discussion concerned the subsidy level in the bus
industry. 58 This suggests that the review of the bus industry was pursued primarily as a
reaction to a rapidly deteriorating financial situation than pressure applied by think tanks
and academics. Nevertheless, the question of what the response should be, and how that
response could be defended was an issue in which pro-deregulation academics could have
an influence.
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THE NEW RIGHT THINK TANKS AND BUS DEREGULATION: AN
ASSESSMENT
This section argues that the TEA and ASI played a marginal role in bringing about
deregulation, although the IEA was important in helping set the ideological context within
which the bus industry was deregulated. It also argues that deregulation has brought about
a fundamental change in the way bus services are provided, from a network of the NBC,
PTEs, and traffic commissioners and others, to a market in which services are largely
determined by private providers.
The Impact of the New Right Think Tanks
The only new right think tanks to involve themselves with bus deregulation were the IEA
and the ASI. These organisations did not play a prominent role in the run-up to
deregulation, although they could be said to have been part of the Pro-Deregulation
Coalition. The individuals who contributed to TEA and ASI reports on the subject, such as
Ponsonby, Hibbs, and Roth used think tanks as another platform (in addition to academic
journals, conferences, and articles and letters in the trade press) to express their ideas. The
think tank reports helped ensure that the issue of deregulation remained active, although it
is doubtful whether these were critical interventions in the debate. More important was the
work inside the DTp by allies of the above, namely Michael Beesley and Stephen Glaister,
who had access to the important decision-making meetings as advisers on the RPTSG
which drew up the blueprint for the 1985 Act. One of the opponents of deregulation, albeit
outside the DTp but heavily involved in the debate, believes the pro-deregulation
academics did play an important role in the process of change.
I think they were influential - they had people like Glaister who were able to
translate the principles into practice. If it hadn't been for the ASI and others it
would no doubt have been much more difficult. John Hibbs had been a voice in the
wilderness for a long, long time preaching the benefits of deregulation before it was
fashionable. It was a combination of the institutes being there at a time when the
Government was receptive to this kind of thinking - their time had come. But
Hibbs, Glaister and Beesley between them knew how the industry worked. Glaister
and Beesley were highly respected transport economists, and this allowed them to
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act as a bridge for pro-deregulation ideas. In a sense the think tanks gave these
people a platform.59
The circumstances leading up to the 1985 Transport Act were conducive to policy change:
the rising subsidy level was thought to have reached crisis levels; there was a credible
belief system which could explain the decline of the industry and offer a workable
alternative ideologically acceptable to the Government; and a figure in Nicholas Ridley
who was prepared to push the reforms through Westminster and Whitehall. The Pro-
Deregulation Coalition was an important influence in helping challenge the conventional
wisdom of previous government policy and the bus industry, and the importance of their
contribution was recognised when individuals were brought in to advise the Secretary of
State. Also significant was the broader work of the TEA which laid the theoretical
foundations for deregulation, not just in the bus industry, but in all spheres of government
policy. Had the arguments for deregulation not been won at the macro-economic level
within the Conservative leadership, it is certainly questionable whether it would have been
applied to the bus industry alone.
Opponents were unable to prevent deregulation largely because it was driven by a strong
minister with a large Parliamentary majority behind him. Moreover, few leading members
in the Consortium, Grand Consortium, or Labour frontbench seriously believed that
preventing the passage of the Bill was a realistic option, although they hoped to amend
what they saw as its most serious defects. Much of the opposition was local, although
thinly spread. Gwyneth Dunwoody believes that one of the significant aspects of the Bill
was that it excluded London from deregulation and so, ironically, was of little interest to
the national press, therefore depriving the opponents of the Bill of high-profile coverage.60
Think Tanks, Bus Deregulation, and Policy-Making
The Transport Act 1985 has had a profound impact on the process by which bus services
are provided. Before 1985, the industry was governed by a regulatory structure dating back
to 1930. During the 1960s, most of the responsibility for co-ordinating local transport
networks was devolved to PTAs. The 1985 Act reversed much of this. Regulation was
replaced by a system of registration under which operators were allowed to run services
where they wished, as long as they obtained an operator's licence. Traffic commissioners
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could prevent a service only on the grounds of public safety and/or road congestion. PTAs
no longer had the responsibility for co-ordinating local transport services, and although
local bus services could still be subsidised on "social grounds", the law required that such
services be put out to tender. Private operators fulfilling the above criteria could operate
services when and where they wished, although this was obviously limited by consumer
demand.
The significance of this new structure was that bus services have been determined less by
policy networks or advocacy coalitions, and more by market relations between operators
and consumers. Central government still has an important role in providing the remaining
subsidies, which in 1995 were calculated at approximately £1 billion per year (Poole, 1995:
p.16). 61 While the resource-dependencies for funding subsidies in the industry may
therefore still be significant in central government, the relationship between local
authorities, PTAs, and Traffic Commissioners is far less important in explaining the pattern
of bus services and policy outcomes in the industry. By definition, deregulation and
privatisation has weakened the role of government. As such it has been difficult for local
government and the nationalised sector to generate an implementation gap.
While it might be tempting for opponents to complain that bus deregulation was an
example of "ideology gone mad", it must be remembered that transport has always been
influenced by political ideas of the day. In the 1930s it was regulation; in the 1940s,
nationalisation; in the 1960s, co-ordination and planning; and in the 1980s, deregulation
and privatisation. Under the Blair Government the new buzzword might be "partnership".
In a speech prior to the 1997 election, Tony Blair maintained that "a new Labour
Government's approach to transport will be a belief in partnership between public and
private sectors" (Blair, 1997). Bus deregulation was cited as part of a transport policy
(along with the privatisation of rail and, possibly, London Underground) which was "a
recipe not for coordination but for chaos".
The 1985 Act thus established a new national framework. As a result, policy-making has
changed in that there is less "policy" for government organisations and political actors
(including think tanks) to address. Commercial considerations now have a much greater
influence on the pattern of bus services, as the shape of the industry is increasingly shaped
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by supply and demand, and thus competitive strategies (pricing, efficiency savings) have
replaced political strategies (bargaining with political, legal, informational etc. resources)
in determining policy outcomes. 62 Buses, however, remain a sensitive area with occasional
issues, such as seatbelts in coaches and minibuses in the mid-1990s, becoming high-profile
political matters. Deregulation also continues to attract political attention, as advocates and
opponents argue over the outcome of the 1985 Act. This is where the Pro-Deregulation
Coalition, with the new right think tanks, continues to maintain its presence in the debate
as a defender of the outcome of the 1985 Act. Hibbs in particular has been a vociferous
defender of deregulation in the trade press, publishing a pamphlet for the TEA in 1993
which responded to some of the criticisms of the 1985 Act, while acknowledging that there
is need for further reform (1993: pp.61-68). When the UK Round Table for Sustainable
Development published a report in January 1997 which criticised the Government's
transport policy for producing a fragmented system which ignored passengers needs, the
ASI issued a press release to highlight "the very real benefits that have followed from
deregulation and privatisation", and who's comments were picked up in the national press
(see, for example, The Times 30.01.97). The ASI published a further report by Hibbs in
October 1997 defending the record of deregulation (Hibbs, 1997)
CONCLUSION
The direct role of the new right think tanks in the debate leading up to deregulation was
limited. The think tanks were part of a loosely-knit Pro-Deregulation Coalition, although
most of the arguments were made by academics acting in an individual capacity. The TEA
and ASI in particular, provided a further platform for the expression and dissemination of
the arguments, a function that they continue to perform in the post-deregulation debate.
The origins of deregulation are more complex than to be reduced to the influence of a
single factor. It is necessary to consider the problem of subsidy by the mid-1980s, and any
explanation of why deregulation occurred must address the importance of Nicholas Ridley.
Of greatest importance, perhaps, was the ideological context and the growing acceptance of
the need to deregulate and privatise to generate competition and efficiency in the British
economy generally and its public services in particular. This is perhaps where the new right
think tanks, especially the lEA and its allies, have had the most influence on bus
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deregulation, albeit indirectly, in helping to create a political climate in which deregulation
could be introduced.
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NOTES
1 Interviews with DTp officials.
2 The Bus and Coach Council has since been re-named the Confederation of Passenger Transport.
3 Interviews with DTp officials.
4 Letter from AMA official.
5 Such as the 1970 directive which introduced tachographs for long-distance lorries.
6 Interview with PTE official.
7 Interview with Jolui Hibbs. According to Hibbs, the CPS study group (on which he served) "made no
useful contribution" to the transport debate. Hibbs met Mrs Thatcher at a CPS reception "and formed the
opinion that she had no interest whatsoever in transport". In Mrs Thatcher's memoirs, transport only gets two
cursory mentions - one in each volume.
8 "A service, or part of a service, is unremunerative when the resulting revenues from it are known (or
definitely expected) to be insufficient to cover the additional costs which would have been incurred if it were
not provided" (Ponsonby, 1969: p.15).
9 Private information.
10 The reason given by the Government in the White Paper for not deregulating in London was "to take a
grip on subsidy" in the capital. The London Regional Transport Act 1984 replaced the London Transport
Executive with London Regional Transport, changing the management of both buses and underground.
Moreover, "LRT is required by the [1984] Act to invite tenders from private firms to carry on certain of their
activities and to accept satisfactory tenders where this would save costs" (Department of Transport et al,
1984: p.14). Deregulation was to be deferred while these, and other changes, took effect.
11 Interview with Michael Beesley.
12 Interview with John Hibbs.
13 Interview with Michael Beesley.
14 Interview with DTp official.
15 Letter from AMA official.
16 Interview with John Hibbs.
17 Interview with Malcolm Buchanan.
18 Interview with Malcolm Buchanan.
19 Beesley was also the DTp's Chief Economic Adviser between 1964-8.
20 Interview with DTp official.
21 Interview with DTp official.
22 Interview with DTp official.
23 Interview with DTp official.
24 Interview with Malcolm Buchanan.
25 Interviews with DTp officials
26 Interview with Malcolm Buchanan.
27 Interview with DTp officials.
28 Interview with Sir David Mitchell.
29 Interview with DTp official.
30 Interviews with AMA and PTEG officials. For public evidence of their opposition, see House of Lords 
Debates, 11.06.85: col. 1137-1141 (Lord Carmichael); col. 1141-1147 (Lord Tordoff); col. 1183-1185 (Earl
De La Warr); co1.1207-1214 (Lord McIntosh).
31 Interview with Ron Whittle.
32 Private information.
33 Interview with PTEG official.
34 Interviews with PTEG and AMA officials.
35 See, for example, Motor Transport 01.11.96.
36 Interview with DTp official.
37 Letter from AMA official.
38 This appeared as a full-page advert entitled "Why is Nicholas Ridley treating our public transport system
like so many toys".
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39 Interview with PTEG official.
40 Interview with Gwyneth Dunwoody.
41 Interview with AMA official.
42 Interview with PTEG official and Gwyneth Dunwoody.
43 Interview with Michael Beesley.
44 Interview with Michael Beesley.
45 Interview with John Hibbs.
46 Interview with DTp official.
47 Interview with DTp official.
48 Interview with DTP official.
49 Interview with Malcolm Buchanan.
50 Interview with PTEG official and DTp official.
51 Interview with DTp official.
52 Interview with DTp official.
53 Rate-capping had been introduced in Scotland in 1982.
54 Interviews with members of RPTSG.
55 Interview with DTp official.
56 Interview with Malcolm Buchanan.
57 These figures do not include Northern Ireland.
58 Interviews with members of RPTSG.
59 Interview with PTEG official.
60 Interview with Gwyneth Dunwoody.
61 The same report notes that between 1985/6 and 1993/4 subsidy has fallen, with payments for secured
services outside London fell by 55%.
62 See Transport Select Committee (1995a: pp.xvi-xxv) for a review of these competitive strategies.
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Five
Education Reform
The Education Reform Act (ERA) of 1988 brought about the most significant
reorganisation of secondary education in England and Wales since the Butler Act of 1944,
and clearly affected the balance of power within the school system. Opting-out weakens
the control of local authorities over individual schools, while the national curriculum and
national testing restricts teacher autonomy in the classroom. The Department for Education
and Employment (DfEE) now supervises the national curriculum, while local management
of schools (LMS) and opting-out increase the autonomy of individual schools in the day to
day running of their affairs. The ERA also extended parental choice, a process that had
begun in earlier Education Acts during the 1980s.
Journalists and educationalists have claimed that the new right think tanks played an
important role in the process of education reform. Baker notes that:
The Centre for Policy Studies was just one of several radical, right-wing bodies to
produce innovative, mould-breaking ideas in education policy. There was also the
Institute of Economic Affairs (where the energetic adviser to Sir Keith Joseph,
Stuart Sexton, produced a series of pamphlets promoting market-led solutions for
the education system), and the Adam Smith Institute. Well ahead of their
incorporation into government policy, the Adam Smith Institute was promoting
ideas such as greater parental choice on school governing bodies, making schools
more responsive to parental choice, schools opting-out of local authority control
and the introduction of specialist schools (1994: pp.60-1).1
Similarly, Heller and Edwards argue that:
The careful nurturing and gestation from idea to legislation, was carefully
abandoned in Margaret Thatcher's cultural revolution. The growth of informal
policy groups (CPS, IEA, ASI) became a substitute for this developmental
approach. The government could adopt already pre-digested codes and simply
158
deliver them to the law officers and civil servants to produce the required
legislation (1992: p.140).
However, the 1988 Act was a huge item of legislation with many diverse and, arguably,
contradictory policy initiatives, raising a number of questions. Did the new right think
tanks make a significant contribution to all, or just some, of these initiatives? If some, then
which ones? From where did the pressure for the other policies come?
This case study suggests that the Conservative Government's reform of education served
two aims: to improve educational standards and the relevance of the curriculum to the
needs of the modern economy; and to undermine the education profession, whose values
were seen to be increasingly at odds with those of the Thatcher Government. The 1988 Act
should be seen as the legislative culmination of three trends present in Government
education reform up until that time: first, a centralising trend which imposes a national
curriculum and assessment structure on all schools from the centre; second, a
decentralising trend with LMS, greater parental choice (open enrolment), per capita
funding of pupils, and grant-maintained schools (GMS); finally, a weaker, vocational
trend, characterised by the creation of city technology colleges (CTCs) and the earlier
Technical and Vocational Education Initiative (TVEI). The centralising trend was largely a
result of pressure from the DES. The vocational trend emerged partly from the employment
policy network, especially with the TVEI. The new right think tanks campaigned for
decentralising measures. A coalition developed between the new right think tanks and
pressure groups on the "outside" and a handful of well-placed advisers on the "inside",
assisted by a combination of sympathetic and ambitious ministers.
It is concluded that declining educational standards have contributed to the politicisation of
education over the past two decades. Politicisation refers to the process by which
politicians become more directly involved with (in this case) education issues and become
less willing to leave decision-making (for electoral reasons or otherwise) to the education
profession. The new right think tanks formed part of a New Right Coalition which was
influential not only in setting a new agenda based upon decentralisation to schools and
choice to parents, but also in initially drawing attention to these declining standards
initially. Concerns over standards and the UK's declining economic competitiveness has
created a more open policy arena, no longer dominated by a policy community (although
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not an issue network), in which the new right think tanks and others have been able to
participate.
POLICY-MAKING IN EDUCATION
The aims of this section are twofold. The first is to outline the conventional models of
policy-making in education, focusing on pluralist, bureaucratic, and policy network
models. In particular, it questions the relevance of the latter, which has argued that
education constituted a policy community comprising the DES, local education authorities
(LEAs), and the teachers' unions. Second, the ERA is placed in an historical context
highlighting the extent to which it marked a departure from previous thinking. It also
provides a brief commentary on the development and implementation of the 1988 Act.
Conventional models of policy-making in education
One of the most influential accounts of post-war policy-making in education was produced
by Maurice Kogan in the mid-70's. He argued that policy-making since the Second World
War had been largely incremental and pluralistic. He did not dispute that the consensus
which was perceived to exist in the education world was a result of the relationship
between the DES, LEAs, and the teacher unions, or that the DES was the single most
powerful actor (Kogan, 1975: p. 238). However, Kogan suggested that policy-making was
about much more than what happens within Whitehall, as "many policies and practices
have developed in the schools and the local education authorities" (Kogan, 1978: p.122).
An example of this was the comprehensive school, which was created by the local
education authorities, and defined as a central government policy only some years later.
Interest groups outside of central government were also said to participate in the policy
process and Kogan listed over thirty groups involved in the policy-making process.
One of the major critiques of the pluralistic interpretation of policy-making in education
was by Salter and Tapper (1981). They argued that pluralist accounts omit the role of
exogenous factors which may contribute to educational change, for example general
changes in societal values or economic climate. Similarly, Marxists, who argued that the
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educational establishment is controlled and run in the interests of capital, must account for
the institutions within which educational change is determined, once the interests of capital
change. The state apparatus does have autonomy from the interests of pure capital, and
helps interpret necessary changes in education when the interests of capital change. "The
main thesis is simple ... the dominant bureaucratic apparatus in the shape of the
Department of Education and Science increasingly controls the process of educational
change" (Salter and Tapper, 1981: p.iv). The DES was the central, co-ordinating, and all-
powerful institution, and the engine for educational change. Furthermore, the state
apparatus (in this case the DES), "is far from passive in it's policy preferences, and which,
in fact, sets the parameters within which the policy debate is conducted" (ibid). Salter and
Tapper's account of policy-making in education portrayed a highly centralised process with
the potential for systemic change, compared to the pluralists who saw power diffused and
change as incremental (Kogan, 1975: p.238). Others such as Lodge and Blackstone (1982:
p.18) claimed the DES was "a vitally important source of influence on policy-making -
indeed, in some instances the single most important source of influence", while the OECD
in 1975 said it was "the most important single force in determining the direction and tempo
of educational development" (cited in Rhodes, 1986: p.326).
Other models saw policy-making as neither centralised nor diffused. Policy-making was
frequently portrayed as a partnership between key actors responsible for the delivery of
education; the DES, the LEAs, and the teachers unions led by the National Union of
Teachers (NUT). Bogdanor (1979) described the common perception of policy-making in
education in the 1970s as one of "elite accommodation" with decisions taken by the
Secretary to the Association of Education Committees, the General Secretary of the
National Union of Teachers and the Permanent Secretary at the Department of Education.
Such views saw the DES as a consultative partner with the teachers and the LEAs, who
expressed their views through national organisations such as the NUT or Association of
Metropolitan Authorities (Rhodes, 1986: p.343). Manzer (1970: p.1-2) has called the
relationship between the three main actors (DES, LEAs, and teachers organisations) an
education "sub-government". Chitty draws upon Briault's (1976) "triangle of tension",
the three points of the triangle being central government, local government and the
individual schools. Where there was conflict, it usually concerned competing
priorities for resources. Yet, providing the sides held, the tension could be seen as
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constructive and valuable in preventing the dangers which could arise if too much
power became concentrated at one point of the triangle (Chitty, 1989: p.2).
For Rhodes, education bore all the characteristics of a policy community:
For the bulk of the postwar period, the government of education was characterised
by consensus, a high degree of integration of its restricted membership and
intensive participation by the technocratic professions rooted in the (vertical)
dependence of the DES. There was a stable policy-making community based on the
troika of DES, LEAs and teacher's unions. Policy-making was incremental (1988:
p.270).
Rhodes believed that government policy in the early 1980's did not significantly affect the
troika, which was able to fend off any challenge to its hegemony in the education arena. In
an earlier work Rhodes maintained that: "Cuts in educational spending and challenges to
the educational consensus have not affected any major transformation in the policy-making
nexus of DES, associations (LEAs) and unions" (Rhodes, 1986: p.345) However he did
later concede that: "With the intensification of economic decline and then recession, the
pressures upon and the stresses and strains within, the education policy community became
greater" (Rhodes, 1988: p.270).
The importance of ministers in the process of policy change is often downplayed. Kogan,
in conversation with former ministers, concluded that the "ability of even the most able
Minister to create, promote and carry out policies is limited" (1975: p.41). Salter and
Tapper maintained that "the most influential role one can ascribe to a minister ... is that of
arbitrator of competing policies within the DES rather than the initiator of completely new
ones" (1985: p.148). Bogdanor observed considering the long-term nature of most
educational policies, the short period of time which an educational minister normally
serves "is hardly long enough to make a continuing impact on policy in the face of the
continuity of civil service attitudes" (1979: p.158).
To explain policy outcomes in education in terms of a policy community of the DES,
LEAs and teacher unions, appears dated in the 1980s and 1990s. Despite the above
perceptions, the 1980s witnessed radical policy change imposed on the education
community by ministers. From 1944 to the 1970s, it is perceived that education was
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characterised by "consensus", which was replaced by "ideology" when the Conservatives
came to power in 1979 (Lawton, 1994). One of the few attempts to incorporate such
political pressures within the education system is Lawton's central "tension system"
(Lawton, 1984; Chitty, 1989). The three groups said to exist within this system are the
bureaucrats (DES), the professionals (Her Majesties Inspectorate) and politicians and their
advisers, each with its own ideology. Chitty focuses on the politicians as the main agents of
change, but stresses the role of the Downing Street Policy Unit as the architect of such
change. He highlights two attempts to alter the direction of education policy. First
Callaghan's Ruskin Speech in 1976 was very much handled and co-ordinated by
Donoughue's Policy Unit as a response to declining standards, and teacher union militancy,
especially in the NUT. The Ruskin Speech consequently, according to Chitty, created a
new consensus regarding education in Britain "built around more central control of the
curriculum, greater teacher accountability and the more direct subordination of secondary
education to the perceived needs of the economy" (Chitty, 1989: p.13). The second attempt
to change the direction of education came in 1987/88 when the Policy Unit under Brian
Griffiths destroyed the new ten-year old consensus in what appeared to Chitty "to be the
complete privatisation of the education system" (ibid.
Education Policy 1944-94
Most post-war policy-making in education concerned the implementation of the 1944
Butler Act, which guaranteed a secondary education for all. This Act was fully in tune with
spirit and values of the "postwar consensus" and the early years of the welfare state. As
Lawton notes, the Butler Act "should not be seen as an example of the expression of Tory
policy but as the product of a war-time bi-partisan optimism and consensus about a better
post-war world" (1992: p.32). It is unclear whether the 1944 Act actually prescribes a
"tripartite" system of grammar, technical, and modern schools, or a common school
providing secondary education for all children. Chitty notes that the ambiguity in the
wording of the act meant that later reforms "could be carried out by reinterpreting the
formula without the need for further legislation" (1989: p.22).
The issue which gradually dominated post-war secondary education policy emerged from
this ambiguity with the evolution of the comprehensive school and the decline of the
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grammar schools. The Ministry of Education in the Attlee Government, under Ellen
Wilkinson and George Tomlinson, did little to break up the tripartite system which was
nevertheless emerging, and which was actually fostered under its "prevailing philosophy"
which included "a deep mistrust of multilateral and comprehensive schools" (ibid). The
few comprehensive schools that were established by 1950 were the result of the actions of
independently minded LEA's. The shift towards comprehensive schools gathered
momentum during the Conservative Government of 1951-64 when "the number of
comprehensive schools rose from five to 195" (Knight, 1990: p.14). Circular 10/65, issued
by Tony Crosland during the first Wilson Government, simply requested that all LEA's
submit proposals for the reorganisation of secondary education along comprehensive lines,
although it had no statutory power. Despite the withdrawal of this circular in 1970 (through
the issuing of Circular 10/70) the number of comprehensive schools more than doubled
between 1970 and 1974 taking their share of secondary education to over 50% (Chitty,
1989: pp.54-5).
Concerns about standards and discipline in schools were highlighted by the publication of
the DES Yellow Book in July 1976, and by Callaghan's Ruskin Speech which called for
higher standards and a more relevant curriculum in preparing Britain's youth for the
changing needs of the economy. The year 1976 is often seen as the year of change in
education (Lawrence, 1992: p.78). Quality was beginning to take precedence over quantity
in education. Callaghan's speech also arguably signals the beginning of a shift from local
authority provision to central control. For example, where Circulars 10/65 and 10/74
(reinstating 10/65) merely requested LEA's to submit plans for reorganisation of secondary
schools on a comprehensive basis, the 1976 Education Act compelled them to do so.
It has been suggested that, following the 1979 general election the appointment of Mrs
Thatcher's first Secretary of State for Education, the moderate Mark Carlisle, signalled an
unwillingness to reform fundamentally the education system (Knight, 1990: p.138). Scott
argues that Mrs Thatcher's early priorities were in the sphere of economics and industrial
relations, with education "for a long time a peripheral item on her government's agenda"
(1994: p.333). The appointment of arch-Thatcherite Keith Joseph in 1981 suggested to
others that fundamental reform was imminent, and a clear sign that education was moving
up the political agenda" (ibicl). The reality is perhaps that both ministers contributed to
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laying the foundations for the Conservative Government's principal piece of education
legislation, the ERA, which was introduced and steered through Parliament by Keith
Joseph's successor, Kenneth Baker.
Conservative educational reforms of the 1980s had three strands - a decentralising, a
centralising, and a vocational. The decentralising strand devolved decision-making from
the DES and LEAs to governing bodies, school heads, and parents. The centralising trend
transferred responsibilities from schools and LEAs to the DES. The vocational trend
attempted to tailor the curriculum directly to the needs of the modern economy. All three
trends were evident in education legislation before 1988. The ERA is significant in that it
marked the legislative peak of both the centralising and decentralising strands of
Conservative education policy. The key centralising measure was the introduction for all
schools in England and Wales of a national curriculum, consuming ninety per cent of the
school timetable, and compulsory for all children up to the ages of 16. As a result "no other
profession was subject to such central control over the content of its work" (Jenkins, 1995:
p.118). This step marked a major departure from curriculum policy following the 1944 Act
where the curriculum was a "Secret Garden" where official or political interference was
rare. 2 The ERA also instituted a national system of tests, with attainment targets for 7, 11,
14, and 16 year olds. Two organisations, the National Curriculum Council (NCC) and the
Schools Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SEAC) were established to oversee the
introduction of these policies.
There was also a heavy emphasis on decentralisation within the ERA: LMS devolved
budgets to all schools; parents could vote for their school to "opt-out" of local authority
control and become grant-maintained; per capita funding of schools was introduced; and
parents were given greater freedom of choice through a policy of open enrolment. The
vocational trend is the weakest of the three in the ERA, represented only by the
introduction of CTCs. The key vocational reforms had been introduced with the TVEI in
the mid-1980s. CTCs were significant in that they build upon the TVEI. Chitty suggests
that the idea of CTCs evolved throughout the 1980s, the TVEI being "the CTC concept in
embryonic form". One official confinned that CTCs "put the flesh on the bones of the
TVEI".3
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Education policy after 1988 followed a similar pattern to that which led up to the ERA,
containing both centralising and decentralising strands. For example, the 1993 Education
Act had two major provisions. The first of these introduced measures to encourage more
schools to opt-out of local authority control, while the second led to greater centralisation
with the merger of the NCC and SEAC into one organisation, the Schools Curriculum and
Assessment Authority (SCAA) (Scott, 1994). The implementation of the ERA was highly
problematic, and plagued by resistance from the teaching profession. Opposition focused
on the increased workload imposed upon teachers resulting from the introduction of the
national curriculum and testing. The tests were seriously disrupted during 1993 by a
teacher boycott. As a response, the Secretary of State appointed Sir Ron Dearing as
Chairman of SCAA with the task of slimming down the national curriculum. His
recommendations were published in late 1993.
The Dearing recipe was to reduce the core compulsory elements within the National
Curriculum, freeing 20 per cent of teaching time to be used at the discretion of the
school, and also to make National Curriculum Orders less prescriptive. Tests would
be simplified and the time needed to administer them reduced. The thicket of
attainment targets would also be pruned (Scott, 1994: p.345).
The Dearing Report was welcomed by both Government and teacher unions, although the
teachers were perceived as the victors. The changes to the National Curriculum were, for
the teachers, "their spoils of victory in the tests boycott" (Baker, 1994: pp.180-1).
TOWARDS EDUCATION REFORM
This section charts the evolution of new right thinking on education over a twenty year
period, providing a background to the work of the new right think tanks in the 1980s. As
the pattern of provision of secondary education emerged during the 1950s and 1960s, a
number of politicians and conservative educationalists became disenchanted with the way
in which the 1944 Act had been interpreted. They were opposed to what they saw as the
assault on traditional values, what Knight (1990) identifies as "excellence in education", or
quality rather than equality. Within this theme, they fought to preserve the politically-
besieged grammar schools. Lawton notes that "although the Labour Party was by no
means united on the theme of 'secondary education for all', most Conservatives were sure
166
that it did not mean multilateral or comprehensive schools" (1992: p.33). The new
dominant values were an anathema to many on the right, and the 1960s saw the beginning
of the "counter-revolution" (Knight, 1990). Ransom and Thomas (1989) locate three
distinct phases to "the challenge to the post-war ruling order". The first of these was the
Black Papers (1969-1975), the second the "parents charter" and the development of the
voucher (1975-1983), and finally the "New Right Pamphleteers" (1984-1988). A further
development, the role of the new right think tanks in the implementation of the 1988 Act,
is also highlighted.
The Black Papers
The first Black Paper, The Fight for Education was published in 1969 and was edited by
Professor Brian Cox and Tony Dyson. There were five in all: Black Paper Two and Black
Paper Three also edited by Cox and Dyson (1969, 1970), with Black Paper 1975 and Black
Paper 1977 edited by Cox and Rhodes Boyson. In their opening letter to members of
Parliament in The Fight for Education they expressed their view that "disastrous mistakes
are being made in modern education, and that an urgent reappraisal is required of the
assumptions on which 'progressive' ideas, now in the ascendant, are based" (Cox and
Dyson, 1969: p.6).
The articles were a mixture of polemic, humour and anecdote, and were written by a
collection of educationalists, academics, headteachers, and the occasional MP. Knight's
work on Tory education policy-making between 1950 and 1986 highlights "the absorption
of the Black Paper spirit into the party" (1990: p.68) during the 1970s, with the editors
forming alliances with key personnel within the party organisation in Parliament, at
Conservative Central Office (especially the Conservative Political Centre and the
Conservative Research Department), and at the grass roots level through the Conservative
National Advisory Committee On Education (CNACE). A pressure group, the National
Council for Educational Standards (NCES) was established in 1972 by Cox, Dyson, and
Boyson to campaign for Black Paper values (see below).
Knight talks of the Conservative Party's "debt to Black Paperite ideology" (1990; p.175).
Cox himself believes that "Mr Baker's Education Reform Act of 1988 had brought into law
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some central Black Paper doctrines" (1992: p.225). Their real contribution, though, was
perhaps to challenge the prevailing consensus of the educational establishment. Maclure
highlights the impact of The Fight for Education, the first Black Paper, when it was first
published:
The first Black Paper appeared in 1969. For all its manifest limitations of what was
right and wrong with the schools, it struck a nerve. It made an impact which
showed that there were many people outside the charmed circle of the education
system who were waiting to challenge the cosy view of educational progress which
had become the received "wisdom" (1990: p.159).
The contribution of the Black Papers in laying the foundations for the Thatcher reforms
was acknowledged by a former Deputy Secretary at the DES:
The Black Papers were not influential in that they led directly to policy because
they didn't. Their effect was influential in that they influenced thought, and they
began the very serious debate about notions of quality and standards. These issues
became increasingly important, as into the 1970s we were faced with a contracting
service, due to a declining birth rate and the oil-crisis of 1973-74. Suddenly the
Black Papers began to set that other agenda, addressing the question of quality and
what we meant by it, and that gathered pace.4
The perceived success of the Black Papers in setting "that other agenda" was
acknowledged as early as 1971, when IEA Director and Black Paper contributor, Ralph
Harris, Brian Cox, and Tony Dyson, considered publishing Black Papers on all aspects of
government policy (Cox, 1992). Looking back on her time as Education Secretary in the
Heath Government, Mrs Thatcher recalled the state of debate in the Conservative Party
regarding education.
On the one hand, there were some Tories who had a commitment to comprehensive
education which barely distinguished them from moderate socialists. On the other,
the authors of the so-called Black Papers had, to their credit, started to spell out a
radically different approach, based on discipline, choice and standards (including
the retention of existing grammar schools with high standards) (1995: p.167).
However influential the Black Papers were, the exercise at least performed a vital
networking function of bringing together a number of disillusioned conservative
educationalists, some of whom were to play a role as "pamphleteers" in the think tanks
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after 1984. The Black Papers gave them the opportunity to publicise their arguments and,
through conferences and membership of the NCES, meet others of similar mind.5
The Battle for the Voucher
The election of Mrs Thatcher as Conservative Party leader, and the foundation of the CPS,
contributed to a climate conducive to radical policy ideas. In education, the most
significant debate concerned the voucher system, under which all parents with children at
school would receive a grant equal to the cost of educating a child for one year. This grant
would be in the form of a voucher which could be used exclusively at a recognised school
(i.e. it could not be "cashed in"). Parents could choose freely which school to send their
child. It was different from the system of open enrolment and per capita funding
established in the ERA because of the proposal that the voucher be available to all parents,
not just those in the state sector, and so could contribute to the cost of educating a child in
the private sector.
The voucher has been described by Halcrow as "the shibboleth of the Thatcherite radicals".
The TEA first advocated its introduction in Britain in 1964 (Education for Democrats by
Alan Peacock and Jack Wiseman), and continued this campaign into the 1990s (see Green,
1991). Articles expressing support for the voucher were written Ralph Harris, then Director
of the IEA, in Black Paper Two (1969), Rhodes Boyson in Black Paper 1975, and Stuart
Sexton in Black Paper 1977. In December 1974, Marjorie Seldon, wife of IEA Director
Arthur Seldon, established the Friends of the Education Voucher Experiment in
Representative Regions (FEVER), to help popularise the voucher proposal. Links between
FEVER and NCES were bridged by Rhodes Boyson. Knight notes that "Everything
FEVER published was vetted by Boyson" (1990: p.122). The CPS established an
Education Study Group (CPSESG), substantially overlapping with other groups. Caroline
Cox and John Marks contributed to Black Paper 1977 and joined NCES, while NCES
member Fred Naylor was asked by Caroline Cox to join the CPSESG (Knight, 1990:
p.115). Voucher advocates on the CPSESG included Arthur and Marjorie Seldon, and
Oliver Letwin. Stuart Sexton, associated with the CPS, was Opposition Adviser on
education and was also pro-voucher.6
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The voucher was opposed by Mrs Thatcher's Opposition spokesman Norman St-John
Stevas, and her first Secretary of State, Mark Carlisle, although local experiments with
vouchers became official policy of the Conservative Opposition following a motion put
before the House by Rhodes Boyson in 1976 (Seldon, 1986). Hopes were raised amongst
the right when Keith Joseph arrived at the DES in 1981. Mrs Thatcher was known to be in
favour, and Joseph in a letter to the Chairman of FEVER confessed to being "intellectually
attracted to the ideas of vouchers as a means of extending parental choice and influence yet
further and improving educational standards" (Seldon, 1986: p.xii). Also at the DES were
Rhodes Boyson as Minister of State, with Stuart Sexton and Oliver Letwin as special
advisers - all pro-voucher. 7 There then began a vigorous debate between departmental
officials and the special advisers over the merits of the voucher, which the latter lost.
One official argued that during the 1980s, delegating budgets was the "spirit of the age"
and there was nothing "educational" about it, although the voucher was especially
"educational" and "a direct product of the right-wing think tanks -that's where the pressure
came from". 8 The IEA, FEVER and parts of the CPSESG and NCES were the most
vociferous advocates. In December 1981, Joseph asked FEVER and the NCES to respond
to the difficulties which the DES officials saw in implementing a voucher system. While
the NCES did not submit a formal response FEVER asked a number of academics to
comment, and these replies were sent to the DES as part of the debate. These were later
published as a pamphlet by the TEA in The Riddle of the Voucher, edited by Arthur Seldon
in 1986. In government, the proposals were advocated by Sexton and Letwin, who had
close contacts with all the above groups. They transmitted the ideas which evolved and
developed in their study groups and conferences into ministerial meetings where they
argued their case against the DES officials, who as Chitty suggest "were quite determined
that there should be no voucher experiment, either on a local or national basis". Halcrow,
Joseph's biographer, notes that:
Between 1981 until 1983 the DES was the setting for a sort of stately quadrille as
Sexton and Letwin put the case for vouchers, and watched it being knocked down
by what seemed to them an unending succession of officials (1987: p.123)
Sexton himself recalls:
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We had regular meetings with the civil service for month after month. They would
put up an argument and we would knock it down, then we would put up an
argument and they would knock it down, and they argued how technically - it was
always technically - impossible. Eventually Keith Joseph took his officials advice
that it was technically impossible. I argued, as did Oliver Letwin, that it was not
technically impossible if you had the political will to do it - but he hadn't.9
Whatever the merits or flaws of the DES arguments in their opposition to the voucher,
Joseph accepted the views of his officials that it was not a feasible policy option, and in
October 1983 at the Conservative Party Conference, Joseph declared the voucher officially
dead.
The New Right Pamphleteers
With the voucher explicitly rejected, the search for and promotion of alternative policies
began. This section identifies six key pamphlets, all from the new right think tanks
between 1981 and 1987, all of which contained in some form contain proposals which later
to be found in the 1988 Act.")
1. The SAU, The Pied Pipers of Education, 1981 - contributors included Anthony Flew,
John Marks, Caroline Cox, John Honey, Dennis O'Keeffe and Digby Anderson.
2. The CPSESG, The Right to Learn, 1982 - contributors included Caroline Cox, John
Marks, Marjorie Seldon, Fred Naylor, and Digby Anderson.
3. The ASI, Omega file on Education, 1984 - written by Eamonn Butler, Madsen Pine,
Peter Young, with inputs from Caroline Cox, Anthony Flew, Digby Anderson, David
Mars land, Lawrence Norcross, and James Pawsey MP.
4. The No Turning Back Group of Conservative MPs (NTBG), Save Our Schools, 1986
(expanded from the document No Turning Back of 1985) - officially written by thirteen
members of the group although actually written by Madsen Pine of the ASI (Gove, 1995).
5. The Hillgate Group, Whose Schools: A Radical Manifesto, 1986 - written by Caroline
Cox, Jessica Douglas-Home, John Marks, Lawrence Norcross, and Roger Scruton.
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Members of the CPS who sought to bypass an increasingly bureaucratic publishing process
of the CPS, and so published independently under the Hillgate Group name.
6. The IEA Education Unit, Our Schools: A Radical Policy, 1987 - written by Stuart
Sexton. The IEA Education Unit was established when Sexton left the DES with Joseph in
1986, at the suggestion of Ralph Harris and Brian Griffiths, then head of the Policy Unit.
Our Schools was a modified version of a private briefing paper given to Mrs Thatcher by
Sexton before he left the DES.
The proposals in all six documents seek to provide a market-oriented blueprint for the
provision of secondary education, which avoids the above weaknesses and aspects of the
voucher which the DES officials found objectionable or unworkable. As a result they all
advocate a structure resembling in some form, what became the internal market. Each
document emphasised the devolution of funds and management away from LEAs and to
the individual schools in all documents. Each advocated increasing parental choice even
further, removing whatever obstacles inhibit this choice within the state sector, and all
advocate a per capita funding mechanism.
Postscript - The Implementation of the 1988 Act
In a speech in 1993 Eric Bolton, former Chief Inspector of Schools argued that the
influence of the right wing think tanks on education policy was greater under John Major
than it had been under Margaret Thatcher (Bolton, 1993). This was a reference to the
appointment of "traditionalists" and "right-wingers" to the NCC and SEAC. This allowed
members of the new right think tanks move out of policy formulation and policy
promotion, and into policy implementation. Judith Judd and Ngaigo Crequer, highlight
seven such appointments (The Independent, 12.12.92):
• Lord Griffiths of Fforestfach - Chairman of SEAC. Former Head of the No.10 Policy
Unit, and Chairman of the CPS. Adviser to the Educational Research Trust.
• David Pascall - Chairman of the NCC. Former member of the No.10 Policy Unit.
• Dr John Marks - Member of SEAC and NCC and Chair of SEAC Maths Committee.
Secretary of CPSESG, member of Hillgate Group, and Director of the Educational
Research Trust.
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• Lord Skidelsky - member of SEAC and chairman of history committee. Sits in the
Lords as a Conservative, and is Chairman of the SMF.
• John Marenbon - member of SEAC and chairman of English committee. Contributor to
the CPS and married to Sheila Lawlor, deputy director of the CPS.
• Anthony O'Hear - member of the Council of the Accreditation of Teacher Training.
Contributor to, amongst others, the SAU.
Many of these were second-generation appointments. Griffiths had replaced Philip Halsey,
a former deputy secretary, as chairman of SEAC, and Pascall replaced Duncan Graham, a
former chief education officer, as Chairman of the NCC. Halsey and Graham had run these
organisations since 1988. Similarly, the chairmen of the subject working parties were often
inheriting the work of others. These appointments were made during the tenure of Ken
Clarke as Secretary of State for Education. They "appeared to grant Thatcherites a degree
of influence over education policy which they never enjoyed while Mrs Thatcher was
Prime Minister" (Scott, 1994: p.339). However, this may be inferring too much. The
working groups were largely comprised of professional teachers. As such political
appointments from the new right think tanks are therefore viewed by some as merely
"token appointments"."1
ADVOCACY COALITIONS AND EDUCATION REFORM
Education reform provides a case study in which, although advocacy coalitions can be
identified, the impetus and pressure for policy change also originated from specific
organisations. This case study suggests that there were two coalitions: a New Right
Coalition, promoting decentralisation, and an Anti-Reform Coalition, which opposed the
ERA. I2 However the two other strands of Conservative education reform - centralisation
and vocationalism - were promoted by two organisations whose resources and strategies
had a major effect on policy outcomes. The national curriculum was pushed by the DES,
while the TVEI was largely developed by the MSC. This section examines both coalitions,
the DES, the MSC, and the role of ministers.
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The New Right Coalition
Most of the new right think tanks were active in the process of education reform and a New
Right Coalition can be identified, although loosely structured and uncoordinated.
Composition, Interaction and Co-ordination: A number of new right think tanks and
pressure groups campaigned for decentralisation. During the 1970s these included the
NCES, FEVER, the IEA, and the CPS. They were joined in the 1980s by the ASI, NTBG,
SAU and the Hillgate Group. Few activists belonged to just one group - Cox, Marks,
Boyson, and Sexton belonged to many. This perhaps accounts for the similarity of so many
of the proposals emanating from the think tanks during the 1980s. Many of the key
activists had also been members of the NCES in the 1970s and had drawn upon its
research. The Independent noted that "like the pre-War Communist Party, the educational
right is adept at founding organisations with impressive titles and interlocking
memberships" (23.07.87). Ball also talks of the "related and overlapping New Right
agencies and groups, ranging from the Centre for Policy Studies, the National Council for
Educational Standards and the Social Affairs Unit to the Institute of Economic Affairs and
the Adam Smith Institute" (1990: p.34). Table 10 highlights the overlap in the authorship
of pamphlets, and membership of organisations or study groups, highlights the individuals
which linked the various groups together, such as Caroline Cox, Marks, and Norcross.
This does not necessarily mean that there was co-ordination between the groups a members
of the New Right Coalition insist that it was much more ad hoc.
People look at these pamphlets and say it was all planned. It was actually much
more reactive. There was certainly cross-fertilisation, but all these groups had a
different emphasis: the ASI's Omega Project covered all aspects of government
policy; the SAU were addressing the whole area of social policy; FEVER was
concerned with promoting the voucher. But it wasn't consciously planned.13
Stuart Sexton maintains:
There was no purposeful collaboration. Nobody went round the think tanks and said
"Now we've published under X we have to publish under Y. I'm glad to say that it
was much more spontaneous than that. It was a very interesting exercise, but
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ultimately nothing more than the natural development of ideas between about a
dozen people.14
Table 10
Overlap in the New Right Coalition
ASI BP/
NCES
CPS
ESG
FEV. IEA SAU HILL	 NTBG
Anderson, D. * * *
Boyson, R. * *
Cox, B *
Cox, C. * * * *
Douglas-Home, J,
Flew, A. * * * * *
*
Letwin, 0. *
Marks, J. * * *
Naylor, F. * *
Norcross, L. * *
Pine, M. *
Seldon, M. * *
Sexton, S. * * * *
Note: This list does not define the membership of the New Right Coalition, but simply illustrates the overlap
between some of the key members.
* denotes either membership of group (NCES/FEVER), study group (ASI Omega Report, or CPSESG), or
contribution to the six pamphlets highlighted in the previous section.
Belief System: The beliefs which united these groups can be identified as: an hostility to
"progressive" education; a belief in quality over equality in education; the advocacy of
greater devolution of responsibility, finance, and management to schools; and parental
choice. Given the lack of co-ordination, there is no collective statement of aims. However,
Black Paper 1975 did print the "Black Paper Basics" to highlight the key values being
promoted.
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1. Children are not naturally good. They need firm, tactful discipline from
parents and teachers.
2. If the non-competitive ethos of progressive education is allowed to
dominate our schools, we shall produce a generation unable to maintain our
standards of living when opposed by fierce rivalry from overseas
competitors.
3. It is the quality of teachers that matters, rather than their numbers or their
equipment. We have sacrificed quality for numbers, and the result has been
a lowering of standards. We need high-quality, higher-paid teachers in the
class-room, not as counsellors or administrators.
4. Schools are for schooling, not for social engineering.
5. The best way to help children in deprived areas is to teach them to be
literate and numerate, and to develop all their potential abilities.
6. Every normal child should be able to read by seven. This can be achieved
by the hard work of teachers who use a structured approach.
7. Without selection the clever working-class child in a deprived area stands
little chance of a real academic education.
8. External examinations are essential for schools, colleges, polytechnics and
universities. Without such checks, standards decline. Working-class
children suffer when applying for jobs if they cannot bring forward proof of
their worth achieved in authoritative examinations.
9. Freedom of speech must be preserved in universities. Institutions which
cannot maintain proper standards of open debate should be closed.
10. You can have equality or equality of opportunity; you cannot have both.
Equality will mean holding back (or the new deprivation) of the brighter
children.
While there was a consensus regarding the need for higher standards in schools, there was
some disagreement over how this should be done. Some believed in vouchers. Those who
did were divided over the timetable. Marjorie Seldon of FEVER believed a voucher could
be introduced immediately, while others such as Stuart Sexton believed that a period of
self-management was necessary beforehand. I5 However, between 1983-88 there was a
considerable degree of consensus concerning proposals for decentralisation, which were
implemented in the 1988 Act.
Resources and Strategies: The principle resource available to the New Right Coalition was
access to decision-makers, utilising the active support of key advisers within government.
These included: Stuart Sexton as special adviser to Norman St John Stevas in opposition,
and Mark Carlisle and Keith Joseph in government; Oliver Letwin, former special adviser
to Keith Joseph (1982-3) and adviser on education in No.10 Policy Unit (1983-86); and
Brian Griffiths, Head of the Policy Unit (1985-90).
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Stuart Sexton is perhaps the central individual within the New Right Coalition. He was
involved as an adviser on education policy to the Conservative Party between 1975 and
1986. His presence in that post ensured an element of continuity in Conservative education
policy. During Mrs Thatcher's first term when the Cabinet and the Policy Unit were
preoccupied with economic and financial reforms, "Sexton was able to establish himself as
the eminence grise of Tory education policy" (Knight, 1990: p.141). With Carlisle
mastering his new brief, Sexton was largely responsible for the Conservatives' opposition
to the 1976 Education Act, and the assisted places scheme (enshrined in the 1980
Education Act).
While special adviser to first Carlisle and then Keith Joseph, Sexton was an important link
between the think tanks on the outside and ministers on the inside. He was very close to
individuals such as Caroline Cox and John Marks. As special adviser, Sexton would not
only maintain contact with the New Right Coalition, but would also broker meetings
between its members and the Secretary of State. Sexton was also a speech-writer to
Carlisle, Joseph, and junior ministers such as Rhodes Boyson, Lady Young, and Bob
Dunn, and would use political speeches to tempt ministers to endorse specific policies.16
Another key point of access was Oliver Letwin. He served alongside Sexton in the DES as
a part-time special adviser where the two found themselves very much in agreement over
their objectives. Both were members of the CPSESG. When Mrs Thatcher took Letwin into
the Policy Unit, the relationship between Letwin and Sexton became increasingly
important. They were in regular contact with each other, and as Sexton recalls
there were plenty of occasions when I would offer ideas to Oliver and vice versa,
and so ideas would go jointly to Keith Joseph and Margaret Thatcher separately but
from a common source. It worked very well."
Thus on numerous occasions the Prime Minister and her Secretary of State for Education
were receiving the same advice from different sources. Letwin was also in contact with the
New Right Coalition, and in particular was "a frequent visitor to the CPS" (Knight, 1990:
p.181). Junior ministers were also a valuable point of access. Rhodes Boyson was involved
with the Black Papers and the NCES from the beginning of the 1970s. Bob Dunn
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established his own study group within the DES including Sexton, Cox, and Marks to
consider education reform. 18 Angela Rumbold was also a minister in the DES during the
mid-1980s, and as a member of the NTBG was well aware of their proposals in Save Our
Schools and argued the case within the department.19
Brian Griffiths was Head of the No.10 Policy Unit during the run-up to the 1988 Act. He
had been associated in the past with the TEA and CPS (Cockett, 1994), and became closely
involved with education reform. Seldon remarks that during these years "the Number 10
Policy Unit, under Brian Griffiths ... had in effect usurped many of policy-making
functions of the DES" (1994: pp.337-8). Kenneth Baker (1993) emphasises Griffiths' role
as a broker between himself and the Prime Minister rather than a major policy-maker.
Chitty likewise talks of the Griffiths Policy Unit (in the context of education reform) "as a
conduit between a number of right-wing pressure groups, particularly the Centre for Policy
Studies, and the Prime Minister herself' (1989: p.13). Chitty highlights a Sunday Times 
report which claims that Thatcher intended to make Griffiths a life peer in the Dissolution
Honours List in 1987, and then send him to the DES, a scheme effectively vetoed by
Kenneth Baker (ibid). Griffiths' greatest influence appears to have been in drawing the
ideas together for the 1987 election manifesto and therefore developing the framework for
the 1988 Act (Chitty, 1989).
Centralisation and the DES
As illustrated above, the work of Salter and Tapper has attributed a major role to the DES
in the process of initiating and managing educational change. However, the national
curriculum was the only major DES-inspired change to have emerged directly from the
DES since 1979. On the whole, the DES's outlook and objectives were seen to be
somewhat at odds with those of the Conservative Government. Nigel Lawson described the
DES as an "unfortunate department to have," one "whose ethos was wholly opposed to that
of the Government: collectivist and steeped in the once trendy nostrums of progressive
education that has so much to answer for" (1992: p.600). Baker's view of the DES, a
department he served in as Secretary of State for three years, was similarly critical, arguing
it was "devoutly anti-excellence, anti-selection, and anti-market" (1993: p.168). Mrs
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Thatcher maintained that "the ethos of the DES was self-righteously socialist" (1995:
p.166).
According to some, the DES opposed attempts to reduce local authority involvement and
introduce "markets" into education. The key officials in the run-up to the 1988 Act were
the Permanent Secretary Sir David Hancock, and the three Deputy Secretaries, Walter
Ulrich, Philip Halsey, and the Chief Inspector of Schools, Eric Bolton. Ulrich was
described as the "most powerful" deputy secretary and "no particular fan of Goverment
policies" (Baker: 1993: p.167), and is widely regarded to have exerted more influence
schools policy than his Permanent Secretary. 20 Sexton, maintains that during the attempts
of the new right to transfer responsibility from local authorities to schools and parents,
"certain top officials were absolutely opposed to everything we were doing".21
While the DES was a force for inertia regarding the funding and structure of education, it
was a force for change regarding the curriculum. Joseph rejected the arguments of his
officials for a national curriculum. 22 Following detailed and lengthy internal discussions
between Joseph and his officials, a White Paper on the curriculum, Better Schools, was
published in 1985 which in the words of one official "took the curriculum debate as far as
it could go without legislation". Baker, when he arrived at the DES in 1986, "had to decide
whether to get out of the ring completely or go for legislation - he went for legislation".23
Baker announced the Government's intention to establish a national curriculum in a
television interview in December 1986 and would form part of the Conservatives' extensive
proposals for education reform outlined in their 1987 manifesto, The Next Moves Forward
(Conservative Party, 1987).
Belief System: The background to the national curriculum shows that the belief system of
the DES was a little more complex than Conservative ministers have suggested, and that its
curriculum model was markedly different from other models. Chitty (1989) argues that the
national curriculum has taken two major forms - a "professional common-curriculum"
model put forward by Her Majesty's Inspectorate and a "bureaucratic core-curriculum"
model advocated by officials in the DES. The former "reflects a genuine concern with the
quality of the teaching process and with the needs of individual children" whereas the latter
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"is concerned with the 'efficiency' of the whole system and with the need to obtain precise
statistical information to demonstrate that efficiency" (Chitty, 1989: p.106).
Whereas the professional approach focuses on the quality of input and skills,
knowledge and awareness of the teachers, the bureaucratic approach concentrates
on output and testing. Whereas the professional approach is based on individual
differences and the learning process, the bureaucratic approach is associated with
norms or benchmarks, norm-related criteria and judgements based on the
expectations of how a statistically-normal child should perform. Whereas the
professional curriculum is concerned with areas of learning and experience, the
bureaucratic curriculum is based on traditional subjects (ibid).
Many on the new right opposed a national curriculum. It is not advocated by the TEA, ASI
or the NTBG, and Sexton echoed Joseph's opposition within the DES, 24 although there was
qualified support for a "core curriculum" from the CPS (1988), the Hillgate Group (1986:
p.'7), and Downing Street (Thatcher, 1993: p.593). The core curriculum was less
prescriptive than the model favoured by the DES, incorporating only English, maths and
science.
Resources and Strategies: The national curriculum eventually took the form favoured by
the DES. Duncan Graham, a future head of the National Curriculum Council, maintains
that the national curriculum was a product of the civil service and not the professionals of
HMI.
I became acutely aware that in its implementation and substance this was a civil
service driven curriculum and not the property of HMI. This was the first evidence
of a huge de facto power shift in the way education was controlled in England and
Wales. The HMI were adjuncts and the inspectors on the working group were
extremely helpful but they were not the driving force: that was the civil servants.
The national curriculum was their baby, the first major education reform in Britain
that had not been created by educational professionals (Graham and Tytler, 1993:
p.30).
Similarly Chitty maintains that there was "no indication of HMI being actively involved in
the final preparation of the 1987 Consultation document" (1989: p.125). The reason why
HMI's approach had been rejected was, according to Baker, because "the inspectors were
seen as part of the 'education establishment' and, as such, part of the problem" (1994: p.84).
Their progressive philosophy on the curriculum had certainly made HMI a target for the
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new right pamphleteers. However as Conservative ministers also viewed the DES with
deep suspicion it is somewhat unclear why the Government should reject the one and
embrace the other.
Functional departments such as the DES enjoy a range of resources which can be mobilised
to affect policy outcomes. Prior to the ERA the DES had authority in its mandatory and
discretionary right to execute its policies. Rhodes maintains that, regarding the power of
the centre, the role of the DES was more explicitly defined than other government
departments. The duty of the minister, as laid down in Section 1 of the Education Act 1944
was "to promote the education of the people of England and Wales and the progressive
development of institutions devoted to that purpose, and to secure the effective execution
by local authorities, under the control and direction, of national policy for providing a
varied and comprehensive educational service in every area" (cited in Rhodes, 1988:
p.111). The powers of the minister are bolstered by Section 68:
If the Minister is satisfied ... that any local education authority ... have acted or are
proposing to act unreasonably with respect to the exercise of any power conferred
or the performance of any duty he may give such directions as to the exercise or the
power or performance of the duty as appear to him to be expedient (ibid.).
The financial resources of the DES were limited as local authorities themselves raised a
proportion of their educational expenditure from local taxation. The DES did, however,
possess political legitimacy with access to public decision-making structures, with
ministers deriving legitimacy from election with the subsequent right to build wsha,
support for their policies. Informational resources were gathered through DES inspectors
who visited schools and reported on standards of teaching and quality of teaching and
equipment. However, given that the control of schools, buildings and teachers was in the
hands of local authorities and the schools themselves, the DES's hold over organisational
resources was weak.
Utilising its authority, political legitimacy and informational resources, the DES was able
to impose a national curriculum and a framework for national tests. The strategy for this
changed from one of consultation to imposition when Baker replaced Joseph as Secretary
of State. Chitty notes that although ministerial speeches began to address the curriculum
181
issue in the early 1980s, Joseph's tenure "was not marked by any attempt from the centre to
specify precisely the composition of the school curriculum, either in terms of areas of study
or of syllabuses (1989: p.152). When Baker arrived at the DES he noted that Joseph "had
argued for a national curriculum to be introduced by agreement and consent" (1993:
p.189).
It took me, however, no time at all to discover that there was no chance of getting
voluntary agreement. The educational establishment in university Departments of
Education were deeply suspicious, some teachers were determined to fight to the
death for their own subject specialisms, while others objected to the whole principle
of an imposed national curriculum (ibid).
As the section below illustrates, the resources and strategies of the opponents to the
national curriculum would seriously limit the success of its implementation.
Resource dependencies are also evident in the relationship between the Mrs Thatcher and
Kenneth Baker. The issue of the national curriculum was a "central issue" (Baker, 1993:
p.193) in discussions between the DES and Downing Street. According to Smith (1995),
the power-dependence framework is equally applicable to understanding cabinet
government as inter-organisational relations. Both prime minister and minister have
resources. For example, the prime minister has authority and patronage but ministers have
their own political power bases, as well as the authority and resources for managing large
government departments. This could suggest why the national curriculum proceeded
despite the opposition of the Prime Minister. He recalls in his memoirs that in October
1987, he felt compelled to challenge a minute which had recorded that art and music
should not be compulsory subjects, and that attainment targets for all subjects other than
the core should be dropped. Baker had not recalled these decisions being agreed. Baker
maintains that he threatened resignation unless all ten subjects in the 1987 consultation
White Paper were included in a national curriculum to be put before Parliament. The Prime
Minister backed down and "the broad based curriculum was saved - for the time being"
(Baker, 1993: pp.196-7). Exactly why Mrs Thatcher was unable to impose her views on the
curriculum debate during 1986-88 is unclear. However, it is clearly possible that despite
Mrs Thatcher's third election victory it would have been a severe blow to the Prime
Minister's hopes of reforming education to lose her high-profile and energetic Education
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Secretary, especially following the turbulence of the Joseph years. This was a situation
Baker was perhaps able to exploit.
Vocationalism, the MSC and the DEmp
Vocationalism is the weakest of the three trends identified in the ERA. Only the
introduction of CTCs can be said to have been truly vocational. Mrs Thatcher only saw two
major trends in the debate on reforming education - centralising and decentralising - and
regarded CTCs free of local authority control as a form of decentralisation (1993: pp.590-
92). Yet vocationalism was an increasingly important approach in the Conservative
Government's educational and training policy, and the formulation of the TVEI (which laid
the foundations of the CTCs) is illustrative of how important education reforms of the
1980s were made.
Belief System: Vocationalism is the belief that the education system should be tailored to
suit the needs of industry. Initially the MSC had set itself "the long-term aim of developing
a comprehensive manpower policy with a dual function: to enable the country's manpower
to be developed and to contribute fully to economic well-being; and to ensure that there is
available to each worker the opportunities and services he or she needs in order to lead a
satisfying working life" (cited in Hennessy, 1990: p.454). Vocationalism was largely a
response to what Chitty calls "The Employers Critique" of the education system, and in
particular "the failure of the schools to prepare their pupils for entry into the world of
work" (1989: p.60). In the early 1980s David Young, soon after becoming Chairman of the
MSC, recognised that
in the future, service sector jobs could be the subject of import penetration if we
were not careful. With the latest forms of communications, back offices could be in
any part of the world. If we did not have the necessary skills there were jobs that
could be exported in the future (1990: p.92).
This perception led to the initial discussions with senior ministers for the TVEI. The same
thinking lay behind the development of CTCs. According to Kenneth Baker
the curriculum had to be made more relevant to Britain's national needs and the
future employment opportunities for young people. We had to educate the young of
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today for the jobs of tomorrow. The curriculum would therefore need to be
technologically oriented and involve employers and industrialists. Changing the
culture of education in this way meant giving employers and industrialists the
opportunity to enter "the secret garden" of education (Baker, 1993: p.177).
Resources and Strategies: Of the two key organisations responsible for the development of
vocational education in the 1980s, the key resources of the DES have already been
discussed. However, given the importance of the TVEI in laying the foundations for CTCs
it is also necessary to consider the resources and strategies of the MSC.
The authority of the MSC was established by the Employment and Training Act 1973 with
responsibility for the development and management of public employment and training
services. The extent of this authority is reflected in the MSC's Corporate Plan of 1975
which stated that:
The Commission ... has set itself the long-term aim of developing a comprehensive
manpower policy with a dual function: to enable the country's manpower to be
developed and to contribute fully to economic well-being; and to ensure that there
is available to each worker the opportunities he or she needs in order to lead a
satisfying working life (cited in Hennessy, 1990: p.454).
Moreover, the MSC had the authority to ekablish the new institutions for the TVEI
through existing legislation. David Young maintains that:
By a happy accident of drafting - and it was no more than an accident - the 1973
legislation that set up the MSC allowed us to run our schools. I was told that it was
never planned but the unintended by-product of sloppy drafting (Young, 1990:
p.93).
Rhodes argues that "the political resources of non-departmental public bodies are limited;
they are non-elected bodies with no distinct constituency" (1988: p.171). The MSC could
not impose policies without the consent and co-operation of the government, and the TVEI
only proceeded following negotiation and endorsement from Keith Joseph at the DES,
Norman Tebbit at the Department of Employment (DEmp), and Mrs Thatcher (Young,
1990: chapter 7). Baker had greater legitimacy to promote CTCs, as an elected minister and
MP, to the education community and the country at large (Baker, 1993: pp.176-188).
Although dictated by the centre, the MSC had considerable financial resources. This
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allowed the TVEI to develop through the MSC's own budget without additional funding
which the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, Leon Brittan, refused to provide (Young, 1990:
p.93). The MSC's expenditure rose from £727m in 1979-80 to f1.9b in 1983-4 and f3.3b
in 1987-8 (Rhodes, 1988: p.265; Hennessy, 1990: p.456). With a staff of over 26000 and a
regional structure, the MSC appeared to have considerable organisational resources.
However, it has been argued that these resources gave the MSC limited autonomy.
The regional role ... was autonomous in one sense only, that they knew more about
the market at regional level than anyone else, and the Centre gave them autonomy
to glean that information, and to make responses on the basis of that information.
However, the autonomy was severely constrained , and closely monitored by the
Centre (Davies, Mason, and Davies cited in Rhodes, 1988: p.176).
The strategy employed is widely perceived to have been one of imposition, the TVEI
developed by the MSC and a small number of senior ministers and officials in the DES and
DEmp. Mike Baker describes the TVEI as "an attempt to sideline the education
department" (1993: p.81).
TVEI was certainly a body blow to the education establishment. Neither the
teachers' unions, the local education authorities, nor the Department of Education
had been involved in its gestation (ibid).
Young describes the episode as a "Dawn Raid on Education" (1990: chapter 7). Moon and
Richardson (1984) argue that the TVEI was a departure from past practice as the relevant
professional groups were not consulted prior to its announcement. Young questions
whether anything other than imposition could have generated the necessary changes.
Supposing we had decided to launch a debate about technical education, or the lack
of it. We might have had a Royal Commission and it might have taken five years or
even ten, to get off the ground. Now we have a pilot project due to start by
September of next year (The Times, 22.11.82 cited in Moon and Richardson, 1984).
While Rhodes acknowledges that the TVEI was announced without prior consultation , it
does not mean that groups in the employment network had no impact on outcomes. Like
the national curriculum, the TVEI was still dependent on local authorities and teachers for
185
successful implementation. The importance of these actors is highlighted in the next
section.
Kenneth Baker adopted a similar strategy for CTCs. The policy was first officially floated
at the 1986 Conservative Party Conference "without any consultation with the teachers or
the local councils" (Baker, M., 1994: p.42). Discussion and consultation was instigated
only after that announcement. Like David Young, Baker saw this strategy as essential as
"the education monolith is resistant to any quick change", suggesting that initiatives such
as CTCs can "become bogged down in a welter of consultation, with the result that analysis
leads to paralysis" (Baker, 1993: p.186).
The Anti-Reform Coalition
The ERA was opposed by what Simon (1988) calls a "broad alliance" of all political
parties (including parts of the Conservative Party where some sections or individuals
expressed deep reservations, and in some cases outright opposition), the Trades Union
Congress, the Church of England, most local authorities, and the teaching unions. Baker
and the Government were routinely condemned for ignoring the advice given to them
during the period of consultation. The TES (20.11.87) noted that Labour's opposition to the
Bill in the House of Commons would be largely based on the issue "that the government is
ignoring the advice of practically every informed educational organisation in the country".
Fred Jarvis, former General Secretary of the NUT, in an article in the same issue claimed
that "rarely have a government's legislative proposals been so strongly and widely
condemned by those expected to put them into effect".
The TES later recorded a "Chorus of Disapproval" (27.11.87) as the Bill was put before
Parliament. Alongside the NUT's opposition, the President of the NAS/UWT called the
Bill "a patronising and deluded assault on the common sense of parents"; the President of
the Secondary Heads Association claimed its proposals would "damage the education
system"; the National Confederation of Parent-Teacher Associations said that the views of
parents had been ignored. Many local authorities were also opposed; the Labour-controlled
Association of Metropolitan Authorities argued "that the Bill would do nothing to improve
the quality of children's education, did not enhance parental choice, and concentrated an
186
unprecedented number of powers - 190 - in the Education Secretary's hands" (TES
4.12.87). The General-Secretary of the NUT highlighted what he saw as the blatant
disregard for the advice of the policy network by claiming that "at no time in his whole
approach to the Bill has Mr Baker sought to meet with the LEAs and the teaching
profession to discuss across the table what he feels about the state of education and its
shortcomings" (TES 20.11.87).
Much of this opposition was localised, with many organisations running their own high-
profile campaigns. For example, the NUT supported campaigns to reverse the
Government's proposals by many of its local branches. However, there was one forum
which did attempt to aggregate the opposition to the Government's reforms, the Standing
Conference on Education (SCE). The SCE arose from the 1987 Conference of the Council
of Local Education Authorities (CLEA), following Kenneth Baker's announcement of a
consultation period before proceeding with his Education Bill. The first meeting of the
SCE was a conference on 26 October in Birmingham.
Composition, Interaction and Co-ordination: Present at the Birmingham conference were
large contingents from CLEA, the ACC, and the AMA, plus the six teacher unions. Also in
attendance were representatives from over fifty other organisations, which are listed befow.
It was something of a success to assemble a group such as this, especially with local
authorities entering into an alliance with teacher unions with whom they had been in
continuous dispute over pay and conditions throughout the mid-1980s. One AMA official
maintained: "I found it strange at the time to be working with the teacher unions with
whom we had a tremendous amount of trouble and who had been quite intransigent
throughout these years". 25 The SCE met only twice as a full-blown body, first, at the
Birmingham conference and then at a second conference in December 1987. However, the
staff for the SCE were provided by CLEA, AMA, and ACC and, as a result, key personnel
had opportunities to discuss SCE business informally. The SCE was co-ordinated by John
Fowler, then with CLEA, and who was hired to be the Officer to the Standing Conference.
Belief System: It is difficult to identify a belief system as such, not only because of the
number and range of organisations with different interests, but also because SCE was
established largely as a reaction to government activity. SCE's aims and objectives were:
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AIM
The aim of the Standing Conference on Education is to provide a forum for all
interested parties to give full consideration to Government proposals affecting the
maintained education system of England and Wales.
OBJECTIVES
(i) the formulation of responses to changes in the education system proposed by
central government and, where appropriate, the promotion of alternative proposals.
(ii) the promotion of a system of education through the provision of a
comprehensive range of publicly funded services which reflects local interests as
represented by LEAs and their partners (Standing Conference on Education, 1987:
P.O.
A former AMA official involved in SCE admits that it was largely a "reactionary" forum.
There wasn't time to do anything else. We had been accustomed to evolutionary
development in education, and this kind of "never mind the quality, feel the weight"
radicalism was quite new. There was also the urgency of the timetable. The
Government began trailing its proposals in 1986 and into 1987, when there was the
General Election. The consultation period began in the summer of 1987 and the Bill
was introduced in November 1987. So it all galloped along, and we had no time to
be anything but reactive. There was certainly no alternative blueprint.26
As such, the responses of the consultation exercise published by SCE (1987), and the
proceedings of the Birmingham conference focus almost exclusively on the Government's
agenda. Overall, these responses were hostile to the detail of the Government's proposals.
Resources and Strategies: It may have initially appeared that the greatest resource available
to the SCE was the legitimacy deriving from so many organisations involved in education
forming such a coalition to oppose the Government's reforms. However, according to one
official, such a gathering was counter-productive "because it was made to look like the
establishment making reactionary noises". 27 The Government could therefore ignore it,
while the SCE's low media profile meant it did not attract much public attention. Whilst its
local government members enjoyed legal authority, the SCE did not, nor did it have
financial resources other than those of organisations such as the AMA which funded it. The
members of the SCE did hold many of the organisational resources (people, skills, land,
buildings etc.) in the education system, and could affect the collection of information from
schools and local authorities. But these resources were not central during the stages of
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policy formulation. The most important resource the SCE held during this stage of the
policy process was access to the Labour frontbench. One of the major roles of the SCE was
to provide the Labour Party with advice on amendments during the passage of the Bill, and
to provide briefings for MPs from other parties.28
Table 11
Groups Attending the SCE Conference
Local Education Authorities
CLEA
ACC
AMA
Welsh Joint Education Committee
Ass.of London Authorities
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities
London Borough Associations
Other Organisations
Ass. of Agricultural Education Staffs
Advisory Centre on Education
Ass. of Career Teachers
Ass. of Educational Psycologists
Ass. for all Speech Impaired Children
AMMA
Ass.of Principal of Colleges
Ass. of University Teachers
Ass. of Recurrent Teachers
British Ass, for the Advancement of Science
British Ass. for Early Childhood Education
British Educational Equipment Association
British Youth Council
Campaign for the Advancement of State
Education
Catholic Education Council
Council for education Advance
Church of England, Board of Education
Community and Youth Workers Union
Education Alliance - West Midlands
E J Arnold Ltd
Educational Publishers Council
Free Church Federal Council
Greater London Staff ass.
IBM UK Ltd
Islamic Academy
Source: SCE, 1987: pp.4-6
Methodist Church
Nestle Co. Ltd
Nat. Ass. of Governors and Managers
Nat. Ass. of Head Teachers
Nat. Ass. of Inspectors and Educational
Advisers
Nat. and Local Govt Officers Ass.
Nat. Ass. for Pastoral Care in Education
NASUWT
Nat. Ass. for the Teaching of English
Nat. Ass. of Teachers in Further and Higher
Education
Nat. Antiracist Movement in Education
Nat. Bureau of Handicapped Students
Nat. Council for Teachers' Centre Leaders
National Confederation of Parent-Teacher
Associations
Nat. Council for Voluntary Organisations
Nat. Council for Special Education
Nat. Federation of Women's Institutes
Nat. Institute for Adult and Continuing
Education
Nat. Society for Education in Arts and
Design
Nat. Union of Public Employees
Nat. Union of Students
NUT
Nat. Union of Townswomen's Guilds
Royal National Institute for the Deaf
Secondary Heads Association
Society of Education Officers
TUC
Undeb Cenedlaethol Athrawon Cymruu
Voluntary Council for Handicapped Chilthen
Workers Educational Association
Staff- ACC, AMA, CLEA
The importance of informational and organisational resources increased after the passage
of the ERA, when the teachers were able to bring about major changes to the national
curriculum and testing structure as a result of a boycott, and a strategy of confrontation.
But, this was achieved independently of the SCE, which was wound up when the ERA
became law. By withdrawing their labour from the national tests, and thus obstructing the
Government's attempts to draw comparisons between schools, the teaching unions helped
bring about a policy shift following the creation and implementation of the Dearing Report.
This constituted a major implementation gap, with the Government initially ignoring the
opposition of the teachers' unions, only to retreat at a later date when it became clear that
some co-operation with teachers was necessary if the national curriculum was to be
rescued. The ability of local authorities and teaching unions to affect other aspects of the
ERA were more limited. CTCs were to be centrally funded, while the decision on whether
a school should go grant-maintained was to be left to a ballot of parents. Although possible
to highlight the costs of grant-maintained status, it is difficult for local authorities to
oppose a decision for a school to opt-out, taken by people who the local authority claim to
represent.
Similarly with the TVEI, it has been argued that the Government had to secure the co-
operation of teachers and local authorities to ensure implementation of the policy, leading
Rhodes to argue that: "The characteristics of the education policy community, particularly
the high degree of vertical independence, are as important a component of any explanation
of the outcome on vocational policy as the empire-building proclivities of the MSC" (1988:
p.266). As a result, teachers and local authorities have been able to influence the
development of the TVEI curriculum. Bowe et al note that "many have pointed out that
the MSC's need to secure the co-operation of the 'education lobby' actually produced
curriculum development in schools that was far closer to the educationalist (mostly-school
based) rather than the occupationalist (mostly MSC-based) model of the curriculum"
(1992: p.8). Drawing on a report from Leeds University's School of Education, the TES
reported that:
Employers are playing little part in TVEI curriculum development ...
"Whatever industrial values were being transmitted by the TVEI curriculum, these
were mainly the values as interpreted by teachers and other educationalists rather
than those actually experienced by employers".
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The team says that most schools claimed to have tried to interest employers in the
planning, but responses had ranged from claiming they could not afford the time to
a lack of interest in education (04.03.88).
The Role of Ministers
Conventional models of policy-making suggested that educational change is almost certain
to come from the civil service or the education profession. Yet the evidence presented here,
suggests that Conservative education policy in the 1980s often developed either without, or
against the wishes of, officials and professionals. Indeed, the broad principles of the
Conservative Party's education policy were largely developed in opposition. Knight notes
that:
It was during the period 1976-78 that the [Conservative Educationalists] were able
to develop so much of what has become Conservative educational policy in
government: the stress on high standards; the extension of parental rights; the
sponsoring of the Assisted Places Scheme and the retention of such selective
schools as survived (1990: p.110).
Mark Carlisle, Mrs Thatcher's first Secretary of State between 1979-81, largely carried out
and implemented policies developed in opposition by Norman St John Stevas and Sexton
(who was appointed as Carlisle's special adviser). Under Keith Joseph (1981-86) the right
had high expectations for a radical education agenda, but on a number of issues including
the voucher, opposition to the GCSE, and the publication of school league tables he failed
to deliver. It was left to the "wet" Kenneth Baker to push through the most comprehensive
and radical reform package for schools (and higher education) since 1944.
Amongst the collection of ministers, civil servants, advisers, and think tank and pressure
group members, the one key point of consensus about the ERA is that it was Kenneth
Baker that "made it happen". Joseph's stay at the DES, five years, was remarkable by
contemporary standards, yet he did not pilot an Act comparable in size or scope to the
ERA. Why did Baker succeed in bringing about these major reforms where Joseph could
be said to have "failed"? First, Joseph had been drained by the teachers strike which had
effectively immobilised the second half of his tenure. Second, while Joseph may have not
lived up to the expectations of the right in delivering the voucher, Joseph was not totally
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inactive. The 1984 and 1986 Education Acts reducing LEA control over grants, increasing
information to parents, and strengthening the power of school governors were key stages in
the development of decentralist policies. Finally, Joseph may have been more intellectually
wedded to some of the ideas contained in the 1988 Act, but it was Baker's energy and
ambition which saw it through Parliament. He had a particular flair for public relations.
Mrs Thatcher appointed him after his victory over the "looney-left" local authorities as
Environment Secretary, and the need for a "first-class communicator" at education
(Thatcher; 1993: p.563). Nigel Lawson has described Baker as a politician whose
"instinctive answer is to throw glossy PR and large quantities of money at it, and his
favoured brand of politics is the instant response of the cry of the moment" (1992: pp.606-
7). Some in the civil service welcomed Baker's appointment:
We were pleased to have Baker. It was once joked that education was the last post
filled by a Prime Minister when constructing his or her cabinet. Edsicztion y>eda.E5 a
higher profile and Kenneth Baker certainly gave us one.29
Evidence also suggests however that Downing Street and Mrs Thatcher's personal desire to
reform education was instrumental in shaping the ERA. A Cabinet Sub-Committee on
Education Reform was established by Mrs Thatcher. According to Nigel Lawson:
The Cabinet Sub-Committee on Education Reform proceeded in a way unlike any
other on which I served. The process would start by Margaret putting forward
various ideas - in addition to the Anson paper she had the No.10 Policy Group
[Unit] heavily involved in the subject, and its then head, Brian Griffiths, was
engaged in little else at the time - and there would be a general discussion ... At the
end of it Margaret would sum up and give Kenneth his marching orders. He would
then return to the next meeting with a worked out proposal which bore little
resemblance to what everyone else recalled as having been agreed at the previous
meeting, and owed rather more to his DES officials.
... After receiving a metaphorical handbagging for his pains, he would then come
back with something which corresponded more closely to her ideas (1992: pp.609-
10).
It appears that many of the ideas which were implemented in the 1988 Act were well
developed before Baker took over at the DES. Although he claims that many of the
decentralising initiatives such as opting out were Baker's own (Baker, 1993), the evidence
suggests the New Right Coalition had been developing them for over a decade. But it also
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required the conviction of Mrs Thatcher and the ambition and energy of Kenneth Baker to
ensure that those policies could eventually find their way onto the statute book.
THE CONTEXT OF EDUCATION REFORM
This section considers the broader political and socioeconomic context in the run-up to the
ERA, focusing on those factors which acted as a catalyst for advocacy coalitions and other
organisations to bring forward proposals for change. Part of the context of education
reform was undoubtedly that as the 1987 general election approached, the Thatcher
Government, "obsessed with the dangers of running out of steam" and "in need of
something radical for the election manifesto" (Baker, 1994: p.40), began to turn its
attention towards social policy. Mrs Thatcher was particularly enthusiastic about the
reform of education, health, and housing (Thatcher, 1993: p.589), after eight years of
economic and industrial reform. However, this section focuses on two more substantive
factors which help explain why ministers were keen to reform education: firstly,
ideological/political factors and the Conservative's desire to curb the ideological threat and
political power of two of the government's most ardent opponents in education it the local
authorities and teachers; and secondly the main socioeconomic factors, namely public
expenditure pressures and declining standards of achievement in the classroom. There is,
admittedly, an element of overlap between the two although the emphasis is distinctive in
each.
This case study, unlike bus deregulation and prison privatisation, does not have a separate
heading for "ideological factors". This is because the education belief system of the
Thatcherites and the new right, first articulated by the Black Papers, was initially
independent of other areas of government policy, focusing on the distinctive shortcomings
of the education system. Although the notions of delegated budgets, choice and
competition were applied to many public services, education reform was very much a
pioneer of social policy refoan. Indeed, Kenneth Baker refers to the ERA as "the only
major social reform undertaken in the Thatcher years" (1993: p.41). For these reasons,
education reform is not said to have been significantly influenced by an "ideological
context". This is not to say that ideological factors played no role in the process of
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education reform, but they were closely linked with political factors and as such will be
treated together.
PoliticaUIdeological - Education as Statecraft
The reform of education, like many reforms of the 1980s, could be said to have been an act
of political statecraft rather than the pursuit of a particular ideology. Statecraft concerns the
way in which political parties seek "to gain office, govern satisfactorily and retain office
within the British structure of politics" (Bulpitt, 1986: p.21). Part of this requires "political
argument hegemony", where a party achieves "an easy predominance in the elite debate
regarding political problems, policies and the general stance of government" (ibid). In
education, the Thatcher Government was resisted in its attempts to achieve such hegemony
by the teacher unions and local authorities. Although local government has been
increasingly marginalised since 1979 (Jenkins, 1995; see also chapter 4), the debate over
education went much further than a territorial argument between central and local
government over who should supervise schools. During the 1970s and 1980s the
Conservatives were increasingly concerned about the increasing use of education, through
the curriculum, by teachers and/or local authorities for the pursuit of ideological goals at
variance with those of the Government. In her speech to the 1987 Party Conference, for
example, Mrs Thatcher complained that:
Children who need to be able to count and multiply are learning anti-racist
mathematics - whatever that may be. Children who need to be able to express
themselves in clear English are being taught political slogans. Children who need to
be taught to respect traditional moral values are being taught they have an
inalienable right to be gay.
This is what Baker calls the "sub-text of the motivation for educational change", where
"numeracy, literacy and moral standards were Mrs Thatcher's aims and she did not trust the
teachers to deliver them" (1994: p.46). Mrs Thatcher herself claims that the propagandists
in the education system were "left-wing local authorities, teachers and pressure groups, not
us" (1993: pp.590-591). The Conservative's attack upon "progressive" education was aided
by what Chitty calls "The Media Campaign" against comprehensive education and "trendy
educational practices" which were perceived to exist within such schools (1989: pp.63-66).
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Apart from growing concern over the level of educational standards (see below), these
perceptions were also reinforced by such high profile events as the ultra-progressive
William Tyndale School scandal in 1975. The school was found to have handed control of
its curriculum to its pupils, allowing them to play table tennis or watch television during
lesson time (Baker, 1994: p.25). The condemnation of this policy in the 1976 Auld Report
was for the media "conclusive proof that enormous harm could be done by 'progressive'
teachers in a state school when parents were kept out of school decisions and managers and
inspectors were clearly guilty of failing to fulfil their statutory duties" (ibid). This provided
valuable ammunition for Mrs Thatcher at a time when, soon after becoming leader of the
Conservative Party, she was attempting to forge a distinctive policy programme (see
Knight, 1990: chapter 5).
The perception of an educational establishment at odds with a democratically elected
government and pursuing its own political agenda was something which the new right
think tanks in the 1980s were able to exploit and reinforce. All sought to portray the
education establishment as a self-serving, politically motivated producer group which not
only ignored the wishes of the Government but also those of the public. The ASI
maintained: "The problems which beset state education share a common origin with those
that incapacitate the other nationalised service industries: . the phenomena of producer
capture" (1984a: p.269). Likewise, the NTBG argued that "The education system in Britain
bears all the hallmarks of producer capture" (1986: p.9). The Hillgate Group argue that:
Like every monopolised industry, the educational system has begun to ignore the
demands of the consumers - parents and children - and to respond instead to the
requirements of the producers - LEAs and teachers (1986: p.3).
This theme was also picked up by senior ministers such as Kenneth Baker who maintains
that:
The DES represented perfectly the theory of "producer capture" where by the
interests of the producer prevail over the interests of the consumer. Not only was
the Department in league with the teacher unions, University Departments of
Education, teacher-training theories, and local authorities, it also acted as their
protector against any threats which Ministers might pose (Baker, 1993: p.168).
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The new right think tanks also collated evidence regarding the mis-use of the curriculum
by left-wing teachers and local authorities, including the example from ILEA which
encouraged teachers to, among other things, compare the Nazi holocaust to Conservative
trade union legislation (Hillgate Group, 1986 p.31; No Turning Back Group, 1986: pp.10-
l 1).3o
The ERA is often criticised as an ideological muddle, with contradicting centralising and
decentralising tendencies (see for example, Flew, 1994). However, ideological consistency
may not have been uppermost in the government's mind when formulating the key
provisions of the ERA. LMS/GMS have resulted in fewer powers and responsibilities for
the local authorities while the national curriculum has reduced teacher autonomy in the
classroom. As an act of political statecraft the ERA, in marginalising two principle
opponents of education reform, could therefore be said to have been both coherent and
consistent.
Socioeconomic - Declining Educational Standards
Another key catalyst for reform was concern over educational standards in Britain's
schools. This emerged as a major political issue during the 1974-9 Labour Government.
Upon becoming Prime Minister, James Callaghan requested a report from the DES on the
performance of the education system. The "Yellow Book", submitted to Downing Street in
June 1976, was never formally published although was leaked widely to the press.
Referring to the growing criticisms of the performance of the education system by the
press, the Yellow Book "proceeded to analyse the various strands of this criticism relating
to both primary and secondary schools and the extent to which the media campaign
represented the legitimate concerns and misgivings of teachers and parents" (Chitty, 1989:
p.74). Primary schools were "blamed for a lack of discipline and application and for a
failure to achieve satisfactory results in formal subjects, particularly in reading and
arithmetic" (ibid. The Yellow Book's comments on secondary education maintained that
"schools have become too easy-going and demand too little work and inadequate standards
of performance in formal subjects from their pupils" (Department of Education and
Science, 1976: para. 14 cited in Chitty, 1989: p.76). Chitty highlights two other broad
themes of the Yellow Book: the first concerned "the alleged failure of some schools to
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prepare adequately their pupils to enter the world of work" (ibid); and the second focused
on the variations and inconsistencies in the curriculum between schools, regions, and
ability bands.
Callaghan gave official recognition to concerns over educational standards with his Ruskin
Speech of 18 October 1976 and the launch of the "Great Debate" on education. Callaghan
himself maintains that the aim of the speech was to "begin a debate about existing
educational trends and ... ask some controversial questions (1987: p.140). Bernard
Donoughue wanted the speech to focus "on the need for more rigorous educational
standards, for greater monitoring and accountability of teachers, for greater concentration
on the basic skills of literacy and numeracy, and for giving greater priority to technical,
vocational and practical education" (1987: p.111). Callaghan's speech "clearly echoed the
sentiments of many parents" (ibid), although it was not well received by the education
profession.31
Anxieties over educational standards continued into the 1980s and were a principal source
of concern to Conservative ministers. Mrs Thatcher notes that the "starting point for the
education reforms outlined in our [1987] general election manifesto was a deep
dissatisfaction (which I fully shared) with Britain's standard of education (1993: p.590).
Nigel Lawson admits that, in the mid-1980s, poor standards were the biggest problem
facing the education system (1992: 606-7). Similarly Kenneth Baker recalls that:
I was particularly concerned about the standard of teaching of English ... Employers
were complaining constantly about the level of literacy and numeracy in seven year
olds. We had also just registered the fact that there were about 6 million adults in
the country who, after eleven years of compulsory state education, still had
difficulty in reading and writing (1992: p.190).
The new right were instrumental in their campaign to propel standards to the top of the
educational agenda, although economic issues also played their part. The 1973-4 oil price
hike and the fiscal pressures resulting from recession meant that increasing public spending
on education was no longer an adequate response. Moreover, a declining birth-rates and
school rolls reduced the significance for doing so. As Callaghan maintained in his Ruskin
speech, the challenge was to achieve higher standards with existing resources:
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There has been a massive injection of resources into education, mainly to meet
increased numbers and partly to raise standards. But in present circumstances, there
can be little expectation of further increased resources being made available, at any
rate for the time being ... There is a challenge to us all in these days and the
challenge in education is to secure as high efficiency as possible by the skilful use
of the £6 billion of existing resources (cited in Chitty, 1989: p.59).
For some, this was Callaghan's Labour plagiarising the emerging new right, and in
particular the Black Paperites. The beginning of Black Paper 1977 maintained that:
In October 1976, Mr Callaghan ... attempted to steal our clothes, which have always
been freely available. He repeated our assertions that money is being wasted,
standards are too low, and children are not being given the basic tools of literacy
and numeracy (Cox and Boyson, 1977: p.5).
Education commentators such as Chitty (1989) and Baker (1994) see Callaghan's Ruskin
Speech as a response to a growing public unease about the performance of schools, with
the Black Papers instrumental in highlighting poor educational standards. This was
achieved both through the Black Paper contributions and the research conducted by the
NCES in the 1970s and 1980s. Research findings by the NCES in the early 1980s gave an
empirical base to Black Paper principles, suggesting that high standards were the result of
good educational practice rather than social class, catchment area, or money spent. Cox and
Marks (1980), for example, highlighted the variations in performance between sixth-forms
in one education authority, ILEA, white a fur(her report CMaIks, Cox, and P omian-
Srzednicki, 1986) highlighted variations in examination performance between ILEA
secondary schools. Larger projects included two reports on standards in schools throughout
England, suggesting that schools differ between types of schools (comparing
comprehensive, secondary modern, and grammar), between schools of the same type, and
even within schools (Marks, Cox, and Pomian-Srzednicki, 1983; Marks and Pomian-
Srzednicki, 1985). They conclude that increasing expenditure on education did not
necessarily lead to improved examination results.
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NEW RIGHT THINK TANKS AND EDUCATION REFORM: AN ASSESSMENT
This section addresses two questions. First, what was the role of the new right think tanks
in the process of bringing about education reform, and how influential were they? Second,
to what extent have these think tanks contributed to a new style of policy-making in
education?
The Role and Impact of the New Right Think Tanks
The new right think tanks were part of a loosely-knit coalition, characterised by
overlapping membership of groups and authorship of pamphlets. The origins of this
coalition can be traced back to the first Black Paper in 1969. Although the IEA was active
at this time on the question of education reform, the ASI and the CPS did not become fully
active in this field until the 1980s. However, some individuals involved with these
organisations (such as Caroline Cox and John Marks) had been involved with the Black
Papers and the NCES in the 1970s. Compared to the other case studies in this research,
education reform was a high priority for the TEA, CPS, and ASI, and which were joined in
their efforts by educationalists, MPs, ministers, special advisers, and other research bodies
and think tanks. The New Right Coalition sought to influence policy by a number of
means, including the publication and promotion of pamphlets and articles, conducting
research, as special advisers to ministers and Prime Minister, as well as maintaining a
regular media profile.
The first point that must be considered when assessing the influence of the new right think
tanks in reforming education is that they were advocating only one key strand of reform
implemented by the Conservatives - decentralisation. They may have had sympathy with
those arguments in favour of vocationalism or even a core curriculum, but these policies
were advocated largely independently of the New Right Coalition. There is a general
perception that the new right think tanks were influential in setting at least part of the
education agenda. Officials testify that they both read the pamphlets which were sent to the
DES, and would brief ministers on their content. Officials themselves claim not to have
been personally influenced by their arguments, but they felt the need to read them, and use
them for future reference. According to one official, the civil servants "were very aware
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that ministers were influenced by the thinking of such groups" and therefore for "defensive
reasons" would familiarise themselves with their pamphlets. 32 Another official suggested
that:
You would have to be conscious of these reports. Remember our first audience was
government, so the agenda of government was always important. So in the sense
that the agenda of government was set by that sort of thinking, then we needed to
be kept well informed about those ideas to give a professional response to them.33
Another senior official highlighted the long-term role of such groups during the 1970s and
1980s in examining how such concepts such competition and parental choice can be
brought in to a public service like education.
These were tremendously radical things which caused people to go back to basic
principles and ask very hard questions of a system that we'd all become very cosy
about, and which was assumed would continue indefinitely. The kind of massive
enquiry we had to go through with the voucher was in some ways very sobering
because it suddenly put on record that you could have a system that was different
from what we had.34
Analysing the significance of a particular document(s) is very difficult. However two
ministers and one member of the Prime Minister's Policy Unit highlight the importance of
the No Turning Back Group's document Save Our Schools. It was said that Mrs Thatcher
was particularly impressed by their arguments (especially regarding GMS, open enrolment,
and per capita funding) and reinforced her belief that decentralisation was essential for
education reform. 35 Former minister of state Angela Rumbold describes what she believes
to have been the impact of the think tanks, and the division of responsibilities between
think tanks and ministers:
Many of the ideas which were contained in the Education Reform Act came as a
result of work that was done by the Institute of Economic Affairs and also by the
No Turning Back Group of Members of Parliament - of which I was an active
contributor in the early 1980s. In particular the ideas that culminated in the ideas of
Grant-Maintained Schools began with the views and thoughts which were explored
in those early years, both by papers that came from the Institute of Economic
Affairs and also from discussions and a final paper on education reform that was
produced by the No Turning Back Group in 1986. Think tanks generally do play
quite a considerable part in the background thinking and formulation of policy,
although it is often individual Ministers, or groups of Ministers, who have quite a
lot of input into the final policy fonnulation.36
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Kenneth Baker's memoirs give little indication of the intellectuaUideological influences
behind his vision of secondary education. Ministers, advisers, and civil servants agree that
many of those ideas (especially those decentralising power and responsibility) were around
in the DES for some time before Baker arrived. Moreover, we have some anecdotal
evidence that Baker was listening to the New Right Coalition. The Guardian (13.01.89)
observed that:
At one point ... Baker ... remarked that the only people he was listening to was the
think tankers on the Right. Why was this? ... it was because the pamphleteers were
tapping directly into a crucial and hitherto unaddressed anxiety amongst parents:
what their children was not getting was a good enough education, and that to fob
this anxiety off with the alibi that the problem would vanish if only more money
was thrown at it was actually dishonest.
The Independent (23.07.87) reported that "Kenneth Baker, Secretary of State for
Education, was overheard telling his political adviser that "these are the people who are
setting the educational agenda", referring to members of the CPSESG, whose ideas "have
shaped Mr Baker's Great Education Reform Bill".
Ultimately, few were campaigning as vigorously for decentralisation as the New Right
Coalition. Knight (1990) focuses on the Conservative Party's internal machinery, especially
CNACE, to explain the development of policy. Members of the New Right Coalition
dispute such claims, and maintain that Conservative teachers and local authorities
campaigned against their proposals, being dominated by producer groups. 37 Bob Dunn
describe CNACE as "hopeless, utterly hopeless, dominated by the left of the Conservative
Party and hostile to our ideas".38 Some members of the New Right Coalition are more
cautious about attributing too much influence to the think tank reports of the 1980s. Stuart
Sexton maintains that many of the ideas enshrined in the ERA were circulating long before
these pamphlets were published. Sexton, though, adds that the new right pamphlets added
"valuable support" to such ideas, although their role and significance is said to be "useful,
but exaggerated" (cited in Denham, 1996: p.110).
The ideas promoted by the New Right Coalition, such as opting-out, open enrolment, and
per capita funding are not revolutionary in themselves, and it would be surprising if the
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DES had not considered their benefits. But it is a major step between accepting an
intellectual argument and deciding on policy change. Arguments need to be won within
governing parties and government departments, as well as in the media and the broader
"climate of ideas". The new right think tanks assisted in this process. Their role was not so
much as originators but as proselytisers, and the importance of this role should not be
dismissed lightly.
The contribution of the IEA, CPS, and ASI and the New Right Coalition was not limited to
advocating a decentralised structure for education. They also played an important role in
shaping the context of education reform. First, much of the Coalition's early work,
especially that of the Black Papers and the NCES, helped raise awareness of poor
standards. Secondly, the new right think tanks in the 1980s helped reinforce the
Government's perception of an educational establishment with radically different values
from those of both government and parents. According to one former official, the new right
think tanks' focus on producer capture was one of their most successful strategies:
What they did more than anything else on the negative side was encourage the
exclusion of whole groups of people from the policy debate before it actually
began. They demonised certain groups of people, to the extent that when it came to
their objections, they could be countered by "Well, they would say that, wouldn't
they". That was them at their worst and their cleverest.39
The New Right Coalition, over a twenty year period, influenced the education policy
debate in two ways. First, during the 1970s and early 1980s by emphasising the
shortcomings of the state education system and declining standards and, secondly during
the early to mid 1980s when an alternative blueprint for secondary education was
proposed. While it is impossible to quantify impact of either, it is difficult to see how the
new right policies of the 1980s could have been achieved without the substantial
groundwork of the Black Papers and the NCES. Indeed, given how much more crowded
this space became by the 1980s, it could be argued that the MSC and the DES were also
beneficiaries of the early work of the New Right Coalition, in prising open a relatively
closed policy community for other actors to enter the debate.
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The New Right Think Tanks, Education Reform, and Policy-Making
The reforms of the 1980s and 1990s suggest that education can no longer be classified as a
policy community. Education has become increasingly politicised and polarised. Policy
outcomes today are not simply dependent on the DfEE, LEAs, and teacher unions.
Ministers, MPs, special advisers, pressure groups, journalists, the Church, industry, all
contribute to and affect policy outcomes. The new right think tanks have also played a
prominent role in the education debate in recent years. According to Ball:
The education policies of Thatcherism have involved a total reworking of the
ideological terrain of education politics and the orientation of policy making is now
towards the consumers of education - parents and industrialists: the producer
groups are almost totally excluded ... Policies are now more clearly political in
character, and the influence networks of the New Right have had a significant
impact on Conservative Party thinking about education ... and have proved
themselves particularly pragmatic and adaptable in mobilising media and some
popular support on behalf of the party (1990: p.5).
The growth and diversity of groups now involved in policy-making has led some to
suggest that education is now an issue network, "relatively accessible, offering the
government more chance to manoeuvre, but with outcomes more variable and uncertain"
(Barnes, 1995: p.32). However, although the education arena could be said to have become
more pluralistic, it is important to recognise that in some cases, policy actors aggregated
themselves on the basis of shared beliefs and policy objectives.
The formulation of the ERA suggests that it is now necessary to shift the focus away from
the providers of education to the resources of others. As Barnes notes:
Given continued electoral support, the government can evidently determine most of
the ground rules, but that does not render it immune from pressures, both direct and
indirect, particular from members of the governing party, the mood of the
electorate, and demands from industry for the right kind of manpower (ibid).
Barnes actually refers to a "skewed pluralism" whereby the resources of certain groups
allow them greater scope for influencing policy outcomes. Thus the demands from industry
carry greater weight given the wider political significance of economic growth and levels
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of unemployment. Other groups which have benefited from skewed pluralism have
included teachers who "benefited when the curriculum from 1945 until well into the 1970s
was characterized as being for professional judgement alone" (ibid).
The new right think tanks have benefited from the greater politicisation of education,
although they clearly did not bring this about single-handedly. The key factor which
propelled education to the top of the political debate over the past twenty years has been
Britain's perceived economic decline and falling educational standards. The new right think
tanks have had to compete with other organisations for setting a new educational agenda.
Ultimately, the Government did not see arguments for centralisation, decentralisation, and
vocationalism as incompatible, and all three have been present in government education
reforms since 1979. The MSC, DES, and New Right Coalition drew upon theoretical
arguments and utilised their resources to persuade the Government to adopt their position.
Perhaps the biggest change of all to policy-making since 1979 has been the almost total
exclusion of the education profession in policy formulation. These developments have
increased the role of ministers and their officials, as policy brokers, to mediate between the
various organisations and coalitions seeking reform. Kenneth Baker's importance has
already been mentioned, although his status as a policy broker might be questioned given
his refusal to engage in meaningful dialogue with the education profession. Moreover,
junior ministers such as Rhodes Boyson, Bob Dunn, and Angela Rumbold have actively
participated within the New Right Coalition.
This new pattern of policy-making in education does not wholly exclude the educational
establishment. While largely ignored in the process of formulation and consultation, the
teachers especially were able to affect policy outcomes with a strategy of confrontation and
boycott of national testing. The resources of the teachers were clearly more effective at this
stage of the policy process than that of policy formulation. Indeed, the only way to resolve
the situation was "to instigate a genuine consultation process through the appointment of
Sir Ron Dearing, in which teacher organisations were invited to play a key part". This led
to "signs that unions will once again be drawn into policy-making consultation" although
the "extent to which this is genuine consultation will certainly have to be evaluated in
future".'
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CONCLUSION
Given the continuity and overlap of personnel, it is difficult to dissociate the contribution
of the new right think tanks and the earlier work of the Black Papers and NCES. However,
the new right think tanks, as part of a New Right Coalition, can be said to have been a
significant pressure for reform in education, especially regarding decentralisation. Building
upon the work of the Black Papers and the NCES, the IEA, CPS, and ASI (and other
members of the Coalition) advocated a new structure for secondary education based on
devolved budgets for schools, per capita funding, and parental choice, and enjoyed
considerable access to decision-makers to influence policy formulation. But the New Right
Coalition lacked the resources to dictate the pace of key reforms. For example, grant-
maintained status could only be conferred upon a school after a parental ballot.
While they fought the educational establishment, the New Right Coalition had to share
policy space with other organisations pursuing change, such as the DES and MSC. The
latter two organisations were key pressures for two other major reforms, the national
curriculum and the TVEI (and later CTCs) respectively. While all sought to address the
problem of falling standards, the New Right Coalition was particularly influential in
highlighting this problem and starting the debate on the quality of British schools.
Policy-making has changed since 1979 becoming more politicised and open, a situation
which organisations such as the new right think tanks were able to exploit. There are signs
that policy-making in the 1990s may be in a state of transformation yet again. The Dearing
exercise signalled a truce between the government and the teaching profession, and soon
afterwards Elizabeth Cottrell, special adviser to then Conservative Education Secretary
Gillian Shephard, identified the "lunatic right" as a big problem in education (The Times
30.08.94). Education may not be the same priority for the think tanks in the 1990s than it
was in the 1980s, although all still publish pamphlets on education reform, the CPSESG
still meets, and the IEA established another Education Unit in 1996. The issues, though,
have changed in recent years. Nursery education vouchers have become a significant issue
after Gillian Shephard became Secretary of State for Education (see TES 07.04.95).
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According to Tony Travers, the nursery vouchers debate of the 1990s reflects a similar
alignment of forces and arguments to those of secondary education in the 1980s.
The legacy of the Thatcher years still casts a long-shadow over education. Right-
wing think-tanks still clatter about the battlements. Local authorities remain a
"problem". Everything in the public sector must be done on the cheap. The
Department of Education wants more powers though without direct responsibility
(MS 05.05.95).
On the one hand, the early abolition of nursery vouchers and the assisted placed scheme
suggests that the new right think tanks might not find the educational ground so fertile
under the new Blair Government. But the emphasis on zero-tolerance for underperforming
schools, increasing the role of parents, and improving the skills of teachers (Labour Party,
1997) might perhaps lay the foundations for a more constructive dialogue between Labour
and the new right think tanks on these issues in the months and years ahead.
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1 In order to avoid any potential confusion, the reader should be aware that this chapter will make numerous
references to works by Mike Baker (1994), an education journalist and author of Who Rules Our Schools?,
which examines the changes in education in the 1980s and 1990s, and Kenneth Baker (1993), the former
Secretary of State.
2 The years following the 1944 Act have been described as "the Golden Age of teacher control (or non-
control) of the curriculum" (Lawton, quoted in Chitty, 1989: p.23).
3 Interview with DES official.
4 Interview with DES official.
5 Interviews with Brian Cox, Caroline Cox, and John Marks
6 Interviews with Stuart Sexton, Marjorie Seldon and Oliver Letwin.
7 As footnote 6. Also interviews with Rhodes Boyson and Oliver Letwin.
8 Interview with DES official.
9 Interview with Stuart Sexton. Oliver Letwin also maintains that the voucher proposal failed mainly due to a
lack of ministerial will (Interview).
WA more detailed outline of each report has been provided by Denham, 1996.
11 Interview with Caroline Cox.
12 It should be noted that this term does not necessarily imply that this Coalition was in favour of the status
quo, simply that it opposed the reforms proposed by the Conservative Government.
13 Interview with John Marks.
14 Interview with Stuart Sexton.
15 Interviews with Stuart Sexton and Marjorie Seldon.
16 Interview with Stuart Sexton.
17 Interview with Stuart Sexton.
18 Interview with Bob Dunn.
19 Interview with Angela Rumbold.
20 Interview with DES official.
21 Interview with Stuart Sexton.
22 Joseph remained opposed to a national curriculum after he left the DES and both spoke and voted against
it when the Education Reform Bill was passing through the douse of Lords.
23 Interview with DES official.
24 Interview with Stuart Sexton.
25 Interview with AMA official.
26 Interview with AMA official.
27 Interview with AMA official.
28 Interview with SCE official.
29 Interview with DES official.
30 See also The Wayward Curriculum, published by the SAU in 1986.
Donoughue recalls that: "The education profession reacted, predictably, with less generosity than the
public. The NUT was furious. The Department of Education was shocked" (1987: p.112).
32 Interview with DES official.
33 Interview with DES official.
34 Interview with DES official.
35 Interviews with Bob Dunn, Angela Rumbold, and David Willets.
36 Letter from Dame Angela Rumbold.
37 Interviews with Stuart Sexton, Baroness Cox, and John Marks.
38 Interview with Bob Dunn. For evidence of Conservative opposition of Baker's opt-out plans, see the TES
18.09.87; 11.09.87; and 09.10.87.
39 Interview with DES official.
40 Letter from NUT official.
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Six
Prison Privatisation
The maintenance of law and order, along with national defence, has been, and continues to
be, widely regarded as an inalienable if not defining responsibility of the modern state.
Ryan and Ward maintain that the state's monopoly of the criminal justice system "is taken
to be one of the settled features of Western industrial democracies" (1989a: p.54). It is for
this reason that prison privatisation has been referred to as "the ultimate privatisation" (Van
de Graaf, 1993: p.40). Prison privatisation was introduced in the Criminal Justice Act 1991
and marks an important step towards the privatisation of the criminal justice system as a
whole (Matthews, 1989). Prison privatisation is not the only major policy change to have
been made within the penal system since 1979. It is, however, the only one to have
attracted any significant involvement from the new right think tanks. One of the new right
think tanks, the ASI, has been widely credited with initiating the debate. Ryan and Ward
(1989b) suggest that it "was the Adam Smith Institute ... that first put the question of prison
privatisation on the political agenda ... and it was in the Omega Report on Justice Policy
that the idea of private prisons made its British debut" (pp. 44-5).1
This case study argues that the ASI initially played a significant role within an informal,
loosely-knit Pro-Privatisation Coalition which was able to place prison privatisation firmly
on the political agenda, promoting it with ministers and in the media. This role declined as
the issue was increasingly taken up by the private sector consortia which later bid for the
prison management contracts. Exploiting its access to ministers, the Coalition (comprising
mainly the ASI, special advisers, Conservative members of the Home Affairs Select
Committee, and firms from the private sector) promoted this policy in an ideological,
political, and socioeconomic context conducive to privatisation. This context included: a
crisis of overcrowding; a turbulent and deteriorating relationship between the government
and the Prison Officers' Association; and the general popularity of privatisation with the
208
Conservative Government. It will be argued that the ASI and the Pro-Privatisation
Coalition had little significant impact upon the structure of policy-making. Policy-making
in the penal system has for many years been fragmented, reactive, and increasingly
ideologically polarised, with a plurality of groups competing for influence. However, the
ASI and the Pro-Privatisation Coalition have had an influence on agenda-setting in the
prison system in that privatisation has introduced the concepts of markets and competition
into the criminal justice system. Privatisation is now a dominant issue in this policy area
for the first time for over a hundred years.
The term "prison privatisation", although widely used, is not universally accepted. The
Home Affairs Select Committee preferred to talk of "contract provision", as privatisation
implies accountability only to shareholders while what was anticipated in the prison system
was private contractors managing prisons on behalf of, and answerable to, the state.
However, according to Bannock et al, privatisation is "the sale of government-owned
equity in nationalised industries or other commercial enterprises to private investors, with
or without the loss of government control in these organisations" (1992: p.342-2 - emphasis
added). While it is acknowledged that "contract provision" may be a more accurate way of
describing privatisation in the prison system, the term "privatisation" is retained.
POLICY-MAKING IN THE PENAL SYSTEM
The aim of this section is to provide a brief account of policy-making in the penal system.
It does not address the detailed procedures of policy-making, but the relationship between
government and groups, the constraints on ministers, access to decision-making structures,
and other major pressures for change. This account is not intended to be exhaustive, but
aims to draw together some of the main themes from the policy-making literature on the
penal system. It has been argued that the operational services such as the Prison Service
(Thomas, 1977) and the Probation Service (King and Jarvis, 1977) have gradually
consolidated their position as key consultative partners during the post-war years. But
policy-making in the penal system is far from routinized. It is an untidy process in which
"it is hard to disentangle the input of ministers and that of officials, or the operational
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services, political or parliamentary influences, or interest groups" (Windlesham, 1993:
p.13).
Three characteristics are identified which demonstrate that an understanding of penal
policy-making necessitates looking beyond the Government's dependence upon the
operational services towards other pressures, which include the need to retain the support
of the Conservative Party in Parliament and at the grassroots, and the importance of public
opinion. These three characteristics are: fragmentation within the criminal justice system;
the importance of events; and ideological polarisation. The Rhodes Model will then be
applied to penal policy where it will be argued that policy-making is best described as
pluralistic (although not an issue network), with numerous groups having opportunities to
participate in policy debates and influence policy outcomes.
Fragmentation and the Criminal Justice System
The prison system in England and Wales is an integral part of the broader criminal justice
system, defined by Cavadino and Dignam as "a term covering all those institutions which
respond officially to the commission of offences" (1992: p.1). This should be distinguished
from the penal system, which is described as "the system that exists to punish and
otherwise deal with people who have (usually) been convicted of a criminal offence"
(ibid). 2 The criminal justice system is composed of a number of different agencies, each
with its own specific functions. These agencies include: the police; the prosecution
services; the courts; the prison service; and the probation services.
Thus the Prison Service, although a distinctive organisation responsible for over 130
prisons in England and Wales, must operate within a broader policy framework. The inputs
into the prison system are very much determined by what occurs elsewhere in the criminal
justice system. According to Davies et al:
The agencies in the criminal justice system are interdependent. One agency's output
is another agency's input. Those who leave the courts with a prison sentence
become the intake into the prisons at the back-end of the system. The role of each
agency depends on its particular function in the overall scheme of things (1994:
p.14).
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Despite the interdependent nature of these agencies, one of the key features of the criminal
justice system in the UK is its unsystematic nature "with different agencies working in
relative isolation from each other, exercising wide and unaccountable discretionary powers,
and subject to no overall co-ordination or strategic control" (Cavadino and Dignam, 1992:
p.7). This was a major conclusion of the Woolf Report following the prison riots at
Strangeways and other prisons in April 1990. It identified a "failure of co-operation" across
the different agencies of the criminal justice system and highlighted a need for greater
communication and co-ordination for it to operate effectively. Sir Brian Cubbon,
Permanent Secretary at the Home Office between 1979-88, in his testimony to the Woolf
inquiry spoke of a "geographical fault" in the penal system. This referred to "the
unpredictable and volatile size of the prison population", which could only be addressed if
the judiciary took "greater account of the capacity of the prison system" (Woolf and
Tumim, 1991: p.261). Part of the problem is that ministerial responsibility for the criminal
justice system in England and Wales is divided between three Whitehall departments: the
Home Office is responsible for the police, the prison system, and the probation service; the
Attorney-General's Department for the Crown Prosecution Service; and the Lord
Chancellor's Department for the financing and management of the courts and advice on
most judicial appointments in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.
The Woolf Report therefore recommended the establishment of a Criminal Justice
Consultative Council (CJCC), the aim being "to provide a forum in which issues affecting
the collective operation of the system of criminal justice could be discussed by senior
representatives of the operational services" (Windlesham, 1993: p.464). The CJCC's
inaugural meeting took place on 15 January 1992, under the chairmanship of Sir Clive
Whitmore, then Permanent Secretary to the Home Office. The membership of eighteen
included the Permanent Secretaries of the Department of Health and the Lord Chancellor's
Department, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, the Director-General of the Prison
Service, and the Acting Director of the Crown Prosecution Service (Windlesham, 1993:
p.463). It is too early to evaluate the impact of the CJCC on policy-making within the
criminal justice system, but there are already doubts concerning the effectiveness of such a
body, with fears that it might simply be by-passed during periods of "moral panic", leading
to demands that the CJCC be placed on a statutory footing (for example, see Howard
League, 1993: p.25).
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The foundation of the CJCC should not obscure other attempts to improve co-ordination
across the criminal justice system. One such innovation was the creation of the Crime
Policy Planning Unit (CPPU) in 1974 based in the Home Office, established to
institutionalise co-ordination between the various criminal justice agencies. During the
1980s, a process of "trilateralism" developed between the Home Office, the Lord
Chancellor's Department, and the Attorney General's Department. In 1987, ministers from
the three departments decided to put such co-operation on a more systematic basis with
regular meetings between ministers (underpinned by meetings between officials) from the
three departments. The basis of such meetings was that "co-operation between the various
agencies which comprise the criminal justice system is crucial to the successful operation
of the system as a whole" (Parliamentary answer by the Lord Chancellor, Lord Mackay,
cited from Windlesham, 1993: p.41). It is, however, important to distinguish between the
degrees of fragmentation at a policy and operational level. Despite the division of
responsibilities between the various government departments, the Home Office retains "the
prime position" as the Home Secretary took "the lead role" in the formulation of criminal
justice policy3 (the role of the Home Secretary is also addressed in the final part of this
section). According to another official, this "strategic" level of policy-making is
"reasonably well-coordinated".
What was difficult was its practical application with middle managers at local level
and with frontline staff, in particular when it came to using resources for other
people's benefit, or trusting each other and sharing information. For example, it
took a very long time for the probation service to trust the police.4
This fragmentation has serious implications for policy-making. It hinders the ability of the
individual criminal justice agencies to carry out their responsibilities effectively. For
example, a lack of communication between the judiciary and the Prison Service can lead to
judges passing more custodial sentences than the prison system has the capacity to deal
with, resulting in overcrowding. The failure of the criminal justice agencies to co-ordinate
their activities and avoid such hazards leads to a vacuum in the construction of a criminal
justice strategy. There is a perception across the political spectrum that the prison system is
in severe crisis (Cavadino and Dignam, 1992: chapter 1). If the criminal justice agencies
are unable to respond constructively to it, then the initiative will move elsewhere. Law and
212
order is a high profile political issue, and there are many organisations and individuals who
may attempt to influence a new strategy or agenda for the criminal justice system.
The Importance of Events
Penal policy is highly reactive. Unanticipated events, such as the murder of a child or a
prison escape/riot can rapidly affect the development of policy. Roy Jenkins, a Home
Secretary under Wilson (1966-67 and 1974-76) speaks of "tropical storms that blow up
with some speed and violence out of a blue sky, dominate the political landscape for a
short time, and then disappear as suddenly as they arrived" (cited in Hennessy, 1990:
p.457). Willie Whitelaw, Mrs Thatcher's first Home Secretary (1979-83), employs a similar
metaphor, talking of Home Secretaries being "exposed to sudden and wholly unexpected
storms" (Whitelaw, 1989: pp.160-161). Kenneth Baker (Home Secretary 1990-2) maintains
that the Home Secretary is "much more the victim of day-to-day events than any other
Minister" (Baker, 1993: p.425).
This is perhaps because, as Drewry notes, penal policy "is particularly bound up with
popular sentiment" and "intertwined with subjective, emotive and, ultimately, moral
considerations" (1977: p.40). According to Downes and Morgan, "the eruption of particular
scandals and concerns, via a rapidly changing media framework, have consistently proved
catalysts for changing policies" (1994: p.185). Specific events can lead rapidly to a loss of
confidence in the criminal justice system, which very often requires an immediate
government response to restore that confidence. Such a response may require legislation.
According to penal reformer Frances Crook, such reactive legislation is inadequate as it has
usually been prepared as a swift, populist response "formulated by moral panic and
discussed in media sound bites rather than through informed public debates". The
Dangerous Dogs Act of 1991 is cited as an example of "the Government's policy of
legislation without consultation" (The Independent 16.12.93).
Occasionally, events can have a significant impact on the direction of penal policy. In 1965
a number of prison escapes including that of George Blake led Roy Jenkins to establish an
independent investigation headed by Lord Mountbatten, who recommended tightening up
prison security at a time when an emphasis on rehabilitation was in the ascendance. The
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Government's acceptance of most of Mountbatten's recommendations ultimately, "led to
disastrous toughening-up of the prison system and certainly many informed sources ...
were to claim that it was playing havoc with the rehabilitative ideal" (Ryan, 1983: p.42).
The riot at Strangeways and other prisons in April 1990, led to the Woolf Report and its
recommendations for improving conditions for prisoners. The Times (17.04.92) claimed
that the riots "forced the unfashionable area of penal reform on to the political agenda in a
way that years of lobbying by pressure groups had failed to do so". 	 ,
Ideological Polarisation
The problems raised by high-profile and emotive events are compounded by the
ideological polarisation which characterises debates on the penal and criminal justice
systems. This is a relatively recent development. According to Downes and Morgan,
"bipartisanship has been the rule rather than the exception in the twentieth century on such
matters as the response to crime, the nature of policing, sentencing policy and so on ...
Crime and criminal justice were minor, taken-for-granted aspects of [the post-war]
consensus". The 1970 general election is seen as the "real watershed" in the politics of law
and order, with the Conservatives criticising the Wilson Government for the serious
increase in crime. While the Conservative further increased their attention on law and order
in the 1974 election, it was the Conservative's 1979 election manifesto which "brought 'law
and order' to the fore as an election issue and dispelled any lingering trace of bipartisan
consensus".
The debates on criminal justice policy in the UK can be said to have two polarised ideal
types, often crudely referred to as "informed" and "populist", or as Cavadino and Dignam
refer to them, "positivism and the rehabilitative ideal", and the "ideology of law and order".
"Positivism and the rehabilitative ideal" maintains that:
crime, along with all other natural and social phenomena, is caused by factors and
processes which can be discovered by scientific investigation. These causes are not
necessarily genetic, but may include environmental factors such as upbringing in
the family, social conditioning and so on. Positivists believe in the doctrine of
determinism; human beings, including criminals, do not act from their own free
will but are compelled to do so by forces beyond their control (Cavadino and
Dignam, 1992: p.48).
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The emphasis is therefore upon treatment rather than punishment. Such thinking reached
its zenith in the 1950s and 1960s when "there was a widespread belief that criminology and
other behavioural sciences would progressively discover the causes of crime and the way to
cure all offenders of their criminality" (ibid. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, such
progressive thinking came under a sustained assault from the ideology of law and order.
This is described by Cavadino and Dignam as "a complex, if naive set of attitudes,
including the beliefs that human beings have free will, that they must be strictly disciplined
by rules, and that they should be harshly punished if they break the rules or fail to respect
authority" (ibid). The rehabilitative ideal is criticised by the law and order school for
failing to acknowledge the importance of the individual when dealing with crime.
According to one Conservative sociologist:
The penal system has become increasingly dominated since 1945 by the utopian
themes of socialists and bleeding-heart liberals. They seem to regard punishment as
morally primitive. They feel more concern for criminals than their victims. They
prefer to find implausible excuses for delinquent behaviour in unemployment,
poverty, and childhood deprivation rather than to acknowledge the real causes of
escalating crime: public and official ambivalence about right and wrong, and
ineffective moral and social control of individual behaviour (Marsland, 1996: p.17).
Both ideologies have powerful advocates. The rehabilitative ideal has been promoted by
the influential penal reform movement throughout the post-war years, including the
Howard League, the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders
(NACRO), and the Prison Reform Trust (PRT). There is considerable common ground
between the three organisations. All seek to reduce the numbers of offenders detained in
prison, while working towards more humane conditions for those who remain. Yet each
organisation is distinctive.
The Howard League, established in 1921, is the oldest and arguably the most prestigious
penal reform group. It has run vigorous and often successful campaigns on such high
profile issues as abolishing capital punishment, prison suicides, reducing the numbers of
women and children in prison, and developing alternatives to imprisonment (such as
probation). The PRT, which was established in 1981, see its role as "enquiring into the
workings of the [penal] system; informing prisoners, staff and the wider public; and by
influencing Parliament, Government and officials towards refomt". 5 While sharing many
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of the Howard League's objectives, the PRT places a greater emphasis on monitoring and
researching the penal system. It produces a number of guides and information packs for
students, researchers, and prisoners. The PRT also conducts post-implementation research,
monitoring the introduction of policy changes in prisons such as those brought about
through the Woolf Report, or the privatisation programme. NACRO, established in 1966,
assists in the rehabilitation and resettlement of offenders in the community. It has a
national network of offices and co-operates with local organisations and communities in
pursuit of constructive approaches in dealing with offenders. Although an independent,
voluntary organisation, NACRO, unlike the Howard League and the PRT, is government
funded.
Opposing those groups propounding the rehabilitative ideal is a combination of the
grassroots Conservatives, the tabloid press, and the police. The strongest demand for a
populist approach to penal policy manifests itself at Conservative Party conferences, where
there are regular calls for the reintroduction of the death penalty, longer and tougher
sentences, and stricter prison regimes. Willie Whitelaw recalled that he "both dreaded and
disliked the prospect of the law and order debate", where demands for the restoration of
capital and corporal punishment overshadowed many of the urgent issues facing the prison
service, including sentencing policy and overcrowding.
Populism is also a characteristic of the tabloid press, which "tries hard to make a Home
Secretary's life a misery. Strident in tone, punitive in outlook, and personalising issues in
ways that can cause great distress to individuals, the tabloids are the stock of the modern
age" (Windlesham, 1993: p.21). Ministers are occasionally influenced by such pressure.
Michael Howard has been accused of pandering to the ill-informed right-wing tabloids
(especially The Sun) in constructing his criminal justice strategy. His decision to impose a
minimum sentence of fifteen years on the schoolboy murderers of two-year old Jamie
Bugler in Liverpool was, by his own admission, partly a response to over 20,000 cut-out
coupons from readers of The Sun demanding a long sentence (The Guardian 18.04.96).
The police have also long championed a tougher approach to law and order. They have
supported the increased building programme and use of prisons, first, to release the number
of sentenced offenders held in police cells due to overcrowding in prisons (thus diverting
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valuable manpower) and, secondly, to take persistent criminals off the streets. They have
been particularly supportive of Michael Howard's criminal justice strategy as exemplified
in the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Responding to the announcement of
Howard's agenda at the 1993 Conservative Party conference, the Independent (07.10.93)
noted that "the police - which have been pressing for an end to the right to silence and
tougher restrictions on refunding on bail - were delighted". Dick Coyles, Chairman of the
Police Federation, hailed the proposals as "First class!".
When talking of ideological polarisation, there are the dangers of generalisation and over-
simplification. There are likely to be many positions between these extremes taken by
various policy actors. It is also the case that not all Home Office officials were/are
sympathetic to the penal reform lobby6, or that all police forces share the enthusiasm for
the "zero-tolerance" approach to crime. 7 Nevertheless, both extremes have their advocates,
and the significance this has for policy outcomes and the Rhodes Model is addressed
below.
Penal Policy and the Rhodes Model
As suggested above, prior to the 1970s there was a largely bipartisan approach to criminal
justice policy. This was the era of positivism, characterised by the belief that "given a
comprehensive programme of research, and a coordinated planning structure, a penal
policy could be forged and implemented which would correct many of those ills, individual
and social, which promoted crime" (Morgan, 1979: p.2). The emphasis on the importance
of research in penal policy led the Home Office to establish a Home Office Planning Unit,
the Cambridge Institute of Criminology, and the Advisory Committee on the Penal System.
The Howard League was also an important organisation during these years. Most members
of the League's Council and Executive Committee, were "public figures with well-
established contacts with those in Whitehall and those at Westminster who run the
machinery of government" which "at times turned into a virtual partnership, so much so
that at times it is difficult to determine for certain where the League's influence ends and
the government's begins (Ryan, 1977: p.106). Ryan maintains that this partnership was
central for understanding the development of rehabilitation as the dominant ideological
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framework in the 1960s, when "both the League and the Home Office made the same
transition; indeed through their close personal contacts and their overlapping membership
of advisory committees, they sustained and reinforced each other in the process" (ibid).
The Howard League was the "acceptable" pressure group. Wright termed it "an 'approved
group' because it threatens nothing; its council and membership are to a man within the
sacred fold of the establishment; its posture is vaguely samaritan, but infinitely cautious; it
believes in 'human rights' but is not prepared to challenge the Home Office on the penal
system wholeheartedly" (cited in Ryan, 1977: p.155). The links between the Home Office
and prison reformers were maintained into the 1980s and placed on a more systematic basis
when a discussion group was developed under the chairmanship of a Home Office Deputy
Secretary, David Faulkner. The group met every two to three months, with the aim of
providing "a sounding board, enabling the civil servants to keep abreast of reformist
opinion, and for the penal reform groups and academic researchers to obtain an insight into
current thinking at the Home Office" (Windlesham, 1993: p.8).
Downs and Morgan show how these groups have changed their approach over time. Before
1970, "pressure group activity metaphorically sought to influence policy by a well-
informed word in the ministerial ear" (Downes and Morgan, 1994: p.209). Following the
gradual politicisation of law and order politics after 1970, reformers found themselves
having to "beat on the ministerial door in a far more public confrontational way", which
ministers such as Douglas Hurd are said to have found counterproductive (ibid).
However, this metaphor should not be allowed to obscure the growth, especially in
the 1980s, of myriad links between the Home Office and the pressure groups. In
conferences, media debates, seminars, and the regular call for expert advice on
penal matters in particular, opportunities abounded for pressure groups to inform
penal policy-making processes (ibid).
By contrast, penal policy since 1979 has been far from consistent. Under both Thatcher and
Major it "gyrated between liberal and tough stances" (Jenkins, 1995: p.191). Nash and
Savage argue that "the Conservative record on law and order since 1979 has been an often
inconsistent blend of ideologically driven strategy, 'progressivist' policy influenced by the
Home Office, and 'event-led' reforms, in some cases dictated by the pursuit of immediate
political advantage" (1994: p.138). The former Lord Chief Justice, Lord Taylor in a lecture
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at King's College, March 6 1996 entitled "Continuity and Change in the Criminal Law",
maintained:
We have had more criminal justice acts in the past six years than in the preceding
sixty ... Sentencing policy has in four years swung from one extreme to another and
frequent swings in penal policy eat away at public confidence in the public law
(The Times 07.03.96).
Such swings in policy reflect the many and diverse pressures which have been exerted
upon successive Conservative Home Secretaries. While penal reformers have enjoyed
"privileged access" 8 to the Home Office and the professional services were consulted on
operational matters, they failed to "manage" the law and order agenda. The performance of
Conservative Home Secretaries at their party conferences suggests that grassroots
Conservatives have also been able to exert pressure, which required appropriate responses.
During Mrs Thatcher's first term, the Criminal Justice Act 1982 introduced the "short,
sharp, shock", announced to the "vociferous handcuff-waving delegates at the 1981 Tory
Party Conference" (Ryan, 1983: p.67). Under Douglas Hurd, the Home Office developed a
punishment in the community programme culminating in the Criminal Justice Act 1991
which confirmed the Government's view of prison as "an expensive way of making people
worse". Yet in 1993, following the debacle surrounding the pound's withdrawal from the
Exchange Rate Mechanism, the pit closure programme and the declining electoral fortunes
of the Conservative Party, the new Home Secretary, Michael Howard, announced at the
1993 Conservative Party Conference that "Prison Works!". Reversing the thrust of the
1991 Act, Howard introduced a seventeen-point package which included: the end of a
suspect's right to silence; harsher penalties for young offenders; a tightening of bail laws;
and the building of six new prisons. It was, according to The Times (07.09.93), "the sort of
fare that Tory conferences love". Support in these quarters allowed Howard to change not
only the content but the style of policy-making: "conviction politics and determined
ministers have recently made policy by decree, and have chosen not to consult and have
chosen to ignore evidence, indeed have sometimes made a virtue of that".9
Policy network analysis has not been applied to policy-making in the prison system, and
given the above observations, it would be difficult to accommodate penal policy within the
Rhodes Model. Professional and interest groups are consulted on operational issues, but the
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organisational and informational resources applied by such groups are not the dominant
factors in determining policy outcomes. Even when the positivist approach reached its
zenith in the 1960s, the basic direction of government policy was swiftly reversed by the
Blake escape and the subsequent Mountbatton recommendations (see above). Penal policy
is also highly reactive, and ideologically polarised. Penal reformers have their champions
in Home Office officials, while Conservative ministers respond to their party's grassroots.
This identifies a further weaknesses of the Rhodes Model in that it under-emphasises
powerful political influences that can be brought to bear on ministers. The Rhodes Model
can also underestimate the role of Parliament. For example, the Government's punishment
in the community programme may be attributed to the "rationalists" (Nash and Savage,
1994) and progressives at the Home Office, but Windlesham notes that, as the policy was
being developed, more than 150 Conservative MPs were invited to working lunches at the
Home Office to sound out backbench opinion. As a result, when the policy was announced
"there was widespread support on the Conservative benches, primarily because so many
people felt that they had been part of the sequence which had led to its formulation"
(Windlesham, 1993: p.224).
Penal policy is not made by a highly integrated policy community, nor is it sufficiently
dominated by professional norms to justify classifying it as a professional network. Too
many other policy actors affect policy outcomes. According to Downes and Morgan the
key players in the politics of law and order constitute a "matrix", the key players being:
"the major political parties, in particular successive Home Secretaries and their ministerial
and opposition teams; senior civil servants who, despite their non-political role, bear
crucial advisory responsibilities; pressure and interest groups in the criminal justice field;
and the mass media" (1994: p.183). The former Chief Executive of the Prisons Agency,
Derek Lewis, reflecting on the difficulties of managing the service highlighted "the widely
differing and often hidden agendas of government ministers, party politicians, civil
servants, prison governors, public sector unions, private sector contractors, prisoners, and
pressure groups" (Lewis, 1997: p.ix).
Given the number of political actors who involve themselves with penal policy, it could be
suggested that penal policy constitutes an issue network. However, penal policy
formulation is centralised in the Home Office, which exploits the ideas that constitute "the
220
world of penal thought". The Home Secretary is given considerable autonomy to develop
the Government's criminal justice strategy, thus providing an important focal point.
According to one former Home Office official, the contribution of the Home Secretary
"lies not in the Minister bringing his own fresh policy ideas, but in operating creatively and
with political drive upon ideas, proposals, reports etc., that are, so to speak, already to
hand, often within the department but sometimes in the surrounding world of penal
thought" (Moriarty, 1977). Windlesham highlights the virtues required in a successful
Home Secretary:
Officials, the party political organisation, assorted advisory committees, outside
commentators, and special interest groups may all be clamouring for action, but
they seldom do so with one voice. A successful Home Secretary needs enough
versatility and openness of mind to listen to what is said before making a choice
between tinkering with the status quo and the more radical alternatives open to him.
[...] With the power to select between policy alternatives; with direct authority over
his department and some, although not all, of the component parts of the system of
criminal justice, but exercising strong influence over other parts; the Home
Secretary still possesses unmatched opportunities for individual decision-making
(Windlesham, 1993: pp.17-18).
Thus, while there may be polarised ideas, it does not necessarily follow that policy should
follow any ideal type. Ministers and officials may adopt an eclectic approach drawing an
various strands of penal thought. Overall, the characteristics of penal policy highlighted
above suggests it is difficult to categorise it within the Rhodes Model. While too open to be
classified as a policy community or a professionalised network, it is too focused on the
Home Office to be an issue network. Ideas and events also have a greater impact on policy
outcomes than emphasised in the Rhodes Model.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRISON PRIVATISATION
As noted above, it is widely acknowledged that the origins of the contemporary debate
regarding prison privatisation in the UK can be traced to the Omega Report on Justice
Policy by the ASI in November 1984. The Omega Report was published as part of the
ASI's wide-ranging investigation into all aspects of government policy. The report drew
upon the then increasing use of the private sector to build, own and operate detention
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centres and prisons in the US to argue for an expansion of the role of the private sector in
the penal system in the UK. Contracting out management was seen as a means of tackling
the crises of overcrowding and cell sharing which are "the by-product of a system
influenced by political considerations and subject to political forces that allow capital
investment to suffer and which reduce flexibility to change" (Adam Smith Institute, 1994b:
p.259).
Over the next few years the idea of prison privatisation attracted support from unexpected
quarters. In 1985, the Tawney Society, a think tank associated with the now defunct Social
Democratic Party, published Crime and Punishment - A Radical Rethink by criminologists
Sean McConville and Eryl Hall Williams which endorsed the principle of greater
involvement of the private sector in the prison system. In particular, McConville and Hall
Williams saw the potential for increased private sector involvement in work for prisoners
under contract for outside employers and the contracting out of: kitchens and catering; half-
way houses; detention services, although possibly excluding high-security prisoners;
leasing premises; medical services; and court and escort services (McConville and Hall
Williams, 1985: pp.30-44).10
At this time, the idea of prison privatisation had not yet made a noticeable impact on
Government thinking. When Sir Brian Cubbon, then Permanent Secretary at the Home
Office was cross-examined by the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee on 17
February 1986, he denied that it was under consideration.
Dale Campbell Savours MP (Labour): Could you give me an assurance that no work
is being done at the moment within your department on the privatisation of prisons
within the United Kingdom?
Sir Brian Cubbon: I can give you that assurance.
Dale Campbell Savours: There is no work being done and there are no proposals that
you know of for a privatisation programme?
Sir Brian Cubbon: That is so (cited in Rutherford, 1990: pp.46-47)11
On 19 November 1986 the Prisons Minister, Lord Caithness, indicated that the
Government had an open mind on the question of privatisation. Questioned on the subject
by the Chairman of the Home Affairs Committee, Sir Edward Gardner, Caithness replied
that "our knowledge is limited, and we are looking to the Select Committee with their
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wider experience which I hope to build on myself by going to America" (Home Affairs
Select Committee, 1987a: p.23). When Gardner informed Caithness that they might
publish a report based on the Select Committee's own visit to a number of privately-run
penal establishments in the US, Caithness maintained that the Government "would
certainly welcome such a report" (ibid).
Interest in the privatisation of prisons grew. In March 1987 the ASI produced a more
detailed pamphlet by Peter Young entitled The Prison Cell. Young had spent the mid-
1980s establishing an ASI office in the US, and the report drew upon the experience of
privately managed US prisons which he collated while in Washington. The Prison Cell
developed many of the ideas in the Omega Report. Young employed the ASI's standard
public choice critique in his criticism of the state prison system. He maintained that
"British prisons share the same characteristics as other public sector institutions that are
immune from competition: inadequate supply, low quality, and high cost" (Young, 1987:
p.2). The prison service was much more a case of "producer capture" than other state
services, "being run to benefit the producers of the service, the employees, rather than the
inmates and the taxpaying public" (ibid). The experience of the US in dealing with similar
problems was seen as a laudable development worth imitating. Drawing upon evidence
from the US, Young suggested that introducing private prisons would: lead to better
conditions for prisoners; not adversely affect public sector employees who are usually
offered jobs in the private prisons; cut operating costs by 5-25%; be constructed
significantly quicker than state prisons; be innovative in design, construction, and
management of prisons; and give prisoners a more relevant preparation for outside life.
Young, therefore, recommended that the private sector be allowed to submit for the
construction and management of new and existing prisons.12
The Home Affairs Select Committee increased the pressure for privatisation with a report
in May 1987, published a short report entitled Contract Provision of Prisons, based on its
aforementioned trip to the US. This was prompted by a desire to seek alternative solutions
to the crisis in Britain's prisons which were characterised by "age, severe overcrowding,
insanitary conditions and painfully slow progress in modernisation" (Home Affairs Select
Committee, 1987b: p.1). The involvement of the private sector in the building and
management of prisons was seen as yielding three major advantages. Firstly, it would
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relieve the taxpayer of the responsibility for the initial capital outlay. Secondly, the private
sector was quicker in constructing prisons. Finally, it would produce "greatly enhanced
architectural efficiency and excellence" (ibid). The Committee therefore recommended that
"side by side with the present prison establishment, commercial companies should, as an
experiment, be allowed to demonstrate the types of custodial services they could provide
and at what cost". It suggested allowing private companies to bid for the construction and
management of a new remand centre, as the remand system suffered from the most severe
overcrowding. The Committee emphasised that the state would not be relinquishing control
of such institutions, since the responsibilities of the contractor would be clearly spelt out in
a contract.
Other advocates of privatisation included Lord Windlesham and two liberal academics,
Max Taylor and Ken Pease. Windlesham argued for the privatisation of remand institutions
in an article entitled "Inappropriate Prisoners" in The Times on 7 July 1987. He spoke with
the authority of a former Home Office Minister of State and of being the then Chairman of
the Parole Board. 13 Windlesham's argument focused on the growing number of remand
prisoners (then 10,000 out of a prison population of 48,000), distinguishing them from
those prisoners already convicted, arguing that: "While there are strong arguments against
the state handing over to private enterprise responsibility for the custody of convicted and
sentenced prisoners, these objections do not apply with equal force to those individuals,
now numbering one in five of the prison population, who have been charged with a
criminal offence and are awaiting trial".
Taylor and Pease saw privatisation as bringing a number of advantages for both the UK
and the US where prison provision "is almost universally dire" (1989: p.183). 14 They
argued that privatisation has many practical advantages. Amongst the major advantages
cited, Taylor and Pease argue that privatisation could incorporate a commercial incentive to
rehabilitate, which would also lead to innovation in penal sanctions. "One of the
characteristics of good private systems is that, not without social cost, they allow change in
response to measures of effectiveness" (ibid). Not only would the "powerful position of the
Prison Officers' Association ... be undermined" (ibid), but would also create a new
structure in which the Home Office could find it easier to enforce minimum standards in
prisons.
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The dual role of the Home Office in prison management would be eliminated.
While the Home Office serves as both an adversary of the prisoner and adjudicator
of the conflict in which the prisoner is involved, the private prison separates the two
functions. Adherence to a set of standards of operation would constitute a term of
the contract, whose monitoring would be an explicit cost within the contract.
Inspection of prisons is now undertaken by an arm of the Home Office. The Home
Secretary is invited to act against his or her own employees in cases of severe
criticism. With an inspected private prison, the same difficulties would not apply
(ibid).
Privatisation could help improve the conditions and treatment of offenders, and contribute
positively to the process of rehabilitation. The Independent noted that support for
privatisation from the progressive wing of the penal lobby "gave a crucial new authority to
the campaign" (05.03.87).
There was increasing evidence that the Goverment was moving towards greater private
sector involvement in the prison system, at least in construction. Just prior to publication of
the Home Affairs Select Committee Report the Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, responded
to a question in the House of Commons regarding the considerable length of time
necessary to build a prison, by replying "I am interested in any ideas which, by using
private enterprise, cut short the time for building a prison" (House of Commons Debates,
02.04.87, co1.1205). On the 7 May 1988 Douglas Hurd announced that he was to send the
then Prisons Minister, Lord Caithness, to the US "to follow up the research that was
undertaken by the [Home Affairs] Select Committee" (House of Commons Debates,
07.05.87, co1.848). It has been suggested that following the general election of 1987, Hurd
effectively rejected privatisation. This claim is based upon a statement Hurd made to the
House of Commons on the 16 July, declaring "I do not think there is a case, and I do not
believe that the House would accept a case, for auctioning or privatising the prisons or
handing over the business of keeping prisoners safe to anyone other than government
servants" (House of Commons Debates, 16.07.87, co1.1303). The Prison Officers
Association, saw this as a "categorical rejection" of privatisation (POA, 1993: p.2).
However, a passage later in Hurd's statement suggested that the issue was far from closed.
I was impressed by the [Home Affairs] Select Committee report. The accounts cited
about the United States vary, and I do not say that we should be slavish followers of
what happens there. However, it is our clear job in this dangerous situation
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[regarding overcrowding] to look around the world to see whether in this area, as in
others, bringing private sector techniques to bear earlier and more vigorously can
improve a very serious public sector situation (House of Commons Debates,
16.07.87, co1.1303).
In July 1988 the Home Office responded to the growing interest in private prisons by
publishing a Green Paper, Private Sector Involvement in the Remand System. The cautious
nature of the Government's approach is reflected in the decision to limit privatisation to
remand prisoners. The Green Paper acknowledged the contribution to the Third and Fourth
Reports of the Home Affairs Select Committee (Session 1986/7) which gave "a
constructive and informative stimulus to discussion about prisons in general and contract
provision of prisons in particular" (Home Office, 1988: p.3). It emphasised the importance
of the majority Fourth Report, The Contract Provision of Prisons, which "is especially
relevant to this Green Paper, and which has given momentum to the debate about whether
to involve private contractors in the management of prisons" (ibid). The Green Paper listed
a number of options which included "contracts ranging from both provision and operation
of remand centres as a whole package" and "contracts for the operation alone of new
remand centres separate from the arrangements for building them" (ibid). The Green Paper
did not contemplate the contracting out of existing establishments.
Most responses to the Green Paper were hostile (see for example, Prison Governors
Association, 1988; POA, 1989; Prison Reform Trust, 1988; Howard League 1988).
Nevertheless, the Home Office appointed the management consultants Deloitte, Hoskins
and Sails (DHS) to consider the practicality of private sector involvement in the remand
system. The DHS report concluded that private sector involvement in the remand system
would not only be practical but also cost-effective, helping to improve conditions for
prisoners, and release prison and police manpower to other duties (DHS, 1989: p.12). The
Criminal Justice Act 1991 authorised the Home Office to contract out new remand prisons.
Group 4 Remand Services Ltd was awarded the first contract to operate the new Wolds
remand centre, which opened in 1992. The Act was later amended to permit the
contracting-out of all new prisons. Blackenhurst Prison, awarded to UK Detention Services
was the first, although the Prison Service was awarded the contract to run the re-opened
Manchester (formerly Strangeways) Prison the following year. 15 In September 1993, the
Home Secretary Michael Howard announced a "rolling programme" of privatisation under
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Table 12
Prison Privatisation - Key developments 1984-94
1984	 The Adam Smith Institute publish their Omega Report on Justice Policy
1985	 McConville and Hall Williams publish Crime and Punishment for the Tawney
Society.
1986	 The Permanent Secretary to the Home Office, Sir Brian Cubbon, denies there is any
programme, or any proposals to privatise prisons.
1987	 Proposals for privatisation published by: AS! (Young, 1987; Logan); the Home
Affairs Select Committee (1987); Taylor and Pease (1987); and Lord Windlesham.
1988	 Home Office publishes Private Sector Involvement in the Remand System. 
1989	 Management consultants Deloitte, Hoskins, and Sails endorse private sector
involvement in the remand system.
1991	 Criminal Justice Act 1991 gives Home Secretary legal authority to put prison
management out to contract.
1992	 The Wolds Remand Centre on Humberside opens to become the UK's first privately
run penal establishment this century. The contract was won by Group 4.
1993	 Blackenhurst Prison opens, run by UK Detention Services.
The Prison Service wins the bid to run Manchester (formerly Strangeways) Prison.
Michael Howard announces a rolling programme of privatisation.
1994	 Doncaster Prison opens run by Premier Prisons.
Buckley hall opens run by Group 4.
which the private sector would be invited to fund, design, build, and run five new prisons,
with the management of existing prisons contracted out. Eventually, the programme would
see twelve prisons (ten percent) privatised, which would "put England and Wales at the top
of the privatisation world league" (Independent 03.08.93).
ADVOCACY COALITIONS AND PRISON PRIVATISATION
The aim of this section is to assess the extent to which two advocacy coalitions contributed
to the debate on prison privatisation: a Pro-Privatisation Coalition and an Anti-
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Privatisation Coalition. This section considers each coalition individually, and the role of
ministers.
The Pro-Privatisation Coalition
The previous section highlighted a number of a number of organisations and individuals
advocating prison privatisation including: the ASI; the HASC; management consultants
Deloitte, Hoskins and Sells; academics such as McConville and Williams (1985) and
Taylor and Pease (1989); and individuals such as Lord Windlesham. However, together
they did not constitute a coalition. In some cases pressure for privatisation was applied
independently of the coalition.
Composition, Interaction and Co-ordination: Members of a Pro-Privatisation Coalition
could be said to include: the ASI; the HASC; firms from the construction and security
industries, such as McAlpine, Group 4, Securicor, and, from the US, the Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA); David Lidington, special adviser to the home Secretary
Douglas Hurd (1987-9); and Carolyn Sinclair, a member of the No.10 Policy Unit. The
Guardian (11.01.89) talked of a "prison privatisation network". There was certainly a
degree of overlap as in the case of John Wheeler MP, for example, who was Deputy
Chairman of the HASC (and Chairman between 1987-92). He is also reported to have been
a supporter of the ASI, and Peter Young conducted a number of meetings with Wheeler on
the subject. 16
 Wheeler later contributed to an ASI report on crime prevention (Wheeler et
al, 1988). Young maintains that the relationship between the ASI and Wheeler on the
subject was "fairly close" and Windlesham noted that:
The Adam Smith Institute, in particular was enterprising in spreading the gospel of
free enterprise. Working closely with John Wheeler and other Conservative MPs, it
made representations to the Home Office and held seminars on the subject (1993:
p.292).
Wheeler was also Chairman of the British Security Industry Association (BSIA) which
includes firms such as Securicor and Group 4 which would later bid for the management of
privatised prisons. Other important links between politicians and the private sector
included Sir Edward Gardner, Chairman of the HASC when it published Contract
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Provision of Prisons, and later Chairman of Contract Prisons (a consortia of the Rosehaugh
Property Group, Racal-Chubb, and Prior) after he left Parliament in 1987. There was also
interaction between the ASI and the consortia. The ASI had meetings with Rosehaugh who
developed enthusiasm for privatisation, as well as with Nicholas Hopkins of UK Detention
Services (UKDS), and Sir Philip Beck of Mowlem's, a leading construction firm who,
along with McAlpine and CCA, formed UKDS. 17 According to Nicholas Hopkins of
UKDS, "You couldn't help bumping into the ASI" during the debate. Hopkins regarded the
ASI as "a very good contact who were able to gain access to senior politicians quicker than
we could"18.
However, not all companies involved with privatisation can be said to have been part of the
coalition. According to its Chairman, Group 4 never had discussions with John Wheeler,
the ASI, or special advisers either in the Home Office or Downing Street, although they did
make presentations to ministers and civil servants. Nor did they discuss the issue with other
firms:
We were and are in competition with other firms. There was no discussion on this
subject between my firm and potential competitors in the industry.19
One private sector source maintains that his company did not lobby although suggests he
that "there might have been some interaction by some of the major players in the early
days, but certainly no conspiracy". 2° An idea of an industry association was touted, an off-
shoot of the BSIA to represent the interests of the private prisons sector, although this was
dismissed due to the fear that it would look to much like a carte1, 21 and was only suggested
after the 1991 Act and "was never mooted to lobby for primary legislation".22
Other key actors who could be said to have joined the Pro-Privatisation Coalition included
David Lidington, who was won over by the arguments from consortia of construction and
security firms. Lidington recalled receiving considerable lobbying from the private sector
consortia, although not from the ASI. 23 Carolyn Sinclair from the No.10 Policy Unit is
also reported to have been supportive, meeting with both the ASI and the private sector.24
There is, however, no evidence that other advocates (including McConville and Hall
Williams, Taylor and Pease, Lord Windlesham, or consultants from DHS) involved
229
themselves in this Coalition or pursued their interest in privatisation much after publication
of their pamphlets and articles.
It is also important to recognise that a number of individuals transferred from the public
sector to the private sector as the privatisation process has evolved. The Times (24.12.92)
spoke of a "brain drain", while the Prison Reform Trust highlighted a "transfer market"
between the two sectors (Nathan, 1993: pp.12-13). Amongst the controversial
appointments were Charles Erickson, who in early 1993 left the Home Office's Contract
Remand Unit to join Group 4. Others included Michael Gander, a former governor of
Norwich Prison, who resigned from the Prison Service in 1992 to join Premier Prisons and
Walter MacGowan, formerly governor of Strangeways who later joined Group 4. However,
there is no available evidence regarding the extent to which they argued the case for
privatisation in the late 1980s or their relationship with the private sector consortia.
The only example of any public, formal contact between these groups in the Pro-
Privatisation Coalition was a function hosted by the Carlton Club Political CQa-mittee_. ca
15 September 1988. The Guardian (11.01.89) refers to this dinner as the coming together
of "the private prisons network". According to Windlesham, the dinner reflected the
"overlap between Party political and commercial interests". In attendance were the ASI and
the CPS, past and present members of the HASC (including Gardner and Wheeler), David
Lidington and his predecessor as Hurd's special adviser Edward Bickham, Hartley Booth
and Carolyn Sinclair from the No.10 Policy Unit, as well as a number of Tory MPs. Finally
there was significant representation from the private sector consortia, which were "out in
strength" (The Guardian 11.01.89). There was also a ministerial presence in the person of
then Prisons Minister Douglas Hogg. Windlesham notes that: "After the seminar, a detailed
policy paper was drafted and circulated to all who attended. Copies were sent to the
relevant ministers and their special advisers, the Cabinet Office, and the Policy Unit at
No.10 (Windlesham, 1993: p.289). It would, however, be some exaggeration to call this the
private prisons network. Although companies and politicians promoting privatisation were
present, others (including opponents from the penal reform groups) were also in
attendance. There were also a number of firms, such as Hanson and ADT, who would not
follow up their interest by bidding for contracts.25
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The Pro-Privatisation Coalition does appear to show an element of interaction, if not
necessarily co-ordination, although this was very ad hoc and informal. According to one
senior official, there were political and commercial pressures for privatisation from
politicians and the private sector, although this appeared "fragmented and
uncoordinated".26 There was no structured forum for the discussion of ideas and strategies.
According to Peter Young:
It was all very ad hoc. There was certainly interaction, and we all exchanged ideas
but on an informal basis. But there was no "privatisation committee". The left think
that there's a great conspiracy, and for every issue there's a committee full of Tory
MPs, "fat cats", and think tanks. It's nothing like that.27
Within this Coalition, the ASI played a marginal role, although it did fill the "unexpected
vacuum in the political debate" (Windlesham, 1993: p.292) by putting the issue back on the
agenda in 1987. Peter Young maintains that the increased involvement of the consortia
resulted in a declining role for the ASI.
From the ASI's point of view if someone else was dealing with the topic then it
meant that there was less need for us to produce work on it. There was no need to
add to our own workload by involving ourselves unnecessarily on a subject on
which there was considerable movement. The construction firms were very well
resourced, and had good connections within the Conservative Party. They actually
hired lobbyists.28
Belief System: Although there was no collective statement of aims, the arguments of the
Pro-Privatisation Coalition can be summarised as follows, based upon a reading of their
individual reports. Prisons are not a high priority for government. Compared with
education and health, "there are no votes in prisons". 29 The result, as with many public
sector organisations, is inadequate supply, low quality, and high cost establishments. The
private sector generally increases supply (where there is demand), improves quality and
reduces cost. Allowing the private sector to bid for prison management contacts would lead
to reduced operating costs (benefiting taxpayers) and more humane conditions and
innovative methods of treatment (benefiting inmates). Evidence from the US is said to
support this view.
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Resources and Strategies: Given the lack of co-ordination and limited interaction, the
resources of the Pro-Privatisation Coalition were deployed by Coalition members
individually rather than collectively. First, Coalition members enjoyed legitimacy, which
according to Rhodes "refers to access to public decision-making structures and the right to
build public support conferred either by the legitimacy deriving from election or by other
accepted means" (1988: p.90). Of importance here is the endorsement of privatisation by
the HAS C. The relationship between select committees and the departments to which they
relate is complex and varied. In the case of penal policy in the late 1980s prison
privatisation acquired greater legitimacy through the involvement of John Wheeler,
Chairman of the HASC from 1987-92. During this period Home Office ministers felt
particularly dependent upon John Wheeler for support on criminal justice issues.
According to Windlesham:
In the process of building support for their policies in the commons, ministers were
sustained by an unusually influential back-bencher, John Wheeler. As a former
Assistant Governor in the Prison Service, Wheeler was well-informed, moderate in
outlook, and generally sympathetic to the Home Secretary's policies. His role was
pivotal, since he occupied concurrently the chairs of the House of Commons Select
Committee on Home Affairs and the reformist Parliamentary All-Party Penal
Affairs group ... From 1987 onwards Wheeler was to prove the Home Secretary's
staunchest ally. Hurd consulted him regularly, listened to what he had to say, and
respected his judgement on the state of parliamentary opinion, in the House as a
whole as well as on the Tory benches (1993: p.224).
Secondly, other Coalition members enjoyed formal access to key decision-making
structures. David Lidington enjoyed access to most of the Home Secretary's meetings and
papers, transmitting his support for privatisation to Hurd. 30 Similarly Carolyn Sinclair had
access to Mrs Thatcher, although the Prime Minister's views on the subject are unknown.
Other actors are able to gain access to decision-making structures, although less routine
and structured than the above, through their reputation or ideological compatibility with the
Government, or individual ministers. The ASI had, in the eyes of many, established itself
as the ideological cutting edge of "Thatcherism". According to one Home Office official:
Whichever party is in power there will be some organisations which are thought to
reflect the essence or key themes of Government thinking, and which are thought to
have the ear of ministers or Prime Minister. The ASI had by the late 1980s emerged
as one of the major ideological powerhouses on the right wing of the Conservative
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Party. That doesn't mean that everyone in government agreed with it but it was
listened to for that reason alone.31
As such its reports and ideas were digested by MPs and civil servants alike, and it was able
to lobby ministers both formally and informally. On this issue, Peter Young has observed
that: "One does meet ministers informally at different events and one can always badger
them a little" (The Guardian 11.01.89). Senior figures from the private sector consortia also
had very strong links with the Conservative Party, which could have assisted in the
promotion of the policy. Adam Sampson from the Prison Reform Trust has argued that the
adoption of privatisation was:
testimony to the ability of the private security industry to lobby ii the connections
between private security and the Conservative Party are very strong. Certainly their
influence over ministers is far stronger than those groups like ourselves or the
Prison Officers' Association who have been lobbying against privatisation. In
particular I'm thinking of senior Conservative MPs who have positions of influence,
who also have strong connections with private security ... Although, of course, one
couldn't suggest that those men behaved anything less than honourably, nonetheless
their connections with the private sector industry may have played some part in
government's decision to adopt the sort of policies that private security industries
would like (BBC, 1993).
However, it is unlikely that their control over organisational resources was a major factor
during this debate. The private sector had constructed prisons for the state for many years,
and was a highly competitive market. Contracts could easily be lost to competitors should
threats to withdraw organisational resources be made.32 Others have pointed to the
financial resources of the private sector and the dependency of the Conservative Party on
the contributions of major construction firms. The "Prisons are not for Profit" campaign
showed that eighteen out of twenty four prisons that have become operational since 1979
were constructed by firms which contributed to Conservative Party funds (Prisons are not
for Profit, 1994: p.4).
The strategy that best describes the work of the Pro-Privatisation Coalition is persuasion,
defined as "to cause actors to accept that the facts are as stated by a variety of means
including rational arguments, lobbying, advice and the promotion of ideas in good
currency, that is, 'best professional practice" (Rhodes, 1988: p.93). Coalition members
were well placed, occupying for a short period of time important positions in the Home
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Office and Downing Street, positions of authority within the HASC, with senior members
of the private sector consortia enjoying close links with the Conservative Party hierarchy.
One private sector source, Christopher Hutton-Penman from Racal Chubb, maintained that
the private sector persuaded the Government to take an interest in private prisons by
spending time "talking to ministers, talking to MPs and talking to the No.10 Policy Unit,
and we kept pushing away at the door until it started opening" (BBC, 1993). According to
Nicholas Hopkins:
It took us two or three years to finally convince the government that this was the
right course of action ... Prisons were not working and there was a viable alternative
... UKDS was very much involved in bringing forward the arguments in favour of
the case (cited in Be-yens and Snacken, 1996: p.245).
The ASI, while also lobbying ministers, made its contribution in the public domain, using
its media profile to attract press coverage and promote the issue at conferences, in the
press, and on the television and radio. For example, The Omega Report on Justice Policy
was covered by many daily newspapers including The Daily Mail, The Telegraph, The
Guardian, and The Times (all 08.11.84), as well as a number of the larger regional dailies
such as the Birmingham Post and the Yorkshire Post. The publication of The Prison Cell 
attracted much more press attention. On publication day (March 4 1987), the story was
covered by The Times, The Financial Times, The Guardian, The Independent, Daily
Mirror, The Daily Star, and even The Sunday Sport (8 March), as well as many other
regional and local newspapers.
The Anti-Privatisation Coalition
Few organisations and actors professionally involved with penal policy-making have either
advocated or supported the privatisation of prisons. Indeed, most have actively opposed it.
According to Derek Lewis:
The unions were predictably hostile, fearing a reduction in their own influence and
pressure on staffing levels. Most staff in the Prison Service and civil servants in the
Home Office were equally opposed. The private sector represented a challenge to
the traditional Civil Service standards of public service, and it more importantly - it
threatened job security, many pressure groups approached it with an ideological
hatred (1997: p.83).
234
This section will address how this opposition manifested itself
Composition, Interaction and Co-ordination: The opposition to prison privatisation has
been extensive, including professionals within the penal system, prison reform groups, and
criminal justice academics. An Anti-Privatisation Coalition has manifested itself in two
mini-coalitions, albeit with some overlap. First, and most directly, is the "Prisons are not
for Profit" (PNP) campaign, launched by nine TUC-affiliated prison unions in October
1991 "to oppose privatisation and to demand a properly resourced prison service to
facilitate minimum standards for inmates" (Prisons are not for Profit, 1991: p.2). The PNP
campaign, led by the POA, and NAPO also includes: the Civil and Public Servants'
Association; the General, Municipal, and Boilermakers; the Institution of Professionals,
Managers, and Specialists; the National Association of Teachers in Further Education; the
National Union of Civil and Public Servants; the Union of Construction, Allied Trades and
Technicians; and the Transport and General Workers Union. Secondly, an umbrella
organisation called the Penal Affairs Consortium (PAC) has also campaigned against
privatisation. The PAC, formed in 1989
is an alliance of 24 organisations concerned with the penal system. It provides a
mechanism whereby its member organisations can work together for penal reform
by presenting our joint views to government, Parliament, the media and the public
(Penal Affairs Consortium, 1995: p.2).
Overlap with the PNP campaign was provided through membership of the POA and
NAPO. There was significant interaction and co-ordination within both forums. The PAC
met six times a year to discuss its activities, although privatisation did not feature
significantly. The PAC was more concerned with sentencing and standards within prisons.
The PNP campaign began as a highly structured operation with regular meetings, at times
twice monthly, to discuss strategies and to co-ordinate their responses to issues regarding
privatisation. 33 Prior to the 1997 election, David Evans, General Secretary of the POA, and
a leading spokesman for the PNP campaign:
When the PNP campaign was launched, it was highly structured. However, I fear
that in the last few years, because we have been involved in so many fights with the
Government on such a broad range of fronts - especially the removal of our rights
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as a trade union in the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act - we have not
been able to give it the sort of emphasis we did hitherto. But since then we have
been working hard with NAPO to bring a new dimension back to that campaign.34
Table 13
The Penal Affairs Consortium
Action on Youth Crime
Association of Chief Probation Officers
Association of Members of Boards of Visitors
Apex Trust
Biosocial Therapy Association
Bourne Trust
Howard League for Penal Reform
Inquest
Institute of Professionals, Managers and Specialists
JUSTICE
Liberty
NACRO
New Bridge
Parole release Schemes
Prisoner Abroad
Prisoner Advice Service
Prisoners' Families and Friends
Prison Governors Association
Prison Officers' Association
Prison Reform Trust
Royal Philanthropic Society
Society of Voluntary Associations
Women in Prison
National Association of Probation Officers
Source: Penal Affairs Consortium
Belief System: Members of the PNP campaign and the PAC were unambiguous in their
opposition to prison privatisation. However, the PNP campaign and the PAC each had a
distinctive raison d'être. The PAC was much more of a pro-active organisation, and has
published its own manifesto for reform of the penal system. Its proposals were based upon
two central principles. First:
An effective response to crime requires a sentencing structure which limits the use
of imprisonment to serious cases and gives prisons the opportunity to provide
positive regimes which can prevent reoffending (Penal Affairs Consortium, 1995:
1).3).
This would have required a greater use of community punishment and reduction in the use
of pre-trial imprisonment. Second:
Prisoners must be treated at all times with humanity, dignity and respect. Regimes
should be based on the need to prepare prisoners effectively for their eventual
release (ibid.)
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Within this framework, the PAC based its opposition to privatisation on three major
arguments. First, there was a moral objection, that "deprivation of a person's liberty is a
core state function which ought under no circumstances be devolved to private
organisations" (Penal Affairs Consortium, 1992: p.2). Second, it took issue with the
positive interpretations placed upon the US experience by the advocates of privatisation,
arguing that the "evidence from America does not vindicate the private management of
prisons" (ibid). The PAC noted that the proportion of US inmates serving in private prisons
was "minuscule", and that there was alleged "evidence of malpractice" at some American
private prisons. Finally, the PAC was sceptical of claims that privatisation would lead to a
more efficient service, maintaining that "there is little evidence from America or Britain to
suggest that private management will mean a more cost effective service" (ibid. This
perception was reinforced by the "commercial confidentiality" which surrounds dealings
between the Home Office and the private sector, such as the "shroud of secrecy" which
characterised the successful bid of Group 4 to run The Wolds. The PAC concluded that it
opposed privatisation
on grounds of principle and practicality. We believe that widespread and
fundamental improvements are needed in the Prison Service. However, we reject
the notion that such improvements are conditional upon privatisation which we
believe will provide a further impediment to the development of the common sense
of purpose which Lord Justice Woolf saw as a prerequisite to progress in the Prison
Service (ibid).
The PNP campaign emerged as a specific reaction to privatisation. Its arguments reflected
the sentiments of the PAC.
The aim of the Anti-Privatisation Campaign is to oppose the privatisation of
prisons. We do not believe privatisation will lift the prison system out of its current
crisis. However, Lord Justice Woolf has provided a radical and fundamental agenda
for prison reform which, if properly implemented, would transform the prison
service into an efficient and progressive public institution (Prisons are not for
Profit, 1991: p.4).
Resources and Strategies: The key resources at the disposal of the Anti-Privatisation
Coalition were organisational - leading trade unions in this campaign, both the POA and
NAPO, represent the majority of professionals in their field. However, the PNP campaign
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was (and continues to be) reluctant to use strike action as a strategy. First, as will be shown
in the following section, privatisation was seen by some as a means of curbing the
allegedly excessive use of industrial action by the POA. Strike action may well have given
ammunition to such calls and has therefore was not used, although there have been other
limited forms of industrial action, such as refusing to accept prisoners delivered by police
(see the Independent 05.11.93; 15.11.93). Second, the prison unions were forced to
cooperage with the privatisation process when prison officers at Strangeways ignored
national policy and backed the in-house bid that eventually won the contract. This suggests
that co-operation with the privatisation process may eventually be the best way for the
prison unions to secure the future of their members.
Other resources were informational. Both the Howard League and the PRT collected data
and monitored developments in the Prison Service. The PRT published regular
"Privatisation Factfiles" in their journal Prison Report, and from June 1996 supplemented
this by publishing Prison Privatisation International Bulletin which reports "news of
international developments in prison privatisation; monitor the performance of the
privatised sector; describe the growth of the 'penal industrial complex'; analyse new
government initiatives". 35 The PRT has also published lengthy reports on the performance
of The Wolds, Blackenhurst, Doncaster, and Buckley Hall. It was also able to disseminate
this (largely negative) information through the media. Letters and articles have provided an
important platform. Between August 1992 and September 1993, the Independent alone
published four letters and an article by the PRT on this single issue (27.08.92; 23.12.92;
19.01.93; 28.08.93; 03.09.93). A final resource was access to the Labour frontbench. Not
only did the Labour Party utilised the information produced by the PRT and others, Labour
MPs have tabled parliamentary questions on behalf of the opponents of privatisation. The
PNP campaign highlighted that parliamentary questions revealed that UKDS was fined
U48000 by the Prison Service "for an incident where parts of [Blackenhurst] prison were
not fully in control" (Prisons are not for Profit, 1994: p.3).
During the course of the debate, the strategies employed by the opponents of privatisation
changed. As the PAC was not established until 1989 and the PNP not until 1991, initial
responses to privatisation were conducted by organisations in an individual capacity. The
first strategy was consultation. In 1988, following the publication of the Government's
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Green Paper, most opponents participated in the subsequent consultative exercise. The
PGA (1988), the POA (1989), the Howard League (1988) and the PRT (1988) all publicly
condemned Government proposals to contract out the management of remand centres.
After the 1991 Criminal Justice Act, the strategy was persuasion. This included meetings
with ministers and shadow ministers, and attempts to attract press coverage. The PNP
campaign generally had a higher profile in this regard than the PAC. The PAC allowed
individual members, such as the PRT and the other reform groups, to publicise the
arguments and evidence against privatisation in the press and with ministers. The PNP
campaign was far more active on this issue. In 1992, the PNP campaign updated its
members on its strategies.
The Prisons are not for Profit campaign will continue to fight privatisation on your
behalf. We will continue to lobby members of Parliament and hold fringe meetings
at party conferences. We will assist local branch campaigns and initiatives. We will
continue to meet with those in prison management responsible for administering the
prison privatisation process and demand information and negotiation over all
privatisation proposals. We will continue to advance our ethical arguments against
prisons for profit and to demonstrate the costs and threats to public safety involved.
The Prisons are not for Profit campaign has already organised a successful lobby
and rally at Westminster. We have written to all MPs and prompted motions of
support for our cause to be tabled in the House of Commons. We have raised
awareness of the issue in the press and have produced information for each prison
worker who belongs to one of the nine unions affiliated to our campaign (Prisons
are not for Profit, 1992: p.4).
Ultimately, the Anti-Privatisation Coalition of the PAC and PNP campaign did not have
the resources to prevent privatisation, and the hostility of groups such as the POA and
prison reform groups was discounted at the outset. According to a former Home Office
official there were four reasons why the opposition failed:
1) They never developed a coherent rationale for opposing the change. They might
dispute that, but it was never clearly articulated and never forcefully expressed to
ministers.
2) They always looked like people who had vested interests in the status quo.
3) They didn't get their act together very quickly. There was little or no opposition
before the passage of the 1991 Criminal Justice Act.
4) Ultimately, if you have a combination of ministers committed to a particular
policy, as you had following Hurd, and a right-wing constituency within MPs and
the party which favoured the policy then it's a very powerful combination. If the
votes are there in Parliament, which in this case there were, then the measure will
proceed.36
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It should be noted that, regarding the second point, the private sector construction and
security companies also had a vested interest in the outcome of the debate over the future
financing of the prison system, standing to benefit financially from the commercial
opportunities of private prisons. However, the private sector companies had three
advantages over the Anti-Privatisation Coalition. First, privatisation has been a popular and
effective policy tool for the Conservatives (see next section). Secondly, the private sector
companies had a much closer relationship with the Conservative Party. Finally, the private
sector did not appear as reactive as the Anti-Privatisation Coalition. Whatever the pros or
cons of privatisation, it at least offered a plausible means of addressing the problems of the
prison system, as perceived by the Conservatives. The lack of an alternative agenda
acceptable to Conservatives from the Anti-Privatisation Coalition limited its impact on the
debate.
The Role of Ministers
The development of prison privatisation was not dependent upon any individual minister.
Policy evolved, from outright hostility under Whitelaw, to fervent support under Howard.
In the early days of the prison privatisation debate, ministers showed little or no
enthusiasm in the issue. The earliest public recording of ministerial interest was a meeting
between Eamonn Butler and Peter Young from the Adam Smith Institute, with Prisons
Minister, David Mellor in 1984. According to Young, Mellor "ridiculed the idea it he
laughed at us" (The Guardian 01.11.89). Douglas Hogg, Prisons Minister between 1986
and 1989, was similarly unenthusiastic and admitted to being "instinctively against the idea
of private prisons, although I may have been wrong about that". 37 As the above section on
the development of the debate demonstrated, ministerial interest in privatisation increased
during 1987 and 1988. This was not only the period when the ASI and the HASC brought
out their high-profile reports, but also when overcrowding was at its worst, and when
relations between the POA and the Government were at their lowest (see following
section). However, it could be argued that the then Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, was not
particularly enthusiastic about privatisation either. Although he was the first Home
Secretary publicly to contemplate a greater role for the private sector in the prison system,
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and he authorised the visit of Lord Caithness to the US, some suggest that this was more a
reactive, that pro-active, measure. According to a former Home Office official:
I think it would be fair to say that he went along with privatisation in the sense that
he felt he had to be seen to be responding to the general pressure, that this was an
issue which a number of influential people within the party and those who set the
pace were concerned about. And therefore simply to say "No" was not a shrewd
tactic. The sensible thing to do was to allow a fairly leisured period of debate and
discussion. And if it was the thought to be a wise step then so be it.38
According to another official:
Hurd took the line of least resistance. He wasn't going to say "this is a non-starter"
when it was Conservative Party policy to privatise anything that moved. After all,
this debate was in the mid-late 1980s and Hurd was pretty sure that he was not
going to be around when privatisation had to be implemented.39
It must be acknowledged that these are merely interpretations of Hurd's thinking towards
privatisation, and should not be adopted uncritically. Indeed some have suggested that
Hurd was more a force for change than others may have realised. According to Douglas
Hogg, Hurd became a "major advocate for privatisation within the Home Office" as a
pragmatic response to dealing with overcrowding and the POA.40.
Opinion as to the role of No.10 and the Prime Minister during this period is divided.
According to Hogg, Mrs Thatcher "was favourably disposed and actively pressed the
Home Secretary [Hurd] to explore ways of increasing the role of the private sector in the
prison system". 41 One senior official recalled that involvement from the No.10 Policy
Unit,42 was limited, while another suggested that "Mrs Thatcher was not involved at all as I
recall - she let Hurd get on with it". 43 It is of course possible that Mrs Thatcher may have
applied a degree of encouragement/pressure in ways that did not manifest themselves to
Home Office officials. But while Hogg's testimony suggests that the Prime Minister's role
should not totally be dismissed, the recollections of officials suggests that Mrs Thatcher
personally did little to intervene in determining the fonn privatisation might take, or the
speed at which it might proceed.
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David Waddington (Home Secretary 1989-90) began the tendering process for the Wolds,
but his tenure was overshadowed by the Strangeways riots. The Wolds contract was
eventually decided by Kenneth Baker and Angela Rumbold (Minister of State), who gave
the privatisation process momentum by inviting companies to bid for court escort services
in the East Midlands and Humberside, and asking Home Office officials to identify two
further prisons for privatisation. Under Kenneth Clarke (Home Secretary 1992-3) the
Prison Service became a Next Steps Agency, with Derek Lewis as Director General. It was
reported that Lewis was appointed by Clarke to advise on the viability of contracting-out
prisons on a regional rather than individual basis (The Independent 27.12.92).
While Clarke opened the bidding to run Blackenhurst and Strangeways, it was Michael
Howard's appointment in July 1993 which had the most significant impact on the pace of
privatisation, over two years after the initial legislation. Howard's privatisation programme
was largely a result of his "tough on crime" approach to law and order, as laid down in the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. As such, Howard's privatisation programme
should not be seen not so much as a dogmatic pursuit of privatisation (although given
Howard's proximity to the right-wing of the Conservative Party this would not be
surprising), but as a means of sustaining his policy of sentencing more criminals, and for
longer.'"
Between 1984 and 1997 there were six Conservative Home Secretaries. During that time
there was a steady shift by ministers, from ridiculing privatisation to embracing it. While
Howard was been the only Home Secretary to have significantly accelerated the
programme, this was after legislation. Prior to 1991, ministers approached the issue
cautiously, although each took steps towards privatisation. The next section highlights
some of the factors which may have pushed ministers down this road.
THE CONTEXT OF PRISON PRIVATISATION
This section addresses the context within which prison privatisation became Government
policy. It highlights three factors: ideological factors - the success of privatisation and its
importance to the Conservative Government; political factors - the Government's desire to
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curb the power and influence of the POA; and socioeconomic factors - the serious problem
of overcrowding in the prison system.
Ideological - The Ascendance of Privatisation
After the election of the Conservatives in 1979, privatisation gradually became the
favoured policy instrument of the Thatcher Government. One of the central tenets of
Thatcherism has been to secure a greater role for the private sector in the delivery of public
utilities and welfare services. Organisations such as British Telecom and British Gas have
been floated on the stock exchange. Central and local government services have been
contracted-out to private companies. The rhetoric of competition and choice has infiltrated
policy debates on subjects such as education. The 1970s and 1980s were a period of
intellectual and political ascendance for the new right, creating a particular context without
which "the very notion of private prisons would be dismissed as unthinkable if not an
absurdity" (Rutherford, 1990: p.42). In his comparison of prison privatisation in Britain,
the United States and Australia (specifically Queensland), McDonald notes that:
conservative governments held sway. In the former two countries, these two
governments launched a concerted attack on the institutional structures and
ideology of the welfare state. Certainly the most aggressive programme of cutting
back the public sector has been in Britain, following Thatcher's election in 1979,
which has continued under John Major's administration (1994: p.36).
Within this context, the emphasis shifted from having to demonstrate that privatisation was
necessary or desirable, to having to show why it was not. According to a former Home
Office official:
Privatisation was a key plank of the Conservative government's agenda. As such,
there had to be very powerful reasons why the privatisation of prisons should not
proceed. The onus was therefore on the opponents of privatisation. They had to
come up with a very good argument why it should not happen. And they could not
really think of one.45
Another official maintained that:
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There was no point in putting yourself as an opponent against something which was
obviously the general political will, unless you had serious arguments that you
could deploy. And those arguments were difficult to find against the recognition
that the public prison system was not a model of efficiency or humanity.46
Nor was there any opposition to the policy from Conservatives in Parliament or at the
grassroots. David Lidington maintains that:
If there had been the sort of opposition within Tory ranks either in Parliament or in
the country then I think Douglas Hurd might well have drawn back. But I don't
recall anything of that sort, although we did have a huge majority. Ministers do take
the temperature of the grassroots. In this case there was strong body of support in
the Tory Party for going down this [privatisation] route.47
For others, prison privatisation is a case of symbolic ideology. Ryan and Ward maintain
that prison privatisation "strikes at the very heart of the State's authority and sends out the
message - the crucial message - that nothing is sacred" (1989a: p.54). Similarly King and
Maguire talk of "the symbolic ideological value of prisons as a vehicle for demonstrating
that even the most 'public' of the public sector's functions can be successfully privatised"
(1994: p.4). But privatisation was not simply a "symbolic" reform. It also sought to rectify
two serious problems within the prison system - the power of the POA, and overcrowding.
Political - Taming the Prison Officers Association
One of the attractions of privatisation for ministers was that it would help undermine the
POA. Since the early 1970s the relationship between the POA and the Home Office had
"been characterised by acrimony and distrust" (Rutherford, 1990: p.60).
Between 1976 and 1980 an average of seventy-four disputes occurred annually.
Through a variety of actions, which included refusing to allow vehicles in and out
of prisons and denying prisoners access to bathing and exercise, the POA, at both
the local and national levels, challenged the authority of the governors and the
Home Office to manage the prison system. In the early 1980s a Prison Governor
commented: "The control of prisons had by the mid-seventies to a very large extent
passed into the hands of the Prison Officers' Association" (ibid).48
The POA notoriously manipulated overtime arrangements, enabling its members to
supplement their basic wages and significantly increase their take-home pay. 49 According
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to King and McDermott, shift pay and allowance systems "were of such labyrinthine
complexity that many prison governors could frankly not understand them" (1991: p.134).
Restrictive or "Spanish" practices existed "which resulted, for example, in staff being
allocated to supervise areas where there were no prisoners to be supervised and the
dropping of tasks from the 'essential task list' for the alleged want of staff to carry them out
in safety" (ibid).
Matters came to a head in the early summer of 1986 when the POA instructed its
members not to work overtime. The withdrawal of staff resulted in disturbances at
forty prisons over a three-day period. So great was the ensuing physical damage that
the POA called off its protest (Rutherford, 1990: p.61).
According to Douglas Hurd's special adviser, this incident "scarred" the Home Secretary.5°
Hurd responded by introducing a package of proposals entitled "Fresh Start" which would
end overtime but increase salaries for a basic working work. Implementing Fresh Start did
little to ease tensions between the Home Office and the POA, with the POA claiming that
Fresh Start was leading to under-staffing. Throughout 1988 relations between the POA and
the Home Office deteriorated. In early 1989, industrial action by the POA at Wandsworth
Prison over the implementation of Fresh Start led to the police running the prison in place
of prison officers. The Conservative Government and Conservative backbenchers were
increasingly exasperated by the stance of the POA. Covering the Wandsworth dispute, the
Financial Times (01.02.89) reported:
Not for the first time, backbench Conservative members of Parliament called for
the POA to be dealt with once and for all. Mr John Wheeler, chairman of the all-
party home affairs select committee, said the recognition of the union should cease
and prison officers made to enter a no-strike deal similar to the police.
The article concluded that "Privatisation might ultimately provide the Government's escape
from the POA". One official believes that privatisation "was extremely seductive to both
ministers and civil servants as a means of dealing with the POA". 51 Douglas Hurd admits
that one of the reasons for authorising the first steps towards private prisons was due to the
"dissatisfaction and anxiety about the administration of the existing prisons and the
unhealthy dominance of the Prison Officers' Association" 52
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Socioeconomic - The Problem of Overcrowding
The British prison system has for many years been plagued by the problem of
overcrowding. In July 1987, at a time when the arguments for privatisation, advocated by
the ASI, the HASC and others, were gathering interest, the Home Secretary informed the
House of Commons that the prison population stood at 51,029. As this figure was 9,300
above the certified normal accommodation (the uncrowded capacity of the prison system),
it signified that the prison system was twenty percent overcrowded. This was a growth of
4,000 in twelve months, due to "the substantial increase in the number of offenders being
dealt with by the Crown Court and an increase in the average length of custodial sentences
passed by the Crown Court" (parliamentary answer by Douglas Hurd House of Commons
Debates, 16.07.87, co1.1296). According to McDonald:
Between 1980 and 1987, the growth of the prisoner population was twice that of the
increase in capacity, so that by the end of 1987, a capacity shortfall of about 5,800
beds existed. The government responded by increasing expenditures for prison
services substantially: a 72 per cent increase between 1980 and 1987, and a prison
building programme projected a 53 per cent increase in capacity between 1980 and
1995. Despite this higher level of expenditure, about 40 per cent of all prisoners in
1986-7 were being held in overcrowded facilities, mostly in remand facilities.
Remand prisoners were also backed up in police cells; during 1987, police cells
held an average of 530 such prisoners (McDonald, 1994: p.37).
The prison building programme established by Whitelaw soon after the Conservatives
came to office in 1979 aimed to provide 17,500 extra places by 1995. But by 1987 the level
of overcrowding forced Hurd to open army camps and use executive release in order to
ease immediate tensions within prisons. Privatisation offered the possibility of alleviating
this problem. Asked in the House of Commons by Edward Gardner whether privatisation
might be an option, Hurd replied that he was considering "whether by using the private
sector and its techniques more intensively and perhaps, at an early stage, we can accelerate
the provision of prison places and thus ease as rapidly as possible the overcrowding with
which we are concerned" (House of Commons Debates, 07.05.87, co1.846).
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THE NEW RIGHT THINK TANKS AND PRISON PRIVATISATION: AN
ASSESSMENT
This section seeks to answer two questions: first, how influential was the ASI in bringing
about prison privatisation, and to what extent did it contribute to a new style of policy-
making?
The Role of the ASI
The ASI participated in a loosely-knit, ad hoc Pro-Privatisation Coalition, which included
Conservative members of the HAS C, representatives from the private sector, and advisers
from No. 10 and the Home Office. Determining the exact composition of this Coalition is
complicated by its informal nature and the complete absence of any collectively produced
literature or promotional material. This Coalition, which existed in the late 1980s, was
extremely well resourced in terms of access to government (in both Whitehall and
Westminster) and the Conservative Party. It also appears that the aggregate pressure
applied was influential in setting the Government down the road to privatisation. The 1988
Green Paper acknowledges the importance of the HASC report, which had given
"momentum to the debate" (Home Office, 1988: p.3) over privatisation, although other
participants in that debate are not mentioned.
Much of the private lobbying for privatisation came from the private sector. The ASI also
lobbied the Government, but this role declined as the private sector took up the initiative.
One civil servant who became involved with privatisation after 1987 has no recollection of
the ASI report having any long-term impact. But perhaps the real contribution of the ASI
lay in its public rather than its private work. Its publications in 1984 and 1987 are widely
accepted as putting the issue of privatisation on the political agenda. Peter Young believes
that the ASI's promotion of privatisation gained it a valuable level of respectability that it
had hitherto lacked, 53 a possibility given that in the early 1980s "the very notion of
privatising prisons would be regarded as an absurdity" (Shaw, 1992: p.30). Similarly, one
prison governor (who later went on to work in the private prisons sector) argued that The
Prison Cell "was a particularly important document, opening up in a public way the
concept of privatisation as an acceptable idea. It was a seminal paper indeed". 54 The ASI
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was a regular contributor to the debate on privatisation in the press, although it was not the
only advocate receiving press attention - the HASC trip to private prisons in the US was
also documented in the press, as was the publication of its report - but the ASI's
contribution to legitimising prison privatisation as a realistic policy proposal through its
public advocacy should not be underestimated.
It cannot be said that privatisation would have occurred because of the need to alleviate
chronic overcrowding, or incessant industrial relations problems without the intervention
of the ASI or the HAS C, because it ignores the extent to which these organisations
highlight, or reinforce the perception of crisis in their pamphlets. The overcrowding and
underfunding of the prison system were both heavily emphasised by the ASI and HASC in
their reports, while the ASI also focused upon the dominance of the POA. Similarly, as
chapter 2 demonstrated, the ASI have done considerable work in the field of privatisation
both nationally and internationally, and this should not be ignored when considering the
ideological context. Ultimately, privatisation occurred due to a combination of pragmatism
and ideology. According to David Lidington:
It was certainly a mixture of the two. The ideological climate was certainly right for
this to be taken seriously and coincided with a time of severe practical difficulties in
the Prison Service, and a feeling amongst senior ministers and civil servants that this
could not continue. We had to look for alternative solutions.55
Similarly, Derek Lewis argues that: "Involving the private sector was seen by the
Conservative government as a way of stimulating change in a monopolistic hide-bound
service, as well as being consistent with mainstream government thinking which strongly
favoured competition, privatization, market-testing and the contracting-out of public
services" (1997: p.82).
The AS!, Prison Privatisation, and Policy-Making
Prison privatisation, according to the Guardian (11.01.89), "provides a remarkable example
of the way in which policy-making has changed" where the debate "is pushed along by
lobbyists, think tanks, sympathetic journalists and business interests as much as
politicians". However, it has been shown that penal policy has never been a closed or
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exclusive policy community. It is a relatively pluralistic arena, dealing with highly emotive
issues which transcend notions of "best professional practice". The debates over
privatisation have also been marked by the ideological polarisation that characterises the
rest of the penal system. Privatisation is significant only in that it has attracted new
organisations such as the ASI and the private security and construction firms into debates
over penal policy. The ASI in particular is keen to spread the gospel of privatisation to
other areas of the criminal justice system such as the police (Evans et al, 1991; Pine,
1992b) and arbitration (Thierer, 1992). More recently greater use of privatisation in the
criminal justice system was advocated in a Hobart Paper by the IEA (Pyle, 1995).
McDonald refers to some of the more sophisticated arguments against privatisation which
talk of a "penal-industrial complex" where "private [prison] operators, whose business
opportunities derive from the shortfall of cell space relative to demand, may provide
influential support for 'get tough' sentencing policies that heighten the demand for prisons
and jails" (1994: p.43). However, he suggests in the US "there is no evidence that private
firms have had any influence over the key decisions that have created booming prisoner
populations", while in the UK the movement between MPs and private firms "does not
necessarily mean that sentencing policy is being distorted by private interests" (ibid).
Similarly, Lilly and Knepper identify a US "corrections commercial complex", akin to the
military industrial complex, which "operates without public scrutiny and influences
enormous influence over corrections policy" (1993: p.160). In their submission to a recent
HASC enquiry on prisons in the UK, the Howard League warned that:
The fact that prison construction and management has been turned into a profit
making exercise raises the prospect of future governments being deterred from
reducing the use of custody by the prohibitive costs of breaking contracts,
particularly with politically powerful private firms. There is a real threat that cost
implications will attain supremacy over appropriate criminal justice considerations
(Home Affairs Select Committee, 1997b: p.215)
There is, however, little evidence as yet to suggest that the private sector in the UK has
been able, or in fact attempted, to influence sentencing policy with the aim of securing
further prison contracts. Questioned on the growth of such a "prison lobby" by Labour MP
Chris Mullin, the former Director-General of the Prisons Agency, Derek Lewis answered:
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I doubt it. I certainly saw no evidence of it during my time in the Service, either in
the contact I had with private companies nor in the meetings that I attended
between ministers and the private companies. Nor, at the end of the day, do I
believe ministers would be so vulnerable to such pressure as to accede to it largely
because the prison population is an extremely expensive thing to maintain whether
it is done by the public or private sectors. At the end of the day, pressures on public
spending are likely to be an effective regulator of any lobbying that the private
sector might undertake (ibid).
David Faulkner, testifying to the same committee thought that "we are a very long way
from that situation at the moment" and "not a matter of great alarm at this moment"
although "it is worth considering in taking a longer-term view of the proper role of the
private sector in the prison system" (ibid). A Home Office report on The Wolds also issued
a warning, forcefully emphasising that it is "vital that the involvement of the private sector
in the [management, design and building] of prisons is kept firmly and demonstrably at
arms length from penal policy decisions about the use of custody" (Home Office, 1997:
p.58).
The issue of privatisation introduces a new dimension to penal policy, and this study shows
the influence that private sector capital can have on policy change. However, the prison
privatisation debate did conform to other characteristics of policy-making identified in the
first section of this case study, namely that debate was relatively open to groups and
ideologically polarised. Thus, while organisations such as the ASI and the firms from the
private sector were able to involve themselves significantly in penal policy for the first
time, this does not mean that the Pro-Privatisation Coalition brought about a permanent
change in the pattern of policy-making in the penal system.
CONCLUSION
The new right think tanks, and the ASI in particular, were not central to the process of
policy change, although it is methodologically difficult to divorce the role of the ASI from
others in the Pro-Privatisation Coalition. The ASI did bring the US experience of private
prisons to the UK through its pamphlets, lobbied ministers, and it secured media coverage
of the issue. Nevertheless, while this may have contributed to putting privatisation "on the
agenda", the policy was promoted most intensely by the private sector. Ministers decided
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upon privatisation as a response to serious problems in the prison system; namely poor
industrial relations and perennial overcrowding. Ministers were persuaded that
privatisation was both practical and cost-effective, and consistent with their broader
commitment to privatisation in other policy areas. The ASI and the Pro-Privatisation
Coalition served the valuable purpose of introducing the idea of privatised prisons into the
public arena and persuading informed opinion of its plausibility, as well as benefiting from
access to ministers and the higher echelons of the Conservative Party. The Anti-
Privatisation Coalition could not prevent privatisation, and could not create an
implementation gap because it was caught in something of a paradox. The key resources
and strategies at its disposal (especially those of the POA) could not be used, because it
was the use of strike action and confrontation which helped justify the policy initially.
Further confrontation might have had the consequence of accelerating the privatisation
programme.
In May 1997, the HASC published its first enquiry into the running of the Prison Service
since 1991, with special reference to the consequences of privatisation. The Prison Service
itself commissioned a Coopers and Lybrand report on the comparative performance of
private and public prisons, the results of which formed the basis of the Prison Service's
submission to the HASC which argued that: "While greater and wider experience of the
private sector in the field of custodial management will enable a thorough overall
comparison to be made with the quality of service in the directly-managed sector, within a
very short space of time new operators have operated well run prisons at significantly
lower cost" (Home Affairs Select Committee, 1997b: p.168). The HASC report itself
argued that "while we support that contracting out is not universally welcomed, we
consider that the fears hitherto expressed over the principle of contracting out - that it
would mean an abdication of state responsibility for public safety and the abdication of
freedom - have not proved justified, and that the idea of privately managed prisons is
undoubtedly now more generally accepted, and should be allowed to develop further"
(1997a: p.lx).
The Anti-Privatisation Coalition remains opposed to the principle of private prisons. In
1995 the PAC demanded that privatisation be abandoned (1995: p.6). In its submission to
the HASC, the PAC (pre-empting the Coopers and Lybrand report) accepted that private
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prisons may well cost less per place than comparable public sector prisons, because they
have lower staffing levels and lower pay. The PAC express concern at "the implications of
the lower staffing ratios for effective supervision and the prevention of intimidation and
bullying of weaker prisoners, and at the longer term implications of lower pay and for the
retention of good quality staff' (Penal Affairs Consortium, 1996: p.17). They conclude
that:
We do not consider that the evidence so far available supports the argument that
private sector prisons can provide a substantially cheaper option (unless they reduce
staffing levels to undesirably low levels), nor that they are likely to provide
significantly better regimes than equivalent well-managed public sector prisons
(ibid).
The HASC report includes published evidence from the Howard, the PAC, the PGA, the
POA and the PRT, all of whom reiterate their opposition to the private management of
(although not private involvement in) prisons. However it is unlikely that this opposition
will reverse the privatisation programme now in progress. The election of a Labour
Government and the appointment of Jack Straw as Home Secretary may have given the
opponents of privatisation an element of hope - at a POA conference in 1996, Jack Straw
called the concept of private prisons "morally repugnant". However, it was announced on
13 July 1997 that the process would not be reversed and further contracts may well be
awarded.
Interviewed yesterday on Radio 4's World this Weekend, Mr Straw said that he did
not back away from those remarks ["morally repugnant"]. "In a better world the
incarceration of prisoners should be handled by the state. But when I used those
words I also made clear that we could not wave a magic wand over the existing
private contracts". The rapidly rising numbers were increasing the pressure to "find
places as best we can", necessitating the further use of private finance arrangements
(Daily Telegraph 14.07.97).
Members of the Anti-Privatisation Coalition will be disappointed - privatisation within the
prison service is unlikely to reversed in the foreseeable future.
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Seven
The Impact of the New Right Think Tanks
This final chapter brings the findings of the case studies together, and offers some general
conclusions regarding the role and impact of the IEA, CPS, and ASI. There are three
sections. The first addresses the work and impact of the new right think tanks on policy
change and policy-making. The second section considers some of the theoretical
implications which emerged from the case studies, in particular for the Rhodes Model, and
the ACF, and indicates how helpful the template was in answering the research questions
outlined in chapter 1. The concluding section suggests directions for future research, and
reflects upon some of the challenges and opportunities which face the new right think tanks
with the recent election of a Labour government.
ASSESSING THE NEW RIGHT THINK TANKS
This section has three parts. The first outlines the role of the new right think tanks in the
process of policy change and assesses the impact of the IEA, CPS, and ASI in the three
case studies addressed. The second part considers the extent to which the new right think
tanks contributed to a new pattern of policy-making in the bus industry, education system,
and penal system. The final part offers a brief summary of the arguments presented.
The Role and Impact of the New Right Think Tanks in Policy Change
In all three case studies, the new right think tanks promoted policy changes which were
eventually implemented by the Conservative Government, although each shows a different
pattern of think tank involvement. All the new right think tanks contributed to the debate
on education refomi, although only the IEA and ASI promoted bus deregulation, whilst the
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ASI was alone in advocating prison privatisation. The variations in think tank involvement
should not be surprising. As illustrated in chapter 2 each think tank was established with
different aims, distinctive guiding philosophies, and their own modus operandi. These
factors will have affected the different research priorities of the three think tanks. The IEA,
for example, might not have published on the subject of prison privatisation because that
issue contributed little to the study of microeconomics. That the ASI was found to have
promoted all three of the policy changes addressed in this research could be explained by
the fact that it has always engaged more directly in public policy debates than the IEA
(which sees itself as one step removed from political activity) and the CPS (whose role was
as much to promote the values and policies of Thatcherism inside the Conservative Party as
outside it). Also, all of the policy issues promoted by the ASI were first floated in the
Omega Project in the early 1980s which reviewed all aspects of government policy — an
exercise not conducted by the other new right think tanks.
Each of the case studies suggests that the new right think tanks operated as part of
advocacy coalitions. The New Right Coalition in education can be traced back to the 1960s
and by the 1980s was largely composed of the new right think tanks, and individuals
closely associated with them. With bus deregulation, the Pro-Deregulation Coalition can be
traced back even further to the 1950s, although this might be more accurately described as
an academic network in which the new right think tanks acted as another platform for
advocates of deregulation. The Pro-Privatisation Coalition evolved over a shorter time
frame as prison privatisation rapidly established itself as a means of dealing with the twin
problems of prison overcrowding and the POA.
The new right think tanks had an identifiable impact on policy change, although this was
greater in some case studies than others. It can be said that the direct impact of the new
right think tanks was marginal in the cases of bus deregulation and prison privatisation, and
more central in the case of education reform. For bus deregulation, the TEA and ASI gave
academics such as John Hibbs a platform to promote the abolition of road service
licensing. The think tanks were not the only platform available but it was (and remains)
one which Hibbs, for example, values. But it should be remembered that Hibbs, Glaister,
and Beesley were first and foremost independent academics not aligned to specific think
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tanks. Thus a more accurate assessment would be that it was the academic economists that
did most intellectually to undermine road service licensing, and who occasionally used the
new right think tanks in their efforts to achieve this. In education, all the new right think
tanks were at the forefront of the debate. Initially their voucher proposal led to a detailed
study within the DES. The eventual rejection of the voucher resulted in a series of
publications on decentralising responsibility and finance to schools, and choice to parents.
With the two principal patrons of the CPS (Thatcher and Joseph) in two of the key
positions in government for education policy, and key advisers (Sexton, Letwin, and
Griffiths) in Whitehall, the new right think tanks had numerous points of access to policy-
makers. Junior ministers such as Bob Dunn periodically brought Cox and Marks into the
DES while Angela Rumbold promoted the arguments of the NTBG within the Department.
Thus the new right think tanks clearly had the opportunities to influence and shape policy
formulation through the utilisation of coalition supporters and ministerial allies. Fewer
such opportunities were available for the think tanks in the process of prison privatisation,
when it was necessary for the private sector to show the Government that it was willing
and able to manage prisons, a function that the ASI could not perform. However, the
publication of the Omega Report and, more importantly, The Prison Cell appears to have
played an important role in placing the issue on the policy agenda.2
The significance of the new right think tanks should not be stressed at the expense of other
important factors, two of which stand out. First, in all three of the case studies, there were
important contextual factors which contributed to policy change. Some factors were
immediate and quantitative: falling passenger levels and rising subsidy in the bus industry;
a falling birth-rate and falling standards in education; and increased overcrowding in the
prison system. There were also political factors, which support the view that policy change
under the Thatcher Government was more an exercise in statecraft (Bulpitt, 1986) than the
implementation of an intellectually coherent agenda. Each policy change reduced the role
of two of the Thatcher Government's bêtes noires — trade unions and local government.
Local government, the NUT and other teacher unions, and the POA have been identified as
the real targets of policy change. The ideological context was also conducive to policy
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change — both deregulation and privatisation became established policy tools of the
Thatcher and Major Governments, and were applied widely across a range of policy areas.
The second point is that there were important advocates for change other than the new right
think tanks, but closer to ministers, who have been identified as playing a major role in the
process of policy change, such as Stephen Glaister and Michael Beesley, the Thatcherite
NTBG, and John Wheeler MP. A recognition of the role of such actors reduces the danger
of over-exaggerating the contribution of the TEA, CPS, and ASI.
Nevertheless two countervailing points suggest that the role of the IEA, CPS, and ASI
should not be dismissed lightly. The first is that the new fight think tanks actively
participated within advocacy coalitions and thus contributed to the development of ideas
promoted by the above actors. For example, the NTBG may have published Save Our
Schools, but it was written within the ASI. Secondly, the cumulative impact of the new
right think tanks' work in contributing to the ideological context must also be considered.
In particular, the IEA did much to promote the. virtues of deregulated markets, while the
ASI was amongst the major advocates of privatisation in the UK. Think tanks such as the
IEA and the CPS also provided intellectual support for key Conservative figures such as
Thatcher, Howe, Joseph and Biffen who helped shape the Thatcher Government's post-
Keynesian economic policy. Thus, although the new right think tanks were pushing at open
doors by promoting policies which were compatible with Government thinking in policy
areas which were, in the eyes of ministers at least, ripe for reform they had an indirect
impact in opening those doors by helping create an ideological climate in which it was
possible to privatise and deregulate.
One question which arises from the comparative case study method is whether the case
studies help identify the conditions which determined whether the new right think tanks
were able or unable to have an impact on policy change. A major problem with such an
exercise is that, for reasons outlined in chapter 1, case studies where policy change did not
occur have not been examined. To reiterate — this thesis set out to test claims regarding
the perceived influence of the new right think tanks by examining three policy changes in
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which they were attributed an influence, and to consider the theoretical implications of
these findings. In order to establish the factors which determined whether or not the new
right think tanks had an impact would require considerably more case study material,
including examples of policy continuity. Only then would it be possible to see which
factors (if any) were present in the case studies where the new right think tanks had an
impact, and which were absent in those case studies where they had none. This could then
provide the basis for hypothesis-building. Without this evidence, the potential for such an
exercise is significantly reduced.
An alternative question to ask is why the new right think tanks were able to have a greater
impact on education reform than on bus deregulation and prison privatisation. An
important resource appears to have been access to policy-makers. It couid be argued that
the new right think tanks had a more significant impact on education reform than prison
privatisation because the new right think tanks had greater access to advisers and ministers
in the DES than they had in the Home Office. It was also the case that with bus
deregulation the most influential pro-deregulation advocates (Beesley and Glaister)
enjoyed privileged access to policy-makers, as did the private sector consortia and John
Wheeler for prison privatisation. Other variables which might also have affected the impact
of the new right think tanks include: the nature of the policy area prior to policy change;
the composition of advocacy coalitions involving the new right think tanks; the role of the
new right think tanks within these advocacy coalitions; and the role of ministers.
It is difficult to evaluate the relative significance of any of these variables due to the
differences between the three case studies. For example, on the basis of the three case
studies, it would be too simplistic to say that the new right think tanks were more likely to
have an impact on policy change in areas characterised by policy communities (such as
education) than ones which are more open and pluralistic (such as penal policy), for this
would be to ignore other differences such as the roles of the think tanks within the two
coalitions, and the significance of ministers. The methodological problems in isolating the
significance of these particular variables inhibits the discovery of the conditions which
detemlined think tank impact, if such a set of conditions existed. Indeed, it might instead
be more prudent to acknowledge the complexities of policy-making, recognising that each
policy area had its own unique set of relationships, personnel, and events, and that each
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example of policy change was a combination of these unique factors — there may have
been no general "conditions" which determined the impact of the new right think tanks.
Nevertheless the role of the new right think tanks in both policy continuity and policy
change is one which requires further research (see below).
The Impact of the New Right Think Tanks on Policy-Making
Although the impact of the new right think tanks on policy-making differed between the
three case studies, what they all suggest is that there was a lack of meaningful consultation
between central government and service providers. Many of those groups which might
have expected to be consulted on routine issues in policy-making had their objections
overridden by the Conservative Government when deciding on broader policy issues, such
as whether a service/industry should be deregulated or privatised. The alignment of groups
in the Anti-Deregulation, Anti-Reform, and Anti-Privatisation Coalitions reflected this
view — all were composed of service providers, local government organisations and others
involved in the provision or monitoring of bus services, education, and prisons on a day to
day basis. Formal responses to consultation exercises highlight the opposition of these
organisations to the policy changes proposed, as did their pronouncements and
demonstrations which followed the introduction of the respective bats to Partian-kotAt.
Although the case studies endorse the view taken by those who identify a shift in policy
style by the Thatcher Government from consultation to imposition, there is little to suggest
the new right think tanks had a direct influence on bringing about this shift. Imposition was
a result of the Thatcher and Major Governments' attempting to address policy problems (or
deal with political opponents) using policy tools such as privatisation and deregulation
which were ideologically or politically unacceptable to service providers. It is more
accurate to say that the new right think tanks were perhaps beneficiaries of the willingness
of the Conservative ministers to contemplate radical change, not only contributing to a
political climate conducive to radical thinking, but where alternative "networks" of
influence were encouraged to assist in the process of policy formulation. For example,
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Nicholas Ridley brought pro-deregulation academics into the DTp to serve on the RPTSG,
and ministers and special advisers drew upon the ideas and advice of the new right think
tanks in developing part of the Government's education strategy, bypassing the education
profession itself.
In some cases, policy formulation was a departure from previous patterns of policy-
making. Bus deregulation, for example, was a rare example of a nationwide policy being
developed for the industry by the DTp and imposed upon local authorities and PTEs.
During the 1980s, the education policy community of the DES, LEAs and teaching unions
was undermined both internally and externally — the DES began promoting its own
agenda of a national curriculum, while the LEAs and unions were almost totally bypassed
in the formulation of the ERA. Moreover, in the cases of both education reform and bus
deregulation the changes advocated by the new right think tanks and their coalition allies
(and subsequently implemented by the Conservative Government) brought about
significant longer-term changes to policy-making in these areas. In the case of the bus
industry, deregulation has seen a shift in provision from networks to provision by markets.
The growing focus on standards, beginning with the Black Papers in the late 1960s, saw
education increasingly achieve a higher political status, no longer the preserve of Whitehall
officials, LEAs and teaching unions. Instead there was an increasing emphasis on the
importance of parents, and the needs of industry which has, to date, survived the change of
government in 1997. Alternatively, penal policy had long been a politically sensitive area
characterised by a plurality of groups and influences, and marked by a distinct lack of
consensus between professional and popular opinion. Privatisation placed a new issue on
the penal agenda which brought with it new actors, mainly the private sector companies.
The privatisation debate reflected the typically pluralistic and polarised nature of other
penal issues. But over time the emergence of a "penal industrial complex" could have
significant consequences for the criminal justice system as a whole, leading to an increase
in political pressure for higher and longer sentences and for the Prisons Agency to build
more prisons. As yet there is no evidence to justify such fears.
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The case studies also show differences in the extent to which the new right think tanks
were able to have a long-term impact on policy-making, or on new patterns of policy
formulation and administration. On the one hand, the new right think tanks have continued
to place a high priority on education reform, and in some cases secured positions in the
policy-making machinery through the appointment of their authors and allies to
QUANGOs such as the National Curriculum Council and, more recently, the Schools
Curriculum and Assessment Authority. But the new right think tanks appear to have
achieved little or no long-term impact on policy-making following the introduction of bus
deregulation and prison privatisation. The reason for this difference appears to lie in the
nature of the policy change. Bus deregulation allowed few opportunities for any political
actor to "capture" policy-making, as the provision for bus services was to be determined
largely by the market. The pace of prison privatisation is determined by the demand for
new prisons which in turn is largely determined by trends in sentencing policy. While the
private sector will no doubt continue to bid for contracts, there is little structural role for
the new right think tanks in the privatisation process other than by an indirect attempt to
indirectly accelerate the process by demanding a tougher approach to law and order. Again,
there is no evidence to suggest that this is happening.
By contrast, the provision of secondary education remains a near state monopoly, and the
1988 Act did not directly attempt or substantially increase the role of the private sector in
the provision of secondary education. Despite the decentralisation of some power and
responsibility to school governors and parents, the centre retained and in some cases
increased control over financial and curriculum matters. This created a new generation of
QUANGOs to which close supporters of the new right think tanks were appointed, thus
institutionalising their input and allowing them to influence policy outcomes during
implementation. This suggests that one of the major factors which determined the long-
term impact of the new right think tanks (and other actors) on policy-making is the nature
of the policy change, the nature of the service, and the role of the market. The greater the
degree of government control and centralisation, the greater chance the new right think
tanks had of influencing policy change after legislation.
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The Impact of the New Right Think Tanks — A Summary
The evidence suggests that a degree of caution is required when assessing the impact of the
new right think tanks, as there are differences in the pattern of think tank involvement, the
role they played within advocacy coalitions, and their impact on specific policy changes.
Their role as platform providers for bus deregulation and agenda-setters for prison
privatisation played a part in, but were not directly pivotal to, policy change. But the new
right think tanks did have a less direct impact in both these cases. The role that the new
right think tanks played in helping coalition allies develop their ideas and thinking should
not be neglected. Also, the new right think tanks, and the TEA in particular, had a
significant impact in creating an intellectual and ideological climate for policies of
deregulation and privatisation to develop. With education reform, the new right think tanks
inherited the role of champions for higher standards from the Black Papers and NCES, who
played a fundamental role in helping to change the direction of thinking in education. The
new right think tanks enjoyed a greater degree of access to policy-makers due to fellow
coalition members holding advisory positions in both No.10 and the DES, which aided the
assimilation of their ideas into government thinking. However, it should be noted that
although the degree of access was greater for the new right think tanks in the case of
education, it should not automatically be assumed that this in itself is a necessary or
sufficient condition for attaining influence. Other differences between the case studies —
and the significance they might have had on determining think tank impact — should not
be overlooked.
The new right think tanks should perhaps be seen as beneficiaries of a Government which
distrusted consensus and consultation, and was willing to contemplate policy change
despite the opposition of service providers. Indeed, the primary purpose of these policy
changes could have been the marginalisation of these interests. Both the formulation of bus
deregulation and education reform were distinctive departures from previous patterns of
policy-making, whereas with prison privatisation the ASI's contribution was to an already
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pluralistic and fragmented policy arena. However, the long-term structural impact of the
new right think tanks on policy-making in these areas has been limited. Only in education
have the new right think tanks been able to achieve any noticeable impact after policy
change, with some of their authors appointed to new advisory positions. It can therefore be
said that, overall, the impact of the new right think tanks on individual policy change has
been greater than their structural impact on policy-making.
The case studies reflect the thrust of Meltsner's argument (see pp.44-45) that there are four
factors which are influential in the production and use of analysis/advice. The impact of
the new right think tanks on policy-making and policy change was celtaix‘iy iniluenceVoy
the resources and strategies of the think tanks (both individually and collectively as part of
advocacy coalitions), the level of support from ministers, the degree of access to decision-
makers, and the nature of individual policy areas. These in turn may be dependent upon
the ideological, political, and socio-economic context within which a policy problem is
discussed and which will thus shape the options available to decision-makers. Establishing
the extent to which the new right think tanks were more or less influential, given the
methodological difficulties of quantifying "influence" and disaggregating the specific
contributions of think tanks from those of their coalition partners. Nevertheless the case
studies do suggest is that the new right think tanks were able to influence policy outcomes
(although in varying degrees), and have perhaps been a neglected variable in the policy-
making literature.
THINK TANKS, POLICY NETWORKS, AND ADVOCACY COALITIONS
All three case studies suggest that the new right think tanks had some impact on policy
change. This section addresses some of the theoretical implications of these findings. The
template was developed from aspects of both the Rhodes Model and the ACF. From the
Rhodes Model it applied the notion of power-dependence. From the ACF it borrowed the
use of advocacy coalitions and a focus on belief systems. From both the dialectic Rhodes
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Model and the ACF it acknowledges that structures and agents interact and that it is
important to consider not just groups but the context within which they operate.
As noted in chapter 3, there are a number of key differences between the Rhodes Model
and the ACF: they aggregate groups in dissimilar ways, with advocacy coalitions
incorporating a greater and more flexible range of actors than the typology of networks
presented by the Rhodes Model; policy networks are held together by resource
dependencies whereas advocacy coalitions are united by their belief systems; and the
Rhodes Model emphasises policy continuity whereas the ACF is used to explain policy
change. The aim of this section is to compare these aspects of the Rhodes Model and the
ACF as the first stage of integrating the two approaches.
Policy Networks and Advocacy Coalitions
Perhaps the clearest distinction between the ACF and the Rhodes Model is the way they
conceptualise group relationships. The Rhodes Model attempts to reflect the diversity of
relationships which are said to exist in different policy areas by creating a typology of ideal
type networks. The ACF, by comparison, specifies only one type of group interaction —
advocacy coalitions. Chapter 3 argued that the Rhodes Model had limited value for this
research, as its typology gave little indication of the role of the new right think tanks in
policy-making or their relationship with other policy actors.
The case studies suggest that a focus on the alternative networks of think tanks and others
was justified, as in some cases these actors were able to have a significant impact on policy
outcomes: without the influence of Beesley and Glaister, total deregulation may not have
emerged as the major recommendation from the RPTSG; without Sexton, Letwin and the
new right think tanks, the proposals for decentralising management to schools and
extending parental choice might not have gathered the necessary momentum required to
sustain a programme of education reform lasting over a decade from 1979; and without the
ASI's early work on prison privatisation in the UK, the private management of prisons
might have taken much longer to introduce. Given that the new right think tanks and their
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allies had resources and appear to have affected the direction and/or timing of policy
change, there is a need to incorporate their contribution to any explanation of policy
outcomes which goes beyond the Rhodes Model and its emphasis on policy continuity.
This is not to deny that policy networks exist, or that they are able to influence policy
outcomes - indeed, the case studies identified such "networks" although presented them as
opposing coalitions to those which included the new right think tanks. In many cases such
networks might be the norm during the routine administration of policy, although the bus
deregulation case study suggests a degree of caution in attempting to characterise a policy
arena in terms of a single policy network. However, it is far from clear that these networks
will have such an impact on outcomes during irregular upheavals in a policy area, as they
may lack the necessary resources (such as access to policy-makers) to affect outcomes at
the "third order" level of policy change.
As shown in chapter 3, Marsh and Rhodes acknowledge the limitations that policy
networks have in accounting for policy change and do not dispute that policy change might
occur despite the opposition of these networks. Others such as Smith highlighted the
existence of these alternative networks, as demonstrated with the Prime Minister's Health
Review of 1989. Despite these two observations — that policy networks resist change, but
there are alternative networks that promote it — there has been little or no attempt to
examine the relationship between these two types of network, and their relationship with
other actors and variables, in the process of policy change.
Unlike the Rhodes Model, the ACF can incorporate the new right think tanks, which
participated in (albeit loosely-knit) advocacy coalitions. The ACF suggests that groups
organise themselves into coalitions on the basis of shared beliefs. It recognises that new
ideas/ideologies do not spontaneously emerge: they have to be promoted by groups and
individuals and decision-makers have to be persuaded of the merits of policy change.
While Marsh and Rhodes argue that "there is little evidence that a plurality of groups is
involved in policy-making" (1992c: p.263), 3
 Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith emphasise the
opposite. This difference can partly be accounted for because of their different conceptions
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of "policy-making". Marsh and Rhodes focus on routine, incremental policy-making and
address the extent to which groups become institutionalised within government, thus
blurring the distinction between state and society. The ACF, by contrast, attempts to
explain infrequent and irregular policy change and, in focusing on groups who articulate
and promote ideas as well as those responsible for service delivery, incorporates a greater
range of actors.
Overall, the concept of advocacy coalitions allows for a more thorough reflection of the
alignment of groups in the three case studies than the typology of networks provided by the
Rhodes Model, although it must be remembered that the policy changes involved were
"third order" changes rather than examples of incremental policy-making. All the case
studies identify at least two advocacy coalitions, one promoting and the other opposing
policy change. In each case, change was opposed by the service providers, local
government bodies, trade unions, industry-wide representative organisations, and pressure
groups — the types of organisations which are said to attempt to routinize policy-making
and prevent policy change within the Rhodes Model. Despite their hold on a range of
resources, service providers and others were unable to prevent change by a Conservative
Government with strong parliamentary majorities, a favourable ideological climate and, in
some cases, determined ministers.
Resource Dependencies and Belief Systems
Part of the reason why the Rhodes Model and the ACF aggregate groups in their respective
ways is because they look at two different relationships. In the Rhodes Model, policy
networks are linked by resource dependencies whereas in the ACF, advocacy coalitions are
linked by the belief systems of policy actors. However, it has been shown that
organisations such as the new right think tanks, special advisers and others also had
resources which allowed them to influence policy outcomes, raising a question about why
these organisations have been so neglected by Rhodes et al. In education, the new right
think tanks were able to exploit their numerous points of access to influence the education
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debate. Other coalition members had other resources which complimented the work of the
new right think tanks. With bus deregulation, Glaister and Beesley were granted privileged
access to DTp policy-makers. On the issue of prison privatisation the intervention of the
HASC is regarded as marking a key point in the debate, not simply because of its authority
as a committee of Parliament, but because privatisation was endorsed by one its most
respected members, John Wheeler. It is also possible to argue that relationships between
coalition members, and between coalition members and ministers, were also characterised
by an element of dependency. Without the public promotion of change by the TEA, CPS,
ASI and others, and the internal work on policy development by Glaister, Beesley, Sexton,
Letwin, and others, ministers might not have had coherent, defensible proposals to bring
forward. At the same time, the new right think tanks were totally dependent upon ministers
to implement the necessary reform, and make change a reality.
However, this point requires two qualifications. The first is that not all actors in the process
of policy change are necessarily dependent upon each other. For example, while there
might have been an element of dependency between ministers and think tanks and between
ministers and LEAs, LEAs are clearly not dependent on the new right think tanks. The
second qualification is that the new right think tanks were clearly politically and
ideologically closer to some actors than others. For example, in the case of education, the
CPS, ASI, and others forged closer relationships with ministers, MPs, and special advisers
than with the teaching unions and the LEAs. Moreover, what united the New Right
Coalition were common beliefs and a shared purpose. As such it might be somewhat
misleading to talk of the relationship between Stuart Sexton and the CPS/Hillgate Group,
or between the ASI and NTBG, in terms of resource "bargaining". This is not to deny that
the power-dependence framework has any role at all, simply that it cannot capture the
dynamics of all group relationships in the process of policy-making and policy change. A
focus on belief systems helps identify relationships which might be missed by an exclusive
focus on resource-dependencies.
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The Rhodes Model and the ACF — Understanding Policy Continuity and Change
The Rhodes Model and the ACF are both useful contributions to our understanding of
policy-making in the UK. The principal strength of the template is that it adopts the
positive aspects of these approaches to produce a framework better suited for assessing the
impact of the new right think tanks. In particular the framework attempts to incorporate the
major variables which were likely to have influenced policy outcomes so that the input of
the IEA, CPS, and ASI could be placed in context. Those studies which lack a contextual
framework (such as Cockett, 1994, or Denham, 1996) run the risk of overstating the
individual contributions of the new right think tanks. The aim of this research was to
provide a more balanced assessment which did not prejudice one variable over another.
The template aided analysis by ensuring that each variable was examined in turn.
However, this approach is not without its problems. Despite attempts to account for the
context of policy change in the case studies, it is possible, indeed probable, that a number
of variables which also affected policy outcomes were omitted. This is partly a
consequence of the multiple case study method, which restricts the amount of space and
time available for each of the policy areas. Thus it is not possible to incorporate all the
influences on the process of education reform from the late 1960s in the space available.
The case studies do not, for example, focus directly on the impact (if any) that electoral
considerations might have had in influencing the process of policy change. While efforts
have been made to focus on the salient factors, no case study could address the potentially
infinite number of factors, such as what happens in schools, LEAs, Westminster, and
Whitehall, which influence the decisions of teachers, officials, and politicians who, in
varying degrees, could have influenced policy outcomes. Thus, although it is possible to
point to the most significant factors contributing to the process of policy change, it must be
recognised that the case studies could never provide the complete context within which it
occurred.
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The development of Marsh and Smith's (1999) dialectic approach, which emphasises how
structures interact with agents suggests that the Rhodes Model has adopted aspects of the
ACF, although this is not explicitly acknowledged. The case studies here suggest that the
Rhodes Model can further learn from the ACF. In particular, the case studies suggest that
the presence of a plurality of groups does not necessarily mean that a policy area can be
described as an issue network. Although the concept of issue networks has been subject to
change and reinterpretation, a central aspect of the idea is that there is no focal point at the
centre for policy actors to bargain with. Yet the case studies suggest that, even when there
are a diverse number of groups competing for policy space, there are government
departments that provide such a focal point. For example, the DES provided a very obvious
focal point for those attempting to influence education policy. Moreover, within the field of
education policy, those seeking to contribute to the policy debate did not manifest
themselves as atomised actors. The concept of advocacy coalitions suggests how groups
might aggregate themselves in policy areas which were, or became, increasingly pluralistic.
Developments after policy change in the three case studies also suggest that the notion of
the implementation gap should not be exaggerated — it is certainly not an inevitable
consequence of policy change. Although the teaching profession was able to secure
changes to the national curriculum and assessment by boycotting national tests, it is less
clear that an implementation gap occurred for bus deregulation or prison privatisation. In
the case of bus deregulation, bus operators and local authorities were unable to affect
significantly the outcome of the 1985 Act which shifted the provision of bus services from
PTEs, county councils and traffic commissioners to the market. It is difficult to measure
the extent to which the opposition of the PNP campaign slowed the process of prison
privatisation, if at all. Given that the difficulties between the Government and the POA was
one of the key factors in bringing about privatisation, it is possible that further disruption
through strike action may only have served to accelerate the privatisation process. As such
(and bearing in mind that the POA do not operate in private prisons), strike action by the
POA and allied unions has not been used and the privatisation process continues.
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Nevertheless, it is perhaps surprising that Marsh, Rhodes, and Smith have not utilised the
concept of coalitions to provide a fuller explanation of the origins of the implementation
gap, where it occurs. Integrating the Rhodes Model and the ACF might be useful for
explaining policy outcomes where implementation gaps have been identified in that it
could show from whom the Goverment received advice and support, and why and how
they might have been persuaded to pursue change despite the opposition of service
providers. As suggested in chapter 3, the policy subsystem should be regarded as the policy
network, defined by groups who have sufficient resources to have a noticeable impact on
policy outcomes. Epistemic communities could be incorporated as a subset of advocacy
coalitions suggesting that policy networks, advocacy coalitions, and epistemic
communities should be regarded as component parts of a "Russian doll", rather than as
competing approaches. In cases of routine, incremental policy-making, the broad policy
network may include only a limited number of actors, as in a typical policy community.
Given that policy communities are partly characterised by shared values it might also be
possible to re-conceptualise them as advocacy coalitions. Over time, and during periods of
policy upheaval, a greater number of actors may enter the network in an attempt to affect
policy outcomes, which may well lead to a greater number of coalitions within the
network, as happened in the case of bus deregulation, education reform, and prison
privatisation. This is not to say that the Rhodes Model should simply be subsumed into the
ACF as there are aspects of the latter approach which have yet to be sufficiently validated.
For example, the ethnocentric nature of the ACF means that it is far from clear whether its
central hypotheses are applicable in the UK or any other western democracy other than the
US (Gorham, 1997).
A policy network may fragment into a policy arena of competing coalitions because of a
number of factors, but one possible reason is as change of government or a change in
govenuuent priorities. Smith, for example, states that "the British trade union movement
was just as well resourced on 2 May 1979 as it was on 3 May 1979 but with the election of
the Conservative government a large part of its influence disappeared overnight" (1993:
pp.3-4). This is almost certainly true, but the case studies in this research suggest that the
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election of the Thatcher Government substantially increased the influence of others. The
new right think tanks and their coalition partners across all three case studies were able to
influence policy change and affect policy outcomes far more effectively and directly in the
1980s and 1990s than in the 1970s and before. This is because the election of a
Conservative Government substantially redistributed the spread of resources between certain
groups. While trade unions, local authorities and producer groups had access to policy-
makers substantially reduced, the new right think tanks, private sector companies and others
found their access substantially increased. Access is not the only resources to affect policy
outcomes, but it was a significant one for the new right think tanks.
This "Russian doll" approach might show that the implementation gap, where and when it
existed, was a reflection of different coalitions exerting resources and affecting outcomes at
different stages of the policy process within an overarching policy network. Different
coalitions are likely to have different resources, depending on their composition. The
political resources of the new right think tanks and others, and their access to policy-
makers during policy formulation might help shape the direction of policy change, but the
resources of service providers/policy communities etc. (should they be unable to prevent
change being introduced) might be able to affect its outcome in implementation. Nor is this
framework incompatible with policy continuity. Although some areas might be
characterised by policy continuity, this does not necessarily mean that they are free from
conflict. Groups or coalitions may launch vigorous campaigns in their attempts to bring
about "third order" change, but may fail. In such cases it might be that the new right think
tanks or their advocacy coalition lacked the necessary resources to significantly affect
outcomes, or alternatively the context of policy change might not have been sufficiently
favourable for their ideas to have an impact. As noted above, if we are to know the
conditions necessary for think tank impact it is necessary to look at areas where policy
change has not occurred. Again, this is an area which requires further research.
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Think Tanks, Policy Networks, and Advocacy Coalitions — A Summary
Although it is acknowledged that policy networks in themselves do not provide an
adequate account of policy change, supporters of the Rhodes Model offer a very limited
conceptualisation of those groups/networks that promote change. The case studies suggest
that the notion of advocacy coalitions has much to contribute to our understanding of the
new right think tanks in policy-making and the role of groups generally in policy change.
Within the case studies, the notion of advocacy coalitions is reflected in the alignment of
groups who opposed and promoted change, while its focus on belief systems helped
identify important relationships which would have been neglected with an exclusive focus
on resource-dependencies. Moreover, by bringing together aspects of the Rhodes Model
and the ACF, it might be possible to construct a framework which can account for the role
of groups in both continuity and change.
CONCLUSION
This thesis has covered a number of broad areas, including think tanks, policy network
analysis, the Advocacy Coalition Framework, and policy-making and policy change in the
fields of transport, education, and penal policy. Due to limited space, it has not always
been possible to do justice to these specific topics — indeed, this final chapter has perhaps
raised more questions than it answers. This concluding section reflects on where the
research of think tanks might go from here. There are two parts. The first outlines two
areas which would benefit from further research and which could build upon some of the
arguments presented above. The second section considers possible developments in the
months and years ahead. In particular, it considers the implications that Labour's victory
might have for the study of think tanks and speculates on what the future might hold for the
IEA, CPS, ASI and others.
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Areas for Future Research
Two main areas which require further research can be identified. First, as suggested above,
more case study material is required. This thesis focused on a particular type of case study
— one in which policy change occurred and the new right think tanks were attributed a key
role. Although the case studies provide new empirical evidence, it is difficult to extrapolate
firm theoretical insights into how and when the new right think tanks were most influential.
Additional case study material might help answer this question, although it might
alternatively fail to unearth any pattern at all, thus complicating rather than clarifying the
issue. This would be an important finding in itself, in highlighting policy-making as an
irregular, haphazard, and chaotic process rather than one which can be reduced to a single
theory or series of generalisations.
There is also a need for a broader range of case study material. Other types of case study
which might enhance our understanding of the new right think tanks and their ability to
influence policy include: areas where policy change has occurred without the intervention
of the new right think tanks; areas where there has been no change despite the intervention
of the new right think tanks; and where there has been policy change but markedly
different from that proposed by the new right think tanks. The framework outlined in the
previous section may assist in accounting for these different scenarios, all of which will
contribute not just to our understanding of the impact of the new right think tanks on
policy-making, but groups as a whole.
A second area for future research is the ACF itself. As explained in chapter 3 this research
has not directly addressed the hypotheses of the ACF. However, this should not overlook
the fact that Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's ACF is both a plausible and increasingly
influential theory of policy change and might further contribute to our understanding of the
new right think tanks. For example, if the ACF is correct in its suggestion that policy
change "is unlikely in the absence of significant perturbations external to the subsystem"
(hypothesis 5), then this would help us identify the limits of the influence of groups such as
think tanks. Thus if hypothesis 5 is correct, then this would suggest that the impact of the
274
new right think tanks on policy change was/is dependent upon "external (system) events".
Similarly, the importance of "policy learning" in policy change and the conditions under
which it is most likely to occur, might also give us a further insight into the role and
potential impact of think tanks in policy change, possibly as facilitators of policy learning.
However, there are a number of doubts as to the applicability and accuracy of the ACF
which must be addressed before it is possible to infer anything about the impact of the new
right think tanks, or other groups, on policy change. Once the causal factors of policy
continuity and policy change have been identified these could be added to the template to
give it greater explanatory power and account for such theoretical questions as:
• under what circumstances is policy change more or less likely to occur?;
• what determines the number of advocacy coalitions within a broader network?; and
• are there circumstances under which agents will be the prime movers in policy change,
or when ideological, political, and socio-economic factors will be the key variable?
The case studies cast doubt on the accuracy on some of the premises of the ACF. For
example, none of the "advocacy coalitions" incorporating the new right think tanks actually
satisfy the stringent formal criteria laid down by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith. The Pro-
Deregulation, New Right, and Pro-Privatisation Coalitions were all characterised by an
element of interaction, but there is little evidence of formal co-ordination. Unlike the Anti-
Deregulation, Anti-Reform, and Anti-Privatisation Coalitions, those coalitions promoting
change did not formalise their relationships. Instead they manifested themselves as loosely-
knit, ad hoc coalitions. It is also the case that certain policy promoters (such as firms from
the private prisons consortia) claim not to have participated in any form of interaction with
other advocates. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith do not claim that all policy actors will be part
of advocacy coalitions and so identifying independent advocates does not conflict with the
ACF. However, this thesis suggests that, for the UK at least, some provision should be
made within the ACF for less formal types of advocacy coalition.
More substantially, the case studies also reflect some of the criticisms made of the ACF in
chapter 3, such as the neglect of "internal" factors in policy change. For example, it is
argued that the Adam Smith Institute played an important role in getting the issue of prison
privatisation on to the political agenda with reports in 1984 and 1987. However, the 1987
report had a much greater impact on the policy debate and helped generate a momentum
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(along with MPs from the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee and
members of the security and construction industry), toward privatisation in the Criminal
Justice Act 1991. The ACF appears unable to account for the fact that momentum for
privatisation developed after 1987 rather than 1984. There were no significant exogenous
shocks to the prisons subsystem between these years. But there was a greater enthusiasm
for privatisation due to a growing crisis within the prison system, with increasing
overcrowding and strained industrial relations between the Government and the Prison
Officers Association. The system-wide "critical election" of 1979 preceded the entire
debate, with the Government first considering and emphatically rejecting privatisation
following the first report on the subject by the ASI in 1984.
The Future of the New Right Think Tanks
Following the resignation of Mrs Thatcher as Prime Minister, and "the retreat from full-
blooded `Thatcherism' skilfully conducted by John Major in the early 1990s" (Cockett,
1994: p.327), it has been argued that the role and importance of the new right think tank
has been in decline. Shortly after the 1992 general election The Economist, reflecting on
the work of the IEA, CPS, and ASI, noted that:
Today, the think tanks are all but silent. The CPS has retreated into itself and
moved to a drabber address. In its glory days it produced a policy pamphlet a
fortnight: none has appeared from its presses since the general election. The IEA
publishes little. The ASI is suffering from a recession in the privatisation business
(07.11.92).
Denham and Garnett believe that "all one can predict with much confidence is that if the
media spreads rumours of the death of the New Right 'think tanks', their long-term
prospects of survival cannot be good" (1996: P.56). 4 However, the death of the new right
think tanks are, perhaps, exaggerated.
In some respects the study of think tanks has the potential to be more interesting under
Blair than it was under Thatcher or Major. It would certainly be unwise to write off the
new right think tanks en bloc at this stage. Some institutes may prosper while others might
decline. For example, it is likely that the CPS will find it difficult to directly influence the
Labour Government given its proximity to senior Conservatives — even its future
276
relationship with the Conservative leadership is in doubt (see chapter 2). Other think tanks
are likely to fare better. The TEA, for example, is unique amongst the new right think tanks
in being the only one to have previously experienced a Conservative defeat in a general
election. Given the IEA's distance from direct political activity, the Labour Government is
unlikely to have much impact (if any) upon the direction of the IEA's work, at least in the
short-term. The ASI responded to Labour's victory by announcing a series of seminars
entitled Achieving Labour's Aims, designed to help put the flesh on the bones of Labour's
policy objectives. However, the ASI's long-term prospects of influencing the Blair
Government may well depend upon its ability to shed its image as a "right-wing
Conservative think tank". Both the ASI and the CPS have publicly expressed their
willingness to work with the new Government. Tessa Keswick maintains that "I can work
with Tony Blair and his colleagues ... And I hope they would come to us for advice" (The
Financial Times 26.04.97). Similarly Madsen Pine of the ASI explained:
We have already taken the decision within the ASI that we intend to serve
government. Our aim is to influence public policy, and if that means the policy of a
Labour government then so be it. This speaks of our self-confidence: that our
agenda will remain of relevance to Labour as to the Conservatives (ibid).
Prior to the election it had been suggested that a defeat for the Conservatives would lead to
a renaissance for the new right think tanks in furnishing the new Oppositiort with i-iew
policies: "Some ultra-right Tories are hoping precisely for this scenario, which they see as
an opportunity to re-cast and update the Thatcherite project" (The Guardian 01.04.95).
Given the size of Labour's majority, it might need more than a few ideas for the
Conservatives to challenge seriously for office in five, or even ten, years time. This was a
lesson learnt from Labour optimists after the IPPR was established in the late 1980s.
According to Ruben:
The hope that the IPPR would increase Labour's electability by providing new
ministers with fresh ideas was soon found to be unrealistic. The 1992 election
defeat showed that fundamental reform of the Labour Party was required, rather
than merely firming up its policy proposals (1996: p.77).
Just as the new right think tanks face-up to a Labour government, so the centre-left think
tanks face challenges. For sonic, a Labour victory has brought its own problems. It was
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predicted before the 1997 election that the IPPR in particular might become a victim of
Labour's electoral success.
IPPR is likely to haemorrhage if Labour triumphs at the polls.
[...] a rival think-tank boss predicts meltdown at IPPR if Labour triumphs at the
polls. "Half of them will be hoping for government jobs if Labour wins — God
knows what will happen to the organisation then (The Guardian 01.04.95).
Soon after the election it was reported that the IPPR had to call an emergency meeting
"after trustees and staff started disappearing to become ministers and policy advisers in
Whitehall" (Sunday Times 18.05.97). However, Labour's victory raises larger questions
over the future of the centre-left think tanks — just what will be their purpose under a
Labour Government?
In opposition the left-wing think tanks never managed to emulate the success of
their free-market rivals. The policies streaming out of Thatcherite think tanks in the
1970s and 1980s were vital to sustaining the Conservatives' long rule. Some of
their ideas were cranky, some dangerous (the poll tax), but many others have
become mainstream and uncontroversial, such as privatisation.
[...] What new Labour wants from its intellectuals, however, is not big ideas but
big messages: words and deeds that will appeal to the electorate and the media.
Where before Labour frontbenchers needed all the practical help they could get,
whole teams of civil servants are now waiting to serve them (ibid).
It is unclear, however, what these big messages will be. The early months of the Blair
Government have seen Labour moving steadily on to the ground previously occupied by
the new right think tanks. Moves to make the Bank of England independent, education
reform (especially speeding up the process of closing poorly performing schools), welfare
to work, and the continuation of the prison privatisation programme have seen the Blair
Government winning plaudits from some of the new right "gurus" of the 1980s.5
Given that the new right think tanks are unlikely to enjoy the direct access to policy-
makers that they did under Conservative governments, it is tempting to assume that their
impact on the Blair Government will be much reduced. This might be correct, although it
does not necessarily mean that the new right think tanks will become an irrelevance. If
Tony Blair is serious about ending the "tribal" politics of the 1980s, and if he is successful
in moving his party even further to the centre-ground, then the new right think tanks might
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find the Labour Government more responsive to their ideas. Moreover, if the oft-predicted
crises in welfare spending materialise in the near future, then the Blair Government might
be in need of ideas sooner rather than later. If the new right think tanks are able to respond
to this by formulating an agenda consistent with their market principles and sensitive to the
needs of New Labour, then they may be more influential than some expect.
Just prior to the 1979 general election, the Prime Minister, James Callaghan, spoke to the
Head of his Policy Unit, Bernard Donoughue, of the impending sea-change that was about
to occur in British politics and of its beneficiary being Margaret Thatcher (Donoughue,
1987: p.191). The subsequent seventeen years of Conservative government changed the
ideological climate of British politics, reflected in Tony Blair's modernisation of the "New"
Labour Party, and its rejection of its old Clause 4. The overwhelming victory of the Labour
party in the 1997 general election perhaps marks a new sea-change, with the advent of the
first post-socialist Labour Government. This will present both challenges and opportunities
for think tanks of all shades of political opinion. How they respond to these will be the
major issue for think tanks in the approaching years.
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NOTES
1 Interview with John Hibbs
2 This does not necessarily contradict the criticisms made of treating think tanks as "agenda-setters" at the
end of chapter 2. These criticisms suggested that to regard the new right think tanks as merely the "agenda-
setters" of a temporally distinct stages approach would be a narrow interpretation of their work. However, it
does not preclude the new right think tanks from occasionally performing this function.
3 This point refers to the case studies addressed in Marsh and Rhodes (1992a).
4 See also The Economist (25.05.92) and The Financial Times (22.09.93)
5 See, for example, "Has Labour Got it Right" by Madsen Pine of the ASI in The Times 31.07.97, and "Think
Tank Running on Empty" in The Guardian on the same day.
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